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ABSTRACT
NICARAGUA’S SURVIVAL: CHOICES IN A NEOLIBERAL WORLD
Stanley G Hash, Jr
Old Dominion University, 2006
Director: Dr Francis Adams

In January 1990 the Nicaraguan electorate chose to abandon the failing Sandinista
Revolution in favor o f the economic neoliberal rubric. However, since 1990 Nicaragua’s
economy has been stagnant. Today it is one o f the four poorest states in Latin America
having been one o f the wealthiest before 1975
The purpose o f this work is to explain Nicaragua’s poor performance since 1990
The hypothesis is that domestic independent variables are central to recovery and are the
underlying causes o f Nicaragua’s failure to fully recover.
The abuses o f the Somozas’ ancien regime before the 1979 revolution are well
documented; less well documented is the continuation o f those practices However, abuses
such as pervasive corruption alone do not explain the failure. This work treats four major
domestic independent variables as the collective determinant: the Roman Catholic Church,
organized labor, the role o f the business community and its instruments, and civil society
with the residual effect from the FSLN period. Each variable has its own impact on
outcomes in Nicaragua, and the failure has defied the predictions o f neoliberal proponents
and the international effort to implement neoliberalism This work validates that domestic
independent variables have a greater effect than external independent variables as
determinants for recovery.
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M ethods o f research include an examination o f available data and literature, and a
review o f events that have affected internal variables. Field research in Nicaragua was
conducted to further investigate the dynamics o f the domestic independent variables
Follow-up to field study was accomplished through further research and electronic contact
with primary sources
The contribution to scholarship is the treatment o f the internal variables as primary
determinants for recovery. Highly indebted poor countries” (HIPC) states are a first-order
project o f powerful states that recognize that a renewed strategy must be developed. This
work provides insight and direction toward that end.
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ABBREVIATIONS, GLOSSARY, ACRONYMS AND TERMS

Adjustment

Refers to the period after the defeat o f FSLN presidential candidate
Daniel Ortega in 1990 This term is used exclusively by FSLN
supporters

Ajuste

(Spanish) See adjustment.

AMNLAE

Asociacion de Mujeres Nicaragiienses Luisa Amada Espinosa.
Successor organization to AMPRONAC after the FSLN victory

AMPRONAC

Asociacion de Mujeres ante la Problematica Nacional (Association
o f Women Against the National Problem) Replaced by AMNLAE

APRE

Alianza Para La Republica (Alliance for the Republic), political
party formed by President Bolanos after breaking with the PLC

ATC

Asociacion de Trabajadores Campensinos (Association o f
Agricultural Workers)

BND

National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desarollo)

BOS

Opposition Block o f the South (Bloque de Oposicion del Sur) led
by Eden Pastora

CACM

Central American Common Market

CAFTA

Central American Free Trade Association (also known in its later
iteration as the Dominican Republic and Central American Free
Trade Association: DR-CAFTA) Ratified by the U S. Senate in
June 2005 and passed by the U.S. House o f Representatives on 28
July 2005

CDS

Sandinista Defense Committee (Comite de Defensa Sandinista) (On
the model o f the Cuban Revolution’s Committees for the Defense
o f the Revolution - CDRs)

CEB

Christian Base Communities (Comunidades Eclesiaticas de Base)

CELAM

General Conference o f Latin American Bishops (series)
First:
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Second:
Medellin, Colombia
Third:
Puebla, Mexico
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XI

CIN

Chamber o f Nicaraguan Industries (Camara de Industrias de
Nicaragua)

CEPAL

Comision Economica para America Latina (See ECLAC)

CNMN

National Teachers' Confederation o f Nicaragua (Confederacion
Nacional de M aestros Nicaraguenses)

Contra

Counter-revolutionary (contrarevolucionario) as individual,
organization or movement

CDCC

Coordinadora Democratic Coordinating Committee, a CIA-funded
temporary political coalition o f conservatives who were closely
associated with the COSEP in the 1984 presidential election. Its
purpose was to spoil the legitimacy o f the election in which Daniel
Ortega was expected to win

Coordinadora
Civil (CC)

A coalition o f approximately 50 civil organizations that were
formed after Hurricane Mitch in 1998 to “support, link and
harmonize
member organizations to . enhance common
efforts for the construction o f citizenship aimed at achieving
human and sustainable development
.” Available [Online]:
http://www ccer org.ni [15 October 2005]

COSEP

Superior Council o f Private Enterprises (National Chamber o f
Commerce equiv ) (Comision Superior de Empresas Privadas)

COSIP

Former name o f COSEP (above) before 1975

CPT

Permanent Congress o f W orkers (Congreso Permanente de
Trabajadores)

CTN

Confederation o f Nicaraguan Workers (Confederacion de
Trabajadores Nicaraguenses)

CST

Sandinista W orkers’ Federation (Central Sandinista de
Trabajadores)

CUS

Confederation for Trade Unions Unity (Confederacion Unida de
Sindicatos)

Dedazo

(Spanish) Latin American slang for naming or “fingering” a
successor candidate.

DN

National Directorate (o f the FSLN) (Directorio Nacional)
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DR-CAFTA

See CAFTA; the Dominican Republic joined the regime later in the
process and has since been included in the acronym. DR-CAFTA
was ratified by the U S. Senate in June 2005 and passed by the U.S.
House o f Representatives on 28 July 2005

ECLAC

Economic Commission o f Latin America and the Caribbean (a
United Nations sub-organization headquartered in Santiago, Chile;
also known by its Spanish acronym CEPAL (Comision Economica
para America Latina y El Caribe.

El Triunfo

(Spanish) The Triumph, a term still used to define the moment o f
Sandinista victorious arrival in Managua on 19 July 1979 and a
general reference to the FSLN victory over Somoza forces

EPS

Popular Sandinista Army (Ejercito Popular Sandinista)

ESF

Economic Support Fund, a sub-agency o f the United States Agency
for International Development.

ESAF

Estragia Antipobreza Facilidad (ESAF), see PRGF

FPN

National Patriotic Front (Frente Patriotica Nacional)

FACS

Augustino C Sandino Foundation (Fundacion Augustino C
Sandino)

FECA1CA

Federation o f Chambers and Associations o f Central American
Industries (Federation de Camaras y Asociaciones Industrias
Centroamericanas)

FAO

Broad Opposition Front (Frente Amplio Oposicion) (See UNO)

FNT

National W orkers’ Front (Frente Nacional de Trabajadores)

FPN

National Patriotic Front (Frente Patriotica Nacional)

FSLN

National Sandinista Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de
Liberation Nacional)

FTAA

Free Trade Area o f the Americas Agreement initiated by the
Clinton administration

FO

W orkers’ Front (Frente Obrero)
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G-8

Group o f Eight (most highly industrialized and wealthy states) that
controls most international economic instruments o f power Known
as the G-5 and G-7 in earlier iterations Current membership is the
United States, Canada, Russia, Great Britain, Japan, Germany, Italy
and France

GN

National Guard (Guardia Nacional)

HIPC

Highly Indebted Poor Country(ies)

IMF

International Monetary Fund

IRBD

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (one o f
five major World Bank operating entities) whose mission is to
provide long-term funding and assistance for major infrastructure
projects for applying states.

IDA

The International Development Association (one o f five major
operating World Bank operating entities) whose mission is
providing credits and grants to the 81 w orld’s poorest states

IADB (IDB)

Inter-American Development Bank

Los Doce

(Spanish) Group o f Twelve (political and business leaders who
supported moderation)

MDN

Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democratico
Nicaraguense)

MPU

United Peoples’ Movement (Movimiento del Pueblo Unido)

NAFTA

North American Free Trade Agreement

OAS

Organization o f American States

Obrerista

(Spanish) Labor movement that was coopted by Somoza Garcia
that, on the surface, demonstrated supported o f “worker pride and
empowerment” but was, in fact, a method o f controlling labor and
labor unions

ODA

Official development assistance

OECD

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
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XIV

Paris Club

Thirty-two (nineteen permanent) creditor states that control major
instruments o f economic power.

PCLT

Popular Church o f Liberation Theology.

PCN

Communist Party o f Nicaragua (Partido Comunista Nicaraguense)

PDCN

Democratic Party o f National Confidence (Partido Democratico de
Confianza Nacional)

PL

Liberal Party (Partido Liberal)

PLC

Liberal Constitutionalist Party (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista)

PMLN

Nicaraguan Marxist/Leninist Party (Partido Marxista/Leninista de
Nicaragua

PPSC

Popular Social Christian Party (Partido Popular Social Cristiano

PRGF

Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (a component o f the HIPC
program that requires subject states to submit a plan for approval
before debt relief is started)

PRT

W orkers’ Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario de
Trabajadores)

PSN

Nicaragua Socialist Party

PSCN

Nicaraguan Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano
Nicaraguense)

RAAN

Spanish acronym for National Autonomous Region North that was
formerly known as North Zelaya Region before its renaming by the
FSLN government This is Nicaragua’s northeastern-most state
bordered on its long eastern coast by the Caribbean Sea and the
north by Honduras

RAAS

Spanish acronym for the National Autonomous Region South that
was formerly known as South Zelaya Province before its renaming
by the FSLN government. This is Nicaragua’s southeastern-most
state bordered on the east by the Caribbean Sea and the south by
Costa Rica.
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XV

Somoza

Anastasio Somoza Garcia: b. 1896, d. 1956
Nickname: Tacho
President or defacto power: 1936-1956
Luis Somoza Debayle, b 1922; d 1967
Nickname Luis
President: 1957-1963
Anastasio Somoza Debayle, b. 1926; d. 1980
Nickname: Tachito; Tacho on death o f father
President or defacto power: 1963-1979

Third Way

Faction that supported ideological pluralism under leadership o f the
Ortegas The Third Way was the successful effort to expand the
revolution’s appeal to disaffected middle class and others who
opposed Somoza regardless o f political affiliation. The joining o f
the middle/business classes with the FSLN was key to the formation
o f the Third Way and ultimate success o f the FSLN revolution.

Triumfo

Term used by FSLN members and its supporters for the successful
overthrow o f Anastasio Somoza Debayle in July 1979, and the
assumption o f power by the FSLN Directorate. Usually heard as el
triumfo (the triumph)

Triumph

See triumfo

UCA

Central America University (Universidad Centroamericana) in
Managua

UC

Catholic University (Universidad Catolica)

UNAG

National Union o f Farmers and Cattlemen (Union de Agricultores y
Ganaderos

UN AN

National Autonomous University o f Nicaragua (Universidad
Nacional Autonoma de Nicaragua)

UNO

National Opposition Front (Frente Nacional Opositora) a loose
coalition o f political parties formed in 1982 from the CDN
(Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Group) that opposed FSLN
programs and 13 others on whose ticket Chamorro won in 1990
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This work presents an explanation for Nicaragua’s failure to recover economically
since 1990 after its eleven-year experiment with a mixed-model economy under the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) The explanation is defined not in the
discipline o f an economist, but in a comprehensive study o f the behavior o f the important
domestic independent variables affected by political behavior, historical experience and
influences o f the long-term culture o f the Republic
The usual but least explanatory approach, is a review o f available literature and upto-date data o f the efforts o f powerful states to assist Nicaragua Such an approach fails to
fully consider the role o f internal dynamics that are at least as important to the explanation
o f the failure and long-term solution toward a legitimate and full recovery.
During the G8 summit meeting held in Gleneagles, Scotland 6 to 8 July 2005,
leaders o f the w orld’s most powerful states acknowledged that their efforts to date had
failed to stimulate many HIPC states’ economies, and that the failure would have a
deleterious effect on the long-term neoliberal agenda. At the conclusion o f the conference,
the leaders chose to rededicate and increase efforts to help the most destitutestates
recover While the conference was focused on the poorest African states, the poorest o f

This dissertation follows the format requirements o f The Chicago Manual o f Style,
15th Edition. Unless otherwise noted, all Spanish-language translations are my own.
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Latin American states were included in the discussion.1 It is notable that the neoliberal
agenda was assumed as the correct solution for recovery o f those states
In the post-Cold War environment there is no political agenda for the G8 states;
rather, the world’s most powerful states put economic health at the top o f their collective
agenda That agenda, under the neoliberal economic rubric, includes full participation by
all states in the world system. Hence, the G8 states’ collective programs are focused on
open markets and unimpeded trade to fully implement a totally restriction-free world
economic system It is o f note, however, that G8 states interests vary according to region
Proximity and historic trade relationships including colonial history have a positive
correlation with the percentage o f foreign aid budget devoted to any particular region. An
example o f such correlation is that in the 2000-2001 period the European Union’s
contribution to overall official development assistance for Latin America was twenty-four
percent while during the same period the European ODA budget contributed sixty-one
percent o f the overall contribution to Africa 2
The failure o f the programs put in place through such instruments as the World
Bank, the IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank in the Western Hemisphere
defies expectations and betrays the most careful planning o f those institutions. The G8

•Most o f the failed states that were the major agenda topic for the G8 summit are
in Africa, however, there are four in Latin America o f which the Republic o f Nicaragua is
one To “qualify” for such attention is a reflection o f extreme economic disparity and a
failing economy. The formula for determining which states fall into the most needy list is
made by the G8 instruments o f economic power led by the World Bank and the IMF. The
Paris Club member states generally follow the guidlines o f the G8.
2Camegie Endowment for International Peace, “The EU and International
Development,” Foreign Policy (Washington, D C : Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, September/October 2005), 10.
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states, including Russia, would far prefer that all states fully participate in the neoliberal
world economic system that has developed since the close o f the Cold War
In July 2005, despite the absence o f clear explanations and dissent from some
quarters, the consensus was that the w orld’s most powerful states had no choice but to
continue efforts to rescue the most destitute states 3 Unspoken but well understood in the
minds o f the G8 leaders was that desperate people living in desperate times would take
desperate steps to gain social and economic equity. The rededicated effort, however, deals
only with the external variables over which the G8 has positive co n tro l4
The Gleneagles conference rededicated efforts to support the United Nations
Millennium Development Goals postponing the completion date to 2015 5 Among the
eight-point plan are commitments toward further debt forgiveness, increased aid,
eradication o f extreme poverty, eradication o f HIV and polio and the reduction o f
domestic subside the prejudice HIPC export earnings Also included was a statement that
HIPC state leaders would be expected to formulate their own development planning and
be held accountable to the people However, no implementing plans were articulated in the
final press release
’United Kingdom Government G8 Gleneagles 2005 site. Available [Online]
http://www.g8.gov.uk/servlet /Front9pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate /ShowPage&c
=Page&cid= 1078995902703 [26 February 2006],
4This is not to say that the G8 programs administered through the World Bank, the
IMF and the IADB do not demand internal reform and condition full implementation o f
recovery programs, but that such reform is difficult to measure and easy to obfuscate The
history o f p o st-1990 reform demanded by the international community for Nicaragua,
especially during the Aleman period, is confusing at best However, it is also obvious that
the international community has adopted the habit o f overlooking failures to comply for
the greater interests o f advancing the neoliberal agenda. See later discussion
5Ibid While the language o f the final documents focuses on African HIPC states,
the commitment recognized the need for all HIPC states
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Unquestionably, the determination o f the G8 has both altruism and economic
pragmatism at its core While there was recognition that more must be done, there was no
recognition that domestic independent variables must be addressed except in last item
cited above.6
This work takes an alternative approach by exploring a combination o f the most
relevant domestic independent variables to explain the failure while holding constant the
collective external independent variable: the support o f the wealthy states While there is
no precise method o f selecting which domestic independent variables are the most relevant
to this study, at least four major variables are self-evident However, an ordering o f those
is more difficult
The selected domestic independent variables for this work, in order o f relevancy
apparent to this author greatest to least are (1) the Roman Catholic Church, (2) organized
labor, (3) the business community and (4) the behavior o f civil society in general that is
influenced by the residual effects o f the FSLN revolution. The collective behavior o f these
variables is seen as an impediment to the full implementation o f the neoliberal program.
While keeping that external collective variable constant, three domestic
independent variables are also kept constant. They are (1) pervasive graft and corruption,
(2) the Spanish cultural heritage and (3) the political psyche o f the Nicaraguan people
conditioned over time by the actions o f the United States and the abuses o f Nicaragua’s
national leaders In short, the four operative variables outlined above (the independent

6It should not be overlooked that the G8 instruments o f economic power demand
internal reforms and provide funding for such in their staged programs. Ultimately,
accountability standards and goals are not enforceable, and leaders o f HIPC states seldom
are held to account by their electorates. See later discussion o f long-term political
conditioning and pervasive corruption.
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internal variables) treated in this work are seen, in combination, as the most important to
the long-term successful outcome o f Nicaragua's full recovery
The economic failure o f Nicaragua in the post-revolutionary period since 1990 is a
conundrum when one considers the fact that before the FSLN 1979 victory Nicaragua was
one o f the most prosperous and advanced states in Central America While its prosperity
was relative only to its most immediate neighbors, the people as a whole enjoyed higher
incomes and slightly better conditions than those in neighboring states 7
The real result o f the failure to recover after 1990 is reflected in the fact that
Nicaragua is now one o f the four poorest states in the Western Hemisphere with very high
levels o f poverty, poor social services and substandard living conditions for most o f its
people
The most elusive internal independent variable, the national political psyche (held
constant), is never-the-less very important to understand the frustrations o f Latin
Americans in their inability to determine their own destiny. This sentiment often can be
seen in political poetry which is the most powerful expression o f the frustrations that the
people have with their long-term relationship with the United States’ dominance in the
hemisphere. Pablo N eruda’s8 powerful poem, “The United Fruit Company,” written more

7Since 1948, Costa Rica to the south has had a consistent record o f relative
prosperity but its natural resources are modest when compared to those o f Nicaragua
8Pablo Neruda, bom Neftali Ricardo Reyes in 1904, the well-known 20th Century
Chilean poet, was a critical observer o f events, and much o f his poetry is political
commentary on the plight o f the oppressed. Beginning in 1927, in the tradition o f posting
respected artists to diplomatic posts, Neruda was a life-long diplomat He joined the
Chilean communist party in 1943, and as a result was later expelled from Chile. He later
served as the Chilean Ambassador to Paris during the Allende regime. He is well known
for his large body o f work including “Las Alturas de Machu Pichu” (“The Heights o f
Machu Pichu”)-a poem in which he laments the plight o f the Inca civilization. He
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than a half a century ago still resonates in the hearts o f Latin Americans, and reflects the
desperation o f Nicaragua and other Latin American states as they struggle to fit into the
post-Cold War neoliberal model. “The United Fruit Company” reflects the frustration and
skepticism in the hearts o f Nicaraguans, and casts doubt as to whether the Republic will
ever be free to find its own destiny whether they are caused by its own self perceptions or
the continued external variables imposed on it by the international community The first
half o f that equation is embodied in the behavior o f the internal domestic variables that can
be modified by Nicaraguans themselves; the second half, held constant, are those that
cannot be easily changed.
Neruda viewed American corporations as both the source o f corruption and the
ultimate exploiters o f the people. (In the context o f the time, it is more difficult to
understand his observations because Argentina and Chile were both relatively prosperous )
Today that view is held by many in Latin America and others who oppose the
“globalization”9 o f the w orld’s economies. In the minds o f the people o f south states, the
north is complicit in the perpetuation o f exploitation o f the poor states, they are likewise
very critical o f their own leaders as having bought into the neoliberal solution. Those
political leaders who follow the north states’ lead in exploitation are both held to account

criticized Chilean regimes without hesitation. His last posting was to Paris as Chile’s
ambassador in 1971 where he served until 1973. He died in Chile just weeks after
President Salvador Allende’s murder by the General Augusto Pinochet’s henchman in a
coup d’etat in August 1972.
9This term is generally defined by its proponents as a totally restriction-free market
economy on a world scale; an economy without any barriers to business and industry
seeking the most efficient and therefore cheapest sources o f resources including labor no
matter the form. Opponents o f globalization see it as a step backward and a tool o f
wealthy states to exploit weaker states. See discussion o f neoliberalism in Chapter II
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for promises made under the banner o f neoliberalism,10 and subject to removal if the
promises o f neoliberalism do not come to fruition."
According to the United Nations’ Economic Commission on Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC-CEPAL), Nicaragua made very little or negligible progress in
poverty reduction in the 1990s 12 It was forecast that at the rate o f progress it would take
fifty years to halve the level o f extreme poverty.13

The problems o f extreme disparity and poverty in states such as Nicaragua are
complex and the causes are many. The everyday reality o f Nicaragua cannot be escaped.

l0With reference to Marxism and M arx’ predictions that capitalism would
eventually run its course, even the people o f those Latin American states that have had
large communist and socialist political parties would have lost confidence, albeit not lost
their frustrations with the increasing economic disparity throughout Latin America.
Ironically, the very disparity that is extant today in Latin America can be seen as fodder
for revolution in the Marxist model, but the failure o f M arxism-even in the diluted form o f
the FSLN’s mixed model-certainly must add to the potential for future revolutions,
especially when the neoliberal economic rubric fails to produce results.
"A n example o f the institutionalized structure o f the north states’ instruments o f
power well known to south states are contained in the charters o f the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. In both institutions, there is no “one state/one vote” system
but a system in which voting power is proportional to the funding contribution o f each
member state. Member states’ contributions are allocated based on formulae that measure
relative economic strength. The system can be seen as permanently prejudicing the poorer
states that, in effect, have a dependency relationship on the most economically powerful
states. Further, only states that are members o f the IMF may be members o f the World
Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the primary instrument
for debt relief.
12 Ricardo Paes de Barros, et al., Meeting the Millennium Poverty Reduction
Targets in Latin America and the Caribbean. (Santiago, Chile: Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean - ECLAC/CEPAL, December 2002), 18.
"Ibid., 27.
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In 2003 Nicaragua’s GNI per capita was $750 14 (by far the lowest in Latin America with
Honduras as a distant second in Central America at $960 15 By comparison, the average
GNI per capita for all o f Latin America and the Caribbean was $3,260.16
The passion o f N eruda’s poem is more valid today than in years past because
conditions are relatively worse, and despite the upheavals caused by revolutions in most o f
the Latin American states, including Nicaragua, progress has not been realized.17 The
extremely poor condition o f the people in terms o f social indicators belies the efforts o f a
wide mix o f would-be benefactors Aside from the unified efforts o f the G8, these include
non-governmental organizations such as Doctors without Borders, the direct bilateral aid
o f many Western governments including such unlikely diverse states as Japan and
Denmark 18

14World Bank, Millennium Development Goals Nicaragua. Available [Online]:
http://devdata.worldbank.org/idg/IDGProfile.asp?CCODE=NIC &CNAME= Nicaragua
&SelectedCountry=NIC [8 April 2006], Latest data available from this source
15Ibid. Data and Statistics, Latin America and the Caribbean. Available [Online]:
http://web.worldbank.org/W BSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/0„menuPK:25
8575~pagePK:146732~piPK:146813~theSitePK:258554,00.html [8 April 2006], Latest
data available from this source.
16Ibid., Millennium Development Goals Honduras. Available [Online]:
http://devdata.worldbank.org/idg/IDGProfile.asp?CCODE=HND&CNAME=Honduras&
SelectedCountry=HND [8 April 2006], Latest data available from this source.
17Most particularly in Nicaragua, the frustrations o f the deepest sort appear in
poetry rather than in other written forms. There is a saying in Nicaragua that all
Nicaraguans are poets at birth unless they prove themselves otherwise. Ruben Dario is the
most famous o f all Nicaraguan poets having played a key role in the modernist movement
o f the early 20* Century. His fame had a profound effect on Nicaraguan political poetry
which was particularly abundant during the time o f the Sandinista-led revolution in the
mid-1970s. Two o f the o f the original Sandinista junta that took power in July 1979 were
well-known poets, as well as the wife o f former Sandinista president, Daniel Ortega.
,8Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The Development Challenge.” Foreign Affairs , Volume 84,
Number 2 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, March/April 2005), 78-90. The mix

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9

In a speech given by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan on 21 March
2005 before the United Nations General Assembly, as one o f a number o f proposed
reforms, he recommended that all wealthy states be assigned a fixed percentage seven
tenths o f their gross domestic product to help develop the w orld’s poorest states rather
than depend on a system o f voluntary contributions.19 The realities include the fact that by
late 2004, Nicaragua had failed to meet the United Nations-established goals20 o f extreme
poverty reduction, and had not met its 2000 goal before.This pattern has remained
constant since the first implementation o f the ESAF/PRGF (Estragia Antipobreza
Facilidad/Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility). While some improvement has been
seen in recent years, the ultimate goal seems even more elusive. 21
o f international aid is complex. It includes bilateral aid, aid through international and
regional IGOs, aid delivered by NGOs that is contributed by states and private
institutions/donors. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), in 2004 the United States’ contribution alone amounted to $16.3
billion o f which $1.7 billion was turned over to multilateral IGOs such as the World Bank
for distribution and the balance o f $14.6 billion was in bilateral aid. The total contribution
amounted to approximately .07 percent o f the national budget. While the total
contribution is highest in the world, the relative contribution is low; Norway has the
highest rate at .92 percent o f its national budget.
19Kofi Annan, “ In Larger Freedom” Executive Summary, 21 March 2004.
Available [Online]:http://www.un.org/largerffeedom/executivesummary.pdf [8 December
2005],
20In September 2000 the United Nations released its ambitious Millennium
Development Goals project designed to reduce world-wide poverty by half by 2015
through a series o f programs that include the participation o f G8 instruments o f economic
power. Most particularly, The World Bank Group (heretofore referred to as the World
Bank) and the IMF were to be a critical part o f the overall scheme to alleviate poverty
through programs o f debt reduction and forgiveness; long-term, low-cost loans and
grants. In March 2002, in furtherance o f the project, the United States with other
international partners adopted the Monterrey Consensus that focused on the development
o f the private sector to double the size o f the economies o f the poorest states in the world.
21United Nations, Social Panorama o f Latin America, 2004 (Santiago, Chile:
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean - ECLAC, November 2004).
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Social indicators represent the final and ultimate picture o f the human condition,
and while affected by politics and otherwise measured in economic terms, the human
condition is what finally matters most. The data from the World Bank for Nicaragua,
Costa Rica and Honduras reveal great variation and disparity.
Costa Rica is the only state among the three that has experienced, since 1948, a
legitimate long-term political democracy. The people o f Costa Rica have a sense o f social
responsibility that is unique in Latin America, and that sense is reflected in political
stability and highly developed social security and state-run medical institutions
Honduras, as the worst-case example, historically has been under the control o f
despotic governments that have shown little sense o f social responsibility to the people.
While it is, at least, a nominal democracy there is no clear evidence that the military will
not intervene at will in the political process.
The data from the table below along are very revealing. The table provides a
snapshot o f Nicaragua’s position in terms o f gross national income per capita compared
with its immediate neighbors. The is most meaningful because it has a direct bearing on its
stability and long-term chances for improvement, and in the long view reflect a very real
change in relative wealth.

Table 1: Comparative Social Indicators

Life Expectancy
at birth

Under-five years
years o f age
mortality/1,000

Child Malnutrition
malnutrition
by percentage

GNI per capita
in United
States Dollars
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Nicaragua

69

Honduras

66

41

17

Costa Rica

79

10

5

38

740

10

970
4,300

Source: World Bank Group, Regional Fact Sheet from World Development Indicators
2005, Latin American and the Caribbean, Facts and Figures from World Development
Indicators, 2005 (Washington, D C.: World Bank Group, 2005). Available [Online] http:
//w w w .worldbank.org/data/quickreference/quickref.html [18 May 2005] While source is
dated 18 May 2005, it reports only the latest (2003) information available

The overall historical relationship between Latin America and the United States
has been positive. From the writings o f Simon Bolivar and his admiration for the early
developing United States democracy,22 to Nicaraguan troop contributions to the Allied
Forces during World War II, to (Somoza regime) Nicaraguan support in the Bay o f Pigs

22While in political exile in Jamaica in 1815, Simon Bolivar authored a well-known
treatise on republicanism known as “Letter from Jamaica.” He was an admirer o f the new
United States republic and a champion o f Pan Americanism. (Today, Venezuela is
officially known as the Bolivarian Republic o f Venezuela to honor its national hero.)
Bolivar’s admiration and support o f the United States and its political system as well as his
anti-European attitude no doubt emboldened President Monroe to author what is known
today as the M onroe Doctrine which was presented as a part o f the state o f the union
address in 1823. Today, it is seen in the negative as the first United States’ policy
statement o f deliberate domination and hegemonic behavior in the Western Hemisphere.
(See Appendix III for selected text.)
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invasion o f Cuba, to current-day support for the United States in the War on Terrorism,
Nicaragua, as with most o f Latin America, views its future with the United States 23
Even a cynic would see the Kennedy administration’s Alliance for Progress
developed during the height o f the Cold War as a positive. The Alliance for Progress’
central goal was to build and rebuild infrastructure in Latin America. If only driven by a
Cold W ar motive and extension o f the Monroe Doctrine to keep foreign powers out o f the
Western Hemisphere, the United State’s contribution to development has been
considerable.
Some see this relationship as harmful to Latin America— a sort o f permanent
corrupting patron to the north, and the long-term cause o f the well-established pattern o f
disparity and unjust economic relationships in Latin America.24

23This is notwithstanding the efforts o f Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to alter
the historical relationship. Among his plans to alter the relationship was an announcement
in mid-May 2005 to establish and operate a Southern Hemisphere radio network to
promote Latin American solidarity and free itself o f its historical relationship with the
United States. Chavez’ pro-Castro, anti-U.S. attitudes are worrisome at best, especially in
the post-Cold War environment. His style is that o f authoritarian populism (see later
discussion) with a socialist theme.
24The economic dependency relationship known as neocolonialism in Marxist
rhetoric can also be seen as a sort o f welfare relationship with the United States dispensing
favors as it sees fit. This is the grist for Hugo Chavez’ argument and other anti-U.S.
elements in Latin America that Latin America should strike its own independent course. In
the post-Cold War context, however, all o f Latin America has and will be subjected to
competing extra-hemispheric economic forces. This is manifested not only in Latin
America as a consumer market but also as a source o f lost-cost labor and manufacturing.
Nicaragua’s establishment o f “free enterprise zones” that are exempt from taxation and
import/export duties in order to stimulate its economy is seen as by anti-globalization
proponents as little more than an officially approved maquiladora (sweat shop) system in
the style o f Mexican border towns.
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With regard to the elusive national political psyche, the origins o f Nicaragua as a
state are relevant because it was during the pre-colonial and colonial period that
dependency relationships developed. Dependency relationships began with the treatment
o f the indigenous peoples by the Spanish conquistadores and by the British o f the Miskito
population along the eastern Caribbean coast, and extend to today’s more subtle
relationship in the neoliberal world.
While the United States did not have ambitions as a colonial master having itself
been a colony o f the British, it did behave as one under President M onroe’s early 19th
Century notion that the all o f the Western Hemisphere should be free o f European colonial
powers. The United States, with military teeth, either independently or in concert with
Great Britain carried out its role as hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, and still today is
seen in the same role but with more effective economic instruments o f power.
The issue that most rankles Latin Americans is that the region has never been free
o f domination whether it be the Spanish, British or “los yanquis.” W hether legitimate or
not, such attitudes toward the United States foster resentment that leads to
experimentation and revolution. In the case o f Nicaragua, such resentment has a direct
effect on how or whether it will adopt neoliberal economic solutions to find a path toward
prosperity,25 and find a path to alleviate the human suffering o f its people. A corollary is
whether the Nicaraguan electorate will have the patience to allow neoliberal polity to play
out to full development.

25This presumes that neoliberalism will produce positive outcomes; however, this
author takes no position on the assertion.
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Globalization (or economic neoliberal policy as its means) o f the w orld’s
economies is a contentious issue, especially with regard to the human condition
Nicaragua presents an interesting case because within a period o f fewer than thirty years it
has evolved in stages from a dependency/import substitution, nominal democracy model
under a despotic family dictatorship that can be described as a cleptocracy,26 to a Marxistinspired revolutionary junta mixed-model economy that sought to improve the plight o f
the common man, to a post-Cold War neoliberal oriented government that is focused on
economic recovery and prosperity. Few states in history have experienced such changes
over such a short period o f time; those abrupt changes or the process o f change can be
seen as a cause in itself for the poor condition o f Nicaragua today.27 Nicaragua has had
only brief experience with the neoliberal rubric, and has not reached any level o f self
competence or confidence in formulating policy.
A term that has been applied to the behavior o f the Somoza dynasty and to that o f
FSLN leadership that followed is “crony capitalism.”28 Outside o f any altruistic motives,
such practices assume absolute political control o f a state by a closely connected group o f

26While this short-hand moniker may be accurate, in fact the Somoza dynasty may
also be described as a nominal democratic system with underlying totalitarian, almost
fascist, characteristics much like many other “caudillo” systems o f the period. Caudillismo
is characterized by totalitarian regimes with strong military either in office or immediately
behind the heads o f states. A modern-day moniker may be something like authoritarian
populism along the lines first seen with Juan Peron in Argentina beginning in the late
1930s now seen repeated in style with Hugo Chavez o f Venezuela.
27Those changes are detailed in this work; however, the focus o f this study in on
the post-Sandinista period beginning in 1990 and the neoliberal adherence o f the
Chamorro, Aleman and Bolanos governments since that time. (Chapter IV.)
28Stephen Haber, “Introduction: The Political Economy o f Crony Capitalism,”

Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America - Theory and Evidence
(Stanford, California: Hoover Institutional Press, 2002), xii.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15

politicians who design policy for their own economic benefit operating in a system o f
pervasive corruption.29 Such systems usually include passive acceptance by the general
population o f that model as normal .30 This was the model during the entire Somoza
dynasty The same practices existed in the Marxist-inspired economic models such as seen
during the FSLN period in Nicaragua from 1979 to 1990.31
In a 2001 study by Anne O. Krueger, Director o f Stanford’s Center for Research
on Economic Development and Reform, and the first deputy managing director o f the
International Monetary Fund, she demonstrated that there is little difference in outcomes
whether a state’s economy is controlled by a state-owned enterprise system (such as the
Marxist, mixed model o f the FSLN) or the crony-operated establishments as with the
Somozas.32 Hence, it could be argued that the FSLN and pre-FSLN systems meant few

29Joseph T Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein and M orton H. Halperin. “Why
Democracies Excel.” Foreign Affairs, Volume 83, Number 5 (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, September/October, 2004), 65.

30Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2004. (Berlin:
Transparency International Secretariat, 20 October 2004). In its 2004 report,
Transparency International reported Nicaragua in its corruption perceptions index in the
97th o f 145 groupings o f states along with Algeria, Macedonia, Lebanon, and Serbia and
Montenegro. Costa Rica was in the 41st grouping and Honduras was in 114th.
31Crony capitalism while most obviously identified with systems such as existed
under the Somoza dynasty, have other characteristics including manipulation o f the state
resources for personal gain, corruption and graft. On losing the 1990 election, many in the
FSLN leadership were seen as providing themselves with “golden parachutes” in the form
o f ownership or absolute control o f established businesses and light industry that had been
nationalized during the FSLN period.
32Anne O. Krueger, “Why Crony Capitalism is Bad for Economic Growth,” Crony
Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America (Stanford, California: Hoover
Institutional Press, 2002), 1-23. A strong case can be made that Anastasio Somoza
Debayle “broke the code” o f crony capitalism in the last few years o f his rule, and lost the
support o f the monied classes and professionals who had previously at least acquiesced to
the system.
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meaningful differences to the general population. Thus, the general electorate in Nicaragua
has become cynical and enured to ever-new promises o f salvation including neoliberalism
The alternative adopted by the post-revolution governments in Nicaragua is that a
transparent, neoliberal model will be more productive and, in the long run, reduce
economic disparity. That argument assumes that a positive response is more driven by the
internal, domestic independent variables than by the external independent variables o f the
G8 instruments o f power.33 It is also obvious, however, that Nicaraguan leaders
themselves having been so conditioned to the power and influence o f U S.-dom inated
policy that they may have unconsciously bought into the promises o f neoliberalism without
consideration o f the behavior o f the critical internal variables.
In January 2004, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund announced
two very significant milestones to alleviate the Republic o f Nicaragua’s desperate
economic situation and reduce poverty. The first o f the two was a World Bank $70 million
zero-interest balance o f payments credit (loan) designed to stabilize the economy and
enable the implementation o f Nicaragua’s poverty reduction program, and institute fiscal
reforms. The other milestone was the International Development Association’s34 and the
IMF’s $4.5 billion support for foreign debt service relief designed to promote foreign
direct investment, stimulate the economy and alleviate poverty

33See Chapter II o f this work for expanded discussion.
34A World Bank Group instrument/sub-organization. The Group consists o f five
entities the most important o f which for this work is the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Originally, the IBRD was designed to carry out
the mandates o f the 1944 Bretton W oods Agreement to facilitate the post-W orld W ar II
reconstruction o f Europe.
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Recent assistance is also seen in bilateral agreements. In July 2004, Russia
announced that it was forgiving the $344 million balance o f the $3 .4 billion, owed to the
former Soviet Union by Nicaragua. As a member o f the Paris Club,35 Russia had
previously agreed to a ninety percent reduction o f the original $3 .4 billion, and a five-year
postponement o f the balance under the Paris Club’s “wide initiative” to help Nicaragua.
Later, the Paris Club members agreed to write off Nicaragua’s entire debt, and Russia
acted in accordance with the plan in forgiving the $344 million balance. An official o f the
Russian Finance Ministry proudly announced, “Nicaragua’s debt (to Russia) does not exist
any more.”36 This foreign debt that accrued during the Cold War after the 1979 FSLN
victory represented a potential impediment to Nicaragua’s eventual recovery, but more
important is that Russia’s forgiveness o f the debt signaled a determination by even the

35The Paris Club, so-called because Paris was the site o f the first unofficial meeting
o f creditor states with Argentine officials in 1956 to avert an economic crisis, consists
today o f nineteen permanent member states and thirteen ad hoc states. Membership
consists o f all G8 states (United States, Great Britain, France, Canada, Italy, Japan and
Germany with the Federation Russia as the most recent but weakest addition.) The central
purpose o f the Paris Club is to restructure foreign debt and to settle any bi-lateral disputes
that might arise among its member states. In effect, the Paris Club controls the primary
tools o f international economic power such as the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, the World Trade Organization and the Inter-American Development B ank-the first
three having evolved from the Bretton Woods Agreement. The WTO is new incarnation
o f the Bretton W oods Agreement’s General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT);
the updated role took place during the GATT conference known as the Uruguay Rounds
held in Montevideo. The Paris Club states that took part in the 1999 meeting in Cologne,
Germany when 90 percent o f Nicaragua’s foreign debt was eliminated were Australia,
Austria, France, Germany, Italy, France, Japan, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation,
Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.
36“Russia Writes off Nicaragua’s Debt o f $344 Million ( P o c c h h cnncajia
H n ica p a ry a ao jir b 344 MHJiJiHOHa a o ju ia p o )” (Moscow. Russian News Agency, 26 July

2004) Available [Online]:>http://www.rosfin. ru/news6587.html>, [17 January 2005],
No doubt, Russia sees such an action as a declaration as a fully capable G8 state willing to
participate in G8 decisions.
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least capable G8 state, Russia, to make economic concessions tow ard the greater goal o f
Nicaragua’s recovery.37
The Paris Club debt relief—the World Bank’s $70 million loan and the ID A/IM F’s
$4.5 billion debt service relief were conditioned on demands that included fiscal austerity,
transparency in government operations, the elimination o f government corruption, poverty
reduction and banking reform.38 However, as previously noted, despite benchmarks and
time lines, those structural reforms are difficult to define and more difficult to enforce.
The most recent debt service relief was awarded in recognition o f Nicaragua’s
having satisfied the conditions o f the “enhanced” Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
initiative.39 It was largely through the efforts o f the Bolanos’ administration that reforms
were deemed to have met the minimum demands o f the G8 instruments o f economic
power. Nevertheless, Nicaragua still remains one o f four Latin American HIPC40 states
37It should not be overlooked that Russia, along with the United States were the
two states most responsible for Nicaragua’s plight. The Soviet Union used Nicaragua as a
surrogate state to provide strategic positioning, and the United States sought to counter
that strategy under the general tenets o f the Truman Doctrine. The Contra War in the
period between 1979 and 1988, in a distilled sense was the manifestation o f the Truman
Doctrine’s containment strategy.
38Such conditions, while sometimes quantifiable in terms o f goals, are really
dependent on the ability and motivations o f the internal dynamics that finally affect results.
Likewise, as the UN and the G8 states’ instruments o f power either ignore or forgive
failure to meet such goals, any commitment by well-intended internal forces is reduced,
and neoliberal agenda calendar is stretched.
^International Monetary Fund, Nicaragua: Enhanced Initiative fo r Heavily
Ittdebted Poor Countries: Completion Point Document IMF Country Report No. 04 72.

April 2004. (Washington, D C.: International M onetary Fund) 3-6. Available [Online]:http:
//www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr0472.pdf. [30 November 2005]
40Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) is a term o f convenience used by the
Paris Club, World Bank, IADB, IMF and others. Also, the term or its abbreviation
appears in most pertinent documents, the formal HIPC list is maintained by the World
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Today, Nicaragua shares the distinction with the other Latin American HIPC states:
Bolivia, Honduras and Guyana.
In 2001, according to the World Bank, more than fifteen percent o f the population
was living in extreme poverty defined as less than one United States dollar per day.
It should be noted that all HIPC states operate under the same framework o f neoliberal
policies o f the G8.41
The hope o f the international community was and is that Nicaragua would fully
develop into a prosperous state, but there is ample reason for pessimism. Internal factors
leave Nicaragua more a basket case than a promising political democracy.
Recovery since the FSLN was voted out o f office in 1990 has been painfully slow
despite the focused efforts o f a wide variety o f IGOs, NGOs and the potent combination
o f the major Paris Club economic instruments. Since the election o f President o f Violeta
Chamorro in February 1990, the Nicaraguan government has variously acquiesced or
cheerfully embraced the neoliberal solution; however, it is evident not all o f Nicaragua’s
electorate was on board.
In January 1997, her administration was followed by that o f Amoldo Lacayo
Aleman, who had just previously served as M anagua’s mayor. During the election he both
adopted Chamorro’s Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) and formed his own Liberal

Bank. Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua plus 34 African states constitute the total
HIPC number. (While Haiti is not on the list, it along with Honduras are often cited as the
poorest state in the Western Hemisphere.)
4IWorld Bank. “World Bank and IMF Support US$4.5 Billion in Debt Service
Relief for Nicaragua.” Washington, D C .: World Bank. Available [Online]: http ://web
workbank.org AVBSITE/ EXTERNAL/NEW S/O„content M DK:201553884>[9 February
2004],
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Alliance party to broaden his electoral base. M ore eagerly than Chamorro, he too followed
the neoliberal rubric and adopted the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF ESAF) dictated by the G8 instruments o f economic power as a condition o f the help o f
official development assistance (ODA)
While Chamorro can be seen as the perfect head o f state for national
reconciliation, her outreach to the former FSLN regime caused concern in Washington
and slowed promised aid, likewise, she was reluctant to tow the line dictated by
Washington. By the end o f her term o f office, Washington and its G8 partners had
established solid relationships with the Chamorro government to further implementation o f
the inevitable turn toward a fully free-market economy.
Enrique Jose Bolanos Geyer took office in January 2002, but not before he was
faced with the unlikely pact between Aleman’s Liberal Alliance Party and the FSLN still
led by Daniel Ortega. Bolanos had been a member o f the PLC but because o f Aleman’s
residual support o f that party, Bolanos formed the Alliance for the Republic party with the
remainder o f his PLC support, Cham orro’s supporters and other anti-Aleman, anti-FSLN
entities.42
Bolanos fits more into the mold o f Chamorro as an older and respected gentleman
o f anti-Somoza bent but not pro-FSLN. As a member o f an old business family with a
German background, Bolanos was seen as a technocrat who could manage Nicaragua’s
recovery and answer the demands o f the G8 conditions for assistance. He had been
previously been implicated in corruption because he was Aleman’s vice president, but

42This seeming unlikely alliance can be explained by the failure o f Ortega to retain a
clear majority o f the electorate, and because Aleman’s Liberal Alliance party likewise
could not retain a majority in the face o f the 2001 presidential elections.
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quickly distanced himself from that camp. To date, Bolanos’ long-term impact is
unknown. He had been severely hampered by the alliance (pacto) between Aleman and his
supporters, and Ortega and his FSLN supporters which in combination hold the majority
o f seats in the National Assembly.
True to his word to clean up corruption and despite his keen knowledge o f the
likely consequences, Bolanos successfully prosecuted Aleman for corruption.43 Since
Aleman’s conviction, Bolanos has been plagued by political opposition, and the National
Assembly has severely hampered his efforts to simultaneously clean up government
corruption, make structural reforms and align Nicaragua’s priorities with the conditions o f
the G8 programs Even considering the ravages o f civil war in the 1980s and a series o f
natural disasters,44 its slow recovery is a paradox. Nicaragua has immense natural
resources that include the most abundant fresh w ater supply in Central America, a willing
and relatively well educated people, infrastructure under restoration, and a long-term
history o f economic well being.
Until the early 1970s, Nicaragua was often referred to as the breadbasket o f
Central America with its abundant agricultural production, and a generally diverse agro
industry that included the beef, coffee, dairy and fishing industries. In spite o f the
vicissitudes o f world markets in that period, Nicaragua was prosperous and had a flexible
economy with few problems. This does not speak to the political side o f the equation nor

43Aleman was sentenced to twenty years in prison but that was later changed to
twenty years in “home” confinement at his luxurious country estate outside o f Managua.
44Hurricane Joan in 1997 (Caribbean coast), Hurricane Mitch in 1998 (central and
northwestern heartland) and Hurricane Hugo in 1999 (heartland).
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does it altogether relate to Nicaragua’s very slow economic recovery since 1990 except in
the historical memory o f the Republic
President Bolanos ran for the presidency, in part, on his commitment to carry out
the neoliberal agenda, and his election reflected the hopes o f the Nicaraguan electorate.
However, it also clear that very few understood the reforms and sacrifices that the
neoliberal rubric would necessitate. Bolanos success in instituting reforms are both to his
credit for having brought in additional ODA, but it also represents the bane o f his political
viability.
The theoretical foundation for economic neoliberalism lies in the model o f the socalled Washington Consensus (See Chapter II for a complete definition ) which provides
the framework for those reforms demanded by the G8 and its instruments. That group has
made substantial concessions to Nicaragua the early and generous resulting from the June
1999 G8 meeting in Cologne, Germany that forgave ninety percent o f all o f Nicaragua’s
foreign debt incurred before 31 October 1988. The debt after that point was recast under
extremely concessionary terms o f a forty-year repayment schedule, a five to ten year grace
period and a zero to two percent interest rate known as the “extended HIPC initiative.”45
The initiative tied the package to strict reforms that have been only partially
fulfilled. At the time, the demands that addressed extreme poverty in Nicaragua were seen
complex but within reach. In any case, the initiative provided incentive for Nicaragua to
move in a positive direction.

45Nestor Avendano, “Where is the State’s Role in the National Development
Plan?” Envio, Volume 22, Number 268 (Managua: Universidad Centroamericana,
November 2003), 22-23.
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When in December 2003 the World Bank and IMF announced that Nicaragua had
satisfied the conditions (reached the HIPC initiative “decision point” ), Nicaragua still
remained one o f the w orld’s poorest states Nicaragua’s failure to progress more steadily
cannot be easily explained in terms o f external support and the neoliberal requirements o f
the G8. Rather, Nicaragua’s lack o f progress can be seen as a function o f the domestic
independent variables that impede or facilitate neoliberal reforms.
Fiscal constraints (largely in the area o f government operation costs) and
transparency demanded by HIPC have been slowly implemented; these, along with
privatization and elimination o f corruption are only a few o f the many domestic issues that
accompany its moribund recovery prospects
A central question is: Why is the Bolanos government unable to fully realign the
direction o f the internal economy and civil society? This work elaborates the factors, and
demonstrates that internal domestic independent variables are the key to recovery
Perhaps the most compelling fact about Nicaragua is its tumultuous history o f the
past thirty. The abrupt social, political and economic policy changes brought on by the
Sandinista Revolution are but part o f the calculus. The sudden about-face in the 1990
election o f Violeta Chamarro and the failure o f the FSLN to regain the presidency has
affected the result as well. From the longer-term view, as the Somoza dynasty failed to
overcome the demands o f the FSLN and provide for recovery after the great earthquake
o f 1972 that destroyed most o f Managua, the relative prosperity that Nicaragua enjoyed in
the forty plus years before the 1979 revolution served in part to frustrate Nicaraguans.
Hence, Nicaraguans favored the promises o f the FSLN; that support strengthened as the
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last Somoza dynasty dictator, Anastasio Somoza Debayle imposed despotic measures to
retain control in the face o f an economic crisis.
The 1979 revolution has its roots in the early 1930s; the fundamental issue in the
early 1930s as in the late 1970s was a demand for political reform and reduced economic
disparity. While the early 1930s’ revolution led by populist Liberal General Augustino C.
Sandino ultimately failed, the Somoza dynasty began with promises to carry out that
agenda, but the promises were really part o f a larger scheme to dominate the economy
through a system o f what developed into crony capitalism.
The 1979 revolution sought to redress those complaints through determined
Marxist-inspired measures that converted the political system to a socialist model, and
installed an economic system o f a mixed command and state-ownership model that was
heavy on appropriations o f privately owned industry and confiscation o f privately owned
basic infrastructure At the point o f the Sandinista victory, much o f the most valuable
light industry, communications business and agro-industry was owned by the Somozas and
their cronies. Although estimates vary widely, the general consensus is that the Somozas
owned about sixty percent o f all revenue producing business in Nicaragua at the time o f
the FSLN victory
The Sandinista government committed to delivering a model o f government that
would redress the disparity o f the past, and meet the economic and social demands o f the
people. The CIA-backed Contra (civil) war plus the collapse o f the Soviet Union
contributed to the weakness o f the Sandinista program which, in most areas, failed
miserably. However, it left the people with a sense o f empowerment and entitlement
extant today.
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International interests in the post-Cold War climate were focused on the recovery o f
Nicaragua as a political democracy model whose economy could sustain the recovery. The
goal was and is that this will eventually lead to the addition o f a vigorous participant in the
new world order o f globalization, a system that would measure success in terms o f
economic health and social justice This is not to say that all o f those international interests
have been in absolute agreement, but only to observe that there are many NGOs, IGOs
and other international institutions and states that have been extraordinarily generous and
supportive in the face o f slow progress.
The World Bank’s self-defined brief for its program in Nicaragua that is pursued
with other major financial institutions covers four areas that condition the international
community’s willingness to provide short and long-term assistance. They include poverty
alleviation, public sector modernization and strengthening o f institutional capacity,
creating a framework for private sector investment and environmental protection.46 As
detailed at the outset in this introduction, Nicaragua has largely met the requirements o f
World Bank, IMF and the IADB, but there is little optimism.
The external pressures that affect the Nicaraguan recovery are largely determined
by world markets, attention from NGOs and IGOs, foreign direct investment, relationships
with neighboring states and the general intent o f international political powers. The
ultimate success or failure, however, will be determined by the internal factors at play.
Nicaragua’s past prosperity was due in large part to its geographic position, natural

^W orld Bank. Nicaragua Country Brief-May 1999, World Bank, Available
[Online]: <http:// wbln0018.worldbank.org/Extemal /lac/lac.nsf7 54a7bf0lc0a0900a8525
7d600b59b4/>[8 February 2004],
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resources, plentiful fresh water supply,47 relatively inexpensive however limited
transportation avenues and industrious people along with its strong business orientation
and focus on international trade. While vulnerable to natural disasters such as earthquakes
and tropical storm, Nicaragua’s economy has been productive. As the historic breadbasket
o f Central America with its surplus agriculture production, it should be able to regain that
status. Surplus production has included a variety o f agricultural products including those
for which is it well known such as rice, beans, cotton, coffee and tobacco. Further, it
experimented with cotton production for export, but ultimately could not compete with
other world producers
There is little argument against the logic that Nicaragua has the resources and
capacity to compete in the agricultural arena. Likewise, it has the capacity in light industry
to provide a wide variety o f manufactured products.
Until the forceful removal o f the last o f the Somoza dynasty in July 1979,
Nicaragua’s economy was operated as a family resource competing in the world economy
as a basic commodities producer while developing some light industry. During the period
from the mid-1930s until the mid-1970s,48 Nicaragua’s basic mode o f operation was a

47Unlike its neighbors, Nicaragua has an abundance o f fresh water with its two
very large lakes. Many south states suffer from a lack o f quality water resources, and that
factor alone affects economic and social well being. However, Nicaragua has not been a
good steward o f its water resources and is now faced with serious pollution issues. See
Map Plate I.
48T. L. Merrill, ed., Nicaragua - A Country Study. (Washington, D C.: Federal
Research Division, Library o f Congress, 1994), 17-18. In the period leading up to World
War One, ffee-market capitalism existed in its purest form. The exigencies o f the postWorld War One economic disruptions and inequities brought about a slow change toward
“managed” ffee-market capitalism that culminated in the Bretton W oods agreements just
at the close o f World War Two. While Nicaragua did not participate in the policy
formulation exercised by the allied forces after World W ar Two, its own economy was
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market-driven capitalistic approach. Nicaragua was a commodities producer in the model
o f many other Latin American states that fits neatly with the theories o f David Ricardo and
other classic economists who posited that markets, if left to their own devices, will settle
to highest efficiencies in each entity. This presumes that there are no artificial forces in the
mix such as tariffs, duties and the like. This, o f course, was not the case.
The Somoza dynasty carefully managed the labor force and its unions with very few major
problems. In fact, the dynasty could be seen as encouraging unionization.
Modern economists such as Raul Prebisch theorized that Latin America could not
survive economically without state intervention because the domestic industry necessary
to support an economy could not develop so long as unimpeded importation o f
manufactured goods continued. Until the mid-1960s, the ffee-market model in Latin
America, according to Prebisch, could be modified such that those Latin American states
could both profit from commodities exports and simultaneously develop domestic industry
for internal consumption. Prebisch introduced the theory, known as import substitution,
that held that high tariffs on imported manufactured goods would, with some state
intervention, spontaneously generate domestic industrial development thus growing the
economy and giving it sufficient strength to break the neocolonial model.

closely tied to those changes. This is especially true because the United States had been
and was foreseen to be the major consumer o f Nicaragua’s basic commodities production
This relationship was a political instrument o f Nicaragua President Jose Santos Zelaya
during his term from 1898 to 1909 who regularly criticized United States’ economic
influence, and flirted with substituting German and Japanese investment for United States
investment. In any case, it was Zelaya who was largely responsible for opening up
Nicaragua for foreign investment and building a suitable transportation infrastructure. At
the turn o f the century, United States companies owned most o f the exporting
commodities (bananas, coffee, gold and lumber) business.
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The import substitution model was wholeheartedly adopted by Latin American
states.49 While import substitution, in the abstract, should have generated increased
domestic industrial capacity, it failed over the long term. Various conclusions can be
drawn to explain the failure, but there was no doubt by the mid-1970s that another
strategy was in order. Nicaragua, as with other Latin American states, experienced a
downward trend, and domestic unrest became a major part o f the Sandinista revolution
and ensuing civil war that took place.
In the post-Cold War model where power o f states is measured more on economic
capacity and performance rather than military capability, a new model has emerged The
theoretical model, the Washington Consensus, was based on unimpeded free-market
economies. Its implementation was conditioned on fundamental changes in economic
policy o f Latin American states, and was adopted by the major IGOs such as the World
Bank, the IMF and the IADB, among others.
John Williamson, the Washington, D C. economist, who first articulated the theory
in its early form, believed that such a “neoliberal” approach would remedy the extreme
poverty and poor social condition o f states such as Nicaragua.50 He and others later
refined the first version but its basis remained, i.e., ffee-market systems with unimpeded
trade and a minimum o f regulation will benefit all states and their people
Major players represented by the Paris Club conditioned programs such as the
enhanced HIPC on domestic reforms that included transparent budget processes, reformed

49The largest state, Brazil, elected one o f the faithful import substitution
proponents, economist and professor Henrique Cardoso, as head o f state.
50Neoliberalism, in the international economy context, imply a near total hands-off
approach to markets with near-complete transparency o f governments’ operations.
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banking practices, focused poverty reduction and improved access to health and
education, and other internal changes that could only be made by domestic policy and
practice. While Nicaragua met those conditions, at least minimally, the central question
remains: Will Nicaragua’s domestic independent variables-the internal factors-serve to
support a recovery or impede it9
Theoreticians such as John Williamson have recognized the need to fine tune the
original model o f neoliberalism and have been candid about the over-simplistic original
approach’s failure, but they retain the central piece o f the theory: pure-form, ffee-market
capitalism.
On the presumption that such reformulated theory provides the solution for
Nicaragua and given the wholesale acquiescence o f the Bolanos administration to the
demands o f the Paris Club, its success or failure lies with the internal factors that influence
the implementation. Since his inauguration, President Bolanos has under fire from
prominent domestic economists on all sides o f the political spectrum and the domestic
media for his strict adherence the recommendations o f the international community.
Nicaragua’s domestic critics are influenced by healthy skepticism that results form
the failures or poor performance o f the past administrations (the Ortega, Chamorro and
Aleman governments). They understandably hold the question as to whether the mixedmodel economy championed by the FSLN could have succeeded had it not had to deal
with the United State’s efforts, overt and covert, to undermine that government. This
lingering doubt contributes to the uncertainly or at least unwillingness to fully buy into the
neoliberal solution.
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It cannot be overlooked that from the 1990 election through the 2001 election, the
FSLN retained a substantial amount o f political support in Nicaragua. Its head, Daniel
Ortega Saavedra, has run for president in each election and still indicates that he will
continue to run. The relevancy o f his candidacy is that it validates the argument that about
forty percent o f the population still would support a return to a mixed model economy
under a socialist rubric. Further, Ortega, despite personal scandal that includes an
accusation from his now-adult daughter, Zoilamerica Narvaez, o f child molestation and
questionable business transactions, somehow comes off as the most honest o f national
candidates today.
The reality is that Daniel Ortega remains a political force that transcends the
memory o f the FSLN, and his social and economic programs still hold promise for many
Nicaraguans. Some see his persistent influence as impeding progress that is demanded by
the Paris Club, and further it explains the frustration o f the current government’s efforts to
carry out reforms.
Much o f O rtega’s support comes from his former role in the FSLN and the FSLN
legacy. Aside from permanently providing a sense o f hope and empowerment to labor,
women and other oppressed groups including the indigenous peoples, the most lasting
legacy can be found in the Nicaraguan constitution The preamble to the Nicaraguan
Constitution contains language that, while appropriate for the time, does little more than
polarize the population (especially labor versus employers), not to mention would-be
external benefactors, and pay homage to the Sandinista Front during a period o f transition
to a market-economy system: “[Dedicated to] the General o f the free men, AUGUSTINO
C. SANDINO, father o f the Popular, Anti-imperialist Revolution . . . [the Christians] who
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inserted themselves into the fight for liberation . . . [and those] who fought and offered
their lives in the face o f imperialist aggression to guarantee happiness for future
generations.”
The polarization serves to remind previously oppressed groups o f their potential,
but also serves to provide a sense o f independence from the United States and its allies.
Thus, its wording can be seen in the context as a positive, pro-nationalism statement and a
commitment to self governance and self sufficiency. The “imperialist aggression” is
Marxist rhetoric, but in today’s context serves to remind Nicaraguan’s o f their own
colonial and neocolonial relationships
The popular press in Nicaragua that is remarkably fearless, and does not suffer the
aftereffects o f the Anastasio Somoza Debayle period censorship, sometimes refers to
Ortega, Aleman and Bolanos as the “three monkeys”51 who are seen as co-conspirators.
Bolanos, however, may be escaping this popular moniker because it has been under his
administration that Aleman was convicted o f embezzlement and various other crimes.
Bolanos’ legitimacy was helped with the indictment and conviction o f former president
Aleman for corruption and excesses o f cronyism in the old model o f Nicaraguan politics.
Aleman supporters, largely led by his wife and daughters, remain a force in the
liberal party, and Daniel Ortega continues to influence events in Nicaragua that are more
focused on self-serving political aims than overall economic and social recovery. This is a
major factor that will influence the direction and speed o f recovery if only by impeding
reforms, reducing foreign direct investment and discouraging the international community.

5‘Such is the cynicism o f the Nicaraguan electorate-the long history corrupt
politicians in Nicaragua being the source.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32

The Catholic Church in Nicaragua plays a major role in the private and public lives
o f Nicaragua including direct influence in the formulation and implementation o f domestic
public policy This is both historical and somewhat unique to current-day Nicaragua Two
o f the original FSLN junta members were priests, and Cardinal Obando y Bravo has
always maintained a political voice in the domestic affairs o f Nicaragua either through
activism under the guise o f Liberation Theology or tacit disengagement when he wished to
de-legitimize certain government actions. Such strategy can be seen today in his sending
Church officials to rallies o f the pacto or its separate entities In a sense it could be seen as
payback to former President Aleman.
The position taken by the Church on any given issue in Nicaragua has a direct
influence on policy outcomes. An example o f its influence and strength is the fact that in
the aftermath o f Hurricane Mitch in 1998, much o f the considerable monetary aid
provided by the international community was given over to Catholic relief in Nicaragua for
administration and distribution. This reflected the alliance between the Aleman
administration and the Church,52 and simultaneously but on a much more subtle basis
satisfied the U.S. Government that the aid would not be diluted by inefficient and corrupt
government bureaucracy.
During the run-up to Cham orro’s election in 1990, “ [T]he task o f projecting an
anti-Sandinista message was more effectively carried out by the right-wing forces o f the
national newspaper, Ixi Prensa, COSEP and Cardinal Obando y Bravo, the head o f the

52Aleman’s quid pro quo, among other acts, was the granting o f a radio broadcast
license to the Church that was later rescinded by the Bolanos government with the claim
that it was illegally granted. In fact, the recision was more a reflection o f Bolanos
administration’s efforts to reform such practices. However, in doing so, it no doubt must
have produced some consternation on the part o f then Archbishop Obando y Bravo.
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Roman Catholic Church.”53 No doubt, those forces influenced the FSLN to adopt the
“third way” strategy that previously had been successful; however, by 1989 the pressures
o f unkept promises and the failing economy were too much to overcome.
Under the general principles o f “Liberation Theology” first elaborated at the
Catholic Bishops meeting in Medellin, Colombia in 1968 the Church took on a more
secular role. That guidance from the Vatican mandated a hands-on, proactive role for the
Church in Latin America that included a political component that can be seen today.
Often, the popular press in Nicaragua quotes Cardinal Obando y Bravo regarding
domestic policy implementation. Further, the national governments find themselves in a
position to facilitate programs through the Church. A negative converse result could easily
spell disaster for any public disagreement between the Church and the government.
The Roman Catholic Church has played and does play a critical role in influencing
domestic policy decisions over a broad spectrum,54 and today is courted by politicians o f
all stripes in Nicaragua including former President Aleman’s wife and daughters who in
2003 and 2004 enlisted the aid o f the Church to have his corruption conviction
overturned. The wife and two daughters are becoming political forces in their own right,
and represent the father when necessary or desirable.

53Hazel Plunkett, In Focus Nicaragua (New York: Interlink Books, 2002), 31.
54Lino Gutierrez (U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua), in discussion with author and
others in Hays-Fulbright Group in July 1998 in Managua. The United States government
acknowledged the power and influence o f the Church in Nicaragua in the aftermath o f
Hurricane Mitch when it took the decision to flow aid through the Church (Catholic
Relief) rather than directly through Aleman’s government. While it was a tacit
acknowledgment o f the rampant corruption o f the Aleman regime on the part o f the U.S.
Government, it can also be seen as recognition o f the Church in the Nicaraguan political
arena.
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With the implementation o f the Liberation Theology agenda, Cardinal Obando y
Bravo saw the participation o f his priests in the government as a threat and, in a larger
sense, felt that Liberation Theology followed the wrong track in Nicaragua. Further, some
believe that he saw Liberation Theology as a threat to his authority.55 During the early
period o f the FSLN government, Cardinal Obando y Bravo sought to have transferred out
o f Nicaragua a number o f foreign priests who he saw as too obedient to the FSLN junta’s
agenda and/or too activist in the Liberation Theology arena.
Obando y Bravo and his leadership o f the Nicaragua Roman Catholic Church can
be seen as an impediment and detriment to the FSLN’s agenda; two o f the original
Sandinista Directorate (D N)56 were Catholic priests, but, on the other hand, they
represented the most progressive o f the Church in Nicaragua “By 1978, the progressive
Catholics and the FSLN were essentially working in tandem
1979, then, was a product o f a joint effort

. The Triumph57 o f July

and would be influenced as much by

Catholic humanist roots as by the peculiarly nationalistic brand o f Marxism o f the original
founder o f the FSLN.”58
The importance o f underlying support o f priests and Church members following
the Liberation Theology path for FSLN cannot be overemphasized because its role in
raising social awareness and bringing relief to the human condition o f the Nicaraguan
55Ibid., Plunkett.
56The Sandinista Directorate was the formal title o f the FSLN junta’s executive
body.
57The Triumph (£7 Triunfo) is both the official Sandinista term for the July 1979
expulsion o f Somoza, and commonly heard today as both a term o f political and
melancholy by FSLN members and supporters.
58Ibid., 42.
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poor. This legacy remains today and interestingly is the cornerstone o f nearly all
international aid and Bolanos’ government’s poverty reduction plan
After the January 1990 national election in which Violeta Chamorro won the
presidency with a coalition o f many minor political parties, the more conservative and
traditional influence o f the Church returned. This has since included some minor scandals
during the subsequent Aleman administration, and role o f the Church as an NGO to
deliver U.S. economic and reconstruction aid following the devastation o f Hurricane
Mitch in 1998.
The Roman Catholic Church in Nicaragua today, as always, is often called upon by
politicians to either endorse candidates or simply be present during key events The
Church continues to play a key role in the everyday social and political lives o f
Nicaraguans.
Another characteristic o f Nicaragua that helps explain the political psyche o f the
people is monism, or the belief that only one superior exists whether it be God or, in
secular terms, the dictator who happens to be in place at the moment. While such
discussion is better left to sociologists or theologians, it is included here because to help
explain why Nicaragua has been so slow to adopt liberal democracy, something that
Nicaragua has never experienced.
Nicaraguans are far more used to vertical relationships that foster abuses and
tolerance for abuse, and disparity. Thus, there is a serious question as to whether the
tenets o f neoliberalism even apply to Nicaragua and Nicaraguans, or whether neoliberalism
demands will result in some unintended perverse form. For example, if corruption is a way
o f life and only extreme corruption is noticed, how might Nicaragua adjust to a system
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that demands integrity in politics and the market system? Will only the oligarchy educated
in the United States recognize the difference, and will it take advantage o f those who have
no exposure to another system9 With reference to the demands o f neoliberalism, the
questions regarding political systems and habits are endless.
Until the 1979 FSLN Triumph, Nicaragua was operated as a business for the
benefit o f the Somozas and their cronies. As such, the Somozas selectively adopted the
latest management practices, and encouraged the business community at large to do the
same Thus, Anastasio Somoza Debayle was quick to jump at the opportunity to co
sponsor and support the Harvard Business School in establishing a prestigious MBA
producing school in Managua with the help o f Nicaragua’s most influential businessmen.
Somoza had a strong alliance with the Confederation Superior de Empresas Privadas
(COSEP - National Chamber o f Commerce) which was a powerful political instrument
until many o f its members turned away from that affiliation in the mid to late 1970s due to
the excesses o f his failing regime.59 Despite the turn in allegiance, the COSEP was no
friend o f the Sandinista regime either as the FSLN government sought to turn to a mixed
economic model as it nationalized many industries and confiscated property in the name o f
the revolution.

59The seminal event that turned the business community from supporting the
Somoza regime was the 1978 murder o f Pedro Joaquin Chamorro who was the owner and
editor o f La Prensa newspaper. Chamorro was killed in downtown M anagua on his way to
work, and his murder was immediately attributed to Somoza’s henchmen led by his West
Point-trained son. By that point in time, the Somoza government’s censorship o f La
Prensa had reached such a stage that Chamorro had to submit all copy to the government
before publication. For the deleted material, Chamorro would often leave blank spaces or
substitute ridiculous Hollywood star photographs to make the point about the lack o f
freedom o f the press in Nicaragua. Likewise, the murder o f the vice-president o f the
COSEP during this same era was attributed to Somoza. Those events in combination,
guaranteed that the conservative COSEP faced hard choices with the rise o f the FSLN.
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COSEP survived as an organization o f the most powerful business and industry
leaders in Nicaragua, but it was tainted by frequent accusations that it was funded by and
acted as an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency during the Sandinista period from
1979 to 1990.
Today, the COSEP’s closest ally is President Bolaiios who, even as Aleman’s vice
president and president o f the National Assembly before his election as president, served
as a vehicle to further dismantle the vestiges o f the Sandinista economic model and restore
a full-market economy.60 Bolanos’ close association with the COSEP presents a political
liability, especially rankling the FSLN membership.61 This was recognized well before
Bolanos’ run for the presidency, a likely connection between his efforts and the
support o f the Central Intelligence agency was revealed in a New York Times article in
1984 62

“ As o f early 2004, some major utilities and industries remained in the hands o f the
government and, and as some allege, in the illegal ownership o f former Sandinista junta
members. This is a source o f significant political controversy as the Bolanos’ government
struggles to meet the demands o f the external neoliberal forces and privatize those utilities
and industries while trying to address the alleged illegal confiscation o f some part o f that
by the Sandinistas and by Aleman and his cronies. Aleman’ conviction on bribery and
corruption charges are a result o f that effort. President Bolanos’ success in prosecution
has cost him political power due to this housecleaning agenda item.
61Holly Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua (Cambridge, Massachusetts. South
End Press, 1988), 193. Bolanos was the president o f COSEP in 1984 when it was actively
supporting Arturo Cruz to run against the FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega in the
presidential election under the Coordinadora (Democratic Coordinating Committee) in a
ruse to spoil the election.
62Philip Taubman, “Nicaragua Rebels Reported to Raise Millions in Gifts,” New

York Times, section 1, page 1 (New York: New York Times, 9 September 1984)
Taubman reported that the CIA and other donors were supporting the “rebels,” and that
Bolanos and his confidants had been in “close association” with the CIA since the early
1980s
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The sense o f entitlement o f the labor class in Nicaragua is one o f the most
enduring legacies o f the FSLN period The nearly thirteen-year period o f reform
conditioned the labor class in such a way that it has become a force in domestic politics as
never before
The sense o f entitlement is well reasoned and justified, especially considering the
exploitation that took place in previous times. Most particularly the labor sector sees the
Somoza era as exploitative; however, economic indicators from most o f the Somoza
period reveal relative prosperity as compared to neighboring states, especially when
compared to Honduras and El Salvador to the north.
Features o f the current neoliberal model in Nicaragua are recognized by some
labor sectors as exploitative. M ost particularly, the device designed to attract foreign
investment in light industry-economic “free” zones-are really are little more than a
legalized maquilas.63 Nicaraguan labor, whether organized or represented by various
domestic NGOs, finds itself with a greater sense o f empowerment but with growing
cynicism that their continued sacrifices in the name o f long-term recover under the
neoliberal rubric is no more than another exploitative tool.
The untenable situation that Nicaragua is in means that it simply must dance to the
tune o f the piper-the external forces at play; however, how it dances to the tune is the

“ Maquilas is the name given to the sweat shops that first appeared in northern
Mexico to provide low-wage, low-cost goods for the North American market. While this
result can be seen as a natural result o f the disparity in wages between Mexico, and the
United States and Canada, it can also be seen as an extension o f the brazero program that
exploits Mexican seasonal farm workers. The system o f maquilas has risen to a high art
form in Nicaragua where high fences guard the exploitation o f labor. The largest “free”
zone in Nicaragua is just adjacent to the Sandino (continued) International Airport in
Managua; most o f the businesses are owned by Taiwan businessmen. It is this exploitation
that is the subject o f anti-globalization opponents. See later discussion.
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question that will determine the result. That obvious result is too little real progress in the
past fifteen years: membership in the “exclusive” HIPC club, a lack o f meaningful foreign
direct investment, a general failure to mobilize its domestic internal components to focus
on direction and progress, and failure to embark on a determined proactive, long-term
policy to fully recover. The domestic independent variables, are those which will most
influence the ultimate result, and it those variables that must align for a favorable result.
Business as usual is the pattern that must be broken, the comfort zone o f that pattern is
that most deeply entrenched.
It is no stretch to compare Nicaragua to a long-term welfare client, not in the sense
o f an unable client, but in the sense o f an unwilling client. The generosity o f the
international community, at least in part, can be seen as a return for the abuse it dealt out
to Nicaragua during the last days o f the Cold War. Likewise, some see excessive
generosity as part o f the problem.
The generosity, with the system o f government under the FSLN, may have caused
a sort o f civil society malaise in Nicaragua that will be difficult to overcome in the short
term. That is not to say that the FSLN victory was unjust, rather, it is clear that all in
Nicaragua, even the growing middle class, very much favored a change from the Somoza
dynasty and its abuses.
While the reasons for the failure o f the FSLN government are not addressed here;
it is clear that in 1990 the Nicaraguan people wanted change for change’s sake, not a vote
against the central tenets o f the FSLN agenda.
What Nicaragua is left with today is a shaky economy that, while propped up by
the international community, may not be able to find its way. Notwithstanding the residual
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forty percent support for the FSLN, what it did to expel Anastasio Somoza Debayle and
the hope it brought, what remains is the reality for which a means to success must be
found.
Given the recent history o f Nicaragua, it is remarkable that its people have not
risen up against the failure o f the current neoliberal model. Certainly, there is abundant
criticism in the Nicaragua media about Nicaragua’s plight and it choosing the neoliberal
path; however, the fatigue o f warfare and suffering-no matter the source-seem s to
discourage any real movement toward another political and economic change. That lack o f
impulse may be the first signs o f a determination to make a go o f it.
The internal domestic forces at can be seen as moribund That is to say that so
much has happened and so little progress has been made that those forces are more
cautious observers and bystanders than participants. The most important actors on the
domestic scene remain the same as before: (1) the Roman Catholic Church, (2)labor and
labor unions, (3) the business community and its instruments , and (4) civil society as
whole influenced by the FSLN residual.
The Roman Catholic Church, Nicaragua’s most revered institution, was implicated
with Aleman’s corruption as well, at least to the extent that it gave tacit approval to a
corrupt administration for favors. While not unique to Nicaragua,64 graft and corruption

^D uring field research in Nicaragua in 1998, 2002 and 2003, this author
questioned a number o f businessmen about the price (corruption and payoffs) o f doing
business in Nicaragua. Usually, my basic question was met with silence and a shrug;
however, one businessman who asked for anonymity complained that business as usual
means that each nearly all officials look for some payoff (mordida-bite). This includes the
local mayor, Ministry o f Labor official and others. Playing by the rules, most o f which
were put in place by the FSLN, counts for very little without the necessary lubrication.
The anonymous successful businessman has a multi-million dollar export business that is
contained within a “free” zone provided by Nicaragua’s law to encourage investment
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are a part o f the system even today, and viewed without surprise. This is a reality that is
not easily measure but is readily apparent. Aleman was also implicated in other scandals
with Central American businessmen that included taking big payoffs during the continuing
privatization o f government-owned infrastructure including the national telephone system.
This work is organized to focus on the post 1990 period in Nicaragua to reveal
those domestic factors that affect the progress o f Nicaragua in its recovery measured in
critical indicators (dependent variables) such as education, health, per capita income,
demographics and others. The focus o f this study is on neoliberal policy, and the domestic
independent variables that affect implementation and outcome.
Included are some o f the counter-globalization and counter-neoliberal theories
that, while not well developed, are the basis for very active demonstrations against the
World Bank, the IABD and IMF. To date, although all Central American states have
joined the CAFTA regime which was ratified as a treaty by the U.S. Senate in June 2005
and approved by the U.S. House o f Representatives in July 2005. Even with ratification,
the road to a positive outcome seems slim unless its proponents can demonstrate that
NAFTA has provided positive benefits to the United States economy.
The Republic is in a state o f turmoil; the purpose and effect o f the Sandinista
Revolution is still fresh in the minds o f Nicaraguans who question whether a return to
some form o f the Sandinista model o f a mixed economy and egalitarian democracy might
still be the long-term solution to solve its problems. This is clearly evinced in the
consistent support that Daniel Ortega, the perennial presidential candidate since 1990 has
maintained. The popular vote for Ortega has been steady at about forty percent. Further,
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his force o f personality, even when separated from the Sandinista Front itself, is such that
he commands attention and loyalty
The 1998 pact fashioned by Daniel Ortega for the Sandinista Front and Arnoldo
Aleman for the Constitutional Liberal Party gives further evidence that the FSLN platform
is still an attractive option Added to this is the overwhelming win o f the Sandinistas in the
provincial governors’ election that took place in November 2004.
In the long view, the revolution is still underway The political unrest and failure to
find effective solutions in the neoliberal model further fuels the ongoing revolution. Hence,
this w ork’s general outline has a sub-theme taken from Crane Brinton’s 1949 Anatomy o f

a Revolution that fits well with the Nicaraguan case in conditions as well as timing o f
events. The phase in which the Republic now finds itself, in Brinton’s formulation, is the

thermidor or the breaking o f the fever and return to normalcy
As the rest o f the world adopts neoliberalism in the post Cold War environment,
Nicaragua is faced with difficult choices. The Nicaraguan revolution that began in earnest
in the mid 1970s and civil war that followed were, in part, reactions to the despotic nature
o f the Somoza dynasty that operated in concert with the United States. Just as the
Sandinistas took power in 1979, neoliberalism shifted the playing field toward
neoliberalism as the Cold War was coming to an end. In effect, the people o f Nicaragua
were faced with an entirely new set o f game rules that were finally inevitable when the
demise o f the Soviet Union, its Cold War sponsor.
Neoliberalism and Nicaragua’s choices are the primary conduits for change;
however, the ultimate result o f neoliberalism policy implementation has a greater
implication in the context o f the neoliberal model assumed by north states as the long-term
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solution for all faltering HIPC states. Nicaragua’s success or failure, then, will provide
some indication and forecast for the long term.
Chapter II provides a brief summary o f the relevant historical and economic
literature plus integrative literature that helps in the understanding as to how Nicaragua
has developed over time, how its internal dynamics interact and how Nicaragua treats
external independent variables that affect its well-being.
Included in Chapter III is a detailed pre-revolutionary historic and economic
review o f Nicaragua’s past. The review provides some understanding o f the behavior o f
domestic independent variables that affect the current dilemma. It should be obvious to the
reader that Nicaragua’s future success or failure is entirely dependent on its own motives
and national psyche, and how those elements affect the internal dynamics in recovery.
Chapter IV treats Nicaragua and neoliberalism from 1990 to 2004. Since the 1990,
Nicaraguans have elected three presidents: Chamorro, Aleman and Bolanos. In each
election those winning candidates were opposed by the FSLN candidate and former
Nicaraguan President (1985-1990), Daniel Ortega. Ortega failed in each national election
despite his 1998 maneuvering to establish a pact with the winning PLC. Put in other terms,
the electorate continued to reject the FSLN model in favor o f an unknown alternative seen
as more promising than that delivered by the FSLN mixed-model economy, socialist
model. Each o f the presidents since 1990 faced (face) different obstacles, and each
implemented the neoliberal model as they were able given that it was their mandate from
the voters and there were and are no other alternatives.
Chapter V is a discussion o f the central domestic independent variables that most
affect the acceptance and implementation the neoliberal model. Ignoring the issues o f
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morality and sense o f obligation that may motivate the north states in their generosity with
regard to the Contra war and the economics pressures imposed on the FSLN from 1979 to
1990, Nicaragua has been the recipient o f a mix o f generous loans, grants and other help
The constancy o f the north states’ commitment to the neoliberal solution juxtaposed with
the failure in application points toward the domestic independent variables as the most
relevant in explaining the failure and predicting how the external aid might be more
effectively applied toward a full recovery.
Chapter VI, the concluding chapter, reviews the development o f Nicaragua over
its short history, provides some insights into how or why Nicaraguan internal dynamics
treat outside intervention, reviews the present state and behavior o f the most relevant
internal domestic independent variables. It provides observations as to how or if
Nicaragua might find a path toward recovery that will return its overall condition to a true
political democracy with equitable and effective economic distribution.
Finally, it is hope o f this author that this work provides a view o f the situation that
helps explain in historical and political terms where the problems lay and how the internal
dynamics might be redirected toward a positive result. Hopefully, the reader will have a
clearer understanding o f the slowness o f the recovery from the Nicaraguan optic, not from
the optic o f an international donor whether it be the G8, one o f its economic instruments
o f power, a bilateral aid program or even from one o f the many foreign NGOs that operate
in Nicaragua today. This is not to impugn the motives or integrity o f any external provider
o f assistance, but to provide some sense o f why and how the internal dynamics affect the
ultimate outcome. Such an approach is especially important in light o f the
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continuing commitment o f the G8 north states as affirmed during the July 2005 plenary
meeting held in Scotland.
That commitment is the most unqualified and determined yet in modem history,
and failures that may follow will require deep re-examination and introspection by G8
states not to mention the subject states themselves. In Latin America, Nicaragua can be
seen as the test case. If those states and the well-meaning empiricist planners employed to
make a full implementation o f neoliberalism fail to consider the internal dynamics first, the
world will probably see a continuation o f failed and slow progress among all HIPC states
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE AND THEORY

The political and economic history o f Nicaragua is important because it provides
understanding o f Nicaraguan experience with regard to its development and relationships
with colonial and neocolonial states. Such an understanding helps explain and elaborate on
the domestic independent variables and how Nicaragua has dealt with neoliberalism.
Below is a review o f history, political and economic literature Also reviewed is theory
literature that provides insight into Nicaragua today.
The love-hate relationship Nicaraguans feel toward the United States and other
powerful states has a long history that was first articulated by General Zelaya, the
Republic’s head o f state in the late 19th Century and early 20th Century Attitudes and
deeply held beliefs about the United States and other north states influence Nicaraguan
domestic behavior today.
This chapter provides some understanding o f the predicament facing Nicaragua,
the various external independent forces that have shaped and will shape Nicaragua’s
direction, and the likelihood o f its joining the modern “globalized” world. Further, it
reveals the nearly unspoken reaction to the failures o f neoliberalism that drives, for the
want o f a better term, the psyche o f everyman Nicaraguan who knows the history and its
relationship with the United States.
The history literature reveals an over-riding recurrence o f Nicaragua as a victim o f
foreign exploitation either as a Spanish colony or, in more subtle but no less exploitative
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post-independence, neocolonial relationships with foreign powers, especially with the
United States. That literature elaborates on the early experience o f Nicaraguans with
Spain, the role o f the Roman Catholic Church, the role o f organized labor, the role o f the
FSLN in shaping behavior, and the shaping o f those domestic variables
The economy literature, focusing mostly on the post- 1990 period, serves to
explain the alternative solution o f Marxism sought by the Sandinistas and their supporters,
and the foundations o f neoliberalism. It is especially critical because Nicaragua has, in its
recent history, experienced relatively sudden transitions from a fascist-like capitalistic
market-economy system to a Marxist-inspired mixed-command economy model to the
neoliberal model seen today.
The theory literature provides a starting point to help explain and predict how
Nicaragua will fare in the near future given that it really has no choice but to join the
neoliberal world economy. The theory literature also provides a broad understanding o f
past failures (both political and economic) and how Nicaraguan domestic independent
variables affect integration into the neoliberal rubric.
In the mid-1960s, in response to the their neocolonial role as suppliers o f
commodities and consumers o f finished goods, Latin American states began to adopt
import substitution as a method to both escape the neocolonial relationships. Import
substitution, most successfully implemented by Chile, Brazil and Argentina, was
accompanied by the democratization o f political systems as Latin American states threw
off traditional military or military-backed dictatorships
However, by 1990 Latin American states found themselves still subordinated to
the more economically powerful states, and internal economic disparity remained
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unresolved although democratization was beginning to take hold. Before Anastasio
Somoza Debayle’s expulsion by the FSLN, Nicaragua had not overcome the military
dominated governments nor did it ever fully adopt import substitution as a national policy.
Rather, it turned to revolution to experiment with the FSLN Marxist-inspired solution.
While the FSLN ultimately failed, its legacy remains and affects Nicaragua’s recovery and
integration into the new world economic system.
After the Marxist-inspired Sandinista government was voted out o f office in 1990,
Nicaragua, as one o f the poorest states in the Western Hemisphere, had little choice but to
cooperate with the neoliberal solution. While the intentions o f the United States and its
allies in the neoliberal solution might be altruistic, the fifteen-year failure o f the program
gives reason for pause, and rationale for some would-be revolutionaries to seek yet
another system in Nicaragua. The Nicaragua case is important because it provides a test
bed that will, in the long run, prove or disprove the promises o f neoliberalism.1
It is difficult to argue that Nicaraguans adopting the neoliberal track is sufficient to
prove or disprove its value as a solution to the economic woes because the program is still
evolving. This is especially true in the face o f its previous eleven years under the mixedcommand economy system o f the Sandinistas and the distorted model o f capitalism under
the 45-year rule o f the Somoza dynasty. In the 1950s, the Nicaraguan economy had the
highest gross domestic product o f any Central American republic ending the decade at a
6.3 percent growth rate but at social costs 2 By 2005, Nicaragua had become one o f the

'In the post-Cold War context, extension o f power by economic means is the
critical component necessary for dominance by dominant north states. Thus, the success o f
the neoliberal agenda is critical-especially to the United States.
2See Table 2.
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poorest states in Latin America. Nicaragua, is now wed to the neoliberal solution, and its
fate will depend on how its internal domestic variables treat the pressures o f neoliberalism
In any case, it is “in for a penny, in for a pound.”
The reasons for Nicaragua’s failure thus far may lie, in part, because the neoliberal
strategy o f outside actors fail to consider the dynamics o f the internal, domestic
independent variables that are explained by a review o f the history. The premise o f the
hypothesis o f this work is based on that dynamic, those variables that are largely ignored
when calculations are made champions o f neoliberalism. Likewise, the Nicaraguans
themselves appear to ignore the consequences o f the domestic variables as it struggles to
adjust3 to the inevitable.
While most o f the literature treated below is purely historical and in some cases
narrowly focused on indigenous, minority or specific parts o f civil society, it also includes
works on the FSLN revolution, proactive organized labor and the cross-over o f the
Catholic Church into secular matters.

Political, Economy and Social Literature
The most complete and balanced study o f Nicaraguan history, and politics in the
past twenty years has been done by Thomas W. Walker, Director o f Latin American
Studies at Ohio University in Nicaragua - Living in the Shadow o f the Eagle4 He is the

3It is interesting to note that the FSLN adopted the word “ajusto” (adjustment) as
part o f its lexicon to define how the Nicaraguan people have adjusted in the p o st-1990
environment. The implication is that there is a need for such a term to explain the relative
failure o f neoliberalism when compared to the profound FSLN failure.
4Thomas W. Walker, Nicaragua - Living in the Shadow o f the Eagle, Fourth
Edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003).
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pre-eminent and most active modem scholar o f Nicaragua and its recent history. This
work contains new material and a compilation o f previous material.
His work provides a complete history from pre-colonial to post-Sandinista periods
His central theme is that the ever-present United States (metaphorically as the “eagle”)
irrevocably shaped Nicaragua, and denied it the opportunity to develop its own. W alker’s
work is exceedingly well detailed and thoroughly documented. It is clear that his work is
not just a compilation o f other works, but a result o f first-hand, on-the-scene experiences
including his first visits beginning in 1967, his presence in Managua at the entry o f the
victorious FSLN on 19 July 1979, and his later presence as an outside election observer
for the 1996 presidential election that Aleman won.
The earlier title o f this expanded work is Nicaragua: Lattd o f the Sandino. While
the endnotes to the fourth edition declare that Walker has a “succinct and even-handed
manner” (Gil Joseph, Yale University),5 it also clear that W alker’s approach is to discover
and elaborate on outside influences that distorted Nicaragua’s ability to develop as an
independent and prosperous Central American state. His language sometimes slips into
Marxist rhetoric and shades what is the modem seminal work on Nicaragua’s history.
His critical observations are not clouded by any love for the neocolonial
relationship that he sees neoliberalism as a contributing factor. Rather, his bias is toward
the mixed-model economy that the FSLN embarked on after its victory in July 1979.
[T]he neoliberal “reforms” enacted in Nicaragua from 1990 onward were actively
promoted by the United States and enforced by the multi-national lending
agencies . . . in which Washington exercised de facto veto power. . . . the
regressive social implications o f the IMF loans were simply incompatible with
their (Sandinistas’) visions o f a more just society. . . . And in 2001, in spite o f deep

5Ibid.
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concern over high levels o f corruption in the Aleman administration, the
international donor community formally admitted Nicaragua to the Highly
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, thus canceling much o f its foreign debt .6
Walker is empathetic with the plight o f the poor in Nicaragua; he discards the
neoliberal argument that a robust capitalist economy will benefit the poor, and improve
their well-being. He criticizes the “international lending community” and the United States
for perpetuating “regressive social” policy while giving little credence to the HIPC
initiative that canceled much o f the foreign debt and allowed the post-Sandinista
government to undertake social welfare reform.
Despite W alker’s obvious bias, this work is the most complete, thorough and well
researched work on Nicaraguan history available either in English or Spanish. This work is
really a work in progress having seen at least three iterations since the early 1980s.
Jaime Wheelock Roman’s7 work, Indigenous Races in the Nicaraguan Anti

colonial Fight in Nicaragua,8 on the plight o f the indigenous people is an extended
metaphor for the present-day relationship that Nicaragua has with the United States and
its economic partners. This historical recounting o f events is information well known and
understood by Nicaraguans in today’s context, and implicates the Catholic Church as a
partner in the subjugation. M oreover, the Nicaraguan people in the Spanish-speaking
most highly populated western third are an amalgam o f Spanish and indigenous. While
there are very few “pure” indigenous communities (an exception being Sutiava near
6Ibid., 100.
7Wheelock was a member o f the original FSLN National Directorate serving as the
Director o f Agriculture Development.
8Jaime Wheelock Roman, Raices Indigenas de la Lucha Anticolonialista en
Nicaragua, 2a edicion (Indigenous races in the Nicaraguan anti-colonial fight in
Nicaragua, 2nd edition), (Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores, S.A., 1976).
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Masaya), most Nicaraguans recognize their indigenous heritage and identify with
indigenous issues as their own.
Much o f W heelock’s reference material comes from the historical writings on the
pre-colonial period o f the Spanish priest chroniclers who had the task o f recording
conditions and events o f the conquest period. Certainly the most famous chronicler was
Fray Bartolome de las Casas who refused the usual rewards o f the Spanish conquistadors
to senior Catholic officials,9 and wrote o f the abuses o f the indigenous peoples in Central
America during the conquest period.10 Much o f de las Casas’ work is held in the National
Library in Mexico City where Jaime Wheelock did his research.
W heelock’s work is a compelling account o f the Spanish conquistadors determined
efforts, with the cooperation o f the Catholic Church officials, to subjugate the indigenous
people o f Nicaragua in furtherance o f the Spanish crow n’s search for material riches
Wheelock, on the back cover o f the book, writes that his approach to the subject is
counter to the usual less-controversial approach that “justifies the structure o f
domination” o f the pre-colonial period .11
9M anzar Foroohar, The Catholic Church and Social Change in Nicaragua
(Albany, New York: State University o f New York Press, 1989). The encomienda system
was a system o f rewarding conquistadores and those who accompanied them with land
holdings and rights to exploit indigenous peoples as they wished. This system was also
intended to secure land for the Spanish crown over the long term. High ranking Catholic
clergy participated in the system, and were therefore complicit in the abuses o f the
indigenous. Las Casas, however, refused to participate in the system, and by 1533 began
to chronicle the abuses. His work was instrumental in the reversal o f the system by the
Spanish Crown in 1542.
10The small city o f San Cristobal de las Casas in the state o f Chiapas, Mexico is
named after Bartolome de las Casas.
1‘Wheelock, while first recognized as a historian and history author, was one o f the
first members o f the FSLN junta and later held the official position o f Director,
Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform during the FSLN period.
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Wheelock is highly critical o f the brutality o f the conquistadores, especially Pedro
Davila (variously spelled DaVila or de Avila) who was named governor o f Nicaragua in
1527. Davila’s tactics to subjugate the indigenous included using attack dogs, enslavement
and forced labor as well as exportation as laborers to the Spanish crow n’s mining in Peru.
Wheelock includes material on the William Walker period and W alker’s plans to
enslave the indigenous people in furtherance o f his goal to expand and strengthen the
position o f the pre-Civil War Southern states. (See later discussion o f William Walker in
Chapter III.) Likewise, he documents the acts o f conservative Nicaraguan regimes to
expropriate indigenous lands for the use o f the oligarchy, most o f which occurred during
the administration o f Pedro Joaquin Chamorro in the late 19th Century.
Wheelock documents the indigenous uprising o f 1881 that, in effect was a general
strike, and involved more than 7,000 indigenous activists. For a period o f seven months
they carried out attacks on Matagalpa, the northern center o f the Nicaragua coffee region,
before being brought under control. The government accused Jesuits as instigators o f the
uprising and in June 1881 passed legislation to expel them. This is the first instance o f
organized labor action in Nicaragua that provided the model for later actions. The earliest
organized labor actions did not have political agendas; rather, they were focused on work
conditions and poor pay.
That Wheelock takes a non-classical look at the indigenous in Nicaragua reflects
his own political predilections that were revealed later when he became a member o f the
FSLN junta. His central theme is that the indigenous and otherwise politically helpless
peoples in Nicaragua have been systematically abused, and that historical memory gives
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rise to the likelihood o f a popular uprising o f the sort that later occurred in FSLN
revolution against the Somoza dynasty
The role o f the Catholic Church in Nicaragua from the pre-colonial period through
the elections o f 1990 is complex, and not easily treated from a purely political or religious
perspective. Manzar Foroohar does an admirable job o f capturing the larger issues o f the
role o f the Catholic Church in The Catholic Church and Social Change in Nicaragua 12
He avoids the potentially prickly religious issues that might prove contentious and
sensitive; his work is objectively analytical without any reference to making judgements as
to right or wrong o f the role o f the Church’s role.
Unquestionably, the role o f the Church as a primary force in domestic issues is
critical to this study, and this 1989 work o f Foroohar provides a well-documented,
comprehensive analysis. It is fair to say that while his work does not address the post1990 period, the patterns that he reveals are still relevant and at play
Foroohar’s work addresses the secular aspects o f the Church’s role. His book
includes many quotations and documents from Church officials to help illustrate the
changing positions and roles taken by the Church. He documents the Church’s complicity
in abusing the peasant classes by the ruling oligarchy. He also includes commentary on the
Church’s commitment to raising social consciousness o f the politically oppressed, and
taking an activist role in overthrowing Anastasio Somoza Debayle
Foroohar effectively demonstrates that the Church has never been a monolithic
institution in Nicaragua, and most often has been split in its political loyalties. The first
split Foroohar documents was the fight between the clergy in Nicaragua who wanted to

12Foroohar.
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preserve the encomienda system and those who followed las Casas’ lead. This is followed
by an account o f the next significant split o f the Church in the early 19th Century during
the independence movement. He details the alignment o f the Church’s priests with the
conservatives and liberals and the taking o f sides in national politics.13
Foroohar details the anti-clerical political efforts o f liberal presidents that began
with the 1830 confiscation o f church property by the state, and the prohibition o f certain
orders o f Church to operate in Nicaragua. There was no subtlety to the National
Assembly’s legislation: “All the properties o f extinguished monasteries in the country
belong to the state.” 14
In an interesting twist to the Church’s role in politics, it supported the illicit
presidency o f American filibusterer William W alker15 who recognized the importance o f
the Church’s support-especially in the legalization o f slavery. Conservative Church
officials in Granada were effusive in support o f slavery. At the end o f Nicaragua’s first
civil war in 1862, when Walker was finally ejected, the Conservative government further
cemented its relationship with the Church. A concordat made Catholicism the official
religion, and put the Church in charge o f education throughout Nicaragua. The agreement
gave the state rights to nominate bishops to the Vatican, but obliged the state to financially
underwrite the Church’s activities.

I3In the long term, until Anastasio Somoza Garcia (a nominal liberal) Anastasio
Somoza Garcia and Luis Somoza Debayle found accommodation with Church officials to
gain and maintain political power, but the Church found itself at odds with the liberals
under Anastasio Somoza Debayle.
14Ibid., 5.
15Among other professions, Walker was a medical doctor, journalist and preacher.
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Foroohar recounts that when Liberal Army General Jose Santos Zelaya took
power in the 1893 revolution, his view o f the Church’s role was entirely hostile. Zelaya’s
Constitution o f 1893 included strong separation o f church and state language, and
removed it from its role as the state’s education function.16 “Finally (Nicaragua’s) Bishop
Pereira y Castellon excommunicated the president [Zeyala], and Zelaya’s response was to
send the Bishop into exile.” 17 In effect, President Zelaya, with some political liability and
held in disdain by the United States government, carried out the doctrine o f “separation o f
church and state.”
The book’s postscript does not predict the 1990 election result. However, it details
the increasing influence o f Liberation Theology and the secular role o f the Church. Most
important, Foroohar provides considerable detail on the severe rift in Church in Nicaragua
that had developed to that point, and the dilemma that Cardinal Obando y Bravo had on
his hands. The joining o f progressive priests in the FSLN movement, and their role in the
new government was important to the FSLN success. The role that the activists priests
played averted the close scrutiny regarding its Marxists ideologies that the FSLN would
have undergone, and swelled the FSLN membership with loyal followers o f the activist
priests.
To illustrate the involvement o f the Church before the FSLN triumph: When
Anastasio Somoza Garcia was murdered by Rigoberto Lopez Perez, a student activist o f
the left-leaning Frente Juvenil Democratico (Democratic Youth Front), the Church

l6There are very few modem examples o f such an arrangement, but one that
survives is in Belgium where the Catholic Church runs the entire public school system.
17Ibid., 11.
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hierarchy in Nicaragua lost an important ally. After Somoza’s death, “ [Nicaragua]
Archbishop Gonzales y Robleto called the dictator ‘Prince o f the Church,’ and offered two
hundred days o f indulgence to the Catholics who would participate in his funeral ”
Following the 1956 Bishops Conference o f Central America held in San Jose,
Costa Rica, the pastoral letter included “The Church has always condemned the usury and
avarice, inequality and injustice resulting from the harnessing o f wealth, insufficient
salaries for minimum necessities o f life and the hated latifundia and monopolies.” 18 In
effect, the letter forecast the assumption o f an activist secular role that came about with
the 1968 Medellin Bishops’ Conference. It was in Medellin when the doctrine o f
Liberation Theology in Latin America was first articulated.
This shift in doctrine led to the accommodation between the political/economic
Marxist ideology and the Church’s new role that was first led in Nicaragua by priests such
as Ernesto Cardenal and Miguel D ’Escoto who participated in the FSLN-led revolution.
While there are many works and sources that seek to explain the rise and success
o f the leftist-inspired FSLN, one o f the most comprehensive is Maltide Zimmerman’s
work, Sandinista - Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution.19 Fonseca is revered
by the FSLN and its sympathizers as the spiritual founder o f the movement. He is
recognized as the worthy successor o f Augustino Cesar Sandino20 who sought to liberate
Nicaragua from outside forces and bring economic, social and political equity to
18Ibid.
19Matilde Zimmerman. Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan
Revolution (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2002).
20Cesar (Caesar) is the “honorific” name given to Augustino Sandino during his
civil war against the conservative government o f Nicaragua and the United States in the
early 1930s.
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Nicaragua. M ost o f all, he is recognized as a patriotic nationalist who sought to bring full
independence to Nicaragua. The reverence in which he is held is akin to that o f Cuba’s
Ernesto “Che” Guevara.
Zimmerman’s work begins with the aftermath o f Sandino’s murder at the hands o f
Anastasio Somoza Garcia’s GN henchmen in 1932, and richly details Fonseca’s dedication
to unseating the Somozas until his own death-also at the hands o f the GN under orders o f
Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1976; Fonseca did not live to see the victory o f the
Sandinistas.
An interesting aspect o f Zimmerman’s work is her discussion o f Fonseca’s belief
that there was no conflict between Marxism and Christianity. ‘“ Being a convinced
M arxist,’ wrote Fonseca, ‘does not exclude respecting the religious beliefs o f the
Nicaraguan people.’ . . . Catholic students did not have to renounce their religion to join
the FSLN . . ”21 Fonseca pointed to the example o f Camilo Torres, a Colombian activist
priest who had adopted a very similar philosophy. Torres, who had joined the antigovernment armed revolution in Colombia, was killed by government forces in 1966-tw o
years before Fonseca’s invoking his memory.
Her biography is a condemnation o f the abusive “lackey” Somoza dynasty as well
as a thorough history o f the FSLN movement itself. At the first assembly o f the FSLN
junta on July 20th, 1979 in the main square o f Managua crowds chanted “Carlos Fonseca,
Present,” a recognition that the spirit o f Fonseca ruled the moment .22

21Ibid., 104
22Ibid„ 221
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Jeffrey L. Gould’s work. To Lead as Equals - Rural Protest and Political

Consciousness in Chinandega, Nicaragua 1912-1979U is a comprehensive study o f labor
and labor movements in Nicaragua that covers the post-Zelaya period through the exit o f
Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Most o f the work is based on a detailed, on-the-ground study
o f the social and economic forces at play in the Chinandega Province o f Nicaragua. This
north Pacific coastal region is the richest agricultural area in Nicaragua that supports
nearly all agriculture except for the best coffee that is grown in the north central highlands.
G ould’s study covers the shift from a latifundia system that was the successor o f
the enconmienda system, to a system o f indigenous-run and owned ejidos that implies
communal cooperation in farming and other labor intensive endeavors His study
demonstrates the transition o f the peasants and small entrepreneurs from an apolitical,
obsequious existence to a politicized and mobilized work force that would affect the
outcome o f the revolution.24
Gould’s method is case study, and his primary vehicle for the study is the labor and
management history o f the Ingenio San Antonio (San Antonio Sugar Mill) located in
Chichigalpa, Chinandega Province. He documents the transition toward social
consciousness o f the workers, early labor union organization, strategies o f the oligarchy to
thwart labor organization, manipulation o f the Anastasio Somoza Garcia government to
coopt the movement into its own political strategy, the involvement o f the Catholic and

^Jeffrey L. Gould, To Lead as Equals - Rural Protest and Political Consciousness
in Chinandega, Nicaragua, 1912-1979 (Chapel Hill: The University o f N orth Carolina
Press, 1990).
24This change accounts for an important domestic variable that will affect the
outcome o f the neoliberal strategies o f the current government.
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Baptist Church, the attraction and growing power o f the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, the
formation o f politically inspired labor unions, and the ultimate effect that organized labor
had on the success o f victory o f the FSLN in 1979.
The history is long and complex but Gould pulls it together through the eyes o f the
rural peasant. Gould recounts that the early apolitical workers were enlisted by Liberal
forces to fight the Conservative government military forces. The Conservatives sought to
bring the region under political control. Their success in resisting the Conservative
government gave impetus to the government’s asking for and receiving aid from the
United States in the form o f U.S. Marines in October 1912. The U.S. Marines managed to
carry out their mission but at the expense o f anti-U.S. sentiment that still resonates today.
According to one account recorded by Gould,
In 1983, eighty-two-year-old Alberto Cortes claimed to remember the events quite
well. “The Chichigalpino rebels fought with machetes and one or tw o pistols.” . .
When the battle ended Lieutenant Long and his soldiers tied up thirteen
insurgentes and marched them to the steps o f San Bias Cathedral, in the center o f
town. There the Marines shot the rebels dead . . . the San Bias massacre became
part o f the popular consciousness. This incident reinforced anti-oligarchic
sentiments among the Chichigalpinos who would begin to link their opposition to
the Conservatives with their repudiation o f U.S. activities in Nicaragua.25
Somoza Garcia’s political astuteness and Machiavellian strategies convinced the
ISA workers, and the port workers at Corinto that his government would and could
improve their lot, and mediate labor disputes in the w orkers’ favor. Thus, Somoza
displaced the influence o f the various w orkers’ unions, and the Conservative Party-at least
until just after World War II. Essentially, Somoza managed to highjack the growing

25Ibid., 26.
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obrerismo (worker or worker“ism”) movement as his own taking advantage o f the rural
w orkers’ growing political consciousness, and propensity for collective action.
Strategies included Somoza’s alliance early in World War II with the influential
Nicaragua Socialist Party (PSN) that was organizing labor, and becoming increasingly
powerful.26 This remained the central method o f controlling organized labor; however, in
the long run, as Gould documents, organized labor in Nicaragua finally saw through the
strategy, and joined the FSLN-inspired revolution.
Gould’s contribution is his in-depth and detailed study o f labor and labor
organization-especially agrarian w orkers- during the period leading up to the Triumph.
He does not limit the study to the ISA workers; rather, he uses ISA as centerpiece case
study to provide a generalized understanding o f the forces at play in Nicaraguan labor and
how they were transformed into a politically consciousness, activist domestic force
A well-known author o f the FSLN period is Carlos M. Vilas. Vilas, an Argentine
economist who worked with the FSLN junta to develop strategies o f the mixed-economy
model during the 1980s. His work, Stale, Class & Ethnicity in Nicaragua,2' was done at
the Autonomous National University o f Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City. This work deals
with the plight o f the indigenous peoples in Nicaragua, especially those living along the

26Such an alliance with socialists during World War II represented no political
liability with regard to Somoza’s affirmed alliance with the United States and its allies that
included the Soviet Union. However, true to form, as the Cold War heated up after the
war, Somoza disengaged from the PSN and took steps to weaken it. Such astuteness was
always evident in Somoza Garcias’ relationship with labor. This trait was absent in the last
Somoza-Anastasio Somoza Debayle-who finally alienated labor and lost its support to the
FSLN.
27Carlos M. Vilas. State, Class & Ethnicity in Nicaragua: Capitalist
Modernization and Revolutionary Change on the Atlantic Coast (Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989).
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Miskito Coast (Caribbean coastal regions). Today the region represents a failure in FSLN
policy because that government was never able to integrate the eastern roughly two-thirds
o f Nicaragua into the revolution. Many o f the English-speaking people o f the region,
Creoles and indigenous Miskito alike, allied themselves with the Central Intelligence
Agency-supported CONTRA forces.
Vilas’ later book published in 1995, Between Earthquakes and Volcanoes -

Market, State, and Revolution in Central America,2* takes a more global approach to the
issue o f how economics affect stability, the human condition, political and social
consciousness o f the poor, and the role o f the Catholic Church. Likewise, in Between

Earthquakes he addresses the influences o f the United States and its economic allies in the
global economy but does not address neoliberalism per se.
His primary criticism o f the United States during the administrations o f Presidents
Reagan, Carter and Bush I is their failure to recognize that the fundamental issue was
economic disparity, not an ideological conflict.29 He details human rights abuses carried
out by surrogates for the United States, and cites dollar figures for those military and
paramilitary operations-money that could have been devoted to the alleviation o f poverty
He also recounts instances o f how the United States withheld funds from the IMF,
the World Bank, and the Economic Support Fund (ESF) o f the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) to force the various Nicaraguan governments into
some compliance; the release o f funding was conditioned on various demands o f the

28Carlos M. Vilas. Between Earthquakes and Volcanoes - Market, State and
Revolution in Central America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995).
29Ibid., 133.
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United States and its allies.30 Vilas makes the very convincing point that the with holding
o f funds forced little political compliance but caused a great deal o f suffering among the
poor.
During the FSLN period, Nicaragua was altogether excluded from external
economic assistance (except that received from the Soviet Union and its surrogate,
Cuba)including President Carter’s embargo o f the last aid package approved by the U S
Congress before the FSLN took power. This combination strategy o f the United States
and its Cold War allies is called the “dirty war” by Vilas who summarizes it from an
objective and relatively unbiased optic.
He rhetorically asks whether the FSLN revolutionary Triumph in Nicaragua was a
success, and answers that it is too difficult to judge. However, he writes, “The presence o f
a revolutionary option was important not only for its sake, but also for the reactions and
counter strategies it evoked from the groups that were beneficiaries o f the established
order.”31 This observation is important because it helps explain how domestic internal
variables affect current neoliberal policy o f President Bolanos
A well-known political commentator and highly respected university professor in
Nicaragua, Oscar-Rene Vargas, is an FSLN supporter whose observations are important
to domestic readership in Nicaragua. His 2001 book, Eleven Years After the Adjustment,32
now in its third edition, is a critical analysis o f the mid-term results o f the relatively abrupt

30Ibid., 130.
31Ib id , 138.
320scar-R ene Vargas, Once Ahos Despues del Ajuste, Resultadosy perspectivas,
3ra edition [Eleven years after the adjustment, results and perspectives, 3rd edition]
(Managua: National Board o f Nicaraguan Universities, 2001).
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transition from the FSLN mixed-model, Marxist-inspired system to the neoliberal, nominal
democratic model seen today.
This is an up-to-date book that includes information on the HIPC and anti-poverty
strategies that have been developed as a part o f the conditions set forth by the IMF and
World Bank to embark on the full program o f grants, low-interest loans, loan forgiveness
and other assistance. The book is rich with well-cited statistics that underlie his central
thesis that no matter the apparent intentions o f the neoliberal champions (particularly the
“technocrats” o f the Bolanos’ government), the programs that are being put in place are
doomed to failure.
While avoiding mention o f the FSLN failures o f the period before the “eleven
years” he outlines the obvious domestic issues that govern or predict long-term success
These include pervasive corruption in government, shaky infrastructure, pervasive
poverty, pervasive economic disparity, poor health services, high illiteracy and a general
inability o f the larger population to participate in the “above ground” economy.
Vargas remarks that in the 1990s Nicaragua saw a return to old habits o f “crony
capitalism,” and accuses the Bolanos government o f having no real sense o f direction
while ignoring the human condition o f the people. His indictment o f the current policies o f
Nicaragua focuses on the failure o f domestic independent variables to change in a way that
would make best use o f the international neoliberal debt relief. He is also highly critical o f
the large number o f international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that operate in
Nicaragua under approval from the national government. His rationale is based on his
allegation that such NGOS are detrimental to Nicaragua’s natural, self-driven
development.
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The greatest vacuum o f the government lies in social politics. The offers o f support
by the government to the NGOs have created . . . [the vacuum] . . . and their
presence is a simulation to cover the (government’s) failures. The NGOs must
reconsider their political support. The time has come that they must clarify and
establish their political and social intentions.33
In effect, Vargas sees the various NGOs as having been coopted by the national
government for purely pragmatic and political purposes, and in the larger sense part o f the
failure o f the neoliberal policies o f the government.
In particular, he criticizes the anti-poverty program “The logic o f the liberal
technocrats is that they reduce society to econom y-the economy o f finance, and economy
o f economic speculation Civil society must drive the logic that the economy should serve
the people.”34 He criticizes the Nicaraguan government as, above all, self serving
remarking that they must be answerable to the public at large to be effective.
Vargas’ very complete discussion seems to validate the adage that “The more
things change, the more they stay the same ” Certainly, his outlook is not optimistic, but
he blames and elaborates domestic forces that are impeding progress rather than the
external neoliberal forces. He also lays blame at the feet o f international institutions for
being blind to domestic impediments such as corrupt political systems and eleven years o f
painful misdirected restructuring while insisting on the same neoliberal policies that in
other instances have led to further poverty and do not address the true issues in
Nicaragua.35
33Ibid., 206. Inferentially, this quotation suggests that some o f the NGOs may
have more than altruistic goals in mind; however, he did not specify further.
34Ibid., 207.
35The official title o f the joint poverty reduction program o f the World Bank and
IMF is Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) or, in Spanish, Estragia
Antipobreza Facilidad (ESAF).
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The activist priests who appeared on the scene in Nicaragua as early as the mid1960s, and whose self-driven secular activity was validated by the 1968 Bishops’
Conference (CELAM) in Medellin (Liberation Theology) have found themselves in a
period o f introspection. The most-often published priest is Ernesto Cardenal Martinez, a
Jesuit who joined the FSLN before the Triumph. He, among other priests took up key
positions in the original FSLN National Directorate include Miguel D ’Escoto Brockman
(Minister o f Foreign Relations), Edgardo Parrales Castillo (Minister o f Social Welfare)
and Fernando Cardenal Martinez.30 (Fernando Cardenal Martinez served first as the
Director o f Sandinista Youth and later the Minister o f Education).
Ernesto Cardenal’s most recent book, The Lost Revolution,37 is a sort o f lament o f
the failure o f the FSLN revolution. He also sees the period as more than revolution His
premise is that the revolution was inevitable because o f the abuses o f the Somoza dynasty
and those before. Cardenal provides a narrative style account o f the early days o f
resistance and the efforts o f activist priests in forming what came to be known as the
Popular (or people’s) Church o f Liberation Theology.
He recounts an early association at the National Autonomous University o f
Mexico in Mexico City with Pedro Chamorro (La Prensa co-owner and managing editor,
and spouse o f later widowed President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro) and other
Nicaraguans from prominent families. It was there, he writes, that he first articulated his

36Em esto Cardenal’s brother.
37Em esto Cardenal Martinez. La Revolucion Perdida ( The lost revolution)
(Managua: Anama Ediciones Centroamericanas, 2003).
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vision o f political change in Nicaragua but, at the same time, made it clear that he did not
envision the founding o f separate political party or movement
Cardenal provides a very detailed history o f his and his com patriots’ efforts (both
in religious and political senses) to alleviate the plight o f the poor, usually rural peasantry
through social and political consciousness programs supported by the members o f the
PCLT. He maintains that those activist priests chose to participate in the FSLN
revolutionary activities because it best served their own goals but by no means did he
consider such the joining o f the movement with religion as any more than a synergistic
cooperative e ffo rt38 However, he does allow that the FSLN embraced Marxist philosophy
in clear opposition to the Nicaraguan Church hierarchy led by Obando y Bravo.
He is quite blunt about the famous 1983 incident in which Pope Paul II visited
Nicaragua, and on the tarmac o f the airfield refused to allow Cardenal to kiss his (the
Pope’s) ring. No doubt, that event further enlarged the rift between the PCLT and the
more traditional Nicaraguan Roman Catholic Church.
In 1978 Cardenal traveled to Costa Rica where he helped reorganize the FSLN for
its final assault on Somoza’s forces. He provides rich detail including names, places,
incidents and tactical planning. He was one o f first group that traveled by air from Costa
Rica in the final push, and in active voice reveals the thoughts and reservations o f those
who participated. His account provides a narrative o f the time line, personalities, and other
facts that lend understanding as to who was supporting whom in the turnover.
As both priest and member o f the inner circle o f the FSLN, he became the de facto
voice o f the movement. The month before the final FSLN push, he gave press conferences

38Ibid., 42-43
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in Costa Rica to enhance the reputation o f the FSLN. At that point, the movement was
known as the “Group o f Twelve,” and according to Cardenal the U.S. Government
believed the leadership consisted o f only five Sandinistas. He remarks that had President
Carter known o f the other two Sandinista members, he would not have proceeded to
remove Anastasio Somoza Debayle 39
Later, the group grew to eighteen junta members, but Washington was still blind to
the truth o f the Sandinista strength. “Bernard Diederich, a North American writer, wrote
that there were only two on the list who were leftist radicals, they were Comandante
Tomas Borge, Minister o f the Interior, and Father Ernesto Cardenal, Minister o f
Culture.”40
When Somoza fled Nicaragua with his entourage on 17 July 1979, Violeta
Chamorro read an FSLN Junta Proclamation via Radio Sandino broadcasting from Costa
Rica: “We offer to create an authentic government o f national unity, and this promise has
come to pass.”41
Cardenal, as a member o f the inner circle, was in a position to know the most
sensitive matters. One example o f his inside knowledge and his detail reports on the
pressure brought to bear by Costa Rica: “The President o f Costa Rica insisted that the
junta [immediately] establish a force in Nicaragua in a liberated area; in any case, we felt
pressure from him to leave so that he could rid himself o f the problem At midnight (July

39Ibid., 299.
40Ibid , 300
41Ibid„ 299
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17), we took flight in two airplanes provided by Costa Rica to land in Leon from where
we would proceed toward Managua ”42
One o f the major themes throughout the book is Cardenal’s condemnation o f the
U.S. military, and Central Intelligence Agency role in first supporting Anastasio Somoza
Debayle, and then later opposing the FSLN government in the Contra War. He details the
mining o f the Gulf o f Fonseca and the tactic o f dropping anti-Sandinista leaflets by air just
before the arrival o f the Pope.43
The most important conclusions Cardenal makes in the last chapter o f the book are
(1) the failure o f Daniel Ortega to win the 1990 presidential election and (2) the ultimate
betrayal o f the core FSLN cadre o f the revolution for personal gain.44 “If the morning o f
the Triumph was the most beautiful dream o f my life, the morning o f the [1990 election]
loss was . . [the worst].”45
His analysis o f the defeat o f the FSLN at the polls in 1990 provides grist for
thought. He recognizes the failure o f the FSLN in carrying out promises, and he

42Ibid., 302. This accounting o f events implicates Costa Rica in its stonewalling the
United States’ efforts to thwart the revolution, and it developed later that Costa Rica
actively opposed any operations launched from its territory during the Contra War period.
43Ibid„ 620.
44It is notable that Daniel Ortega, the leader o f the Sandinista Front and dominant
player in the 2005 National Assembly has allied himself with former President Aleman
who was convicted o f embezzlement and corruption. Such as alliance gives pause to any
naive supporter o f that pact, and gives comfort to those who believe that “business as
usual” should return as the solution o f choice. Cardenal makes no distinction between the
sins o f Aleman and those Sandinista leaders who, he contends, betrayed the movement
The “business as usual” attitude is a factor in the internal domestic independent variable o f
civil society and its behavior vis-a-vis adoption o f neoliberal reforms.
45Ibid , 649.
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specifically identifies the United States as the responsible agent through economic
starvation o f the people.
He rationalizes the 1990 election defeat as proof that the FSLN government was
truly democratic, and that the defeat was really a moral victory. He continues that the
defeat o f the FSLN was a pihata (golden parachute) for the FSLN core leadership. “We
don’t have absolute proof (o f systematic looting o f the treasury) but we can name names.
. . . Humberto Ortega, Bayardo Arce, Tomas Borge . . . now are millionaires, and they
were not during the revolution.”46 “Before in the Marxist fight that was a scientific
certainly o f immediate triumph Those who only believed [in Marxism], have become
disillusioned with the revolutionary fight after the [election] failure. But those who fought
did it because it was a just cause, a cause o f love-win or lose. For the Christians, the
symbol will continue to be the cross . ,”47
The FSLN carried out its commitment to gender equality even before the July
1979 Triumph. While exact records are not available, some literature suggests that up to
forty percent o f the fighting forces for the FSLN were women. With the victory o f the
FSLN, women began to take their place in the government and formed organizations that
championed women’s causes. Despite the fact the Violeta Chamorro was one o f the
members o f the original FSLN junta, her 1990 election to the presidency brought a great
deal o f frustration because her policies seemed to reverse gains made by women during
the FSLN period.

“ Ibid., 662.
47Ibid., 665.
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In Cynthia Chavez M etoyer’s Women and the State in Post-Sandinista

Nicaragua,48 this issue is fully elaborated. She states that her estimation o f women
participating in the revolution was between 25 and 30 percent. She allows that women’s
issues were not at the top o f the FSLN list, but that the victory “opened political spaces in
which women’s equality and other interests could be pursued.”49 Her indictment o f
President Chamorro and neoliberalism is explicit:
When Chamorro assumed the presidency on February 25, 1990, she intended to
reactivate Nicaragua’s economy by shifting from the Sandinista redistributive
social model to an export-model economy based on neoliberal principles. . .
Structural adjustment policies aim to remedy stagnant economies by shifting the
responsibility o f survival from the state to the household. . . Because women are
traditionally responsible for managing the household and contributing to
household income generation, it is no surprise that women’s share o f the work is
increasing worldwide under structural adjustm ent50
Chavez’ observation that the growth o f the informal economy has affected women
more than men is an oft heard complaint from the anti-globalization forces. She observes
that while the percentage o f women in the work force has grown, in fact most o f the
growth has shifted to the informal sector.51
Chavez complains that under the FSLN-sponsored AMNLAE, the women’s
movement was monolithic and well focused, however, because o f neoliberalism the

48Cynthia Chavez Metoyer, Women and the State in Post-Sandinista Nicaragua
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).
49Ibid., 3-4.
“ Ibid., 5. Outside o f the women’s content o f this quotation per se, this provides a
concise summary o f the differences between market-economy systems and egalitarian, re
distributive systems in the Marxist model.
51Ibid., 81-83.
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movement disintegrated into more than 200 separate groups.52 She notes, however, that
by 1996 the National W omen’s Coalition had been formed and supported in part by a
grant from USAID. The Coalition was formed in the last year o f the Chamorro
administration, and has taken up community-based programs to address spousal abuse,
child abuse, underemployment, and health issues. Chavez concludes that, on the whole,
the FSLN gave impetus to the w om en’s movement in Nicaragua, and that while
neoliberalism impedes more progress that should be made, the establishment o f the
Coalition has given women a voice in the political process.
Before his assassination in Asuncion, Paraguay, Anastasio Somoza Debayle
completed a book in collaboration with U.S. writer Jack Cox Nicaragua Betrayed53 is
intended as both a rejoinder to U.S. foreign policy, and condemnation o f the United States
government in general. It is rich with detail, and includes facsimile copies or reprints o f
various cables and transcripts o f recordings made during Somoza’s last months.
It would be irresponsible not to include this book because, while it is an
acrimonious condemnation o f the United States and its key allies, it provides insight into
the real thinking o f Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Somoza’s acrimonious and nearly
palpable vitriol directed against President Carter and the U.S. State Department betrays
that Somoza Debayle had absolutely no understanding o f the plight o f the Nicaraguan
people nor the reasons why the rebellion against his government was so universal in
character. Likewise, he found it difficult to fathom why he, as such an ardent anti-

52Ibid., 101.
53Anastasio Somoza and Jack Cox, Nicaragua Betrayed (Boston: Western Islands,
1980).
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Communist, would be forced to step down from his position as head o f state and the
commander o f the Nicaraguan military.
In any case, Somoza details Nicaragua’s faithful “service” to the United States
during his time and infers the long-time almost obsequious allegiance beginning with his
father’s first assuming de facto control, as anti-Nazi (anti-fascist) and then as anti
communist.
Whether support for the United States and its allies was real or little more than
pragmatic politics, the evidence is clear that Nicaragua helped the United States in many
ways Such support, over a forty-year period ranged from allowing U.S. military bases in
Nicaragua during World War II to protect the Caribbean, to permitting a permanent U S
Navy communications station to operate on C om Island off the Caribbean coast,54 to
support for the CIA in the overthrow o f President Arbenz o f Guatemala in 1954, to the
basing o f CIA operations for the Bay o f Pigs to the consistent pro-US votes in the United
Nations.
Somoza opened his book at the logical point in time that he saw the undoing o f the
Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua: the 1972 Christmas earthquake that virtually destroyed
Managua and its entire infrastructure. While he was not head-of-state at the time, as one
o f three GN generals who were running the Republic, and as Chief o f Staff o f the GN, he
assumed command o f the rescue and cleanup efforts.55 The disaster was so complete that
it reversed Nicaragua’s good reputation as an economic leader in Central. Somoza details

54The U.S. Navy departed the small communications base just as the FSLN took
power
55Somoza Debayle won the presidency in Nicaragua’s next national election as the
candidate for the Liberal Party.
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the deterioration o f relations with the U.S. Congress, “false” accusations o f corruption in
the handling o f earthquake relief funds, interference from the Catholic Church in
Nicaragua, a falling out with the conservative oligarchy o f Nicaragua, and an acceleration
o f Sandinista rebel activity-particularly in the north and northwest regions.
The undoing o f his relationship with the Carter administration, he claims, was due
to the purposeful siding o f President Carter with the would-be Marxist government o f the
FSLN that by late 1978 was poised in Costa Rica to move into place. U.S. Ambassador to
Managua, Lawrence Pezzullo, delivered the demands o f the Carter administration that he,
Somoza, step aside. Nicaragua Betrayed contains 65 pages o f transcripts o f recordings
he made during his meetings with various high ranking U.S. officials in Managua. It is not
clear that in all cases the recordings were made with the permission o f all parties. The
transcripts clearly reveal C arter’s developing and final policy toward Somoza.
In a taped conversation, Somoza quotes himself: “W hat’s most important

is

that Nicaragua not fa ll into the Communists hands, [italicization in original] The national
interest o f the U.S. will not be served well if the Communists take over this country.”
Pezzullo responded, “Agreed, agreed!”56
In their last meeting transcript between Pezzullo, Somoza Debayle and Somoza’s
son (a lieutenant colonel in the GN), Pezzullo revealed that Somoza would not be afforded
diplomatic immunity if he fled to the United States but stated, “You could be arrested for
crimes, so you wouldn’t have that immunity. But you will have the protections o f the
law.”57

^Ibid., 371.
57Ibid., 374.
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Somoza punctuates his acrimony with what he saw as a clear betrayal by the
United States. He continues describing his meeting with Ambassador Pezullo. At the
conclusion o f the meeting, Somoza reminded Pezzullo that Panama, Costa Rica and other
states were complicit in his downfall, and were actively supporting the FSLN effort with
arms and ammunition. Pezzullo took the information as intelligence, not commentary,
and added that other states including Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama were joining to
urge Somoza’s departure.58
In a November 1978 meeting, Envoy William Jorden,59 outlined the case for
Anastasio Somoza’s departure to Somoza Jorden’s outline reflected a worse-case
scenario that would result in a communist takeover. His points included (1) an increasing
political polarization that would deny a moderate government a chance to be successful,
(2) an increasing potential for national economic collapse to would lead to political
turmoil, (3) an increasing success o f the Sandinista forces taking advantage o f the first two
points, (4) a fear o f would-be moderate political opposition to challenge Somoza

58An interesting historical sidenote with regard to Panama and its head o f state at
the time, General Omar Torrijos, is that Somoza Debayle facilitated the return o f Torrijos
to Panama in mid-October 1968 to successfully challenge a coup that had occurred while
he was visiting Mexico for a short vacation. Somoza provided an airplane and names an
experienced American bush pilot, Red Gray, to facilitate Torrijos’ entry into western
Panama at Malek Airport in the city o f David near the Costa Rica border. Major Manuel
Noriega was the local military commander who helped Torrijos return and Noriega was
later awarded the position as Chief o f Intelligence for Torrijos. (Personal knowledge o f
this author who was assigned to the Panama Canal Zone during these events.
59U.S. Envoy o f the Organization o f American States, International Commission o f
Friendly Cooperation and Conciliation. Jorden was just previously the U.S. Ambassador
to the Republic o f Panama.
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because o f his reputation for crushing opposition and (5) the United States governm ent’s
view that only outside mediation would prevent a catastrophe60
Somoza’s response to Jorden’s final recommendation that William Rogers, former
Assistant Secretary o f State for Latin America, serve as mediator was met with outright
rejection. Jorden’s response was to paraphrase a previous Somoza statement. “

you

have said in the past that the choice is either you, Somoza, or chaos, and we don’t believe
that those are our only alternatives.”61
This work serves to illustrate the increasing deterioration o f Somoza’s legitimacy,
that his stubbornness may have radicalized the final result due to his repressive measures,
and that his legacy affects the political behavior o f the time affects the patterns o f domestic
behavior today.
The term “globalization” evokes an almost visceral reaction from its widely varied
opponents, and opposition to it manifests itself in sometimes violent demonstration such as
seen at the World Trade Organization ministerial summits held in Seattle and Genoa The
term is no more than a generalization o f a process that defines significantly increased
interchange including trade, politics, and society in the world; and that he dominance o f
the United States in the post-Cold War environment is a strong influence on accelerating
speed and completeness o f globalization.
Opponents to globalization are most often concerned with its effects relative to
south states’ economic well-being o f people, and related issues such as health and
education. The primary concern among opponents that include both individuals, national

"Ibid., 314-315.
61Ibid., 317.
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and transnational organizations, and Third World governments is increasing disparity
between “haves” and “have-nots ” It is important that the history and tenets o f
neoliberalism (often generalized as globalization) be fully elaborated for a fuller
understanding o f the dilemma that Nicaragua faces.
Liberalism and neoliberalism are terms that have both political and economic
definitions, and defined in both disciplines as well; in most cases they overlap.62 Marxism is
a theory that is a political economy model, i.e., it has components that touch on ideas
about politics and economy that are mutually inclusive.
As it developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the
intellectual movement was known as liberalism emphasized individual freedom as the
ultimate goal in society. It supported laissez faire economics at home as a means o f
reducing the role o f the state thereby enlarging the role o f the individual; it supported free
trade abroad as a means o f linking the nations o f the world together peacefully and
democratically. In political matters it supported the development o f representative

62Robert Jervis. “Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation,” International
Security, Volume 24 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute o f Technology,
Summer 1999), 45. Jervis makes the distinction that neoliberalism is defined by the school
o f thought that analyzes international issues. “Neoliberal institutionalists concentrate on
issues o f international political economy (IPE) and the environm ent;. . . Thus . . . it would
correct to say th a t . . . (realism) sees more conflict in the world . . . than in the world
analyzed by neoliberals . . . because they study different worlds. . . . neoliberal
institutionalism is more concerned with efficiency and realism focuses more on issues o f
distribution, which are closely linked to power as both an instrument and a stake . .
Neoliberalism’s argument (usually implicit) that distributional conflicts are usually less
important than potential common gains stems at least in part from its substantive concern
with issues in which large mutual benefits are believed to be possible, such as protecting
the environment, rather than disputes over . . . territory, status and influence.” Likewise,
Jervis makes the point that neoliberals are most concerned with absolute gains while he
wonders whether states concentrate too much on the realist tenet that only relative gains
matter.
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government and o f parliamentary institutions, reduction in the arbitrary power o f the state,
and protection o f the civil freedoms o f individuals.63 Much o f this thought can be seen in
Simon Bolivar’s “Letter from Jamaica” (Appendix III.) wherein he invokes the memory
o f the indigenous peoples o f Latin America and yearns for republicanism.
The Nineteenth Century liberal regarded an extension o f freedom as the most
effective way to promote welfare and equality, the twentieth-century liberal regards
welfare as either prerequisites o f or alternatives to freedom In the name o f welfare and
equality, the Twentieth Century liberal has come to favor a revival o f the very politics o f
state intervention and paternalism against which classical liberalism fought.64
Driven by economic distress and pervasive poverty, the post-Sandinista period in
Nicaragua forced the succeeding governments o f Chamorro, Aleman and Bolanos to take
action; they had little choice but to respond to the overtures o f the only option available
That option was to salvage what was left after the departure o f the FSLN and Daniel
Ortega by opening itself to foreign economic forces. The United States and its allies put
forth a program o f economic neoliberalism as the model for prosperity and economic
salvation.
Economic neoliberalism may, in the minds o f Nicaraguans, be no more than
another false promise but the facts remain that it is the only option in play. Whether

“ Beginning in the late nineteenth century, and especially after 1930 in the United
States, the term liberalism came to a very different meaning, particularly in economic
policy. It came to be associated with a readiness to rely primarily on the state rather than
on private voluntary arrangement to achieve objectives regarded as desirable. The
catchwords became welfare and equality rather than freedom.
^M ilton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Fortieth Anniversary Edition
(Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 2002), 5-6.
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Nicaragua chooses to fully embrace the program o f near-unfettered capitalism is a matter
o f which domestic variables singly or in combination finally tilt the scale in favor o f full
implementation. The history o f world economics and the experience o f Nicaragua as
influenced by the various theories and national policies o f more powerful states
conditioned Nicaragua and its people in ways that are not well understood.
A very brief review o f the classical economy theorists is appropriate to help explain
and predict how Nicaragua developed into an imperfect model o f theoretical free market
economy. The transition from mercantilism during the colonial period to a market system
early in the IQ* Century nearly perfectly coincides with the theories o f Adam Smith, John
Mills and David Ricardo, and Nicaragua’s emergence as an independent state.
David Ricardo’s Principles o f Political Economy and Taxation65 and his remarks
on Adam Smith’s observations on what was to become labeled neoliberalism are included
to provide a point o f departure in the discussion o f neoliberalism. While both posited that
free trade without government controls would be advantageous to all traders, Smith’s
absolute advantage model was further refined by Ricardo in his comparative advantage
model which is the basic and underlying premise o f neoliberlism.
Smith’s observation was that economies should be allowed to operate in a laissez

faire manner but with very minimal government intervention to maximize its efficiency
for the general good. The cited edition’s introductory author, Alan B. Krueger, wrote:
With regard to the subject o f neoliberalism and globalization, Smith makes
observations throughout the tome that seem especially current and valid if the
reader is in the neoliberal camp. . . . His observation was t h a t . . . restrictions on

65David Ricardo, Principles o f Political Economy and Taxation, (London: J.M.
Dent & Sons 1911; Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1996). Citations are to the
Prometheus edition.
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trade are, in the long run, detrimental to both the importing and exporting states.
To give the monopoly o f the home-market to the produce o f domestic industry, in
any particular art o f manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in
what manner they ought to employ their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be
either a useless or hurtful regulation.66
David Ricardo, influenced by Adam Smith, in Principles o f Political Economy and

Taxation, expanded on economic theory and is most famous for his economic theory o f
“comparative advantage” in trade. He makes the central case for neoliberalism with Adam
Smith’s support:
Adam Smith, . . . has shown that, by permitting every country freely to exchange
the produce o f its industry when and where it pleases, the best distribution o f labor
o f the world would be effected, and the greatest abundance o f the necessaries and
enjoyments o f human life will be secured. . . . “The monopoly o f the colony trade,”
he says, “like all other mean and malignant expedients o f the mercantile system,
depresses the industry o f all other countries, but chiefly that o f the colonies . . ,”67
Richard Rosecrance in his The Rise o f the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the

Coming Century,68 provides a brief explanation o f how Smith and Ricardo influenced
Great Britain’s economic and political policies, and turn toward a comparative advantage
model.69 Such policy adjustments can be seen as an early form o f neoliberalism.
After World War II with the emergence o f the Bretton Woods agreement, the
Western allies embarked on a highly structured economic framework that included the
introduction o f the IMF, the General Agreement on Trade and Tarriffs (GATT - now in its
more proactive transfiguration as the World Trade Organization), and the World Bank

“ Ibid., 573.
67Ibid., 234.
68Rjchard Rosecrance, The Rise o f the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the
Coming Century {New York: Basic Books, 1999).
69Ibid., 216-217.
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with its various major subdivisions. Other regional instruments sprung from the agreement
that included the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)that affects development in
Latin America.70 (Notably, there are other less powerful economic instruments that are
under the exclusive control o f the region’s states.)
John Maynard Keynes in his The General Theory o f Employment, Interest, and

Money71 lays out a theory o f state economic interventionism as a tool o f state power in
manipulation o f fiscal and monetary policy.
His theory has been institutionalized in such instruments o f economic power and
policy as the United States Federal Reserve, the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. While the United States and the economic IGOs that it controls put forth
economic neoliberalism as the solution for Nicaragua, it is still is reluctant to allow an
entirely free market economy for itself having long ago conditioned itself to the tools o f
the Bretton W oods regime.72
Neoliberal economic policy and theory have roots in liberal economic policy and
theory o f the past. Milton Friedman o f the “Chicago School” o f laissez faire economics is
an early and central theorist, and strongest proponent o f late 20th century economic theory.
In his best known work, Capitalism and Freedom, he uses the term “liberal” in its classic

70It is the “soft” power exercised by those institutions-mostly controlled by the
United States-that shapes the well-being o f Latin American states. However, that control
o f power is subject to severe scrutiny and criticism.
71John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory o f Employment, Interest, and Money
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936; New York: Prometheus Books, 1997).
References are to the Prometheus edition.
72Keynes was a prominent representative o f Great Britain in the negotiations at the
close o f World War I that resulted in the Treaty o f Versailles, and a representative in the
early Bretton W oods talks.
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sense and protests strongly that the enemies o f liberalism and capitalism (market
economists) have appropriated the term.
Friedman’s elaboration o f liberal economic theory was originally published in 1962

(Capitalism and Freedom, University o f Chicago) in the Cold W ar model o f response to
Marxist-inspired states The post-World War II theories o f John Maynard Keynes and its
application in the Bretton Woods Agreement are particularly troubling to Friedman.
Friedman is an influential protagonist for free trade with minimal government
intervention. His work, while based on economic analysis, is also political statement
against the interventionist model o f John Maynard Keynes and any Marxist theory
(“welfare state”) in any form (See below for Marx discussion.)
Friedman, the central theorist o f the so-called “Chicago School” o f economics,
credits Friedrich Hayek in his 1944 work, The Road to Serfdom, for laying the
groundwork for the arguments against central planning that was essential to
Marxist-inspired states. Friedman makes a strong argument that economic freedom with a
minimum o f government interference is part and parcel o f political freedom. He uses the
term “liberal” in the classic (now-all-but-United States) sense (see above)
[Some] activities currently undertaken by government in the U.S. that cannot, so
as I can see, validly be justified . . .
Parity price su p p o rt. . . for agriculture.
Tarriffs on imports or restrictions on exports
Government control o f output
Rent control
Legal minimum wage rates
Detailed regulation o f industries
[C]ontrol o f radio and television by the Federal Communications Commission.
[Compulsory] social security programs [and the requirement that annuities be
bought] from a publicly operated enterprise.
Licensure provisions . . . which restrict
enterprises or occupations or professions
to people who have a license, where the license is more than a . . . tax
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So-called public housing
and other subsidy programs directed at fostering
residential construction such as F.H.A and V.A. mortgage guarantees
Conscription . . . in peacetime
National parks
The legal prohibition on the carrying o f mail for profit.
Publicly owned and operated toll roads73
Friedman’s work looks like the basis for economic neoliberalism in the Washington
Consensus context that is the mantra o f the Paris Club instruments. In effect, Friedman
sought to de-construct Keynesian economics and propose a laissez faire system monitored
by the Federal government that could use monetary policy to make any necessary
adjustment. He provides the framework for the neoliberal policy o f today in advocating a
free-market system with minimal controls
The most far-reaching criticism has come from the Marxists. Marx argued that
labor was exploited. Why? Because labor produced the whole o f the (continued)
product but only got part o f it. Even if the statements o f fact implicit in this
assertion were accepted, the value judgement follows only if one accepts the
capitalist ethic. Labor is “exploited” only if labor is entitled to what it produces If
one accepts instead the socialist premise, “to each according to his need, from each
according to his ability”-w hatever that may mean-it is necessary to compare
what labor produces, not with what it gets but with its “ability,” and to
compare what labor gets, not with what it produces but with its “need.”74
Friedman sees w orkers’ salvation in healthy economies and political democracy.
With regard to welfare and poverty issues, he addresses the issues in political terms
making the distinction between political democracy and egalitarian democracy. His
approach seems hard-nosed even to the neoliberal who recognizes a need to alleviate
poverty if, for any purpose, but to stimulate economy and grow the economic system.
Friedman has a different approach:

73Friedman, 35-36.
74Ibid.
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The liberal w ill. . . distinguish sharply between equality o f rights and equality o f
opportunity, on the one hand, and material equality or equality o f outcome on the
other. He may welcome the fact that a free society, in fact, tends toward greater
material equality than any other yet tried. But he will regard this as a desirable
by-product o f a free society, not its major justification. . . . The egalitarian w ill. . .
want to go further. He will defend taking from some to give to others, not as a
more effective means whereby the “some” can achieve an objective they want to
achieve but on the grounds o f “justice.” At this point, equality comes sharply into
conflict with freedom; one must choose. One cannot be both an egalitarian, this
sense, or a liberal.75
Friedman’s premise challenges the very definition o f neoliberalism which, in its
present form, actively addresses issues o f poverty and welfare. His approach has more to
do with individual initiative with the provision o f equal opportunity and access to
economic systems, not equal outcomes as suggested by Marx.76
Robert G. Gilpin, in discussion o f the relationship between hegemonic powers and
economic liberalism in “The Richness o f the Tradition o f Political Realism” in Neorealism

and Its Critics, argues:
[Tjhere is no necessary connection between political hegemony and economic
liberalism. . . . The close association between political hegemony and economic
liberalism in the modem world began with the political and economic rise o f
Great Britain. . . . Nor does it follow that the decline o f hegemony will lead
inevitably to the collapse o f a liberal world economy.77
Realists and neorealists see a state’s economic health and its relationship to
75Friedman, 195.
76While not a subject o f this study, it should be noted that Friedman’s central
theories were applied to Chile’s economic policy during the regime o f General Augusto
Pinochet beginning in the mid-1970s by the so-called “Chicago Boys” (o f the Chicago
School). Chile’s economy prospered and despite its repressive fascist political system
Chile was a leading example o f a well-managed economy and prosperity in Latin America.
Even today, Chile stands as an economic leader; no doubt, the Chicago School would take
credit.
77Robert G. Gilpin, “The Richness o f the Tradition o f Political Realism” in

Neorealism and Its Critics, Edited by Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986), 310-311.
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military power as fungible. Gilpin’s observations, while theoretically obvious, do not seem
to reflect reality.78
Economic neoliberalism is best defined by the “Washington Consensus.”79 The
Consensus was first elaborated by John Williamson in a policy paper in response to the

780 n e needs only to study the objectives o f Sadaam Hussein in his manipulating the
United Nations’ “Oil for Food” program to understand the direct relationship between
economic wealth and military power potential.
79 “A Guide to John Williamson’s Writing.” Washington, D C : Institute for
International Economics. Available [Online]:http://www.iie.com/stafJ7jwguide ,cfm#topic3
[3 December 2005], In a background paper “What Washington Means by Reform” for an
Institute for International Economics (HE) conference in November 1989, John
Williamson presented what is now known as the “Washington Consensus.” The paper was
later published in the conference volume Progress o f Reform in Latin America in 1990.
The early work on the Consensus ideas were formulated during the Latin American debt
crisis o f the mid-1980s by the IIE, John Williamson was a contributor to Toward Renewed
Economic Growth in Latin America (Bela Balassa, Gerardo Bueno, Pedro-Pablo
Kuczynski and Mario Henrique Simonson (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1986 [in
Spanish]; Washington, D C.: Institute for International Economics, 1986 [in English]).
The central themes o f the book included competitive exchange rates, import liberalization,
adequate domestic savings for internal investment and better controlled fiscal policies.
John Williamson is the co-editor and an author in Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski and John
Williamson, eds., After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in
Latin America (Washington, D C.: Institute for International Economics, March 2003).
Williamson was also the project director and author o f the United Nations High Level
Panel on Financing for Development (the Zedillo Report) in 2001.
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debt crisis in Latin America in the late 1980s.80 Today it provides the rationale81 for policy
that has been adopted by most o f the Western W orld’s industrialized and north states, and
championed by the 21st Century economic superpowers through their strong influences on
the international economic institutions. It seen as the panacea for world economic health,
at least in principle even though most its strongest proponents continue to selectively
retain protective tariffs and other methods both to protect domestic industry and as an
instrument o f power.82

80In 1972, Raul Prebisch, formerly the head o f the Central Bank o f Argentina and a
well respected Latin American economist put forth the argument that the system o f
“import substitution” (imposing high tariffs on imports and subsidizing directly or
indirectly national industries) as a remedy for failing Latin American economies as
opposed to the then-accepted classical theory o f Ricardian “comparative advantage” (See
Chapter II for discussion o f contribution o f David Ricardo). Prebisch saw Ricardian
economics as impoverishing Latin America and concluded that peripheral states, in fact,
lost ground under implementation o f that theory. He posited import substitution for Latin
America as a solution to build Latin American economies to provide the basis for
economic health and growth. This strategy was adopted by all Latin American states
except Cuba, but in the long run was identified as the cause, not solution, o f failing
economies in Latin America. See discussion in Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick.
Theories o f Development. (New York: The Guilford Press, 1999), 43-45.
8IPolitical liberals and neoliberal theorists hold that international institutions such
as the World Bank and IMF are at least equal to if not more important than states in the
world system. Therefore, what is today labeled as economic neoliberalism with the
Washington Consensus as its framework, both political and economic neoliberalism meld
together with an ever-diminishing distinction as stand-alone theories.
82For the purpose o f clarity the terms, first, second and third tier states are used,
however, the author recognizes that these terms can easily be replaced by such terms as
Major Western Industrialized states (such as the United States, Canada, France and Great
Britain), G8 or G8 states (that include the former list plus Japan, the European Union as a
separate entity, and Russia); NIEO states (newly emerging economic order); NIC (newly
industrialized countries such as Poland, Indonesia and Argentina), and LDC states (least
developed states such as Haiti, Nicaragua and Somalia. Likewise, as detailed later in this
study, North-South Theory characterizes Northern states (generally in the northern
hemisphere) as industrialized and advanced, whereas South states (generally in the
southern hemisphere) are characterized as developing or underdeveloped.
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The Consensus has been adopted as policy by most first-tier and second-tier states,
however, there is growing resistance to the consequences o f such adoption either in an
outright form (by Venezuelan President Chavez or qualified form by Brazilian President
“Lula”).83 It is understood that the United States’ influence over the w orld’s major
economic institutions forecast its elaboration
The details o f the Washington Consensus in implementation are complex. This
outline below 84 is the “rule book” for second and third tier states hoping to join world
markets as full participants.
Fiscal discipline: government budget deficits should no more than 2% o f GDP.
Public expenditure priorities: expenditures should be redirected from politically
sensitive areas toward neglected areas like primary health care, education,
and infrastructure.
Tax reform: incentives should be sharpened and sequity [sic] improved.
Financial liberalization: interest rates should be market-determined as far as
possible.
Exchange rate: rates should be sufficiently competitive to induce rapid growth o f
non-traditional exports.
Trade liberalization: quantitative restrictions on imports should be replaced with
tariffs in the range o f 10% over a period o f 3-10 years.
Foreign direct Investment: barriers to the entry o f foreign firms competing on
equal terms with domestic companies should be abolished.
Privatization: state enterprises should be returned to private ownership.
Deregulation: governments should abolish regulations restricting competition
Property rights: the legal system should secure property rights without excessive
costs.

83Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski and John Williamson, eds. After the Washington
Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America (Washington, DC. : Institute
for International Economics, March 2003), 324.
84Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick, 52.
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The Washington Consensus, on the whole, aims to simultaneously liberalize trade
and economic policy while focusing on the human condition with the effect o f improving
everyone’s lot in life no matter citizenship 85
M arx’ theories provided the doctrinal foundation for the FSLN. M arx’ best-known
work, The Communist Manifesto,86 must be included to fully understand FSLN strategy
and policy decisions. This work by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels was first published in
early 1848 just at the outbreak o f the French Revolution o f 1848. Marx believed that the
French Revolution was to be a manifestation o f his theory that the proletariat (factory
worker class) would be victorious and that his work provided a guide toward their further
political organization. It serves as the modern day secular bible for Marxists and was at the
core o f the Sandinista revolution.
The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that
their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow o f all existing social
conditions (social disparity). Let the ruling (capitalist) classes tremble at a
communist revolution. The proletariats have nothing to lose but their chains. They
have a world to win. Working men in all countries unite!87
The bourgeoisie, by rapid improvement o f all instruments o f production, by the
immensely facilitated means o f communication, draws all, even the most barbarian,
nations into civilisation. The cheap prices o f its commodities are the heavy artillery
with which it batters down all Chinese walls (foreign trade), with
which it forces the barbarians’ intensely obstinate hatred o f foreigners to
capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain o f extinction, to adopt the bourgeois

85Notably, the tenets o f the Consensus are Marxism on its head with the exception
o f attention to the social condition o f the working class that in the Marxist model requires
direct state intervention and economic control. See theory chapter for fuller discussion.
86Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1848 in German;
repr., with translation to English. New York: Penguin-Putman, Inc., 1998).
87Ibid., 91.
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mode o f production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into
their midst, i.e., it creates a world after its own im age88
It is an easy task to substitute M arx’ words for capitalist states, “Chinese” to
second and third tier former colonial states, Bretton Woods institutions as the means, and
the West as racist and exploitative The various forms o f communism and socialism that
emerged collapsed or mutated, and there is no example o f pure Marxist theory having
succeeded in the long run.89 This remains the strongest argument against such systems.
That is not to say that its altruistic motives were and are not embraced as legitimate goals.
Despite its history and failures in implementation, Marxism has wide appeal because it
addresses issues o f disparity and social injustice; and, at least in theory, egalitarian forms
are appealing to even the most skeptical.
Marxism later mutated to a more pragmatic form refined by Lenin. Lenin’s
“contribution” to Marxism through the introduction o f a “vanguard” and his willingness to
make practical changes, ultimately proved to be a faulty strategy. However, Lenin gave
Marx credit for “. . . the advantage o f (the proletariat) o f clearly understanding the line o f
march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results o f the proletarian movement .”90
Neoliberals see Marxism, Communism, Socialism and the variants as impediments to the
full development and potential o f the w orld’s economy in the laissez faire model.

88Ibid., 55.
89The well-known stage theory o f Marx, e.g. primitive society - slavery - feudalism
- capitalism - socialism - communism (final stage) was never played out. The
implementation was stillborn because o f later adoptions that did not follow the model. For
instance, Lenin was willing to deal with capitalists o f the West; the best and early example
being Armand Hammer a Lithuanian-born, Jewish entrepreneur from the United States.
^Ibid., xxiii.
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The Sandinistas labeled their version a “mixed” system -a system that endeavored
to change a nominal market economy o f the Somoza dynasty to a state-planned and run
system. It should be remembered that Nicaragua was a client state o f Cuba and the Soviet
Union. The early Sandinista system was really dependent on the beneficence o f Cuba and
the Soviet Union This was in return for its Cold War usefulness as a strategic ally by
virtue o f its geographic location and proximity to United States military interests.
Shafik Handal and Carlos Vilas, two prominent Latin Americans (the first a
politician and revolutionary, and the other an economist) discuss the relevancy o f Marxism
and socialism in the post 1990 environment in The Socialist Option in Central America*'

The Socialist Option was published just after the FSLN loss in the 1990 elections What
they recognize is the reality o f the collapse o f the Soviet Union and its consequent
withdrawal o f support o f its client states including Cuba and Nicaragua. They suggest a
compromise solution in the face o f the rise o f neoliberalism.
Carlos Vilas was a primary economic advisor to the FSLN in the Ministry o f
Planning; while there he also assisted in the planning for the FSLN program to take
control o f the Creole and Miskito-dominated Atlantic Coast made up o f tw o large states,
North Zelaya and South Zelaya Provinces 92 It was during this period that the provinces
were renamed RAAN and RAAS in a symbolic FSLN gesture to the indigenous people o f
the Miskito region.

91Jorge Handal Shafik and Carlos M. Vilas, The Socialist Option in Central
America: Two Reassessments (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993).
92These provinces were renamed by the FSLN administration to North Atlantic
Autonomous Region (RAAN) and South Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS) to
recognize the uniqueness o f the region and as political recognition o f equality. These
names were later incorporated into the FSLN inspired, current Nicaragua Constitution.
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Shafik Jorge Handal was the general secretary o f the El Salvador Communist Party
and senior official in the Faribundo Marti Liberation Front (FM LN )-the equivalent o f the
FSLN. The book is in two parts, the first part is an interview o f Handal conducted by
Marxist scholar M arta Hamecker that is largely political in commentary, and the other is a
Vilas elaboration o f the Handel interview in terms o f economic observations and solutions.
This turn o f events [downfall o f the Soviet Union and the failure o f the FSLN in
the 1990 elections along with the failure o f the revolution in El Salvador] has not
come to us gratis , it is a result o f the fact that they have not been able to beat us
militarily. We are a force with a demonstrated capacity to hit strategically at the
regime [referring to Latin America as a whole and El Salvador in particular] .
O ur own experience sufficiently demonstrates that revolutionary violence is a
necessary response to oppression, and a legitimate right o f people. The theorists
o f “new thinking” shouldn’t forget that the violence occurring in social, political
and revolutionary struggles has deep roots in the exploitation and oppression o f
some people by others, which express a hateful racial, nationalistic and religious
discrimination. . . . In the third world, the achievement o f changes without
violence that the people long for is the exception to the rule.93
He holds that detente was achieved at the expense o f the Soviet Union that
ultimately resulted in its defeat, and traces the downfall o f the Soviet Union to the
emergence o f neoliberalism. What was left, he said, was “[T]his same public that did not
find a vanguard with a clear alternative to offer; on the contrary, there were many
demagogues with a neoliberal mentality that coaxed the masses with promises o f social
welfare based on privatization and ‘free m arket.’”94
Handal called for a socialist state in El Salvador but applied his solution to all o f
Latin America. In particular he criticized the El Salvador bourgeoises for failing to

93Ibid., 90
94Ibid.
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establish true democracy, agrarian reform95 and national self-determination making the
point that the United States dominates El Salvador in all respects.96 Handal called for a
“new society” wherein the capitalist and socialist forces could find a solution to address
social and economic disparity. Vilas central question is whether the FSLN and FMLN,
having essentially lost their battles for political control by 1990, left any useful lessons or
institutions.97 Handal cites raised social consciousness o f previously marginalised classes
o f people including women, peasants, and indigenous groups; a greater sense o f
participation in government, a mobilization o f “sectoral” interest groups business
associations; and chambers o f commerce 98 He laments the general decline o f popular
participation in institutional in institutional affairs.99 Vilas continues, “Socialism did not
replace capitalism, and instead o f patria libre

we now face renewed hegemony o f the

United States . . . but (the Revolution) forced the United States to . . alter its old
alliances ” 100 He also claims that the first fully free democratic presidential election in
Nicaragua was due to the hard work o f the FSLN.101

"R eferring to the 1930s El Salvador communist-inspired agrarian and worker
revolution that resulted in reforms..
"R eferring to the Marxist idea neo-colonial exploitation by capitalist states. See
above for discussion.
97Ibid , 81.
"V ilas makes specific reference to the COSEP and its opposition to the FSLN
government.
"Ibid., 125
100Ib id , 134.
I01Ibid., 122

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93

The beginnings o f realism pre-date modern history but its elaboration by Hans
Morgenthau after World War II is timely for political and economic under-standing o f the
behavior o f states. The proponents and theorists o f neoliberalism can be seen as those who
predicted political behavior and economic policy seen today One o f the first was F A
Hayek who, just at the close o f World War II, was a proponent o f a return to the liberal
attitudes o f the 19th Century.
While Morgenthau and Hayek were both economists by profession, their works are
written in a political vein. The section below mostly pertains to power and relationships o f
states in terms o f conflict and cooperation. F A. Hayek, an Austrian economist who taught
at the University o f Chicago, the University o f London and the University o f Freiburg,
wrote The Road to Serfdom, 102 first published in London, not as an economic work but
“. . . as a warning to the socialist intelligentsia o f England.”103 Hayek believed that his
academic associates and friends who advanced the socialist agenda were misinformed
about totalitarian regimes-particularly Nazi Germany. Proponents o f Marxism would
clearly see Hayek’s work as a serious challenge along economic and political lines.
Hayek did not mince words in his 1956 preface written at the height o f the Cold
War:

. . socialism is probably a thing o f the past, some its conceptions have penetrated

far too deeply into the whole structure o f current thought to justify complacency .” 104

102F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, Fiftieth Anniversary Edition (Chicago: The
University o f Chicago Press, 1994)
103Ibid., xxviii-xxxiv.
104Ibid.
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“What is called economic power . . . can be an instrument o f coercion . . . it
creates a degree o f dependence scarcely distinguishable from slavery .” 105 The contribution
o f Hayek in The Road to Serfdom was his challenge to the political thinking o f the time.
He was an economist but attached a great deal o f importance to political systems. Central
planning o f the sort seen in totalitarian regimes, he wrote, were doomed to failure
Further, collectivism along the Marxist model was likewise doomed because it reduced the
likelihood that individual would innovate, invent and otherwise be motivated to maximize
production.
Hans J. M orgenthau’s masterwork Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r

Power and Peace106 is recognized as the central theory o f modern realist. The original
edition was published in 1948 by McGraw Hill Companies, Inc. It came on the heels o f the
post-World War II recovery and the beginning o f the Cold War. As such, it was a vehicle
to explain and predict state behavior, and no doubt influenced the Truman Doctrine o f
containment Further, it is recognized as the centerpiece for the Cold War policies o f the
West.
The realpolitik logic o f M orgenthau107 was a useful tool and guide for Cold War
policy that was subscribed to by the Soviet Union as an instrument to attract other peoples

105Ibid., 160.
106Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The
Struggle for Power and Peace, Brief Edition (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1993).
107Ibid., 34.
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and states in the Cold War battle for dominance.108 Likewise, the United States adopted
the Truman Doctrine o f containment that while fundamentally defensive in purpose also
adopted similar strategy
M orgenthau took the position that the motive o f a state determined the
interpretation o f whether economic policy were selfish or altruistic, and used the example
o f loans to Poland by the United States after World W ar II as an example. “ [T]he purpose
was not primarily economic or financial. It was rather to enable such countries to move
towards a degree o f independence o f the influence and power o f the Soviet Union.” 109
He wrote that if the United States chose to defer or forgive payment o f such loans,
then it would be not just for “humanitarian and charitable” reasons. M orgenthau provides
“p ro o f’ that powerful states care little about the well being o f the people Such reasoning
strengthens the Marxists’ “devil” theory 110 However, he takes care to deconstruct the
Marxist argument “The ‘devil’ theory o f imperialism operates on a much lower ntellectual
level than do its companion theories It is widely held by pacifists and has become
stock-in-trade o f Communist propaganda.” 111

108The Soviet Union treated Cuba in a neo-colonial sense but its major interest was
political and strategic, not economic. Nikita Khrushchev later remarked that the third
stage o f the capitalist crisis in Cuba was bom without an economic crisis and therefore did
not qualify as a legitimate revolution o f the people. Khrushchev characterized the W est’s
capitalism as imperialism (inferring economic colonialism) and the creation o f the
multi-national and transnational corporations as an instrument o f imperialism. The Castro
revolution largely predated this period.
I09Ibid , 35.
110The Marxist assertion that equates capitalism and imperialism as a conspiracy o f
capitalist states to serve private gain.
IIlIbid , 60-61
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Morgenthau maintained that imperial powers summon capitalists to support
imperial policies. Morgenthau made the point that economic imperialism could be aimed at
changing the status quo o f power relationships and that states as rational actors may
undertake such policies; however, such policy would gain no territory. M orgenthau used
Central America as an example to illustrate his argument.
The Central American republics, for instance, are all sovereign states; they possess
and display all the paraphernalia o f sovereignty. But, their economic life being
almost completely dependent upon exports to the United States, these nations,
unless they receive significant support from another source, are unable to pursue
for any length o f time policies o f any kind, domestic or foreign, to which the
United States would object.112
In the Cold War model and in its manifestation in the Truman Doctrine o f
containment, alliances o f states in the Western Hemisphere were important to the West.
This included Nicaragua as a part o f the overall strategic importance o f not allowing any
Soviet incursion or influence into the Western Hemisphere. W hether it can be seen as
rational today, the Cold W ar mentality o f the United States government and its allies was
that it would support any pro-Western, anti-Soviet regime no matter its domestic record at
home. This included the Somoza dynasty governments.
Morgenthau and realists easily separate economy from larger state interests What
was important to the realist during the Cold War was that Nicaragua was in the Western
camp. Morgenthau would today argue that the WTO, IMF, IADB and the World Bank are
no more than tools o f the states that control them, and have no higher function.

112Ibid., 71.
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Kenneth N. W altz’ Theory o f International Politics'u was published 41 years after

Politics Among Nations. Waltz had the advantage o f seeing how post-W orld War II IGOs
roles played out during the Cold War. He began in his first chapter: “ I write this book with
three aims in mind: first to examine theories o f international politics
second to construct a theory o f international politics that remedies the defects o f present
theories, and third, to examine some applications o f the theory constructed.” 114
Waltz was very careful to construct his theory in a strict “scientific” sense, and
intended that his work not be merely descriptive. Unlike Morgenthau, he makes use o f
statistics for his empirical “proofs ” His painstaking care to define his terms and methods
are indicative o f his career as a distinguished college professor and former president o f the
American Political Science Association.
Waltz maintains that states are the sole actors on the international scene, and that
matters o f economy and economic policy both domestically and internationally are
functions o f those states. However, Waltz is more specific about the contribution o f trade
to power o f a state. Quoting Henry Kissinger, Waltz wrote, “[M ilitary, economic, and
political potential were closely related. To be powerful, a nation had to be strong in all
categories. This is no longer so. Economic giants can be militarily weak, and military
strength may not be able to obscure economic weakness.115

113Kenneth M. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, First Edition (Boston:
McGraw Hill, 1979).
114Ibid., 1.
115Ibid., 130.
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Waltz was mostly concerned about trade as a component o f interdependence, and
he devotes a great deal o f discussion about the issues o f relative strengths and weaknesses
that economic interdependence causes. He stated that economic inequality is inevitable;
however, he gives a positive spin to it by arguing that the converse. “The inequality o f
states, though it provides no guarantee, at least makes peace and stability possible.” 116
Such an observation may seem an anathema to a Nicaraguan in 2005 who is living at or
below subsistence level.
Richard Rosecrance in The Rise o f the Trading State" elaborates a theory that
trade has become the defining factor in state power relationships. In his earlier works,
Rosecrance was an advocate o f a systems approach to explain and predict behavior o f
states. Rosecrance posited that complex interdependency o f states was more relevant that
a more straightforward realist or neorealist view, and that trade has become more
important than territory or military power.
Rosecrance holds that trade is at least equal in the equation as military force, and
that “socialization” o f states can lead to the trade option. He notes “[C apitalists o f the
First World conspire together to impose a condition o f dependency on the less developed
nations o f the Third World. . . . The capitalist North gets ric h e r. . . while the South get
poorer.” 118
116Ibid., 131.
117Richard Rosecrance, The Rise o f the Trading Stale: Commerce and Conquest in
the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986).
118Ibid., 51 While not addressed in this work, it is important to define North-South
theory. In short, the theory holds that through circumstances o f history and development,
north states (largely in the northern hemisphere) that are industrialized and otherwise
advanced will continue to exploit either through design or by circumstance the South
states that are located largely in the southern hemisphere and mostly agrarian. Rosecrance

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

99

If Rosecrance were to re-write or update Trading States, he would no doubt
observe that the United States and its Western economic allies have, with the exception o f
the G ulf War and War in Iraq, sought to dominate and manipulate the world economy
through the various Bretton W oods institutions. To Rosecrance, this is predictable
behavior119
Rosecrance posited that trade and control o f economic systems were a peaceful
and likely alternative to warfare and territorial expansion; however, he conceded that even
the weakest states must maintain some territorial integrity and devote energy to its
defense. “In defense and trade, there is mutual exchange and a sharing o f responsibilities
. . [In the 1980s], Third World countries contracted great debts and high interest rates
. . a combination o f refinancing o f loans and rescheduling o f payments . . . offered hope
for a purely economic and commercial solution o f the problem. Military force certainly
provided no answer.” 120 The World Bank and the IMF have engaged in such peaceful
behavior in the last decade in the form o f programs such as the HIPC initiative 121
Rosecrance criticizes Marxist dependency theory as more a result if internal “local
adoption” o f a means o f development that results in great economic disparity. Perhaps the
most notable element o f neoliberal theory is inclusion o f international regimes and IGOs in
the mix o f “players” on the scene that can influence outcomes in both military and

held that (in 1986) that the north states would eventually have to face the dire need o f the
South.
119Rosecrance, x.
I20Ib id , 21.
‘•"Nevertheless, anti-globalization skeptics would maintain that such activity is no
more than neo-colonial behavior o f the powerful states o f the world system.
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economic senses. Rosecrance argues that such regimes and IGOs have almost equal if not
more power to influence events He continues, “[1International regimes do not cover all
forms o f international behavior In security, for example, there is no regime which governs
the military . . behavior o f the United States or the Soviet Union.” 122
In Power and Independence,123 Robert O Keohane and Joseph Nye continue the
logic o f Rosecrance but include a wider panoply o f actors. They cite Morgenthau and his

Politics Among Nations as a sort o f bequest that constrained United States foreign policy
during the Cold W ar.124
Keohane and Nye make the case that powerful states have shifted policy and
tactics, and their Power and Independence is a thesis to support that change, and a theory
Like Waltz, they are academics, and are careful to construct the theory with explanatory
notes and definitions. The authors’ theory, then, replaces the realists’ theory that only
state actors matter and that they always seek to maximize or at least balance their
positions vis-a- vis security requirements through force. Keohane and Nye hold that
states’ foreign policy can no longer ignore today’s complex interdependency, and that
decision makers can no longer ignore domestic affairs in making and carrying out foreign
policy.
Under realist conditions, one expects military force, whether used directly or by
linkage, to be the most effective instrument o f state policy. Under conditions o f
complex interdependence, manipulation o f economic interdependence in the issue
area and o f international organizations and transnational actors are expected to be
122Ibid., 60. On the surface, it seems strange that Rosecrance does not cite
agreements such as SALT I & II that can be counted as regimes.
123Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Independence, Second
Edition (New York: Harper Collins, Publishers, 1989).
124Ibid., vi.
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more important for achievement o f states’ goals. As we have seen, although force
remains a potential instrument o f state policy . . . its use has become less frequent,
particularly by large states. . . The smaller states, (have proved) more adept,
however, in manipulating transnational actors.
More broadly, faced with the erosion o f one regime, the great powers have
tried to negotiate an alternative to through international organizations rather than
unilateral measures backed by force. . . . in short force . . . has not been the most
important instrument.125
Their central advice is that foreign policy must include the issues and vagaries o f
complex interdependency, and avoid the realist military force. While defining liberal
theory, they also provide the basis in logic for economic neoliberalism.

After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin
America,126 published by the Institute for International Economics, is a primary source o f
Washington Consensus theory. It is a discussion o f the successes and failures o f the first
iteration o f the Consensus, and an outline for continued movement toward full
implementation It lays out the changes that are necessary to bring Latin America to the
point o f being able to compete in today’s economic global environment. The central theme
focuses on the equitable distribution o f wealth and social well being. After the Washington

Consensus is a recipe that is necessary to regenerate the reforms that were first instituted
beginning in the later 1980s following the debt crisis. Some o f the additional ideas having
to do with educational, political and labor reforms were not included in the original
Consensus outline, but are seen as essential for a comprehensive recovery.
John Williamson’s Consensus on which this work is based was the short-hand
term for a system o f reforms but, “The term has been used and misused in all sorts o f ways

125Ibid., 115-116.
126Kuczynski and Williamson.
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. . . to mean laissez faire and minimalist government, and a disdain for all values, the
growth o f GDP, but its original meaning was vastly less ideological .” 127
M ost o f the comparisons, and standards by which Nicaragua is measured are either
from the United States, OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development128); or the European Union, and the standards first laid out in the Maastricht
Treaty that established it. The central argument is that well-established political and
economic reformed institutions are the key to progress.
While the original Consensus was not political in purpose or intent, After the

Washington Consensus agenda takes on political issues head-on as part and parcel o f
necessary second-generation reforms. The second generation list includes

“An important

role for the state o f institutions . . . in creating and maintaining the institutional
infrastructure o f a market economy.” 129 This is a departure from the original consensus
that assigned only a small role to the state.
In the chapter by Patricio Navia and Andres Velasco, that updated agenda is
revealed as all o f the first ten points (see above) plus the following:

Legal and political reform
Regulatory institutions
Anti-corruption (continued)
Labor market flexibility
127Ibid., 22.
128Organization for Economic and Cooperation Development (home p a g e ),
Available [Online]:<http://www. oecd.org/home/>[23 January 2005], A successor
organization o f the Marshall Plan, it was established in 1960 and now made up o f thirty
predominantly Western industrialized states but has some recent accessions eastern
European states such as the Slovak Republic.
129Kuczynski and Williamson, 11.
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World Trade Organization agreement
Financial codes and standards
“Prudent” capital account opening
Nonintermediate exchange rate programs
Social safety nets
Poverty reduction130
According to the authors, the problem with this second-generation list, is that they
affect entities that have little interest in change. This is certainly true o f the former
Nicaraguan Presidents Ortega and Aleman, plus those sectors o f society that control the
economic pulse o f the state. Their observations supports this w ork’s basic premise that it
is the internal dynamic that most affects change.

Anti-Globalization Literature:

Alternatives to Economic Globalization13' is a comprehensive volume that
covers details o f the anti-globalization arguments. Its title that includes “economic”
reveals the care in which this book was conceived and put together by the International
Forum on Globalization. The book is the result o f an effort to reach overall consensus o f
nineteen anti-globalization (anti-neoliberal) writers and activists in the movement.
“The immediate priority is to frame the issues, recognizing that to arrive at a consensus
. . . is a far more complex and difficult task that building agreement on what we oppose.
That which we oppose is immediate and concrete. . . .We live and breathe the

I30Ibid., 268.
‘^ “International Forum on Globalization.” Alternatives to Economic
Globalization, A Better World is Possible: A Report o f the International Forum on
Globalization. (San Francisco: Berrett-Koelher Publishers, Inc., 2002).
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consequences o f corporate globalization and share the great pain it inflicts on humanity
and the earth.132
The International Forum on Globalization was formed in January 1994 on the eve
o f NAFTA implementation, and is composed o f a wide range o f anti-globalization
members and member organizations.133 It is the leading anti-globalization
non-governmental organization. This book has nineteen authors-many well known in
anti-globalization organizations-and its purpose is to provide comprehensive arguments
that demonstrate the failures o f neoliberalism, and provide alternative solutions.
The areas include agrarian reform, ecology, poverty reduction and, in general, the
negative effects o f globalization (in its strictest definition) and economic neoliberalism. A
unique term “economic democracy” is defined and discussed at length.
The current and future well-being o f humanity depends on transforming the
relationships o f power within and between societies toward a more democratic and
mutually accountable modes o f managing human affairs that are self-organizing,
power-sharing, and minimize the need for coercive central authority. Economic
democracy, which involves the equitable participation o f all people in the
ownership o f the productive assets on which their livelihood depends, is essential
to such transformation because the concentration o f economic power is the
Achilles heel o f political democracy, as
the experience o f corporate globalization demonstrates.134
The authors see the Bretton Woods system as undemocratic and dominated by the
interests o f the wealthy states. They include “Key Ingredients o f the Globalization Model”
(paraphrased by author)

132Ibid., 1.
133Intemational Forum on Globalization (home web site) is Available [Online]
:<http: //www.ifg.org/>[22 January 2005],
134Intemational Forum on Globalization, Alternatives to Economic Globalization,
8.
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Promotion o f hypergrowth and exploitation o f environmental resources
Privatization and commodification o f public services
Global cultural and economic homogenization and intense promotion o f
consumerism
Integration and conversion o f national economies to environmentally and socially
harmful export-oriented production
Corporate deregulation and unrestricted movement o f capital across borders
Dramatically increased corporate concentration
Dismantling o f public health, social, and environmental programs already in
place, and
Replacement o f traditional powers o f democratic nation-states and local
communities by global bureaucracies135
One o f the issues addressed is that neoliberal policies have an effect in the formal
job sector forcing a shift to informal thereby exacerbating the ability o f governments to
address poverty, education and health. This shift is accompanied by an increasing disparity
in income distribution.

. . with no clear evidence that this shift is temporary in

character.” 136
Among the other issues are the effects o f neoliberalism on human rights diminution
and systematic violations o f the United Nations charter in the name o f corporate expansion
and neoliberalism. Examples include the argument that the understanding o f the
“commons” be expanded to include public health systems, water purification, education
and information access. “ . . . the quality o f being available to all

. [but] have since

been absorbed by the state and are also now on tap for privatization ” 137

135Ibid , 19.
136Ibid., 214.
137Ibid., 82.
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As with the Alternatives to Globalization, Latin American Political Economy in

the Age o f Neoliberal Reformm is important if not a bit dated because it addresses the
arrival o f the neoliberal model and the collapse o f the import substitution model that had
been prevalent. While not an anti-globalization/neoliberal tome per se, it is a
comprehensive look at the effects o f the transition and its likely outcome. “Understanding
these social and economic transformations and their implications demands a fundamental
rethinking o f many central issues in Latin American political economy. . . We harbor no
illusions o f having discovered a new paradigm.” 139
The focus o f the book is to explore the relations between economics and politics in
the neoliberal environment. The introductory chapter by Eduardo Gamarra deals with the
issues o f simultaneous economic transition to a neoliberal model and democratization. The
central thrust o f the authors, as addressed in chapter two, is to reconcile the “ . . . socio
political conflict and economic performancein order to understand the logic o f support for
and opposition to market-oriented restructuring and to identify several alternative
political-economic scenarios for the region.” 140
The authors link politics with economic health. In effect, they propose a renewed
effort while they lament the previous failed systems-including neoliberal approaches. They
make the observation that the Pinochet government in Chile successfully achieved

138William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acuna and Eduardo A. Gamarra, Latin American

Political Economy in the Age o f Neoliberal Reform: Theoretical and Comparative
Perspectives for the 1990s (New Brunswick: North-South Center, Transaction Publishers,
1994).
139Ib id , v.
I40Ibid , vii.
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economic prosperity, however, at the expense o f democracy and the human condition.
They observe that new democracies such as that o f Nicaragua have a great deal more
difficulty with crafting successful economic policy than long-established democracies such
as that o f Costa Rica
Since its publication in 1993, left-of-center governments have with the exception
o f Venezuela, failed politically and economically .141 Costa Rica can be defined as a
left-of-center state by long tradition along the line o f Social Democrats in Europe Costa
Rica fits the model o f economic “success” o f a well-established democracy. On the other
side o f the coin, Nicaragua, that could be defined as a democracy during Sandinista period
(but an egalitarian democracy) and should be counted by definition as a new (political)
democracy that is struggling 142
Given the conditioning o f the general population in Nicaragua to social
responsibility, the post- Sandinista governments beginning in February 1990 may have had
the intent but not the resources without outside assistance. Even then, the staring point in
early 1990 was so low that recovery o f basic services was difficult.
An observation made in Latin American Political Economy is that “ . . one
striking feature o f Spanish public opinion [in the Latin cultural context] data is the gradual

l4lOther up-to-date literature on the same subject cites Hugo Chavez’
left-of-center policies, while dictatorial in character and having the potential to succeed,
are leading to economic disaster.
142Richard Harris and Carlos Vilas, eds. Nicaragua: A Revolution Under Siege.
(New York: Zed Books, Ltd., 1985). Harris and Vilas provide in-depth discussion o f the
failing Nicaraguan Sandinista policies under pressure from the United States in the Contra
War.
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disassociation between evaluations o f the economic situation and o f political
institutions.” 143
This speaks to the issue o f effects o f monism and human behavior, and to the
observation that the culture144 may never allow an escape from that model despite
incessant pressures for political change from the United States and the West in general.145
Both this work and the earlier reviewed work (Handal) advocate a social democratic
system as the ultimate long-term solution for Latin America. (Likewise, in the modem
world, this speaks to Islam followers who, from the Western optic, disassociate
relationships between economic conditions and theocracy as a preferred mode o f social
organization.)

143Ibid , 193.
144Skidmore, 5-7.
145Marcelo Cavarozzi. “Politics, a key for the long term in South America” in Latin
American Political Economy in the Age o f Neoliberal Reform. William C. Smith, Carlos
H. Acuna, and Eduardo A. Gamarra, eds. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 1994.
Cavarozzi identifies “new” caudillismo as embodied in the presidencies o f Carlos Menem
in Argentina, Fernando Collar de Mello in Brazil and Alberto Fujimori in Peru (only Collar
de Mello was still in office in 2004). He calls them “minimalist” caudillos with a “ . . .
personalist leadership style typical o f the state-centric formula.” Cavarozzi argues that
those new caudillos have developed “complicity” with the general populations, and
expressions o f empathy for reduced standards o f living that results in political apathy.
Plus, those new caudillos also try to maintain exclusivity for policy initiation and
innovation that results in the need to permanently generate innovations that further leads
to greater centralization in the hands o f the Dpresidencies-a vicious circle that results in
corruption and ultimata failure. The author cites the Fujimori case. Arguably, Aleman, the
Nicaraguan president who proceeded the current president o f Nicaragua, Bolanos, and
succeeded the first 1990s Nicaraguan president, Chamorro, fits the model o f an
increasingly corrupt, state-centric “new” caudillo.
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Integrative Literature
Jeffrey Sachs’ as a special advisor to the United Nations Secretary General
addresses the United Nations ambitious Millennium Development Goals program that is
focused on poverty reduction in targeted states o f the world. His The End o f Poverty’ -

Economic Possibilities fo r Our Time146 work is designed as a fresh look at the methods
and strategies that have been developed. He asks why the neoliberal program has been
relatively ineffective to date despite a panoply o f IGOs, NGOs and individual states that
are focused on total elimination o f poverty and a regeneration o f the poorest states to
become economically self sustaining over the long term.
Sachs is clear in expressing his belief that The End o f Poverty is within reach over
time; however, he is also quite specific in his criticisms o f the international community’s
failure to carry out an effective program. His book, written with the intention o f serving as
a sort o f report to the international community, is never-the-less objectively specific in
listing failure and likewise specific with a plan to pull together the various entities into an
effective force.
His central theme is that the extant programs are incoherent and not focused on
the real, underlying, causes o f pervasive and unending poverty. The community, he writes,
“ . . announces bold goals . . and even ways the goals can be achieved such as the pledge
o f increased donor assistance. . . . Yet, when it comes to real practice . . . the Millennium
Development Goals are expressed only in vague aspirations rather than operational

146Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End o f Poverty - Economic Possibilities fo r Our Time
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2005).
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targets.” 147 (An observation by such a well-respected economist must rankle the
bureaucracy o f the various IGOs and internal Nicaraguan government officials However,
at least one prominent Nicaraguan economist, Avendaiio, seems to be in agreement.)
He is a proponent for capital development and eschews Marxism out o f hand
Globalization, and all that goes with it, is seen as a fundamental and permanent feature o f
the w orld’s economic landscape. Sachs’ goals-based poverty reduction strategy is laid out
in five parts:
A Differential Diagnosis [tailored to each state’s needs]
An Investment Plan which shows the size, timing, and costs o f the
required investments
A Financial Plan [tied to the Investment Plan that details the exact portion
that donors will have to commit to fill]
A Donor Plan [that details the necessary donor commitment to fill the
MDG financing gap]
A Public Management Plan that outlines the mechanisms o f governance
and public administration that will help implement the expanded public
investment strategy 148
While Sachs does not address Nicaragua in this work, he does detail his extensive
work with the Bolivian149 government. While much o f the discussion has to do with
monetary policy, what is most clear is that solutions are at hand if the public will supports
them.
Sachs holds that outside intervention is essential, and he provides compelling
arguments that such intervention should include absolute, no-strings-attached debt

147Ibid„ 271.
148Ibid., 273.
149Bolivia is one o f four HIPC states in Latin America. The Bolivian national
election o f socialist candidate Evo Gonzalez and his installation in January 2006 creates
uncertainly with regard to Bolivia’s HIPC treatment with regards to reforms.
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forgiveness. Official Development Assistance (ODA), the term for non-NGO assistance
from IGOs and individual states, he writes, is critical to breaking the inevitable downward
spiral o f poverty. He puts forth the Marshal Plan as an example o f a well-coordinated,
apolitical, humanitarian program that should be modeled,150 and he cites the fact that the
Marshal Plan cost the United States approximately one percent o f GNP from 1948 to
1952, about ten times more than the United States is now committing to poverty relief
today world wide.
Sachs takes the time to either validate or debunk commonly held “truisms” that
predict that there is no real hope for any program These include corruption, democracy
deficit, patterns o f behavior, lack o f moral values, lack o f modem values and “laziness.”
His view o f globalization champions the dictum that “a rising tide lift all boats” is
that globalization and free market systems (inferentially economic neoliberalism) will not,
on their own, be sufficient to either meet the current challenge or keep up with population
growth and simultaneous depreciation o f domestic capital investment. Rather, he holds,
that with sufficient ODA, the dictum will be valid even for the donor IGOs and states.
Sachs believes that the anti-globalization have been useful in exposing hypocrisy
and “self congratulations” o f the WTO and IMF. He writes that because o f the anti
globalization efforts, the issue o f poverty reduction has stayed on the “front burner.”
However, Sachs is also critical o f the anti-globalization movement in their unending
anticorporate animus, the movement’s belief that special protections must be provided to
states from corporate evils, and its failure to recognize that globalization has resulted in a

150He does not miss the point that a weakened western Europe after World W ar II
would have been vulnerable to Soviet influence.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112

reduction o f extreme poor. The anti-globalization forces, like the MDG, fails to recognize
the underlying deeper causes o f poverty 151
Jagdish Bhagwati, a political economist at Columbia University and former advisor
to the United Nations on globalization, debunks many misunderstood or purposely
distorted features o f globalization in In Defense o f Globalization, 152 He makes the point
that globalization is a very old and natural phenomena that was only interrupted after
World War I by ineffective protective measures such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff act.
Above all, Jagdis believes that the proponents o f neoliberalism and the anti-globalization
forces should reconcile with a common goal toward creating an effective program to
alleviate poverty and rectify social inequities
Samuel P. Huntington is sometimes categorized as a realist; however, his The

Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f World Order153 he looks at an entirely
different framework to explain the behavior o f states in today’s world. In the Post-Cold
War environment, his own analysis shifted toward culture and “civilizations” from states
as unitary actors in the realist context His is an historical perspective rather than a more
clinical empiricist’s approach. He recognizes that states are only a part o f a larger system
that are subordinated to the more important historical divisions o f culture and civilizations.
In effect, he looks beyond the strictly constructed and parsimonious realist’s approach to
international relations.

151Ibid., 357.
152Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense o f Globalization (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004).
153Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f World
Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1996).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113

Among others, Huntington uses Latin American examples to illustrate his
argument. He reminds the reader that Mexico, as affirmed by its famous modem Mexican
writer Octavio Paz, is a non-W estem state— it is an indigenous culture; therefore, a
Western policy maker may not automatically presume that Mexico will behave in a
Western manner despite its geographic position To further make the point, Huntington
details the programs o f Mexican presidents de la Madrid and Salinas de Gortari to
recombine and strengthen the sense o f Mexican “self’ in the 1980s as had President Benito
Juarez, a Zapotec, more than a century before when he defeated the French (read Western
European) Emperor Maximilian.154
Huntington maintains that civilizations are not easily integrated. That is not to say
that the West cannot do business with other civilizations-only that the West must
recognize the differences and act on them. Huntington cites the North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA) and other economic IGOs such as M ERCOSUR (Southern Cone
M arket)155 and the Central American Common M arket (CACM). With regard to NAFTA,
he writes “[T]he United States and Canada attempt to absorb Mexico . . . [It is] a process
whose long-term success depends on the ability o f Mexico to redefine itself culturally from
Latin American to North American.” 156 In effect, any reconciliation between cultures
toward some mutual benefit will take time and patience. Huntington is pessimistic about

154This fits with the Nicaraguan sense that there is an indigenous element in that
society that can be seen in the few remaining concentrations and in the Miskito Coast;
likewise, it fits well with the notion o f exploitation by foreign forces.
155M ERCOSUR now includes Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay with Chile
and Peru as associate members.
156Ibid., 127.
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modernization and the “advanced material level” o f “civilization,” because o f the increased
immorality and a general breakdown o f law and order. However, he applauds the changes
that have reduced slavery, torture, and abuse o f individuals.157 He offers a recipe for
avoidance o f further breakdown that includes the mandate for the West to “ . . encourage
the ‘W esternization’ o f Latin America and, as far as is possible, the close alignment o f
Latin America with the West .” 158 This proposal seems interesting because o f the historical
closeness o f the United States with Latin America in the first instance; however,
Huntington is addressing the more profound issues o f cultural, linguistic and religious
differences. In effect, Huntington instructs the West to make further efforts to bring about
the homogenization o f the Western Hemisphere.
The most up-to-date integrative work on the present political and economic
dilemma in Nicaragua is Antonio Lacayo Oyanguren’s La Dificil Transition

Nicaragiiense, en el Gobierno con Dona Violeta (The difficult Nicaraguan Transition, in
the government o f Dona V io leta)159 From the perspective o f the Nicaraguan moderate
optic, this is the most definitive work available. Lacayo was the Minister o f the
Presidency under President Chamorro, and the driving force and architect behind the
organization o f UNO that successfully unseated the FSLN in the late 1989 presidential
election. More than the official roles he played, Lacayo is the son-in-law o f Chamorro, and
as such was and is privy to the most intimate o f details o f that period in Nicaraguan

157Ibid , 321.
158Ibid„ 312.
159Antonio Lacayo Oyanguren, La Dificil Transition Nicaragiiense, en el
Gobierno con Dona Violeta (The difficult Nicaraguan transition, in the government o f
Dona Violeta) (Managua: Fundacion Uno, 2005).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

115

history. In his official position as Minister o f the Presidency, he was in close contact with
high U.S. Government officials and with former President Carter whose foundation
monitored the 1989 presidential election.160

La Dificil Transicion is an intimate work that reflects the deepest o f understanding
o f independent and dependent variables that play out in Nicaragua; as a Nicaraguan
nationalist, he knows how the internal dynamics can affect outcomes no matter the
constancy o f international support or motive. He details the development o f those internal
dependent variables and how they interact today with great care.
Perhaps most valuable o f all is the Lacayo lends understanding as to how President
Chamorro managed to carry off a change in government, retain control and placate the
very large and active FSLN residual such that Nicaragua did not enter into yet another
civil war. Her government was really a tenuous weak coalition o f parties that sought to
displace the Marxist, mixed-economy strategy o f the FSLN, and her support was subject
to quickly dissolving in the face o f other ambitious and capable UNO coalition
members.161 In particular, he explains the rationale behind leaving Humberto Ortega in

160A uthor’s note: While I have acknowledged Antonio Lacayo and cited him
numerous times in this work, I feel compelled to mention that his valuable and always
generous assistance lead me to a greater understanding o f the Nicaragua situation. Our
first twenty minute meeting went for three hours, and his generous support has not waned
since. Above all, he is a Nicaraguan patriot to the core, and with a great deal o f study and
understanding o f the historical past o f Nicaragua, and takes his own decisions on matters
that have and will affect the outcome o f the current dilemma. In my last brief meeting with
him in Washington, D C. in February 2006, he expressed a great deal o f skepticism about
the political future o f the republic in view o f the motivations, qualifications and
backgrounds o f those would-be presidential candidates discussed in this work.
Nevertheless, he remains hopeful and determined to make a contribution to the final
outcome.
I61ln the UNO nomination process, Virgilio Godoy received four votes for
nomination, Enrique Bolanos three to Violeta Cham orro’s five. Godoy was chosen to be
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place as the head o f the military during the early days o f Chamorro administration much to
the chagrin o f the U.S. Congress. It is interesting to note that he explains that he had an
almost instinctive trust that Huberto Ortega would carry out an agreement to facilitate the
reduction o f the EPS and agree to step down at a later date
Lacayo credits former President Carter’s simple question whether he (Lacayo) had
ever met with either Daniel or Humberto Ortega as the pointer to find a long-term plan for
President Cham orro.162 Lacayo’s answer being in the negative gave impetus to the
obvious conclusion that such a meeting was paramount, and it was the meeting with
Humberto that gave Lacayo the post-election strategic outline for President C ham orro’s
ultimately very effective reconciliation strategy. In return for Humberto O rtega’s
commitment, Lacayo gave President Cham orro’s promise that there would be no
retribution against the EPS or other armed branches o f the FSLN government
Lacayo explains every step taken by the Chamorro administration to
simultaneously retain power and undertake the necessary national reconciliation to provide
the path to a successful transition. With the understanding that the U.S. Government,
would react negatively (and did by withholding vitally important financial support)
President Chamorro did not devalue the positive contributions o f the FSLN and agreed to
abide by the 1985 (FSLN) Nicaraguan Constitution.163 The struggle for legitimacy o f her
government was well understood to be the first order o f business.

the UNO vice-presidential candidate. Godoy, as vice president, was opposed to working
with the FSLN during the transition and this, in part, led to the final breakup o f UNO.
I62Ibid., 30.
163Ibid., 140.
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Only Lacayo would have the ability to define the most poignant moments in
Cham orro’s administration. One event reveals both the determination and heart-felt joy at
the final demobilization o f the EPS. “[Contra] Commander Franklin [and] Israel Galeano
kept their promise [at the ceremony in Chontales] . . and brought her their arms. Dona
Violeta took them, embraced them, kissed them and raised a rifle above her head as she
was met with a grand cheer.” 164 In attendance at the event held in the town church was
Bishop Obando y Bravo and other dignitaries. During the same event, the Contra forces
gave up 62 Red Eye ground-to-air missiles and by the end o f the month Humberto Ortega
had managed to reduce the EPS by half While this event is but one event described by
Lacayo, it lends to a greater understanding o f the power o f Violeta Chamorro to persuade
Nicaraguans that the time had come for reconciliation. While Lacayo does not define those
moments as the reason that Violeta Chamorro is known today with great affection and
respect as Dona Violeta, it is obvious that her almost mystical unifying force accounts for
the relatively smooth transition that Nicaragua was able to make.
As important and telling as Lacayo’s inside knowledge o f the Chamorro
administration was, perhaps as important is his keen understanding o f the inner workings
o f U.S. politics. He includes many quotations by such U.S. Government luminaries o f the
time such as Jesse Helms (a hard-over anti-FSLN opponent) and James Baker (a more
pragmatic solution seeker). Also notable is Antonio Lacayo’s sense o f humor. He
explains that while having to deal with the many-headed hydra (the overwhelming number
o f issues to deal with and resolve), state duties, while usually tedious, sometimes revealed
the more human side. One such story that he relates in his book is the situation he found

164Ibid., 189.
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himself in during a state trade visit to Taiwan in which he found himself sitting next to a
very high government official who must have been the most prodigious drinker o f alcohol
in the country. Upon the occasion o f the last toast o f the evening, everyone but that
official rose, his body seemed totally immobilized and despite his best efforts he could not
unglue himself from his seat.
Perhaps the most important point Lacayo makes in La Dificil Transicion is that
President Chamorro and her camp, even today, do not consider themselves neoliberals,
liberals nor populists,165 but patriots who are focused on a healthy and prosperous future.
His concern for honesty and integrity in politics with a focus on nationalism is the
recurring theme o f his work; and his own history serves to reinforce his commitment to
such values. Clearly, he subscribes to the basic tenet that peace and reconciliation are and
were most important. Lacayo concludes,
As a consequence o f democracy, the government o f Dona Violeta installed a firm
and lasting peace after ten years o f civil war-som ething seen as almost impossible.
The governm ent. . demobilized the resistence forces (residual o f the Contras) as
the last armed force against the government in the history o f our country, reduced
the Sandinista Popular Army to the smallest in the region, imposed the law o f the
Republic on the Nicaraguan Army, subordinated authority o f civil officials to
elected officials, and professionalized and introduced a culture o f national
reconciliation . . . so cemented in place that a foundation is left such that never
again will the children o f this nation will die for political reasons.166

165In this context, this reader understands clearly that neoliberal refers to the
negative aspects o f the thrust o f the Washington Consensus, that liberals refers to the
residual o f the worst o f what former President Aleman represents and populists to the
FSLN and the negative baggage that is still at the feet o f the general population in
Nicaragua.
166Ib id , 714.
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Explaining Nicaraguan Revolution
Crane Brinton’s 1938 master work. The Anatomy o f Revolution'61 neatly applies
to the Nicaraguan case, it provides structure to this study and a rough outline for events
that have occurred in Nicaragua from the mid-1970s to 2004 Brinton’s work has
explanatory and predictive value with reference to the FSLN revolution in Nicaragua and
po st-1990 events. Brinton’s projections remain accurate in the modem context.
The early stages o f revolution, according to Brinton, are characterized by a
weakening economic position on the part o f the ruling class (oligarchy) and subsequent
loss in confidence. In Nicaragua, the parallel is the result o f the Somoza dynasty always
allowing a competing monied class but never giving up ultimate control.
As the fortunes o f the dynasty slipped, it put more pressure on the oligarchy and,
thus, provided the seeds for the early movement-especially after the devastating 1972
earthquake in Managua. “[The] discontent which undermined their esprit de corps at the
outbreak o f the revolution had its origins in their economic difficulties.” 168
By late 1978, the anti-Somoza oligarchy had joined with the FSLN as the so-called
“Group o f Twelve” for the purpose o f deposing Somoza and rebuilding Nicaragua in a
new model. However, the opposition oligarchy did not expect to be completely overtaken
by the ideology o f the FSLN.169 As the revolution builds to a climax, according to

167Crane Brinton, 1938, The Anatomy o f Revolution. Revised edition. (New York:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965).
168Ibid., 56.
169Brinton observes throughout his work that as political independence rises, so
does the discontent o f the masses who become more aware o f how much they are still not
in control o f their destinies. This interesting observation can be applied to the discontent
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Brinton, the legitimacy o f the government declines, as can be seen in the Russian example,
discontent increases, censorship increases,170 taxation is perceived as unfair, government
deficits increase, more than usual corruption is perceived, and work stoppages (official
strikes and otherwise) begin to occur. The government begins brutal crackdowns on civil
disturbances. This is exactly the pattern o f the Nicaraguan revolution leading up to the 19
July 1979 ‘Trium ph.”
The second stage o f the revolution is labeled by Brinton as the “rule o f the
moderates.” In this case, the FSLN movement had already envisioned the need to include
moderate voices in the campaign, and therefore included Violeta Chamorro as an early
junta member Further, the alliance with the Group o f Twelve was seen as a necessary step
to gain the confidence o f Nicaragua as a whole.
Typically, according to Brinton, the moderate rule that is put in place after the
revolution is short lived because it cannot satisfy the inflamed demands o f the
revolutionaries nor satisfy the remaining loyal opposition oligarchy. The attempt to
appoint the “moderate ruler” surrogate by Anastasio Somoza Debayle just days before his
departure from the country fits this model perfectly. He must have known that his
appointee, Francisco Urcuyo, was doomed to failure. Urcuyo fled Managua just a day
after Somoza

o f the FSLN electorate in the 1990 elections in which they failed to re-elect President
Daniel Ortega.
170A case in point for Nicaragua was the heavy censorship o f the La Prensa
newspaper whose editor was Pedro Chamorro, husband o f Violeta Chamorro. Although
Pedro Chamorro was murdered in the streets o f Managua in January 1979, probably by
Somoza henchmen, his newspaper fared no better during the FSLN period that censored it
in the name o f the defense o f the revolution.
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After the Triumph, the FSLN Directorate began its consolidation o f power, and
lost its moderate voice with the withdrawal o f key members o f the junta including Violeta
Chamorro. Chamorro, in Brinton’s theory, would be from a well respected background
and highly placed in the opposition movement o f the former government .171 Violeta
Chamorro could not be thought o f a member o f the opposition in the FSLN’s
government’s earliest days because her husband, Pedro, vigorously opposed Anastasio
Somoza Debayle, and was murdered at the hands o f Somoza henchmen. However, for
reasons never made public, she had a falling out with the FSLN leadership, and the FSLN
lost an important moderating voice With her departure from the junta, she took with her
the middle class and the business class that had sided with the FSLN during the last days
o f the Revolution
The next stage identified by Brinton is labeled “The accession o f the extremists ”
This stage, like its label, is characterized by the total takeover by a smaller but more
ideologically unified revolutionary group. The FSLN followed this pattern exactly with the
moderate junta quickly being outmaneuvered and replaced by a “National Directorate”
that included only avowed Marxists who systematically dismantled the early reforms o f the
moderates They then proceeded along a more purely Marxist/Socialist agenda without
regard to political freedom or freedom o f the press.172

171Another example would be that following the Russian February Revolution in
1917 when Czar Nicolas II was deposed, he was replaced sequentially by Count Grigory
Liov and then by Alexander Kerensky (a respected Socialist lawyer in Moscow), both
moderates who were finally displaced by the Bolshevik leader, Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin)
in October 1917.
172A case in point for Nicaragua was the heavy censorship o f the La Prensa
newspaper whose editor was Pedro Chamorro, husband o f Violeta Chamorro. Although
Pedro Chamorro was murdered in the streets o f Managua in January 1979, probably by
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In fact. President Carter who had abandoned Anastasio Somoza Debayle promised
support to the early junta but later realized that the shape o f that government had changed
into a more extremist model. “The dictatorship o f the extremistsis embodied in
governmental forms such as rough and ready centralization. . . . a wide range o f matters is
taken away from local (democratically elected) authorities.”173
Again, this was the case in Nicaragua exactly as in Brinton’s model; the new FSLN
junta disposed o f nearly all dissenting groups and moved toward consolidation as the
Central Intelligence Agency began to mount the “Contra” opposition. The FSLN would
and did use any force necessary to quash any opposition during the mid to late 1980s.
Brinton identifies the final stage o f revolution as the ihermidor period (a breaking
o f the fever) or, metaphorically, the ebbing o f the tide o f revolution.174 The moderate
period is followed by extreme economic distress and shortages o f basic necessities in
which the extremists begin to lose the fealty o f even their most ardent advocates What
follows is a return to normalcy that Brinton measures in elastic long-term social systems
“ . . . social systems are still in many respects almost as perversely unaffected by
revolutionary good intentions as tides or rubber bands.” 175 The thermidor is
characterized by a number o f changes. Arguably and ironically, it is Violeta Chamorro,

Somoza henchmen, his newspaper fared no better during the FSLN period that censored it
in the name o f the defense o f the revolution. A study o f the Cuban Revolution will reveal
the same pattern. President Urrutia, a moderate named by Castro as president, lasted only
a short while.
173Ibid., 171.
174Ibid„ 205.
175Ibid., 204.
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elected in 1990, who assumes the role o f the leader in the thermidor period. She was faced
with a need for reconciliation but still had to maintain sufficient control to carry out the
necessary policy to move from a centrally planned economy and highly polarized society
to a market economy and a more democratic system o f government. As in the Brinton
model she was able to take advantage o f the mood o f the people who sought a more
peaceful and quieter environment.
The Transition Protocol authored by Cham orro’s Minister o f the Presidency, Dr.
Antonio Lacayo, enabled the process. The most critical move, perhaps, was Cham orro’s
agreement to leave Daniel O rtega’s brother, Humberto, in charge o f the military. This was
a pragmatic maneuver that allowed her time to eventually remove him without incident,
and reduce the bloated and unnecessary military force.
Other steps included amnesty programs for political foes o f the former regime, the
return o f the traditional (more conservative) Catholic Church (countering the example o f
the revolutionary priests who were so influential in the FSLN junta), a return to “pleasure”
or signal from her administration that there was no requirement to follow the regimen o f
the FSLN Marxist-inspired junta, and a return to the concept o f private property and
property rights.
The governments o f Aleman and Bolanos can be seen as a further expansion o f the

thermidor direction, and the policies o f those governments follow the same rough pattern.
However, some variances can be observed such as the issues o f the residual FSLN
influences and the pervasive corruption which plagues the political system.
Perhaps the most important observation o f Brinton, at least for the Nicaragua case,
is that permanent changes occurred in the society and culture that affected future attitudes
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and changes in domestic variables. While Brinton observed, “It may be that what they
changed is m ore-or less significant for the sociologist than what they did not change.” 176
Among other changes, however, are the expectations o f the population at large that
political change can be made, that the machinery o f government should be efficient and
serve the people, demands for the reduction o f poverty, a sense o f egalitarianism, a
reduction o f class structure influence, a return o f real freedom o f religion, and a cautionary
signal to future would-be despots.177
While it would seem unusual to some to include a theory o f revolution in this
work, it is at the same time clear that Nicaragua is still in the process o f revolution
Brinton’s work is remarkable in that it outlined the likely path that Nicaragua would take
more than sixty years ago. His book only treats four major revolutions including the
American Revolution and the Bolshevik Revolution, he very carefully laid out
“uniformities” in revolutions that have value for the analysis o f the Nicaragua case.

Hypothesis and Discussion
The multiple factors in the dynamics o f Nicaragua’s current situation with regard
to its poor economic health and alarming level o f poverty make it a “model” to study in
terms o f the effects o f neoliberalism that has been in place for the past fifteen plus years.
Neoliberalism is a term that does not automatically connote economic policy or change;
however, in the context o f the new, post-Cold War world order, the economic issues are
the imperatives, and the ultimate success or failure o f the tenets o f economic neoliberalism

176Ibid., 237.
177Ibid„ 237-249.
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will be played out first in those states that have the least ability to dictate their own
policies.
In the face o f the collapse o f communism and the subsequent loss to Nicaragua o f
its patron state, the Soviet Union, Nicaragua is faced with no choice but to choose the
neoliberal plan There is no other option except to the extent and speed to which
Nicaragua embraces the G8's demands
It is important here to make distinction between neoliberalism as a general political
science term that can seen as the opposite o f Marxist historical materialism as both an
historical analysis, and political economy theory. (In the United States the terms liberal
and neoliberal have varying meanings according to the discipline, but are seen as mis-used
by the rest o f the world )
In defining the difference between neoliberalism as a political concept and
economic concept,
[T]he social functions o f production and distribution, surplus extraction and
appropriation, and the allocation o f social labor are, so to speak, privatized and
they are achieved by non-authoritarian, non-political means. In other words, the
social allocation o f resources and labor does not, on the whole, take place by
means o f political direction, communal deliberation, . . . (etc.), but rather through
the mechanisms o f commodity exchange . . . based on contractual relationships
between “free” producers-juridically free and free from the means o f
production-and an appropriators who has absolute private property in the means
o f production 178 . . capitalism has a special character because the coercive power
supporting capitalist exploitation is not wielded by the appropriators . . [but] by
the state . . . and private economic power . . 179

178Mark Rupert, ed., Ideologies o f Globalization - Contending Visions o f a New
World Order (New York: Routledge Press, 2000), 3.
179Ibid.
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Her point is that while government and government policy have a coercive effect,
ultimately the market which has its own authority will determine the outcomes. In effect,
she provides the argument that the neoliberal solution when left to full development will
fulfill its promises.
It is important here to make distinction between neoliberalism as a general political
science term that can seen as the opposite o f Marxist historical materialism as both an
historical analysis, and political economy theory. (In the United States the terms liberal
and neoliberal have varying meanings according to the discipline; but are seen as mis-used
by the rest o f the world.) In Ellen Meiksins W ood’s Democracy Against Capitalism,180 she
defines the difference between neoliberalism as a political concept and economic concept,
and clarifies the term in the international context.
The “prescription” for Nicaragua’s recovery, then, has already been laid out in
general concept by the adoption o f the Washington Consensus and in particular by the
conditions o f the ESAF. Those external variables can be seen as constant, at least for the
foreseeable future, and any success or failure o f that regime will depend on how Nicaragua
aligns herself with the theory and practice o f economic neoliberalism. The ultimate,
underlying tenet o f economic neoliberalism that represents the Cold War victory is based
on private ownership o f the means o f production and laissez faire system o f commodities
exchange.181

180Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy Against Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995).
181Rupert, 49.
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The question, then, remains whether such as remedy will work in Nicaragua.
Nicaragua has the resources and human capital to make sufficient recovery to join the
modem world economic system but for the dynamic o f the internal variables For the
purposes o f this study, the external variables are treated as constants, and the focus is on
the internal, domestic variables that will finally influence the outcome. The underlying
basis for the hypothesis o f this study is that only domestic variables matter, or put
somewhat more positively: domestic forces in Nicaragua will determine the likely success
or failure o f its economic revival and full re-integration into the world system.
The important domestic independent variables are reduced to five. They are
influence o f the Catholic Church, the influence o f the business community and its
instruments, influence o f labor, enduring effects o f the FSLN and the Revolution, and
the political culture o f Nicaragua. These variables are critical to Nicaragua’s neoliberal
solution, or the chance that Nicaragua might choose to return to some variation o f a past
experience.
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CHAPTER III

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY TO 1990

This chapter’s focus is on Nicaragua’s direction and likelihood for a healthy
political and economic recovery in the context o f neoliberal basic outline and the historical
background o f the Republic. The primary instrument o f the neoliberal agenda is seen in the
DR-CAFTA (Dominican Republic - Central America Free Trade Agreement).1 Below is a
brief history o f Nicaragua that provides the background to this study. The detail is
important because it lends understanding to the Nicaraguan experience with regard to its
own development and relationships with colonial and neocolonial states. In the modem
context, such an understanding has a direct relationship with the dynamics o f
neoliberalism.
The love-hate relationship Nicaraguans feel toward the United States and other
powerful states today has a long history that was first articulated in Nicaragua by the
Republic’s head o f state, General Zelaya, in the late 19th Century. Such attitudes and
deeply held beliefs about the United States shape current domestic behavior; thus, they
affect domestic independent variables that will ultimately guide the outcome o f the current
recovery struggle.
This review also lends to the understanding o f the various external, independent
forces that have shaped and will shape Nicaragua’s direction, and the likelihood o f it

]The United States, Dominican Republic and Nicaragua along with the other
Central American states are signatories to DR-CAFTA (Dominican Republic -Central
American Free Trade Agreement) sometimes known as CAFTA-DR.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

129
rejoining the modern “globalized” world. Further, it reveals the nearly unspoken reaction
to the failures o f neoliberalism driven by the psyche o f every Nicaraguan who knows the
history o f Nicaragua and its relationship with the United States.
In the context o f the historical, economic, cultural and political history, the four
selected internal, independent variables are treated below. The external independent
variables including foreign ODA support and relief in all forms are treated as a collective
constant, but presumed to condition the domestic independent variables.
Notwithstanding the best efforts o f Nicaraguans themselves who had no real
identity until the early 20th Century, the Republic has been the subject o f outside
exploitation from the beginning. The earliest exploitation by the Spanish was followed by
exploitation by Great Britain and finally, in the modern context, by nearly all north states
that had either a strategic or economic interest in the state. The Marxist term for the later
relationship is neocolonialism 2 While the interpretation o f this term may be in dispute,
there is not question that Nicaragua, as with other Latin American states, has been victim
o f exploitation and subject to unfair treatment
The Congressional Record from the period reveals much discussion regarding the
potential o f Nicaragua as a trans-isthmian canal route via the San Juan River and the large
lake system. This later developed into competition by European powers and the United
States for the construction o f a trans-isthmian canal. In the mid-19th Century, Nicaragua

2I have chosen to use this term because it is the easiest shorthand term available,
and accurately descriptive, i.e. a colonial relationship in economic and political terms that
has all o f the characteristics o f colonialism except its specific meaning o f an official
relationship. That it is a Marxist term is purely incidental to my use o f the term.
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was seen by some influential United States southerners for its potential as a slave state to
be annexed
In the later iteration o f neocolonial treatment, Nicaragua was a pawn in the Cold
War due to its strategic location in the Central America. Today, a cynic would hold that
the north states’ generosity and altruism in trying to revive the Nicaraguan economy is
little more than selfish motives to restore Nicaragua’s ability to provide basic commodities
for world markets. In any case, the interpretation that is relevant to this study is that which
resides in the Nicaraguan political psyche.

Formative Period
From the early 16th Century occupation by the Spanish along the western Pacific
plateau and the 17th and 18th Century exploitation by the British on eastern Caribbean
coastal side, Nicaragua and its people early on were seen as a resource for the benefit o f
its uninvited foreign invaders. While there is nothing remarkable about this for Caribbean
and early Central American territories, Nicaragua’s economic development or lack o f it
can be tied to its historical relationships with outsiders.
What is not so apparent to the casual student is how its geography affected the
manner in which Nicaragua developed into a state, and how its economy people fared over
time. The earliest exploitation o f Nicaragua was by a Spanish expedition from what is
today Panama through Costa Rica up the western side o f Nicaragua by Francisco
Hernandez de Cordoba in 1524. Hernandez established the first European colony in
Nicaragua and led expeditions from Leon and also founded Granada. That expedition had
the sole purpose o f extracting gold and any specie that might be found or stolen from the
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indigenous people.3 The Spanish expeditions that later developed several outposts to carry
out that project were all located along the western side o f Nicaragua, west o f the
mountain range that runs its length. The Spanish were roughly aware o f the remaining
approximately two thirds o f Nicaragua to the east, but that knowledge did not take them
beyond the western third o f its territory.
Nicaragua was named by the Spanish after an indigenous chief (Nicarao) who was
particularly powerful and cooperative with the Spanish.4 The Spanish, in the typical
method o f the time, made all efforts to coopt the indigenous leaders, subjugate the people
for the Catholic Church, and impose at least some modicum o f Spanish language and
culture. Those early efforts were the beginning o f successful colonization that today is
reflected by the 85 percent Catholic faith o f the western one third o f the state, and the use
o f Spanish as both the official language and the lingua franca o f the indigenous people.
Geography was the determinant that resulted in the stark contrast o f what is found
between the roughly eastern two thirds o f the state and the western third. In the eastern
two thirds, English (Creole) and some remaining indigenous languages are spoken, and the
predominant religion is Moravian. In the western third, the language is Spanish with very
little indigenous language spoken, and the predominant religion is Roman Catholicism

3Merrill, 8. These two early colonial cities developed into the respective political
centers-Leon as the liberal center and Granada as the conservative-whose roles played
out over time in the warfare between liberals in Nicaragua. A later political
compromise moved the capital to a new, undeveloped area which today known is
Managua. In addition to gold and other valuables, the Spanish also enslaved many
indigenous workers who were shipped to Peru to work the gold mines there. The number
o f those enslaved have been estimated at perhaps as many as tens o f thousands. See later
discussion in this chapter.
4Ibid„ 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

132

Not long after the settlement o f Jamestown, Virginia in 1607 and well after the
Spanish began development o f the western third was the settlement o f Providence Island
(today renamed in Spanish Isla de Providencia) in 1631 off the Mosquito Coast. These
were on the model o f the Massachusetts Bay Company and other concessions granted by
the British monarchy.
The earliest interests o f British Puritans in settling Providence Island were to
establish a toehold to develop agriculture and to exploit any trade opportunities. By 1635,
the Company o f Adventurers consisted o f five hundred whites and ninety African slaves
under the leadership o f Robert Rich, the Second Earl o f Warwick. The British company,
while meeting with limited success in agriculture on the island, ultimately failed because o f
the persistent attacks by the Spanish fleet, their fear o f the isolation on the island and
severe weather.5
The colonization o f the western coastal mainland was not planned. Rather, it
resulted from the settlement along the M osquito coast first at Cape Gracias a Dios by
those same English indentured servants and African slaves who made their way to the
mainland from Providence Island after it failed. They found the native indigenous people
friendly enough, intermarried and with the later introduction o f freed African slaves
developed into an amalgam o f what later became known as the Miskito. In the modern
context, however, the general population o f region has evolved into an amalgam o f

5Robert A. Naylor, Pente Ante Imperialism (Rutherford, New Jersey. Farleigh
Dickeson University Press, 1989), 29.
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Miskito, Creole and Hispanic Nicaraguans whose eastward expanding agricultural frontier
has reached the Caribbean c o a s t6
The newly developed British outposts along the mainland Caribbean coast
prospered due to trade with pirates and European visitors including the Dutch. As Great
Britain recognized the potential o f the region as a British colony, it began to make more
purposeful efforts to nurture its development.7
As the British influence along the eastern coast remained constant throughout the
19* Century, the rest o f Nicaragua was developing as a newly emerged state with no
history but as a colonial dependency o f Spain. Latin American visionaries such as Simon
Bolivar included Nicaragua in grander plans to build an independent system o f Latin
American states. In the early part o f the 19* Century most Latin American nationalists
including Simon Bolivar8 admired the new-born United States, and had a vision o f a

6While the people are known as Miskito, the territory is known as the M osquito
Coast or Mosquitia. In fact, the Miskito are one o f six or seven tribes o f indigenous people
who populated the region at the time the British showed up, and who later intermarried
with the British and African slaves brought with them. The exception is the Garifunos
whose racial origin is only Africa; however, little is known about the true history o f the
Garifunos even today. The Garifunos populate areas along the eastern coast o f Nicaragua,
Honduras and Belize. Some people o f the region refer to Miskito as the surviving
indigenous native American full-blooded Miskito, i.e., not racially mixed. In western,
Spanish-speaking Nicaragua, the Miskito are known as Costenos (coastal people).
7In 1687, the British governor o f Jamaica formally recognized the King o f
Miskitos, and developed that relationship such that the King’s control over the region
became an integral and carefully developed extension o f British control until the late 19*
Century. M ost o f the creole and native indigenous Miskito population are pro-U.S., and
many joined in the mid-to-late 1980s Contra war against the FSLN. This relationship
remains an anathema, if rarely expressed, to the national government. Miskito
representation in the National Assembly or in the executive branch is very minimal even
though its population is approximately ten percent o f the 5 .5 million total population.
8In Simon Bolivar’s “Letter from Jamaica” (1815) written during a period exile; he
expressed admiration o f republican forms o f government and criticizes the tyranny o f the
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unified, independent Latin America Little did they calculate that they would later identify
the United States’ “North Americans” along with the Europeans as exploiters.
The British saw Latin America as an opportunity for colonization to replace the
Spanish, but American business saw Nicaragua in another light, beginning just before the
U.S. Civil War. Because o f Nicaragua’s obvious potential as a trans-isthmian canal route9
due to its largest lake (Lake Nicaragua) and the San Juan River that flows from it to the
Caribbean coast, its strategic potential was recognized by the Spanish as early as the 16th
Century. However, practical engineering limitations dictated only that navigation up the
Rio San Juan and the short overland trip from the current-day vicinity o f El Virgen to San
Juan del Sur on the Pacific was all that could be conceived. By the mid-19th Century it
became obvious to European powers and the United States that there was potential for a
trans-isthmian water route that required dredging the San Juan River from the Caribbean

European monarchies that abused their colonial relationships. Bolivar expressed the spirit
o f the new Latin America and included the indigenous as a part o f the newly developing
independent Latin America. Indirectly, he complimented the newly established United
States, and later invited the United States to participate in the Congress o f Panama in
1826 in which he made the first attempt at hemispheric cooperation and unanimity.
Despite the proclamations o f the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, Bolivar saw the United States as
an equal partner and likely ally in the struggle for full independence from former European
colonial masters. (Appendix III)
9The western-most point in a cross-isthmian route, whether by road, railroad or
canal is only twelve miles from the most western point o f Lake Nicaragua to the town o f
San Juan del Norte on the Pacific coast. Commodore Vanderbilt improved that route for
his own steamship line by building piers on the lake for his shallow-draft steamers and a
surfaced road from the dock site to the town o f San Juan del Sur to serve “49ers” from
the east coast o f the United States traveling to California as an alternate to the dangerous
Panama overland route. The Rio San Juan was navigable by ocean going vessels until
violent earthquakes in mid to late 17th Century render it navigable only by shallow draft
barges and steamers.
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side, use o f the lake route to the west and a short ten or twelve-mile canal leg on the
Pacific side at San Juan del Sur to enter the Pacific Ocean.
After its break from the United Provinces o f Central American in 1848, Nicaragua
settled into self-sufficient agrarian economy that was ruled by the Conservative Party. The
period was short lived because o f pressures from the Liberal Party that sought outside
assistance to gain control o f the government.
In 1850, without consultation with the Nicaraguan government, the United States
and Great Britain entered into the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty that mutually guaranteed each
power that the other would not begin a canal project in Nicaragua without prior
consultation and guarantees o f passage. Some in the United States saw the treaty as a
reversal o f the central tenet o f the M onroe Doctrine o f U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere.
In a larger sense it reflected the attitude o f the United States and Great Britain about the
sovereignty o f Nicaragua, and reflected poorly on the Liberal Party’s motives.
From the optic o f Nicaraguan attitudes about the United States, perhaps the most
onerous period in Nicaragua’s history is the William Walker period just before the U.S.
Civil War. Notably, there is a prominent and well maintained plaque on the central square
o f Granada that commemorates W alker’s defeat in that city. Also, in Cartago, Costa Rica
there is a statue o f Walker being run out o f Central America at the bayonet points o f Costa
Rican soldiers. These reminders o f U.S. interventionism are not lost on the modern
populations o f Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
W alker’s and his United States sponsors’ interests in Nicaragua were dismissive o f
Nicaragua as a state and its people. Their primary focus was on a political
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and military takeover to annex Nicaragua as a slave state for southern interests.10 W alker’s
efforts were largely underwritten by United States southern state wealthy businessmen
mostly in Louisiana where Walker had been a writer and editor for a New Orleans
newspaper.
In 1855, with the promise o f generous land grants, Walker was invited by the
Liberals in Leon to join in the fight against the conservative forces based in Granada. The
Liberals did not expect to lose control to Walker, and that Walker would convert his
military success into the presidency o f the Republic.11 W alker’s ultimate miscalculation
that led to his being run out o f Nicaragua was the degree o f determination o f Commodore
Vanderbilt to remove Walker when after Walker confiscated Vanderbilt’s profitable
Accessory Transit Company. Vanderbilt had made a fortune transporting “49ers” from the
east to west coasts o f Nicaragua, and losing control o f the company was no small matter
to Vanderbilt.12 It is interesting that both Walker and Vanderbilt had economic not
political ambition, but political tools (in this case the use o f military force) was their
primary implement

10Walker was a Tennessee-born, French-trained medical doctor turned journalist
and filibusterer (in the old meaning) who became infatuated with the South’s cause just
before the U.S. Civil War. His first adventures took him to Sonora, Mexico where he was
badly defeated by local caudillos. His Nicaragua adventures, however, were better funded
by United States southern state interests in expanding slave-based agriculture operations in
Central America.
"W alker also declared Nicaragua a slave state and made English its official
language.
12While the details o f Vanderbilt’s efforts and his business miscalculations in
maintaining control o f the company are interesting, the bottom line is that W alker’s
confiscation o f the company by nationalizing it, was more an affront to Vanderbilt than a
financial loss. Vanderbilt’s influence with the United States government was key in
causing the removal o f Walker.
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Likewise, Walker miscalculated that Costa Rica would not declare war on him
which it did in March 1856. The first time Walker was ejected was with the help o f the
U.S. Navy in May 1857;13 however, it was not until four more expeditions that he was
finally captured by a British force and turned over to Honduras where he was executed by
firing squad.14 The pressure that was brought to bear by Commodore Vanderbilt in the
name o f United States’ business interests served as the rationale for the U.S. M arine’s
actions.
The almost mythical tales o f Walker’s adventurers are all too true, and have been
the subject o f several books and Hollywood productions. His filibustering adventures in
Nicaragua under the sponsorship o f Southern slave-state interests illustrate in some
miniature model to Nicaraguans and other Central American nationalists their vulnerability
to U.S. interests whether they be economic, political or strategic. The lesson serves to fuel
cynicism and skepticism about motives o f the United States and its allies. Such a lesson
was reinforced less than a half a century later when the United States actively intervened
in Nicaragua’s political process.
Partly because o f W alker’s miscalculations and because o f powerful neighboring
states’ conservative forces, after W alker’s exit, Nicaragua was ruled by conservatives
from 1857 until 1893. During this period it experienced very strong economic growth

13The U.S. Navy was charged by the U.S. President to remove Walker to please
Vanderbilt and U.S. business interests and avoid further embarrassment.
14While not clearly recorded in history, it is apparent that the ruling Conservative
Party in Honduras feared a Liberal uprising in Honduras, and had motive to reduce that
threat in executing Walker.
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because o f the world demand for coffee and bananas. Likewise, it enjoyed substantial
investment from the United States Nicaragua's wealthy oligarchy also operated very
profitable cattle ranches. Included in its natural wealth were gold deposits and
valuable hardwood in Mosquitia that were exploited by large U.S. operations. In one
manner or another, the exploitation by U.S. businessmen continued until the FSLN
Triumph.
The forced removal o f Walker meant the demise o f the Liberal Party’s efforts to
gain control, and the Conservative Party resumed its oppressive agriculture and labor
practices while flirting with the United States government and investors. In effect, the
Conservative Party chose to subordinate itself to its own and outside economic interests.
In an effort to further bolster the Nicaragua coffee sector, the Conservative
government passed laws that perpetuated near-slave wages for coffee producers. This was
seen by the wealthy cattlemen as an unfair advantage, and it resulted in a political struggle
that finally led to a the installation o f General Jose Santos Zelaya as president in 1893
Zelaya was both a Liberal and a nationalist
By the later part o f the IQ* Century a canal route was seen as feasible, and its
attraction to the U.S. Congress can be seen clearly in the Congressional Record o f the 47th
Congress’ House o f Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs report to accompany
House Bill 6799. The record also reflects the presumptuousness o f the United States
government in considering such a project without input from the Nicaraguan government
o f the time; rather, only considering Great Britain’s interests. Notably, this was an early
deviation from the central tenet o f the Monroe Doctrine
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In January 1902, the House passed a bill authorizing the construction o f a
Nicaragua canal. Despite the fact that the House had authorized the Nicaragua project.
General Zelaya’s generally hostile stance and the ongoing strife between the political
factions in Nicaragua played a role in the final choice that resulted in the Hay-Herran
Treaty a year later dooming the Nicaragua canal option in favor o f the Panama option.
General Zelaya apparently was indifferent to the opportunity, or he had decided
that the sacrifices to Nicaragua’s sovereignty would not be worth i t 15
At the insistence o f President Theodore Roosevelt, the Panama option was taken
up. The U.S. Congress’ approval included a payment to Colombia o f $40 million.
Colombia was a reluctant partner but its circumstances at the time forced the “sale.” 16 The

15United States Congress, “Nicaragua Canal Report to Accompany H R. 6799,”
House Committee on Foreign Affairs Report No. 1698, Congressional Record , July 21,
1882 (Washington, D C.: U.S. Congress, 21 July 1882), 1-2 Theodore Roosevelt had
pushed for a trans-isthmian canal for both economic and strategic reasons, and finally was
instrumental in the 1902 choice o f Panama as the site During the conduct o f the SpanishAmerican War in 1898, when Roosevelt was Under-secretary o f the Navy in the McKinley
administration, he illustrated the strategic importance o f a Trans-isthmian canal citing the
sixty-seven day voyage o f the SS Oregon warship from San Francisco to the Caribbean as
a case in point. His strategic argument was further supported by Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge and Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, the most respected U.S. Navy tactician o f the
time. Roosevelt favored the Panama option in part because o f his impatience with the
complications o f the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and an unfriendly Nicaraguan president,
Zelaya.
16Colombia was involved in a civil war at the time; it ultimately took the money. In
effect, circumstances provided the conditions for the United States to set the stage for a
Panama territory revolution which was engineered by Cromwell, Buneau-Varilla and Dr.
Manual Amador o f Panama Province. Amador would become the first Republic o f Panama
President. The U.S. backed the break from Colombia by the presence o f a U.S. warship in
the Colon harbor on the Pacific side. On November 3rd, 1903 the Colombians managed to
land 400 troops in Panama but were “encouraged” to depart because o f the arrival o f the
U.S. warship and other factors. These included bribes to key Colombian officers as well as
purposeful deceit on the part o f the American-owned railroad that had promised to
provide transport o f the Colombian force from the Atlantic side (Colon) to the Pacific side
(Panama City) which was the seat o f the revolution. In effect, the United States was party
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rough-shod manner in which the U.S. enforced its hegemony in the Western Hemisphere,
and it willingness to back up any policy decision with military force became known as the
Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine
Discounting the history o f William W alker’s earlier interference in Nicaraguan
politics, General Zelaya was the first prominent Nicaraguan who spoke out against the
neocolonial hegemonic tendencies o f the United States; in today’s context o f
neoliberalism, this anti-United States bias can be easily understood. The United States and
Great Britain inadvertently helped General Zelaya gain and retain power while Japan and
Germany took the opportunity to spread their own influence in the region.17

to and supported the conspiracy to have its way in Panama. President Roosevelt was
unapologetic. While the details o f the Panama canal and all that surrounds it are not part
o f this study, Roosevelt’s well-known comment about the Panama Canal Zone: “I took it
and it is ours.” reflects Latin Americans’ understanding about United States attitudes
toward them. While Roosevelt was criticized for that attitude and strategy, even his critics
grudgingly gave him credit for the success o f the Panama option. However, Latin
Americans have a long memory and would easily recall the Roosevelt’s attitudes and
behavior as reinforcing their anti-U.S. sentiments.
17In a side note to Central American history, it is easy to understand the worry o f
the United States vis-a-vis European and other foreign influence in the Western
Hemisphere when one considers what has happened in Panama since the passage o f the
Panama Canal Treaties that were ratified by the U.S. Senate. Lacking expertise and
needing cash, the Panamanian government gave the People’s Republic o f China long-term
concessions to operate the key termini at the Pacific and Caribbean sides o f the canal. This
effectively provides the PRC opportunity, and with motive can undertake to negate the
DeConcini amendment to the Panama Canal Treaties that allows free and ready passage o f
U.S. warships without the prior approval o f the Panamanian government. A clarification
to the Treaties before they were approved by the U.S. Senate in 1978 and accepted by the
Panamanian people in a national referendum, was that the United States foreswore that it
would not meddle in Panama’s internal affairs. No doubt, McKinley, T.R. Roosevelt and
Alfred Thayer Mahan are turning over in their graves despite general agreement that it was
time for the United States to abandon its hegemonic status in the Canal Zone. (Sources:
Author’s personal knowledge and Library o f Congress, (website) Country Studies:
Panama (a series). Available [Online]:http: //countrystudies.us/ panama/19.htm [10
November 2005].)
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In an interesting development that demonstrates the continued interest in additional
trans-isthmian water routes can be seen in Nicaragua today with the Nicaraguan
government’s concession to develop a barge route using the San Juan River as its longest
link 18 The barge traffic would travel to and from Bocas del Toro, Panama which is
nearest deep-sea port.

Subjugation And Dependency
Clearly, the United States and European powers did not recognize rights o f
sovereignty for Nicaragua or its people. The [Theodore] Roosevelt Corollary policy put
teeth into the Monroe Doctrine, and further strengthened U.S. hegemonic policy;
however, its other purpose was to address the weakening o f the M onroe Doctrine by the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. It can also be seen as an early signal that extra-hemispheric
powers would be a factor in Nicaragua’s development.
Aside from the canal issue, as the large United States corporate operations in
coffee and bananas were developing, Zelaya was particularly troublesome for the yanquis.
The central issues were sovereignty, economics and the domestic politics behind the
growing wealth o f Nicaraguan investors in collusion with United States firms
Among other changes that rankled the United States and outside investors was the
Zelaya government’s new constitution. It contained anti-clerical provisions, limitations on

18 Gabriel Pasos (President, Ecocanal, S.A.) in discussion with author in Granada,
Nicaraguan, December 2003. Even today, it could be argued that the Nicaragua option
would have been cheaper, a closer route and generally faster to complete. In 2003, a
Texas entrepreneur and a Nicaraguan businessman convinced the National Assembly to
issue an exclusive government charter to develop a barge system along the route that
would roughly replicate the original thinking. The company, Ecocanal, S.A., is a
registered Nicaraguan corporation that has undertaken studies toward that end.
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the foreign diplomats’ rights to diplomatic immunity and abolition o f the death penalty.
General Zeyala pushed all o f the hot buttons including encouraging Japanese and German
business investment while violating the United States political sensibilities articulated in
the Monroe Doctrine. Zelaya defiantly garnered the ire o f powerful U.S. politicians by
advertising his own imperialist goals in Central America19 and baiting the United States.
He publicly offered trans-isthmian Nicaraguan canal concessions to Japan and Germany all
the while criticizing U.S. interventionism in Central America.20
Zelaya settled the dispute with Great Britain over its M osquito Coast claims, and
gained recognition that the eastern coast was under the sovereignty rights o f the
republic-albeit nominally.21 This action followed Zelaya’s pattern o f nationalism at any
cost, and it later earned him accolades from the FSLN as the first Nicaraguan head o f state
to defy the United States. General Zelaya is seen as a hero today because he defied wouldbe outside forces22 and the Catholic Church that had sided with the Conservatives. While

19As late as 1908, Zelaya attempted to conquer neighboring Honduras and El
Salvador through military incursions.
20Merrill, 14-18.
21Later renamed by the FSLN, the most north-eastern Nicaraguan Mosquitia
province was Zelaya Province North, and the most south-eastern province was Zelaya
Province South; they were named in recognition o f General Zelaya’s efforts to integrate
the territory into the larger state. Interestingly, 1898 marks the last year that there was a
Miskito king ruling the region with British protection and some financial support which
coincides with Zelaya’s settlement with the British crown.
“ “United States Intervention, 1909-1933,” Federal Research Division, Library o f
Congress. Available [Online]: http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-921 l .html [26
February 2006], General Zelaya’s defiance o f the United States showed up later in the
embodiment o f General Augustino Sandino. He was a determined liberal military leader
fighting against conservative forces in the northeast regions o f Nicaragua. He defied both
the United States and the newly installed Nicaraguan government by refusing to sign the
Pact o f Espino Negro o f 20 May 1927 that had committed Liberal forces under the
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simultaneously modernizing Nicaragua’s transportation infrastructure, substantially
increasing foreign investment and overseeing the further boom in coffee and banana
production he retained the presidency for a remarkably long time. His 1893 Liberal victory
is still commemorated23 in Nicaragua today. There is some irony in Zelaya’s being
commemorated because his larger interests seem to have been in the corporate
development o f Nicaragua along the lines o f the Somoza dynasty. However, what General
Zelaya represents to Nicaraguans today is an entirely different matter. Today, it General
Zelaya’s defiance o f the United States and the inevitable influence o f money in politics that
is admired. In effect, he simultaneously represents defiance for those who have political
motives and for those who are opposed to neoliberalism in any form.
Theodore Roosevelt, a hero o f the Cuban expedition during the Spanish American
War, a proponent o f geopolitical theory,24 former Under-secretary o f the U.S. Navy and

command o f General Jose Maria Moncada to disarm simultaneously with the Conservative
government forces. The Pact provided for the introduction o f a U.S. Marine
force to maintain order until the results o f the planned 1928 national elections. Additional
information is the general knowledge o f author.

23Envio, “Three celebrations and a host o f scenarios,” Envio (Managua:
Universidad Centroamericana, August 2003), 2. On 11 July 2003, the Partido Liberal
Constitucional (PLC - Constitutional Liberal Party) held a large celebration to make the
point, in part, that the current Bolanos government’s macroeconomic policies to satisfy
the very outside forces that Zeyala would have opposed. It should not be overlooked
either that the assembly was also intended to voice support for former President Aleman
who, at that time, was jailed for corruption.
24The geo-political theorists o f the time included Frederich Ratzel (German),
Alfred Thayer Mahan (American) and Halford MacKinder (British); Theodore Roosevelt
included himself as close associate and supporter o f Mahan who today is recognized as
one o f the foremost naval theorists o f all time whose works have been studied by major
military forces in the world. The geo-strategic theorists hold that control o f key naval (and
land) choke points and passages are essential to maintain military dominance, and by
extension, any cross isthmian w ater route in Central America (a canal) was critical. This
theory ultimately played out with the nearly simultaneous opening o f the Panama Canal
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Chief o f Police in New York City, and Vice-president under President McKinley became
the President o f the United States in 1901 25 In view o f the Monroe Doctrine and the U.S.
policy o f unquestioning support for U.S. business in Latin America, Roosevelt was
predisposed to remove Zelaya as quickly as feasible.26 His actions toward that goal were
purposeful and determined.
In 1909, the United Fruit Company purposely depressed the wholesale price o f
bananas by about one third. United Fruit owned the steamship line concession home
ported in Bluefields in Mosquitia previously awarded by Zelaya. Its operations at the time
were largely as middleman. United Fruit bought Nicaraguan bananas from independent
American operations; those products were then shipped by United Fruit’s Bluefields’
Steamship Company to market. The intended effect o f the price reduction was to raise
anti-Zelaya political pressures to help him make his decision to resign This and others
factors including United Fruit Company’s monopolistic practices in Central America and
the Caribbean earned it the regional nickname “pulpo.”27

and the outbreak o f World War I in September 1914 and also saw the untimely death o f
Mahan.
25See Appendix VIII. Nicaraguan poet Ruben Dario depicts Theodore Roosevelt in
“To Roosevelt” as all that embodies the good and evil o f the United States.
26Not forgotten, certainly, to Latin Americans was the fact that the United States
had run Spain out o f the hemisphere in 1898; Theodore Roosevelt was the hero o f the
Spanish-American War. In effect, he became the caudillo o f the hemisphere. Roosevelt’s
attitude and actions were seen as one o f an avuncular relative who would not hesitate to
punish any lesser state if it got out o f line.
27K.C. Tessendorf, Uncle Sam in Nicaragua (New York: Atheneum, 1987), 74.
(Pulpo is octopus in English.)
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Zelaya had overestimated his own strength, and underestimated the outside view
o f Nicaragua’s strategic, and economic value. General Zelaya’s forced resignation came in
December 1909, but not before, over the objections o f the U.S. Ambassador, his army
executed two U.S. mercenaries serving with the Conservative rebel forces. They were
caught trying to blow up Nicaraguan government troop ships headed southeast on the San
Juan River bound for Bluefields to put down the Conservative uprising there. Zelaya’s
ill-advised actions, flirtations with Germany and Japan, and his anti-U.S. pronouncements
were sufficient to assure his ultimate downfall. Zelaya was seen as a threat to be removed,
and he w a s 28
Tessendorf, in his Uncle Sam in Nicaragua,29 quotes Theodore Roosevelt’s
biographer and historical commentator Wilfrid Callcott as imagining what Roosevelt
would have said about the U.S. relationship with Latin America-an attitude keenly
understood but poorly digested by Latin Americans: “These are our younger brothers.
When they need spanking we expect to do the job, and incidently when we think it

28In the 1970s and later, Zelaya’s strong positions served the anti-U.S. political
sentiment in Nicaragua well, but its immediate effect was to bring his own downfall with
the arrival o f a conservative rebellion that included the U.S. Marine Corps in support. The
conservatives enjoyed British financial support intended to protect British interests in the
Mosquitia region. There is an easy parallel to be drawn between the conservatives
willingness to give concessions to outside forces and the pro-neoliberal policies o f the
Bolanos administration. Zelaya’s legacy is that he rekindled the open military conflict
between the liberals and conservatives, provided an opening for U.S. military occupation
and direct involvement in political affairs, and formulated a model o f defiance o f the
United States.
29Tessendorf.
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advisable we shall take charge o f their spending money, and maybe certain other choice
possessions in the meantime ”3(l
When Zelaya resigned, the United States intervened quickly. It dictated the terms
o f the cooperation o f the Conservatives by promising support to Miguel Estrada on the
condition that Nicaragua’s constituent National Assembly write a new constitution31
removing the onerous parts o f Zelaya’s Liberal constitution.32
When President Taft took office in 1909. He embarked on a new strategy that was
more corporate in approach with the hope that he could both increase business with
Nicaragua, and reduce the expenses and need for ever-present U.S. Marines on the scene
Taft’s Secretary o f State, Philander C. Knox,33 who was a corporation lawyer and
overseas investor, was the architect o f “dollar diplomacy.” The United States was
enjoying an economic boom and the government had a fat treasury. Dollar Diplomacy
strategy was straightforward. For the commitment o f exclusive rights (nearly on a
sovereign level) to do business in the chosen state, “The United States would pay off-debts

30Ibid., 72. While Roosevelt’s policies and strategy worked in most o f the
Americas, Zelaya would have none o f it. It is for this reason that his revolution is
celebrated by the liberals in Nicaragua today. President Zelaya defied W ashington’s wishes
and he is recognized for that as much as his own tyrannical and imperialist behavior fades.
31The constitution that was produced was written almost in its entirety by a Yale
University professor who had been “recommended” to the new government by the United
States.
32Ironically, Zelaya settled in New York City in a very small apartment where he
died with little recognition o f who is was or how he had defied the United States.
33Knox was best known at the time as the corporate lawyer who organized the
U.S. Steel conglomerate.
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with dollars and pump in new American money, with the U.S. overseeing the debtor
nation’s revenue sources to ensure repayment (and make money for the U.S. investors).”34
Dollar diplomacy was one o f the earliest o f a series o f proactive United States
government economic policies in Latin America. Dollar Diplomacy represented the first
example o f a very purposeful change in direction from the reactive policies o f using the
U.S. Marines as tools o f diplomacy or the threat o f their use for the same purpose in
concert with President Theodore Roosevelt’s “big stick.” In some sense, T.R. Roosevelt
embodied the “Eagle to the North” that at the time was seen as pro-Latin America patron
rather than an aggressive superpower.35
Such United States’ policy resides in the memories o f many Nicaraguans. Today
those memories serve to fuel resistance and suspicion o f any neoliberal programs that are
thrust upon Nicaragua.
President Taft’s speech in which he proposed to “substitute dollars for bullets”36
served as the central piece o f his foreign policy with Nicaragua and the rest o f Latin
America. It should not be overlooked that Knox, himself an investor in Nicaragua in the
La Luz gold mine, suffered at the hands o f Zelaya when Zelaya canceled the La Luz
concession in 1908. There was no love lost and Knox (with Taft’s approval) intended to
remake Nicaragua along the model o f the U.S.-imposed franchisees in the Dominican
Republic and Cuba

34Ibid , 73.
35Dollar diplomacy was a strategy that was designed to create monopolistic
economic relationships in Latin America for the benefit o f U.S. banker investors and
businessmen; in Marxist rhetoric this defines the term neocolonialism.
36Ibid.
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Until Taft’s administration, the United States had engaged in a sort o f big brother
role that often meant dictating terms to Latin American states and using the military to
assert U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere
As an extension o f Dollar Diplomacy and with the purpose o f pumping yet more
money into Nicaragua, Nicaragua and the United States entered into the Bryan-Chamorro
Treaty that for three million dollars in payment gave the U.S. a 99-year exclusive
concession to build a canal in Nicaragua. At that point, the Panama Canal was already in
operation for nearly two years carrying out its strategic role in supporting allied forces in
World W ar I.
Dollar Diplomacy and President Taft may seem obscure historical notations, but
that period in Latin America was an entirely different matter. Noting that Zelaya and his
revolution is still celebrated, it is clear that attitudes o f the United State-view ed as the
greedy and pushy yanqui to the north-are still in the minds o f Nicaraguans It is the antiAmerican sentiment so sharply reflected in Pablo N eruda’s poem.
Dollar Diplomacy was the order o f the day in Nicaragua.37 The United States
engineered and supported the successful revolution o f the Conservatives in 1909, and took
effective control o f the Nicaragua. Dollar diplomacy had the intended effect in Nicaragua
with the United States underwriting the Nicaraguan state treasury; U.S. foreign investment
flowed in with the U.S. Marines as guarantor. It was “safe” because the United States
supervised the Nicaraguan customs houses, and allowed bankers to take over the national

37The importance o f the economic value o f Nicaragua can be easily illustrated by
the eagerness o f the United States to intervene in Nicaraguan affairs in 1912. While such
action can be seen as an extension o f manifest destiny, there is little connection to the
basic tenets o f the M onroe Doctrine because no foreign powers were involved.
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bank and the railroad. The country was tagged “The Brown Brothers’ Republic” in a play
on the “brown-skinned natives” with the name o f the principle U.S. banking house, Brown
Brothers.38
Within a year, the new Nicaraguan National Assembly was persuaded by Minister
o f War, General Luis Mena, to name him president upon the expiration o f President Diaz’
term in 1913. The United States balked, refusing to accept the Assembly’s decision to
violate the spirit and letter o f the new constitution that was intended to put an end to the
Liberal-Conservative acrimony. Mena rebelled against Diaz, and Liberal General Benjamin
Zelaydon responded to M ena’s call for military support.
Diaz requested military assistance from the United States to maintain the order that
it had already engineered in theory. In support o f Diaz, the United States landed a force o f
2,700 U.S. Marines at the Caribbean ports o f Corinto and Bluefields on the M osquito
Coast. The upshot was that Zelaydon was killed, and Mena licked his wounds outside o f
Nicaragua. The significance o f these events over the long term is that Nicaragua has a
permanent expectation that the United States will intervene at will, and such expectations
condition the domestic responses to the neoliberal agenda.
The United States government found itself compelled to prop up shaky
governments if just for the purpose o f maintaining economic stability. In 1913, a
contingent o f 500 U.S. Marines were sent to Nicaragua to back up the same
Conservatives that it had helped in 1909 to win their revolution from their base in
Bluefields. In 1913, it was an impatient Conservative general, Luis Mena, who sought to
overthrow conservative President Adolfo Diaz. By the time the U.S. Marine mission was

38Ibid., 78.
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over, over 1,000 Nicaraguans (Liberals and Conservatives) were dead, but civil authority
was secured. Six U S Marines were killed 39
In 1913, national elections were held in Nicaragua under the de facto supervision
o f the U.S. Government Following the election o f conservative Adolfo Diaz,40 the United
States pressured the new government into signing the Castillo-Knox Treaty in 1914 which
gave the United States perpetual rights to intervene militarily in Nicaragua along with
exclusive concession to the coveted canal route.41 However, neither the United States nor
Nicaragua ratified the treaty After removal o f the provision that allowed United States
intervention, the second iteration o f the treaty, known as the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, was
signed and ratified in 1916. The central purpose o f the Bryan-Chamorro treaty was to
negate the agreements that the Zelaya government had entered into with the Japanese and
Germans. Clearly illustrated were United States’ motives in using Nicaragua as a strategic
pawn to assure a contingency canal route all the while having access to its considerable
agricultural potential.42

,9This theme has played out repeatedly since that time in the context o f the northsouth theory both with reference to economics, politics and strategic interests. It was the
Somoza dynasty that took control o f and understood these external factors and brought
long-term stability to Nicaragua for 34 years; the FSLN either chose to ignore those
factors or did not feel the need to address them given the support o f Cuba and the Soviet
Union until 1990.
40The liberals did not participate.
41The Panama canal was completed and in operation just at the outset o f World
War I in September 1914.
42The sentiment matured sufficiently to facilitate the victory o f the Marxist FSLN,
and today is what in part explains the cynical opposition to President Enrique Bolanos.
Bolanos detractors accuse him o f blindly leading Nicaragua down the neoliberal path once
again kowtowing to the United States and its friends. While this may seem an
exaggeration on the surface, it has sufficient legs to impede Bolanos’ agenda.
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Anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America was growing then as now, and by 1925 the
U.S. Government sought an escape from the dilemma it had created The United States, in
its efforts to re-establish a modicum o f democracy in Nicaragua and settle the perpetual
disputes between the liberals and conservatives, sent Colonel Henry Stimpson43 to
Nicaragua in 1927 by President Coolidge to find a permanent solution. During the period
o f Stimpson’s work, Anastasio Somoza Garcia, an ambitious GN officer, managed to
ingratiate himself with both Stimson while he served as Stimpson’s translator. The United
States Marines had already re-organized the Nicaraguan Army into a powerful and
efficient GN, and Somoza’s quick rise to power within the GN was, in part, the doing o f
the U.S. Government and Stimpson
Stimpson was sent to Nicaragua as a sort o f ultimatum to Nicaraguan combatant
parties. In a famous meeting in the countryside along the Tipitapa River, Stimpson laid
down the conditions o f an accord: “The present (Conservative Party) regime must survive
U.S. Marines would completely disarm both armies [Liberal and

Conservative],

thereby stopping the war, andThe United States promised to oversee and enforce a
completely fair election in 1928.

. . Presidential candidates, Conservative and Liberal,

were invited and would campaign freely.”44
The announced purpose o f the U S Marine contingent in Nicaragua that arrived in
late 1926 and 1927 was to protect American lives and property. The real motives were
more complex, and included protection o f American business interests to assure that there

43Later U.S. Secretary o f State and Secretary o f War
44Ibid„ 85.
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would be no Bolshevik influence in Nicaraguan politics 45 The United States had been
supporting the Conservative party while agreeing, somewhat reluctantly to the results o f a
U S.-supervised election in 1924 after which an unstable Liberal/ Conservative
government was installed
The U.S. Marines left Nicaragua on 3 August 1925 secure in the belief that there
would be no need for further intervention True to form, that government could not meet
the challenge o f losing candidate Conservative General Emiliano Chamorro Vargas.
Chamorro and his supporters viewed newly installed President Carlos Solorzano (also a
C o n serv ativ e's weak and ineffective. In an almost Hollywood-like scenario, on 28
August 1925, the brother o f General Alfredo Rivas (a Conservative and supporter o f
Chamorro) broke into a high-level cocktail party in Managua that was attended by the
U.S. Ambassador and President Solorzano (who had just previously departed the event),
and by threat o f arms and firing o f weapons took hostage the Liberal cabinet members in
attendance The Liberal cabinet members represented the coalition compromise, i.e., a
Conservative president with a Liberal cabinet.46
Liberal Vice President Juan Bautista Sacasa left the country, and within days
General Chamorro secured the resignation o f Solorzano but not before Solorzano saw fit

45It is easily forgotten that the Bolshevik Revolution represented a political threat
to the United States at that time even though at the time it not well understood. Hence the
spread o f the revolution to the Western Hemisphere was unwelcome by the United States
Government
^Emerging from the event was the fable-like recounting that the Liberal cabinet
members before being hauled off to prison at La Loma clung to the coattails o f U.S.
Ambassador Eberhardt seeking his protection. La Loma is the underground hillside
location on the outskirts o f Managua from which President Anastasio Somoza Debayle
directed his military in his last days in office in June and July 1979.
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to fire the Liberal cabinet that had been imprisoned thus providing the excuse to release
them from La Loma 47 Chamorro then appointed himself the new vice president
In a later development, Liberal Vice President Sacasa fled to the United States
where he attempted to secure the favor o f the U.S. Government He was rebuffed by the
U.S. State Department because the U.S. had a general distrust o f Liberals 48 Sacasa went
on to Mexico where he was able to organize an army that he first staged in relatively
inaccessible northeastern Nicaragua
The United States’ concern that Sacasa was supported by Bolsheviks was based in
part on the recent Mexican Revolution in which Mexican nationalists who were somewhat
socialist in behavior had gained power to the consternation o f U S business interests
there.
The increasing success o f Sacasa’s Liberal forces against the weak Chamorro army
precipitated the decision to return the U.S. Marine force to Nicaragua In late 1926 with
the mission to establish so-called neutral zone-the real intent was to neutralize the Liberal
army to allow the Conservative military forces to regain presence and authority. Chamorro
by that time had resigned the presidency in favor o f the Nicaraguan ambassadorship in
Washington, and Conservative Adolfo Diaz once again assumed the presidency with U.S.
approbation. It was Diaz who emerged as president following the U S -backed rebellion in

47La Loma, a hillside facility used by Anastasio Somoza Debayle as a miliary
redoubt during his last days in Nicaragua today is the site o f a park that commemorates
the downfall o f the Somoza dynasty and the heroics o f General Sandino Its proximity to
Managua’s largest hotel and shopping complex is remarkable
48Some parallel can be drawn with the early overtures o f Fidel Castro to the U S
Government in late 1959 seeking support to remove Fulencio Batista. Castro was rebuffed
for much the same reason. Another opportunity lost9
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Bluefields against Zelaya in 1911, and it was Diaz who was supported by the U S Marines
when Conservative General Mena attempted to overthrow Diaz Mena later surrendered
to U.S. Marine Corps Major Smedley Butler49 in Grenada
While the detail above may seem tedious, it is but a very brief recounting o f the
interference o f the United States Government’s in Nicaraguan politics Not all the blame
should be placed on the United States, however, because it was often the very Nicaraguan
politicians who had no real legitimacy who invited U.S. Government intervention The
history o f such involvement, is a vital piece o f the puzzle to understand how domestic
independent variables might behave today in light o f the newest form o f outside pressures
from the United States. As before, some in Nicaragua would invite United States and its
north state partners participation to find a solution to the current economic crisis. At the
same time, those with long memories might hesitate
Anastasio Somoza Garcia emerged against this tumultuous political background
He saw his enemies as any anti-U.S. element including the residual o f the liberal
opposition led by Sandino. As Stimpson’s aide and translator, Somoza was in a position to
lever his influence into a position o f greater power in the GN and take credit. At least
indirectly, Somoza took credit for Stimpson’s successful negotiation in convincing
General Moncada to stand down the Liberal army in exchange for the promise o f a U .S.supervised national election. What the U.S. did not understand was that the single holdout
General Augustino Sandino, would be able to fight on for so long and so effectively, nor
would the United States understand why he retained so much support in the countryside.

49Smedley retired as a general officer, and today has almost iconic status in the
annals o f U.S. Marine Corps history.
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President Coolidge, confident that he had retaken control o f Nicaraguan politics
withdrew the U.S. Marines in early August 1925 leaving a small 100-man delegation to
continue supporting the GN and protecting the Conservative president. A miscalculation
by the U.S. Government and Somoza himself was the failure to understand that Sacasa’s
and M oncada’s real motives to displace the Conservative Diaz government and assume
their place as U.S. lackies who would profit from that relationship By this time, Dollar
Diplomacy was in full force with New York bankers making heavy investments, and loans
in Nicaragua backed by the guarantees o f the U.S. Government and the U.S. Marines
Sandino, on the other hand, was far more motivated by his nationalistic sentiments,
and strong sense o f need to rectify the injustices o f the Nicaraguan society and economy
In an interview given to Carleton Beals o f The Nation in early 1928 from his stronghold
near the border with Honduras,50 Augustino Sandino made his motives clear enough:
We have taken up arms from love o f our country because all other leaders have
betrayed it and have sold themselves out to the foreigners or have not bent the neck in
cowardice We, in our own house, are fighting for our inalienable rights What right have
foreign troops to call us outlaws and bandits and to say that we are the aggressors9 I
repeat that we are in our own house We declare that we will never live in cowardly peace
under a government installed by a foreign Power (sic) Is this patriotism or is it not9 And
when the invader is vanquished, as some day he must be, my men will be content with
their plots o f ground, their tools, their mules, and their families 51
However, the U.S. Government had little trust in Sandino’s true motives, and that
position was reinforced with the knowledge that Augustino Sandino’s half brother,

50This too seems to have repeated itself with the interviews o f Fidel Castro by New
York Times correspondent Seymour Hersh from his mountain redoubts in Cuba in late
1958 and early 1959.
5,Ibid , 93
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Socrates Sandino,52 was actively seeking support for Augustino Sandino in the United
States. “The Communist-backed All-American Anti-Imperialist League featured Socrates
Sandino . . . at mass rallies in New York City. They picketed at the White House, bearing
signs like WALL STREET AND NOT SANDINO IS THE REAL BANDIT [upper case
original]. Police arrested one hundred seven protestors at that time The League also
issued “Sandino stamps” to paste on letters in addition to U.S. postage ”53
The United States’ government also felt the pressure from other groups including
the Quakers who sent a telegram to President Coolidge condemning U.S. actions to
remove Sandino. “ Irrespective o f whether you think that Sandino is a bandit or a patriot
. . it is undeniable that he is a Nicaraguan fighting on his own soil

The United States

will not make peace by shedding Nicaraguan blood. Do not exterminate Sandino ”54
Despite the U.S. Marine Corps’ best effort, Sandino managed to elude them, but the
Marines were able to supervise a national election without interference
General Moncada, a Liberal, won that election, and in 1929 Sandino spent most o f
his time in Mexico trying to capitalize on his fame and regroup his forces However, the
U S.-Mexican relations had improved to the point where the U S was able to persuade the
Mexican government to force his move from Mexico City to Merida in the Yucatan By
1930, Sandino had returned to guerilla warfare in Nicaragua along the rough Honduran
border

52Socrates Sandino was killed with his half brother in the Anastasio Somoza
Garcia-engineered ambush that made Augustino Sandino a popular martyr and namesake
o f the FSLN
53Ibid..
54Ibid

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

157

In part, it was Sandino’s successes that drove the U.S. to further strengthen the
G N -the same GN whose military head was Anastasio Somoza Garcia by 1933. The
confidence that the U.S. had in Somoza in conjunction with flagging U.S. enthusiasm due
to the Great Depression, began to build the rationale for the U.S. pullout o f the U.S.
Marines in January 1933. It was Henry Stimpson as Secretary o f State, still bellicose in his
attitudes toward Nicaraguan revolutionaries, who made the recommendation to President
Hoover that Sacasa run.
President-elect Sacasa selected Somoza Garcia55 as the first Nicaraguan
commander o f the GN; to that point it had been under the direct supervision o f the U S
Marine Corps until they departed in January 1933. Apparently, Sacasa saw his selection
o f Somoza, o f whom the United States had a high opinion, as a signal to the U.S.
Government that the GN would remain a professional force Also, Sacasa probably saw
Somoza as a compromise candidate who would be compliant to his wishes. However,
Somoza wasted no time in consolidating his power that ultimately included the control o f
all security, intelligence and police functions 56
Sacasa appealed to the newly posted U.S. ambassador Arthur Lane for a guarantee
o f U.S. protection to serve out his presidency until the next election in 1936. Lane, under

55Sacasa was Somoza Garcia’s uncle
56Merrill, 196. Somoza’s control o f those functions stayed in the family until the
departure o f his son, Somoza Debayle, on July 17, 1979. Chronology o f Somoza family
control: Somoza Garcia (direct or indirect control) 1933-1956; Luis Somoza Debayle
(direct and indirect control) 1956-1957, Anastasio Somoza Debayle (direct control o f the
GN) 1956-1967; and Anastasio Somoza Debayle (indirect and direct control) 1967-1979.
When he assumed the presidency in 1956, Luis Somoza Debayle appointed his brother,
Anastasio Somoza Debayle, as the head o f the GN. (See glossary for more complete
information.)
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orders from Washington not to interfere or offer such assistance, demurred Lane left
Sacasa at the mercy o f Somoza, a U S favorite
Sandino saw the handwriting on the wall, and from his newly awarded agricultural
compound,57 Sandino launched verbal attacks against Somoza and the GN as
unconstitutional and no more than lackies o f the U.S. Government. Sacasa chose to side
with Sandino, ordered the GN from the areas that Sandino controlled, did not carry out
the second phase o f disarmament o f the Sandino army, and thus polarized the situation
Somoza wasted no time, and informed both Sacasa and Ambassador Lane they
could not hold him responsible for what the GN might do to defend its authority and
honor Sandino’s blunder was that he believed that despite Somoza’s bluster, Sacasa was
in control. To further his alliance with Sacasa, Sandino made a number o f unescorted trips
to Managua to confer. Despite Som oza’s overtures to Ambassador Lane that he could
easily rid Nicaragua o f Sandino, Lane explicitly compelled Somoza to take no such action
unless he first consulted with Lane It was an empty commitment made by Somoza On 21
February 1934, following a dinner party with President Sacasa, Sandino and his party’s car
was stopped at a GN roadblock Sandino, his brother Socrates and his military aides were
taken to the airport and shot; Sandino’s father and a Sacasa cabinet official were put into
prison.
Ambassador Lane, enraged, immediately found the ambush site and then drove to
the GN prison where he challenged the GN officer-in-charge Lane was not successful in
having Sandino’s father and the cabinet official released President Sacasa, who was

57The agricultural compound was given to Sandino as a political compromise
where he would run a communal farming operation with his disarmed former military
forces. Its location was well to the north, strategically located far away from Managua
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motivated by his concern for the safety o f the ambassador, begged Lane to come to the
Presidential Palace which he did
From there, Lane tried to locate Somoza by telephone; however, Somoza could
not be located Lane then drove to Som oza’s residence where he found Somoza claiming
that he had just returned from a poetry recital. However, he did admit that he was aware
that Sandino’s father and the cabinet official were incarcerated in a GN prison adding that
he could not be responsible for them. Lane drove to the prison, and by force o f will alone
caused the two to be released
On the murder o f Sandino, the GN undertook a brutal campaign to exterminate the
remaining Sandino military forces in the northeast. General Moncada voiced approval o f
the killing o f Sandino, and Somoza insinuated that it was carried out with the approval o f
Ambassador Lane. Such history still lingers in the minds o f those in Nicaragua who see the
United States complicity in the murder o f Sandino.
By this point, the U.S. Government had enough o f Nicaraguan political intrigue,
and was more focused on the domestic Great Depression problems at hand. Franklin D
Roosevelt embarked on the “Good Neighbor” policy as a new direction in relations with
Latin America. Roosevelt’s government would not approve o f yet another coup in
Nicaragua, and Somoza understood that well.
In early 1936 after a decent interval and clever maneuvering, Somoza finally
deposed o f Sacasa by staging anti-government riots which the GN refused to put down
Somoza, to put himself in a more innocent looking position, resigned from the GN. Sacasa
and his vice-president both also resigned, and the Nicaraguan legislature appointed a new
president o f Somoza’s choice with himself in the background. Sandino became an
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international mythical hero, and Somoza became the next Nicaraguan president in the fall
1936 elections.
Somoza had cleverly provided the political cover that Washington required, and
set out to ingratiate himself with the United States After his election, Somoza resigned
the presidency, and immediately afterward had the Nicaraguan constitution rewritten to
include eight-year presidential terms. He ran again in a sham election winning 99 percent
o f the votes.
The Great Depression, in combination with the high-handed U S interventionism
throughout Latin America including Nicaragua, engendered criticism from the
international community as well as from nearly all Latin Americans President Roosevelt
took early steps to rectify the situation. At that time, neighboring El Salvador had its own
Bolshevik revolution With rise o f the Communist Party and violent strike actions what
resulted was some land distribution and some displacement o f the traditional controlling
oligarchy.
President Roosevelt, in a speech made at Chautaugua, New York on 14 August
1934 elaborated on the rationale for the Good Neighbor Policy:
Long before 1 returned to Washington as President o f the United States, I made up
my mind that, pending what might be called a more opportune moment on other
continents, the United States could best serve the cause o f peaceful humanity by
setting an example. That was why on the 4* o f March 1 9 3 3 ,1 made the following
declaration . “In the field o f world policy, 1 would dedicate this nation to the policy
o f the good neighbor-the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he
does so, respects the rights o f others-the neighbor who respects his obligations
and respects the sanctity o f his agreements in and with a world o f neighbors.” This
dedication represents my response; but it represents more than a purpose, for it
stands for a practice To a measurable degree it has succeeded; the whole world
now knows that the United States cherishes no predatory ambitions. We are
strong; but less powerful nations know that they need not fear our strength We
seek no conquest, we stand for peace. . . . The American republics to the south o f
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us have been ready always to cooperate with the United States on a basis o f
equality and mutual respect, but before we inaugurated the good-neighbor policy
there was among them resentment and fear because o f certain administrations in
Washington has slighted their national pride and their sovereign rights In
pursuance o f the good-neighbor policy, and because in my younger days I had
learned many lessons in the hard school o f experience, 1 stated that the United
States was opposed definitely to armed intervention. We have negotiated the Pan
American Union (predecessor to the Organization o f American States) embodying
the principle o f nonintervention. We have abandoned the Platt Amendment
. . . (and) withdrawn from Haiti. We have signed a new treaty
with Panama
. . . To give substance to this determination a conference will meet on Dec 1, 1936
at the capital o f Argentina, and it is, I know, the hope o f all chiefs o f state o f the
Americas that this will result in measures which will banish wars forever from this
vast portion o f the earth 58
The altruism o f Roosevelt, and the intention o f his administration were no doubt
genuine, but the realities o f Latin American politics, and the example o f the rough-shod
manner o f the United States prior to Good Neighbor Policy lingered The prospect for a
catholic understanding o f the good will o f Washington was not promising
Somoza Garcia understood U S. politics very well, and used that understanding to
engrandise himself with the United States In 1936 Somoza took care to rename the
longest avenue in Managua “Roosevelt Avenue,” 59 praised Roosevelt for his overtures to
Hitler and Mussolini to maintain peace in Europe, expelled known Nazis convicted o f
crimes in Nicaragua, and announced Nicaraguan postage stamps featuring Will Rogers.60
Somoza’s tactics paid off. In May 1939, he, and his wife were hosted by President
and Mrs Roosevelt in an official visit to Washington. On arrival in Washington by special

58Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Good Neighbor Policy. Available
[Online]:http://www.search.eb.com/elections/pri/QOO 120.html [10 November 2005],
59The name remained until the FSLN Triumph in July 1979
^Tessendorf, 118. The issuance o f postage stamps that pandered to U.S. interests,
and others was continued by Somoza Debayle. An example would be the postage stamp in
commemoration o f the Boy Scouts.
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train from New Orleans, Somoza and his wife were met by the President, his wife; the
Vice-president, his wife, a number o f Roosevelt’s cabinet members; and the Chief Justice
o f the Supreme Court. The military review accorded to Somoza from an open car included
fifteen tanks preceding the official party, five thousand uniformed servicemen, and an
overflight o f ten new-model B-17 bombers.61 Somoza’s visit preceded the official visit o f
the King and Queen o f England which further gilded the lily Somoza was the embodiment
o f the best o f the Good Neighbor policy. “[TJhere were qualifiers.

. . The Americans

tried to stress that Somoza’s welcome was representative o f sentiments due all o f the
‘Good Neighbor’ nations to the south Nonetheless, Somoza returned south as the blueribbon Latin American leader, and Tacho never allowed them to forget it.62
The goodwill, and actions o f the United States, while meant for all o f Latin
America, had the unintended consequence o f a United States imprimatur on Somoza’s
fascist dictatorship, and others like it. In any case, Roosevelt was not naive, and his
famous “He is a son o f a bitch, but he’s ours ” reflects that Somoza wasted no time in
returning the favor o f FDR’s support to cement the relationship, and his own ego. ‘“ I
consider every Nicaraguan aviator, and soldier as a potential fighting man for the United
States.’ And when Pearl Harbor dashed the United States into World War II, Nicaragua
followed immediately, with the U.S. grateful for Tacho’s avid support when Nazi
submarines prowled the Caribbean in 1942 ”63

6lIbid.
62Ib id , 119.
63Ibid. Somoza Garcia (“Tacho”) repeated the favor in 1954 in providing a covert
base o f operations for the CIA in his successful plan to displace democratically elected
Guatemala President Jacobo Arbenz who was viewed as too communist for comfort.
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Somoza well understood that the non-intervention policy o f the United States gave
him political space to manipulate the Nicaraguan political landscape for best effect. He
was confident in his hold on power, and allowed domestic opposition press to criticize his
regime, the rise o f the Nicaraguan communist party (Partido Socialista Nicaragiiense PSN)and communist-inspired labor movements. Internally, the game rules were well
understood that Somoza would crack down if and when necessary.
At the conclusion o f World War II, Somoza made the transition from anti-Nazi to
anti-Soviet handily, and without much fanfare but always in vocal support o f United States
policy.64 Anastasio Somoza G arcia’s well-known declaration that “My enemies are yours
too.”65 was more than just a gesture, in return, he expected unwavering support from the
United States government which he generally received until the Carter administration
challenged Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s human rights’ record and stopped military
assistance.

Somoza Garcia’s second son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, again repeated the favor by
providing bases o f operations, and support for the C IA ’s failed Bay o f Pigs fiasco.
Tacho is a shortened affectionate nickname for Anastasio. In turn, Anastasio Somoza
Garcia, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, and Anastasio Debayle III were known by this
nickname. While living, the father would be known as Tacho while the son would be
known as Tachito (little Tacho).
^Tacho had spent part o f his youth in Philadelphia where he learned American
humor, and mannerisms. Thus, it was easy for him to charm Americans whether
businessmen or government officials. Also, Tachito, his son, attended three years at West
Point where he learned a great deal about U.S. military policy. Tachito’s son also attended
West Point but was expelled in a cheating scandal; it was Tachito’s son as a GN officer
who was implicated in the murder o f Pedro Chamorro, owner, and editor o f La Prensa.
LaPrensa was the primary opposition newspaper during the last years o f Tachito’s reign.
To avoid confusion, Anastasio Somoza Garcia is referred to as Tacho while his son,
Anastasio Somoza Debayle is referred to as Tachito; in fact, when Tacho died in 1956
most in Nicaragua referred to Tachito as Tacho II instead.
65Tessendorf, 123.
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When caught in despotic policies and actions, Somoza Garcia always demurred,
but he nearly lost the support o f the U.S. Government when in 1948, he removed the
elected (puppet) Nicaraguan president as mentally incapacitated. The president had
criticized Somoza and Somoza’s role in the GN, and tried to reorganize the GN. Somoza
replaced that president with another puppet, and Truman saw no humor in it withholding
recognition o f the new government for several months.
Somoza understood the American collective political persona very well, and he
was usually able to push that understanding to the limits; however, his son, Tachito, was
not as skilled, and instead relied on his unwavering obsequious pro-U.S., anti-Soviet
stance.66
Nicaragua, as a source o f primary war materials, and foodstuffs during World War
II, began to meet its promise o f as a prosperous economy. Powerful Nicaraguan
businessmen had invested heavily in cotton production which had by that time outstripped
coffee as the main crop export.67 Cotton remained a primary export until the mid-1950s
when he international market demand forced a shift to concentration on other crops.68
The United States took on a more subtle role as a neocolonial power that was no
less exploitative than the former colonial model o f the Spanish. The neocolonial model
was developed from eagerness o f United States investors who saw the region as a very

^Anastasio Somoza Garcia was educated in a prestigious Philadelphia private
school and his wife was an American. Also, his son Anastasio Somoza Debayle attended
West Point and his son, Anastasio Somoza II also attended West Point before his
expulsion for cheating.
67Today, Nicaragua’s primary exports are coffee, sugar, shrimp, lobster and gold.
68An example o f the wide variety o f materials was the hardwood that was
harvested from Mosquitia that served as planking on the PT boats for the U.S. Navy.
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appealing business opportunity. In Marxist lexicon, the development o f that relationship is
couched in terms o f dependency theory that holds, in effect, that commodity producing
states will be at the whim and mercy o f the most powerful in the system. From the mid19th Century, the United States developed Latin American foreign policy around the
position that U.S. business had an inherent right to operate in Latin America, and that such
activity was entitled to United States political cover and military protection.69 During war
time, the logic was extended to protection o f vital war materiel supplies and suppliers.
Nicaragua gladly contributed as its oligarchy prospered.
Nicaragua can be seen as an example o f a south state in the North-South theory
definition that south states produce basic commodities, and otherwise do the bidding o f
wealthier north states who are consumers. Certainly during Nicaragua’s early days as a
colony, Spain can be viewed as a north state in that context, but more specifically
beginning in the mid 19* Century the United States, and Great Britain fit closer to the
theory in their competition for a trans-isthmian canal route and eagerness to exploit its
resources.
Nicaragua’s role shifted somewhat at the outset o f the Cold W ar because o f its
geostrategic position in the middle Americas. By then, the shift was made from Nicaragua
as a south state supplying basic commodities to a combination role both as a strategic
partner and supplier o f commodities. It was with the cooperation o f Luis Somoza Debayle
that in 1962 the United States Central Intelligence Agency established staging air bases in
Nicaragua to initiate the Bay o f Pigs invasion with obsolete B-26 bombers.

69Femando Henrique Cardoso, and Enzo Faletto. Dependency and Development in
iMtin America (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1979). See this work contains an
exhaustive discussion.
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This period o f history finds the United States giving unconditional support to
dictator governments o f Latin America despite the pro-democracy rhetoric to the
contrary. The United States governments from Truman to Ford winked at the situation
because Somoza Garcia (and his successor sons) was more valuable as a scoundrel in
support o f the United States in the Cold War than a enemy along the lines o f Zelaya. The
period is one o f hypocrisy, and contrast.
The United States, beginning with the direction o f policy formulated by the
Kennedy administration, embarked on infrastructure building under the Alliance for
Progress programs and the Peace Corp initiative. However, the U.S. still maintained a
Cold War containment strategy that the Somoza sons were able to use to maintain their
own domestic power and regional influence.
Nicaragua became a Cold W ar prize for the Soviet Union for its geopolitical
usefulness; likewise, Nicaragua was seen by the United States as a pawn that must be
controlled. In short, Nicaragua for reasons o f economic exploitation, strategic position,
and geopolitical usefulness was the subject o f outside competition.
It was not until the end o f the Cold War, and the removal o f the Marxist-inspired
FSLN government in Nicaragua in 1990 that Nicaragua was no longer o f critical interest
to any outside state except in the context o f the neoliberal agenda. It no longer
represented a geo-strategic advantage nor either a militarily strategic advantage to either
the United States or the Soviet Union. Nicaragua then evolved into a backwater states in
the terms o f strategic military value from which it had benefitted during the Cold War
because o f the Soviet Union’s interests in retaining a foothold in Nicaragua. The
Nicaraguan foothold, along with Cuba and the short-lived Grenada holding under the
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Marxist president Maurice Bishop essentially represented a triangle that controlled the
Caribbean at least for air control if not naval control.

Sandinista Liberation Front Origins
The Sandinista National Liberation Front, taking as its namesake General
Augustino Cesar Sandino,70 has it origins in the late 1950s, and early 1960s that sprung
from the traditional semi-autonomous university settings in Nicaragua and the Cuban
Revolution. During the term o f Luis Somoza Debayle (1956 to 1967), the national
government allowed the operation o f the dissident parties and press. This gave impetus to
the renewed influence o f the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Nicaragiiense PSN).
Sandino’s affiliation with the left, especially the Socialist and Communist parties, is
not clear. However, Augustino Sandino’s brother, Socrates, connection with Socialist
Party in the United States raises questions. Augustino Sandino’s focus was ridding
Nicaragua o f the U.S. forces, and what he saw as a puppet government o f the United
States, and this was the basis for the early movement to adopt him as their namesake.
The Cuban Revolution’s victory in January 1959 was an inspiration to would-be
revolutionaries in Latin America. While Castro did not immediately espouse Marxist
doctrine, it was clear from the beginning that his anti-United States rhetoric put him in that
cam p-there was no middle ground in the Cold War. Within a month o f the revolution’s
success, many radical and leftist students were attracted to the open invitation by Castro

70Cesar (Caesar) was an additional name given to Augustino Sandino as a sort o f
honorific title in recognition o f his war against the U.S. Marines, and Nicaraguan
Conservative government.
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to join in the revolutionary process. A wide variety o f Nicaraguan dissidents, and students
traveled to Cuba; included were Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, and Adan Selva Ramirez who
made up part o f the so-called Revolutionary Directorate o f Nicaragua.
Their loosely defined goal was to overthrow the government o f Luis Somoza
Debayle. Chamorro, and Selva were politically moderate. According to Selva, who met
with Che Guevara, and asked for assistance, Guevara responded,
I don’t think you are capable o f making a revolution in Nicaragua, and in fact I
tend to think we should . . . suppor t . . . the more progressive group. But if you
are set on organizing a movement, go ahead, and do it, and if you do manage to
get yourselves onto Nicaraguan territory, and liberate a piece o f it, then we would
be jackasses if we didn’t support you. “According to Selva, the young
conservatives then met with the U.S. Ambassador in Costa Rica, who promised his
support as long as the expedition brought down Somoza without any bloodshed,
and without calling a general strike.”71
The group that the Cuban revolutionary government supported was a coalition
group known as the Committee for the Liberation o f Nicaragua that was made up o f PSN,
and the Independent Liberal Party (PLI) as well as Nicaraguan radical students who were
exiled in Venezuela. That group published a call to action known as the Havana Letter
whose leader was a former Nicaragua GN officer, Rafael Somarriba.
The military organization that was organized by Somarriba with the help o f
Guevara met with almost immediate disaster at El Chaparral, Honduras on June
24, 1959 where it was decimated by both Honduran, and Nicaraguan military
forces. Among that group was Carlos Fonseca, a young leftist student from the
Autonomous University o f Leon.72 Fonseca later wrote, “ . . . lessons that are

71Zimmerman, 53.
72There is a long-standing tradition in Latin America that universities are
autonomous both in name, and fact. While the purpose o f such a tradition may be seem to
be both a device to contain would-be dissidents but still provide a sanctuary for academic
freedom, in fact, the tradition was often violated by the Somozas.
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impossible to learn even from a thousand books or a hundred teachers [that were
taught at El Chaparrel].”73
Fonseca would emerge as a leader o f what would become the FSLN. Fonseca was
particularly interested in Augustino Sandino’s successful tactics, and he studied them in
great detail It was Fonseca who persuaded the others in the leadership o f the FSLN
predecessor organization, the National Liberation Front74 (FSLN)to add Sandino’s name
to change it to the FSLN. Before that point the movement had a number o f names that
began with the core group o f University students who founded it.
The failure o f El Chaparral also was instrumental in Fonseca’s turning away from
the PSN. Fonseca had been a PSN student leader since 1958, but was later disillusioned by
its inability to foment change in Nicaragua. While a student activist at the University o f
Leon, he had organized the first student chapter o f the PSN whose membership included
Tomas Borge (an anti-Somoza Conservative Party student activist), and Silvio M ayorga (a
fourth-year law student activist). It is these three who are credited with the 1961 founding
o f the FSLN precursor organization.
The PSN’s first and only El Chaparral operation was such a failure that it
confirmed Fonseca’s decision to leave the PSN even though the PSN ’s Central Committee
beat him to it by expelling him for taking the “guerilla path.” Later, in correspondence
from the Soviet Union, Fonseca wrote “Un Nicaraguense en M oscu” (A Nicaraguan in
Moscow) in which he supported the PSN ’s ideals but criticized its approaches. Even until

73lbid. 56.
74The National Liberation Front was the name o f the much-admired Algerian
organization that had revolted against France in the late 1950s.
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the victory o f the FSLN on 19 July 1979 the PSN continued to criticize the FSLN for its
guerilla tactics
A Somoza trait-both Somoza senior (Anastasio Somoza Garcia and his sons was
impatience, and lack o f finesse when pushed to their limits. Following the GN victory at El
Chaparral, the GN undertook an operation in Leon where Luis Somoza believed the
greatest threat to his government to be. On 23 July 1959, the GN attacked an antigovernment protest, killed four students, killed tw o spectators, and wounded over one
hundred others. That date gave the name to a loosely organized group o f students to
known as the “Generation o f '59", this moniker replaced an earlier one, the “Generation o f
‘44" that was named for Conservative and dissident Liberal students who had suffered a
similar fate.75
The 3,000-strong student demonstration had been organized by Student Council o f
the National University (CUUN) in Leon to protest what they believed the slaughterof
hundreds o f Nicaraguan students at El Chaparral including Carlos Fonseca.
The excesses o f the GN mobilized otherwise neutral sentiment in Leon, twelve
thousand showed up for the funeral o f the students the day after the event. The public
university in Leon was closed until August 31s1, and when it reopened it was populated
with GN troops. The students and faculty later managed to convince the government to
remove the GN forces before classes resumed.
Carlos Fonseca and other Nicaraguans wounded at El Chaparral were recovering
from their wounds in Cuba during the July 23rd incident It was in Cuba where Fonseca
began serious study o f Sandino. Fonseca developed his notion o f the “path” similar to that

75Ibid., 57.
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taken by Sandino to foment revolution in Nicaragua. Also, during his recovery he began to
define for himself the fundamental differences between his Cuba-revolution inspired
Marxist activism, and the strategies o f the PSN.76
After his recovery, Fonseca traveled to Costa Rica where he joined other
Nicaraguan dissidents. While Daniel Ortega is the leader today o f the FSLN in Nicaraguan
politics, most die-hard FSLN supporters see Fonseca as the founder o f the party, and the
origin o f its anti-United States, Marxist/Socialist tendencies.
In June 1960, dissident Nicaraguans published a letter in an Havana newspaper
condemning the expulsion o f Cuban diplomats from Nicaragua. Among the signers were
Fonseca (delegate in Costa Rica), Tomas Borge (delegate in Cuba), and Silvio Mayorga
(delegate in Venezuela); none were identified as being in Nicaragua. Fonseca (still in
Costa Rica), and dissident students in Leon organized the first anniversary protest o f the
July 23 rd incident, and predictably the GN reacted with force killing two more who would
become martyrs. Luis Somoza’s decisions, and the G N ’s actions led by his brother
Anastasio further polarized the public sentiment. Some argue that the crumbling o f the
Somoza dynasty began at that point in time.
The founding o f the FSLN was more a gradual process than a specific event. JRN
students including Fonseca, and others became increasingly frustrated with the “pacifist”
path taken by the PSN, and undertook to carry out an armed revolution against the
Somoza dynasty. An early manifestation o f such non-pacifist strategy can be seen in the

76The rift between the traditional communists, and the more proactive Marxists in
Latin America is not unique to Nicaragua. For instance, in Panama the revolutionary
Marxist student group known as La Tendencia or the faction criticizes the Panamanian
Communist Party (PDP - Partido del Pueblo - Peoples’ Party) for its inaction, and uses the
Spanish word momios (mummies) to describe them.
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September 1956 assassination o f Anastasio Somoza Garcia by a dissident poet, Rigoberto
Lopez Perez, who had been trained by former GN members who were in exile in El
Salvador. Lopez Perez had ties with the dissident Independent Liberal Party (PLI - Partido
Liberal Independiente) that was focused on removing Somoza from power. Somoza
Garcia’s older son, Luis, immediately assumed the presidency, and declared a state o f
siege which was enforced by his brother Anastasio Somoza Debayle, already the head o f
the GN. At the time o f the assassination, Carlos Fonseca was still in the PSN camp, and
did not praise Lopez Perez’ action until sixteen years later when he had left the PSN, and
adopted the armed revolutionary strategies o f the FSLN.
In November 1960, in reaction to guerrilla strikes in the north, an uprising in the
mountains near M atagalpa by dissident Conservatives, and the student protests, Luis
Somoza Debayle gave recognition to the critical nature o f the situation by declaring a state
o f siege 77 This gave impetus to further student uprisings in protest o f the government
action, and affirmed the need for a split from the PSN to undertake armed revolution.
It is important to note that the earliest formulations o f purpose o f what would
become the FSLN centered not on Marxist thought but on anti-Somoza, anti-American,
pro-labor, and the urban pro-petit bourgeois characteristics.
Nicaragua, from its very beginnings, had a history o f coup d’etats and militarybacked changes o f government, and the disputes were largely between the Conservatives

77A strategy first adopted by Somoza Garcia was the establishment o f alternate
outlets to take the wind from the sails o f dissident factions. An early example was the
establishment o f the Such was the purpose o f the Nicaraguan government establishment o f
the Central American University (UCA - Universidad Centroamericana)in 1960 in
Managua. The Jesuit school was headed by President Luis Somoza’s uncle. The founding
o f UCA was severely criticized by public university students who branded the UCA as an
instrument o f the rich, and the Catholic Church then allied with the Somoza family.
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originally based in Granada, and the Liberals based in Leon. The Somoza’s identified
themselves as Liberals but only nominally; the dynasty that endured from 1935 to 1979
was a period o f relative stability but always enforced by the G N -the same force that the
U.S. Marine Corps had originally organized and helped train
The frustrations o f labor were voiced only through occasional strikes and work
stoppages such as those seen at the port o f Corinto; however, the Somoza’s always found
a solution usually by force or coercion. Further, the Somoza’s had always been able to
meet the demands o f the petit bourgeois, intellectuals, the Church, and other key elements
o f society that would have been able to weigh in on the side o f anti-Somoza sentiment
The plight o f the common man whether agricultural peasant or urban working
poor was not really addressed except conceptually. The FSLN provided the vehicle for the
change in that situation. The FSLN’s accidental strategy was to cause the Somozas to
overreact, and overuse the GN as an enforcement tool rather than use political finesse.
While externally the Somoza’s were ardent supporters o f U.S. foreign policy, domestically
they behaved in an entirely despotic manner.
The style o f domestic policy is defined by Georgetown University Timothy P.
Wickham-Crowley o f Georgetown University’s Center for Latin American Studies in his

Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin America 8 as patrimonial praetorianist or “mafiacracy.”
(It would seem that mafiacracy is really a misnomer because one can assume that in any
fascist state, the head o f state or the power behind the head o f state will be able to
manipulate any entity for personal gain.) In his study to find the causes o f revolution in

78Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley. Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America, a
Comparative Study o f Insurgents and Regime Since 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1992).
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Latin America, Wickham-Crowley further identifies mafiacracy: “Such a regime unites
personal rule over the military, and hence the state; suppression o f political parties, and
their competition; and individualized patrimonial dispensing o f rewards, and favors, along
with massive corruption.”79
This model, among other conditions were extant for Castro to manipulate, and a
close match to the regime o f the Somoza family. He draws a parallel with the Cuban
Revolution with regard to the mobilization o f the disenfranchised middle and upper classes
that joined with the Nicaraguan rural rebellion led by the FSLN. In effect, the FSLN
leadership had already seen a model o f success in the Cuban Revolution, and took steps to
replicate it in Nicaragua In effect, that the FSLN was able to raise the political
consciousness o f the general population being helped along with increasingly repressive
measures o f the last Somoza. In effect, as Anastasio Somoza Debayle struggled to retain
power, his despotic measures backfired and played into the hands o f the FSLN.
Despite the core motivations o f the FSLN leadership, there developed a three-way
split that nearly derailed the FSLN agenda to remove Somoza rule. The FSLN cadre80
that developed in the early 1960s was distinctly eclectic in makeup. It consisted o f Carlos
Fonseca, Tomas Borge, and Silvio M ayorga (all originally from the University o f Leon)
who were Marxists; dissident Conservative Party members who had been waging a lowlevel war with the GN such as Eden Pastora Gomez (who later assumed the FSLN nom

d 'guerre Commander Zero); and notably two activist Catholic priests Ernesto and

79Ibid., 158.
80Vanguard is often used by Marxists as the term for cadre that mobilizes other
segments o f society.
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Fernando Cardenal81 who were both brothers. This mix o f leadership provided a wide
appeal, and had the effect o f removing the potential reluctance o f some who would have
been hesitant to join an all-Marxist movement.
The Catholic priests who joined created a natural split with the more conservative
Catholic Church in Nicaragua headed by Cardinal Obando y Bravo. Obando y Bravo had a
policy o f making accommodations with the Somozas that did not change until late into the
FSLN revolution when Anastasio Somoza Debayle disbanded the bi-cameral legislature
and brutally cracked down on all dissidents.
By the final months o f the revolution, Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s actions
facilitated the FSLN agenda, and broadened its appeal to nearly all segments o f
Nicaraguan society except those who were partners in the self-serving oligarchy.
In January 1978 in Managua, the most polarizing incident that was carried out by
Somoza to put down the dissident elements was the murder o f Pedro Joaquin Chamorro,
owner, and editor o f the opposition newspaper La Prensa. His murder accelerated the
revolutionary process with the Nicaraguan middle and upper classes who were not a part
o f the Somoza family mafiacracy. This all played into the hands o f the FSLN which by that
time had settled on a single strategy.
Notwithstanding the blunders o f Somoza who from m id-1977 forward failed to
engage civil society as a whole, and focused on using the GN as a tool o f repression, the
FSLN leadership did not have a comprehensive, single strategy. This, in part, accounts for
the failure o f the FSLN to make more headway in the years from the 1960s to 1970s. In

81The Cardenal brothers were but two o f three Catholic priests who would make
up core o f the FSLN cadre. Ernesto is a Jesuit, Fernando a Trappist, and the third priest,
Miguel d ’Escoto a Maryknoll.
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1969, the FSLN published a manifesto known as the “Historic Program” that laid out its
goals o f removing Somoza, and establishing a government that would protect rights o f
political, economic, social and civil rights plus embark on a program o f land redistribution,
and a broadening o f access to health services and education.
The Historic Program, adopted by the FSLN leadership in August, consisted o f
thirteen central tasks o f the FSLN revolution; it was heavily flavored with Marxist
rhetoric. Its language was focused on appeal to the peasant and worker classes.*2
While the FSLN gained active support from the peasant class in the north from
Matagalpa to the Honduras border, it had largely failed to gain the support from the urban
poor class in Managua or, more importantly, the more moderate middle and upper classes
who were bystanders in the struggle.
Because o f the strong FSLN identification with Marxism, the FSLN had failed to
gain the support o f the traditional Catholic Church, the moderates, and the potentially
anti-Somoza business community.*3 In December 1976 Carlos Fonseca died in combat,
and his unifying force disappeared with his death. If by force o f personality and leadership
alone, Fonseca had managed to organize the FSLN around a Leninist-Marxist orientation

*2Zimmerman, 124.
*3The business community that held considerable economic power had been
vigorously represented by the COSEP (Chamber o f Commerce o f Private Business) that
until the mid-1970s had been in the Somoza camp; however, as the FSLN gained support,
and Somoza favored those who were part o f his mafiacracy the COSEP, the COSEP
redirected its support to the removal o f Somoza. Certainly, many members o f the COSEP
were opposed to the Marxist elements in the FSLN leadership, but their priorities became
more aligned with the FSLN’s goal o f the removal o f Somoza as the economy
deteriorated, and Somoza lost international support. Many sources make undocumented
references to the likelihood that the COSEP was supported by the Central Intelligence
Agency in its opposition to the Marxist elements within the FSLN.
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that emphasized guerilla tactics, and urban resistance; however, in the mid-1970s, the
FSLN leadership had split into three factions.
Two o f the factions favored traditional Marxist approaches to the revolution: (1)
the Russian revolution model o f working class revolution known as the Proletarian
Tendency led by Jaime Wheelock Roman, (2) the Chinese model o f rural, peasant
insurrection along the Maoist theory known as the Prolonged Popular War, and (3) a
more pragmatic strategy known as the Insurrectional Tendency that was focused on
building alliances with other anti-Somoza forces.
The Insurrectional Tendency was supported by brothers Daniel and Humberto
Ortega.84 After Fonseca’s death, the third-way Insurrectional Tendency o f the FSLN
leadership began to move toward establishing alliances with any potential supporter within
Nicaragua, and internationally. Beginning in 1976, the FSLN began to shift its focus from
class warfare (peasants, and workers) to a broader “popular”85 appeal The United States
had begun to back away from any support o f Somoza, and the FSLN began
to appeal to the general public as a patriotic, nationalistic organization focused on the
removal o f the Somoza dynasty as damaging to Nicaraguans across the spectrum.
The Group o f Twelve had been organized in October 1977 by prominent
businessmen and academics who opposed the Somoza regime, and sought a solution to

84Zimmerman, 125. Carlos Fonseca’s leadership had been critical to the FSLN
revolution, but he had been arrested, and imprisoned a number o f times by Costa Rican
authorities, and both his father, and half brother, Fausto, who resided in Managua were
highly critical o f his affiliations, and activities. Fonseca’s father was a close friend o f
Somoza, and Fausto who publicly urged Carlos to return to peaceful means to change the
system helped Somoza retain support o f the urban, middle classes.
85In this context, communist rhetoric uses the word popular to refer to “people” at
all levels without a particular focus on specific group.
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the deteriorating situation. Among the group were four FSLN members including Sergio
Ramirez who would later become a member o f the FSLN National Directorate In part,
the Group o f Twelve was trying to stem capital flight, suspension o f foreign investment,
and international loan refusals directed by the United States government This initiative
was well suited to the goals o f the “Third Way” led by brothers Daniel and Humberto
Ortega.86
M ore pressure was applied by President Jimmy Carter who was pressuring
Anastasio Somoza Debayle to lift the state o f seize, and quit the program o f news
censorship. Carter conditioned military aid on Somoza’s reaction to those demands, and
Somoza responded by lifting the seize in September 1977 that had been imposed in
December 1974; however, the result for Somoza was negative in sum.87 (It is interesting
to note that President Carter seems to be the first U.S. President who was willing to
looker deeper into Somoza’s behavior rather than accept his prom ises prima facie

86Putting aside the victorious march into Managua by the FSLN on 19 July 1979,
the FSLN had tw o previously notable successes that both embarrassed, and cost Somoza
power. The first occurred on 27 December 1974 when an FSLN guerilla contingent
captured a number o f high-level government officials at the home o f a former Somoza
official in Managua. The captors demands were all met by Somoza. They were (1) a one
million dollar ransom, (2) release o f fourteen FSLN political prisoners who were flown to
Cuba, and (3) publication o f a government declaration that announced the release o f the
prisoners. Archbishop o f Managua Obando y Bravo was instrumental in negotiating the
agreement. This operation cemented the strategy o f armed attacks, and otherwise-criminal
acts to force the Somoza government to submission. In typical fashion Somoza further
stepped up military operations against the FSLN.
87Despite the concession, President Carter later ordered the suspension o f all
military aid to the Somoza government in February 1978 forcing it to turn to the
international market. Unquestionably, the murder o f Chamorro on the streets o f Managua,
and the national strikes that followed helped Carter make the decision.
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Anti-Somoza demonstrations resumed, and the GN, in turn, stepped up its attacks
on the FSLN guerrillas. President C arter’s pressure had enabled, and encouraged the
FSLN propaganda machine, and the Group o f Twelve gained influence in part from the
perception that Somoza would fall, and that a more pluralistic approach was necessary.
After the murder o f Pedro Chamorro in January 1978, the FSLN published another
manifesto outlining its agenda. That manifesto downplayed its Marxist roots, and
Fonseca’s role in the FSLN establishment. Rather, it took advantage o f the popular
outpouring o f anti-Somoza sentiment evinced by the 50,000 strong demonstration in the
Managua that day after Chamorro was murdered. Its appeal was to the middle class, and
intellectuals. This was a sort o f rapprochement with the broader population, and it
appealed to the “Group o f Twelve” (Los Doce) that served as a forum for consolidating
anti-Somoza forces. The domestic, internal forces including the Church would be those
that finally enabled the FSLN to win not just militarily but also with the popular support o f
the people.88
In May 1978, three anti-Somoza groups had joined together to form the Broad
Opposition Front (Frente Amplio de Oposicion - FAO). The FAO consisted o f the Group
o f Twelve, the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democratico
Nicaragiiense - MDN) formed in March by an anti-Somoza businessman, and the
Democratic Liberation Union (Union Democratica de Liberation - Udel) originally led by

88It is important to note that Nicaragua’s FSLN revolution example supports the
tenets o f revolutionary theory in four specific areas: that successful revolutions are led by
intellectual elites whose roots are in wealth, that peasants seldom organize themselves to
carry off a revolution without the support o f those elites, that revolutions occur when
economic conditions are improving, and that the head o f state appointed by the outgoing
government is usually a moderate and will not retain power for long. See chapter tw o for
an elaboration o f these points.
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Pedro Chamorro, and Somoza Minister o f Education Ramiro Sacasa There was no FSLN
representation in the FAO.
The FAO was focused on a negotiated solution with Somoza. However, Somoza
did not cooperate, and the Group o f Twelve withdrew from the FAO in October The
FAO persisted in its negotiation solution but the ineffectual result caused the defection o f
many FAO members. The FSLN strength was bolstered when the Organization o f
American States published a report on the human rights abuses o f the Somoza regime
which was followed by an official United Nations condemnation. A Cuban-led mediation
team managed to patch up differences in the FSLN in December 1978 between the three
factions o f the FSLN, and by March 1979 the FSLN staged an official reconciliation.
These events, in combination, strengthened the FSLN, and broadened its appeal both
domestically, and internationally.
In July 1978 the FSLN, having no political arm, formed the United People’s
Movement (Movimiento del Pueblo Unido - M PU) that was made up o f individual leftist
students, PSN members, left-leaning labor movements, and unions, and leftist student
organizations. The M PU ’s announced strategy was armed overthrow o f the Somoza
government through a nation-wide strategy o f insurrection. In effect, the FSLN took
advantage o f the OAS findings, the United Nations condemnation, and the inability o f the
FAO to engage in meaningful negotiations with Anastasio Somoza Debayle.
The most dramatic, and very effective operation that signaled the end o f the
Somoza regime was the capture o f the entire National Palace along with 2,000
government officials on 22 August 1978 by the FSLN. Eden Pastora Gomez (Commander
Zero) led the attack had the same central purposes as the 1974 attack except it was done
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in the name o f the FSLN “Third Way.” Again Cardinal Obando y Bravo, who by that time
was stepping up his criticism o f Somoza, along with the ambassadors from Costa Rica,
and Panama , negotiated a settlement. The settlement included (1) a $500,000 ransom, (2)
the release o f sixty FSLN political prisoners, public dissemination o f an FSLN declaration,
and (4) safe passage to Venezuela, and Panama for Pastora G om ez’s89 force. This
operation provided the impetus for an FSLN reconciliation (see above), humiliated
Somoza, and shook the confidence o f the GN leadership such that Somoza immediately
was forced to reorganize the GN to avoid a coup attempt. However, the GN
resumed its largely successful operations against the FSLN guerrillas in the countryside.
The events that occurred between 1975, and 1979, either by design or otherwise,
broadened FSLN general support, garnered it greater membership, strengthened its
guerrilla forces, and gained it international support. Somoza, despite his superior military
forces was forced out by circumstances alone. On 17 July 1979, after naming interim
Nicaraguan President Francisco Maliano Urucuyo, Anastasio Somoza Debayle fled with
his family and stolen fortune.
Urcuyo fled to Guatemala the next day following many GN officers and soldiers
who defected. On 19 July the new FSLN government in exile proceeded to Managua from

89Pastora Gomez later defected from the FSLN, and in 1981 led a counter-FSLN
movement based in northern Costa Rica-the Nicaraguan Resistance which was made up o f
three separate anti-FSLN military groups operating in the north, the south, and the
Miskito Coast. They were made up the original core o f anti-FSLN forces. Additionally,
the CIA-sponsored Contra forces originally funded with $19 million, and manned by
former GN members based in Honduras put pressure on the FSLN. Their success against
the FSLN was mostly due to successful harassment operations against the Nicaraguan
infrastructure. The involvement o f the United States government, the Oliver North
Iran-Contra affair, and the Boland Amendment and its purpose are well documented, and
not a subject o f this study.
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Leon where it had arrived the day before by aircraft from Costa Rica. The FSLN
leadership, and its new government then was faced with carrying out its program o f
pluralism, a mixed economic system to support a social democratic form o f government,
and a non-aligned foreign policy It was faced with meeting the expectations o f its broad
support base that included urban workers, peasants and the remaining bourgeoisie plus
some wealthy bankers and businessmen who had not been a part o f the Somoza insider
group.
In Nicaragua Betrayed, Anastasio Somoza Debayle holds that he was betrayed by
the U.S. Government because it refused to come to his aid when it was most needed His
logic ignores the suffering o f the people, and is mostly based on his, his father’s and
brother’s strong anti-communist rhetoric and actions during the Cold War.90
However, he makes ad hominem attacks against President Carter while praising the
support o f President Nixon and his administration.
The reasons for the United States’ actions that including withholding o f military
aid and suspension o f economic aid were complex but part o f President Jimmy C arter’s
human rights plank to take whatever steps, however politically distasteful, to add human
rights as a fundamental part o f the U.S. foreign policy. In any case, Anastasio Somoza
Debayle, despite his and father’s political acumen in earlier years relative to United States
political sensitivities, acted as if though it was simply his due. No doubt, this narrowing

^ It is well documented that Luis Somoza supported the Central Intelligence
Agency’s Bay o f Pigs Operation by providing logistical support, and air basing o f the
World War II aircraft that took part in the Bay o f Pigs invasion. Likewise, Anastasio
Somoza Debayle assisted in General Omar Torrijos’ return to Panama during a coup
attempt in October 1968; however, Torrijos later betrayed Somoza by tacitly supporting a
Panama contingent that would join the FSLN forces on the southern front.
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view was a fundamental element in his fumbled attempts in his last year in office, and that
view is reflected in his book in an unintended way.
What is most important about Anastasio Somoza Debayle is the political legacy
that remains in Nicaragua today. While he claims in Nicaragua Betrayed that Nicaragua
had democracy, free enterprise, freedom o f the press and freedom o f religion, he also
argues that he did not mismanage public funds, that he was not a despot, and did not steal
international relief funds after the 1972 earthquake. His visceral attacks on President
Carter and the United States government in his postscript work, no doubt sealed his own

With the fall o f my government, there was ebullience in Moscow, Havana, and
Washington, D C. The Communists had won, and the free world had lost. As soon
as the Army o f Nicaragua had capitulated, Cuba started direct flights to the
Managua Airport. These flights brought more arms, military equipment, military
personnel, and they also brought something else. They brought teachers, hundreds
o f them, nurses, and doctors. Even then, the United States refused to recognize it
for what it w as-a Communist victory. . . . N ow comes one o f the most stupid
moves . . . that Carter had ever made. With U.S. taxpayers money, he going to
finance the Marxist government in Nicaragua. It’s as Lenin said a long time ago,
“Americans will sell us the rope with which we will hang them.” In this instance,
the U:S. is not even selling the rope. It’s being given to the Communists. Is there
no sanity in the U.S. State Department, and has Carter gone off the deep end? . . .
It could indicate that the U.S. now [1980] now has Communists, and Communist
sympathizers in the most sensitive positions in the U.S. State Department. . . . Mr
Carter sent $3.5 million in food, and medical supplies to the Marxists. Then the
State Department [diverted] $8 million o f foreign aid money . . . sending this
money to the Communist government in Nicaragua. That’s no all. Not by $75
million it isn’t.91
President Carter persuaded the U.S. Congress to authorize the additional $75
million in aid to Nicaragua in March 1978 well before the departure o f Anastasio Somoza

91Ibid., 287.
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Debayle on 17 July 1979. Simultaneously, President Carter canceled all remaining
committed military support to Somoza plus previously authorized foreign aid.
From Somoza’s optic, however flawed, he saw the U S. betraying Nicaragua’s,
and its own future. The more meaningful actions o f President Carter, however, are that he
helped lever Somoza out o f power, and provided substantial support to the people o f
Nicaragua.
The cynical Nicaraguan today may view President C arter’s actions as a mere
continuation o f its neocolonial strategies whose long-term ambitions would be to exploit
Nicaragua. However, the more pragmatic analysis would be that the United States gave
but a pittance o f what it owed the Nicaraguan people that was only a small fraction o f the
damage caused by the CIA ’s conduct o f the Contra War against the FSLN.

President Reagan and The Contra War
President Reagan was determined to undermine the FSLN despite early overtures
by Daniel Ortega. Outside o f that context the strategy o f the United States that included
the Central Intelligence Agency Contra forces, economic embargo, and other pressures
including suspension o f any loans or loan guarantees from the international community.
While the original National Directorate, the de facto FSLN government,92 was
made up o f both FSLN Marxists, and more moderate middle, and upper class members
including the widow o f Pedro J. Chamorro (Violeta Barrios de Chamorro) who would
become president in 1990, President Reagan saw the issue only through Cold W ar lenses.

92General elections were not held until 1985, partly under pressure from the United
States, when Daniel Ortega Saavedra won the presidency. Afterward, the FSLN authored
the Nicaragua political constitution which is in effect today
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The pressures that he put on the FSLN no doubt contributed to the eventual downfall o f
the FSLN government despite its wide popular support The legacy o f the FSLN is both
part o f the modern-day Nicaragua political psyche and, in a sense, a source o f resistance to
change toward the neoliberal model.
The Somoza legacy is an almost forty-three year plus hiatus in the legitimate
development o f democracy during which the major domestic forces were either coopted or
manipulated for the maintenance o f the Somoza dynasty, and its self-enrichment. During
this period, Nicaragua grew economically but unevenly because o f the fascist-like
management o f the state. The Somozas dictated all public policy that included economic
strategies, labor relationships and social policy. Nicaragua was operated as a family estate
for the Somoza and their closest associates.
While the FSLN enjoyed the majority support o f the general population until its
defeat in the 1990 elections, it had been helped because of, not in spite of, the Somoza
dynasty’s policies. The FSLN’s ultimate demise was based not on its ideals but rather on
its failure as an instrument o f change that would improve and grow Nicaragua
economically, and socially. However, much o f failure o f the FSLN to find success can be
attributed to its own reactions and policies in dealing with the pressure put on it by the
United States.
One central fact is not disputed by scholars on either side o f the argument
regarding Nicaragua’s fate. Nicaragua had one o f the strongest economies in Central
America up to 1972 when the Christmas earthquake destroyed the capital city, Nicaragua
has abundant natural resources, sufficient workforce and the potential to return to that
status if circumstances are right.
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Despite the abuse by the Somoza family dynasty, Nicaragua still attained a very
high standard o f living relative to neighboring states in Central America. It is that paradox
most troubling to Nicaragua’s and would-be external partons. The FSLN was not able to
attain anything close to Nicaragua’s previous economic condition despite the patronage o f
the Soviet Union and its surrogate, Cuba. While it is true that the United States’ pressure
on the Sandinistas through the support o f the Contras was a factor, it was not the civil war
(fought between the EPS forces and Contras)that proved to be the FSLN downfall. It was
the failed economic policy, and the data from the period clearly reflect that.93
The nominal democracy that Anastasio Somoza Garcia had set up with the help o f
the U.S. Government, and U.S. Marines was little more than an instrument o f his
ambition. While kowtowing to U.S. foreign policy externally, internally Somoza was
building a personal fortune based on confiscations, illegal transactions, rake offs o f U.S.
aid, and any sort o f activity that would strengthen his fortune, and power-all enforced by
the GN. It was not until the Carter regime, that Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s hand was
called.
Despite the corruption, and fascist manner o f the Somoza dynasty, the strategy to
encourage foreign investment, and engender an atmosphere for growth was effective.
Before events that spelled the end o f the dynasty beginning with the devastating
earthquake in Managua that Somoza handled badly, large United States corporations
operating in Nicaragua included Sears and Roebuck, various American banks,
M cDonald’s and Kentucky Fried Chicken franchises. The Somoza dynasty had altered the
traditional patronage system such that it had substituted the role o f the patron who looked

93See Table 2.
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after his charges through thick, and thin to a national patron or caudillo who acted as a
sort o f supreme patron with the extended family as overseers o f the system. The more
traditional system is well described in To Leadas Equals by Jeffrey Gould: “Most
campesinos were used to thinking o f hacienda labor as a part o f reciprocal aid. The
campesino “helped” the landlord with labor, and the landlord “helped” the campesino with
a few acres o f land, food, and some cash. . . campesinos viewed many o f the ricos (rich
folk) as kind-hearted.”94
Arguably, the substitution for the traditional patron (rico) who operated within a
limited geographic area to a national model was created by Zelaya in the late 19th Century
He raised the patronage system to a higher level by dispensing monopolies, and charters in
return for either political favors, loyalty or, more probably, money. This style o f
government was wholly adopted by the Somoza dynasty until its demise; it was closely
tied to politics, and the GN with the ultimate goal o f remaining in power. “Patronage, in
the form o f using resources o f the central government to award positions, and pork as a
private payoff for political support, is the most salient example o f cronyist impulse . . .
Nonetheless, there has been very little work devoted to identifying the interaction between
the cronyism on the one hand, and formal political institutions on the other.”95

94Jeffrey L. Gould, To Lead as Equals - Rural Protest and Political Consciousness
in Chinandega, Nicaragua, 1912-1979 (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina
Press, 1990), 89.
95William R. Summerhill, “Party and Faction in the Imperial Brazilian Parliament,”

Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America - Theory and Evidence,
Stephen Haber, ed., (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2002), 109. While this cited
work refers to the Brazilian lower house o f Parliament from 1881 to 1884 during its
constitutional monarchy period, it illustrates the characteristics o f those seen in Nicaragua
including the subordination o f political parties to the powers o f whichever Somoza was in
power. However, Summerhill also holds that political parties did have some influence on
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The relationship o f rural poor to the hacienda-style “patron” system changed in an
evolutionary way as modem agricultural methods demanded a scale o f operations that
changed the landscape, and a proletariat class evolved to work in urban factories; its
tradition is part o f the “psyche” that remains in the culture today. It was the breaking o f
that tradition that, in part, was at the root o f rebellion.
Until the early 1960s, Nicaragua was largely an agricultural society that had a
relatively diversified economy that included exports o f coffee, cotton, cattle, and sugar.96
However, as world markets changed, the agro-industry in Nicaragua followed. In
particular, cotton as a primary export is no longer seen in Nicaragua but by the late 1990s,
the fishing/lobster industry had gained a prominent position in the export economy.
Most o f the exportation was through the Pacific port o f Corinto or, in the case o f
the Atlantic coast through Bluefields or Puerto Cabezas. Corinto operations were well
placed near the breadbasket o f Nicaragua in Chinandega Province. Historically,
Nicaragua’s relatively diversified commodities exportation has been subject to the vagaries
o f the international m arket- especially in coffee, sugar and cotton. In terms o f percentage
o f exportation in dollar value o f the four commodities, the order o f most to least in terms
o f value from 1960 to 1979 was cotton, coffee, beef and sugar.97

voting outcomes in the legislature. Anastasio Somoza Debayle dismissed the Nicaragua
legislature in 1978 precisely because its activities were becoming problematic.
^These four commodities were the mainstay o f most o f Nicaraguan economy;
however, the more marginalized M osquito Coast has had substantial exportation o f
lumber, fish, lobster, and shrimp. Also, Nicaragua has some gold mines that have been
exploited since the time o f the Spanish colonization.
97Mark Everingham, Revolution and the Multi-class Revolution in Nicaragua
(Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1996), 66.
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Beginning in the 1950s, and expanding in the 1960s, Nicaragua developed a
modest light industrial sector concentrated in Managua that included such industries as
milk processing plants. Most o f Nicaragua’s labor is still concentrated with peasants in the
agricultural sector, and port workers in Corinto with a growing maquila sector in
Managua that populates foreign-owned factories.98 Nicaraguan law encourages such
maquila operations by allowing “free zones” that receive raw materials without tariffs, and
export finished goods also without any imposition o f duties or tariffs.
It is ironic that the same peasant and labor force that originally made up the bulk o f
Somoza Garcia’s political base in 1936 when he ousted President Sacasa from office, was
a force in alliance with other sectors that ultimately compelled Anastasio Somoza Debayle
to leave office. Until that point in time, the labor movement in Nicaragua was associated
with Anastasio Somoza Garcia’s rise to power.99
The wave o f strikes that began in early 1936 spread to workers in Chinandega
where sugar refinery unionists joined forces with urban workers in protest o f the Sacasa

"C urrent Nicaraguan law designed to encourage foreign investment allows tax free
importation o f unfinished raw materials, and exportation o f finished goods. The largest
such tax free zone (compound) is located near the Sandino International Airport in
Managua where the primary products are clothing. However, investors may apply to the
government for designation o f tax free zones anywhere in Nicaragua, and shipments to,
and from are by bonded road transport.
" I t should not go unnoticed that the system o f patronage can be seen first in the
hacienda system before the 1930s, the transfer o f loyalty to Somoza Garcia after his rise in
1936, and ultimately in the FSLN’s iconic leader, Carlos Fonseca. Further, the presidency
o f Violeta Chamorro can be seen as a transition period away from that cultural habit;
however, both Aleman had and Bolanos has appeal as patrons.
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government. Somoza Garcia, while head o f the GN, was by the time o f his coup in May
1936 identified as a non-repression friend o f peasants and labor.100
The largest single manufacturing entity in Nicaragua since the 1920s has been the
San Antonio sugar mill (Ingenio San Antonio - ISA) in Chichigalpa, Chinandega where
more than 2,000 workers are employed. It was privately owned until its appropriation by
the FSLN government in 1988. The origins o f worker political consciousness in Nicaragua
are attributed to the ISA workers whose political Liberalism was energized by the close
relationship the ISA owners had with the conservative governments that were propped up
by the U.S. Marines beginning in 1912. Those owners depended on the Conservative
governments for legislation, and public policy that would favor management. ISA workers
staged strikes against the ISA in 1912, and 1926, but it was not until 1936 that Somoza
Garcia’s coup provided the impetus to organize a formal union and stage a general
strike.101
During the Zelaya period, the ISA had been protected by the government,
government policy favored monopolies, and tariff protection, and by 1909 ISA had nearly
doubled the size o f its operations. After the conservatives took power, the new
government continued Zelaya’s practices including forced labor. Thus, its anti-labor, pro
cartel practices made it vulnerable to political manipulation. In August 1912, ISA workers
joined a paramilitary force to defeat Conservative forces in Chichigalpa that marks the
beginnings o f the Liberal revolution against U.S. supported Conservative government

I00Gould, 39-40.
101Ib id , 22.
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forces. Somoza Garcia identified himself as a member o f the Liberal Party, and used labor
unrest as a political took to assume power
As Nicaragua’s most powerful industry,102 the ISA was inextricably tied up in
politics, and national economic policy, and remained so until its expropriation in 1988.
General Augustino Sandino was not able to translate ISA labor complaints into mobilized
support for his effort, but Somoza Garcia had the requisite political skill to manipulate
labor.103 After a general strike July 1936 by ISA workers that was settled in favor o f
management through the intervention o f Somoza’s GN troops, the workers and
management warmly greeted Somoza during a visit to the plant
Revealing a strategy that later he would refine to a high art form, Somoza Garcia
did not mention the strike but declared, “I assure you that the people’s rights will not be
mocked, and that the workers, and the proletariat will enjoy the privileges o f full
citizenship ” 104 The apparently self-contradictory positive reaction by the workers to
Somoza is explained by Gould as recognition o f the workers that they needed government
support to carry out their liberal agenda. The reaction can also be seen as an early example
o f Somoza’s “carrot, and stick” long-term strategy to both promise labor reforms, and
crack down when labor was not sufficiently compliant. The Somoza strategy included
encouragement o f labor unions, and in 1946 briefly garnered the endorsement o f the PSN.

102ISA’s product included very lucrative production o f spirits, and export o f sugar
to canneries on the west coast o f the United States.
103More credit should be given to Somoza Garcia for his astuteness because his
own family fortune was tied to the cattle industry that required far less labor intensive
operations. The cattle industry in Nicaragua is more identified with the Conservatives than
the Liberals.
104Ibid., 42.
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A review o f Somoza Garcia’s strategies is useful because it both remains in the current
memory o f deal makers in Nicaraguan politics, and reveals a reason for cynicism o f the
general electorate
The U.S. Government had mediated conflicts between the National Liberal Party
(Partido Liberal Nacional - PLN), and the National Conservative Party (Partido
Conservative Nacional - PCN) since the arrival o f the U.S. Marines in 1912, and
continued to do so until their withdrawal in 1932. However, that intervention set up a
false system that Anastasio Somoza Garcia was able to take advantage o f when he
removed his uncle, President Juan Batista Sacasa in early 1936.
“(T)he United States took responsibility for protecting Conservative, and Liberal
governments from General Augustino Cesar Sandino’s ‘Defending Army o f National
Sovereignty o f Nicaragua,’ a nationalist, anti-imperialist guerilla movement.” 105 President
F. Roosevelt’s removal o f the U.S. Marines was both because o f the pressures o f the
Great Depression, and his “Good Neighbor Policy.” The removal gave Anastasio Somoza
Garcia, who was the GN Commander, the political space and power to remove his uncle,
and take control.
Anastasio Somoza Garcia began the process o f putting the entire power structure
in the hands o f his PLN cronies. He expropriated coffee, sugar, and cattle operations that
were the backbone o f the PCN ’s economic support.106 Among the expropriations were
coffee plantations, and cattle ranches owned by German fascists. His goal was to gain

105Everingham, 45.
106The San Antonio Sugar Mill (Ingenio San Antonio - ISA) was owned by PCN
members and/or supporters.
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overall control o f the mechanisms o f the export economy. Among other actions, he put in
place taxes and fees, and mechanisms to monitor foreign commodities exchanges. When
Somoza Garcia was forced to step down from the presidency in 1947, he managed to
retain his control over the GN, and effectively control the political process through PLN
surrogates until the 1950 election.
In April 1950, the PCN and the PLI reached an accord with the dominant PLN for
the purpose o f retaining some control in the National Assembly, the “pact” was awarded
one-third o f the seat in the Assembly, and a commitment for greater commercial freedom
in exchange for a pledge o f support to Anastasio Somoza Garcia and the GN that he
controlled. This agreement is known as the “Pact o f the Generals.” 107
The PCN took satisfaction that it had regained a voice in economic policy, and the
PLI gained constitutional amendments that guaranteed individual freedoms. Relative to the
Conservative Party’s attitudes toward labor, Somoza’s changes to the Nicaraguan labor
code had looked too liberal and damaging to PCN businesses. Thus, the pact reduced the
objection through accessions o f Somoza Garcia to allow PCN participation in
government.
However, the agreement also included a change to the constitution that allowed a
president to succeed himself or herself. Thus the conservatives led by conservative
Emiliano Chamorro, jeopardized their future opportunities to take leadership o f the
government.

107The name o f the agreement is a reference to military officers who would be
spoilers if pushed to political or economic limits, e.g. a recognition by Somoza Garcia that
compromise was a path toward perpetuating his control o f Nicaragua.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

194
Another important effect for Somoza was that he removed from organized labor
any extant political platform thus continuing his strategy o f manipulating labor and
blunting its potential disruption o f the state as a corporate enterprise. While the
Conservative Party was assured at least minority participation in the government as a
condition o f the Pact o f the Generals, it also assured that neither party would be troubled
by labor unrest. “Hegemonistic concerns were placed in the sphere o f contradictions

internal [italics in original] to the dominant class, and no longer as a part o f the relation
Somocista [Garcia] state to the labor movement.” 108 In effect, Somoza betrayed the
promises he had made under obrerismo in favor o f absolute control o f labor with the GN
as his tool for enforcement. The impetus for the agreement probably was the United
States’ announcement that it intended to invigorate trade with Latin America through
foreign investment, and outright developmental assistance. In effect, the U.S. Government
was witting, and complicit with Somoza and his strategy.
Somoza Garcia encouraged his government, and the Nicaragua National Chamber
o f Commerce to cooperate with the IMF to develop a plan to modernized Nicaragua’s
economy The major parties, prominent bankers and businessmen joined in the effort; their
focus was largely on capital flow that favored the commodities export producers
Anastasio Somoza Garcia, as politically astute as ever, used the generosity o f the
World Bank (with United States’ encouragement) to gain more control. He placed PLN
cronies in key positions recommended by the World Bank experts, and founded the
National Development Institute (Instituto de Fomento Nacional - INFONAC) to carry out

108Carlos Vilas, The Sandinista Revolution - National Liberation and Social
Transformation in Central America. (Berkeley, California: Monthly Review Press Center
for the Studies o f the Americas, 1986), 86.
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the plan to modernize the economy. The INFONAC worked closely with the National
Bank o f Nicaragua (Banco Nacional de Nicaragua - BNN). The BNN had been established
in 1912 under a U.S. law model, and survived until 1941 as an instrument to facilitate
foreign trade and investment. In 1941, the BNN was nationalized, but continued to serve
the commodities export industry. However, the BNN was in the hands o f Somoza and the
PLN by the late 1940s. When the BN N ’ close relationship with the INFONAC began in
the early 1950s, it further empowered Somoza Garcia and the PLN.
Somoza incorporated the economic strategy o f financial experts from the Federal
Reserve Board o f the United States, the IMF, the World Bank, and the Food and
Agricultural Organization into his political platform He portrayed himself as a
champion o f the “national well-being” and staked the success o f his administration
on attracting foreign aid, and expanding export agriculture. The sudden
international attention whetted the appetites o f wealthy exporters, and merchants
who insisted that the PLN allocate resources fairly so that they could compete
aggressively in world markets. However, Somoza reacted by invoking “emergency
executive powers” granted by the 1950 constitution to control the reorganization
o f the economy beginning in 1952. At this point, the national agenda turned
toward the creation o f a modem economic infrastructure.109
Somoza’s control o f these instruments served as political tools to manipulate, and
placate the wealthy opposition with promises o f economic prosperity. It also meant a lack
o f transparency in the banking system and unlimited opportunities for hidden transactions
that would benefit the Somoza dynasty. Such a lack o f transparency later became a reform
issue demanded by the Paris Club instruments in exchange for assistance under the
neoliberal rubric. It is a reasonable observation that these practices were institutionalized
in Nicaragua, and probably there is a residual today that affects coercive powers o f the
captains o f banking and industry in Nicaragua.

I09Everingham, 47.
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Dependency Theory and Unintended Consequences
Some students o f dependency theory would identify Paris Club instruments o f
power as facilitating a dependency relationship between the first-world industrialized
states, and an underdeveloped commodities-export-dependent states like Nicaragua. In
fact, the economic boom that followed diminished the arguments o f critics and keen
observers o f what had transpired
There was an unintended consequence o f the Somoza strategy; wealthy opposition
businessmen in Nicaragua, largely from the PCN, took the opportunity to establish private
banks that survive today. The most prominent among them is the Bank o f America (Banco
de America - BANAMER) that survived the FSLN, and operates today.110
Another long-term result o f the Pact o f the Generals was an unintended opening o f
opportunity for those in opposition to, and in economic competition with Somoza Garcia;
however, Somoza may have seen the pact as the only method o f assuring his own survival.
He stood to, and did in fact become very wealthy because o f the economic boom
that ensued with his confiscations o f farms and ranches. However, from 1960 to 1964,
Nicaraguan peasants, and workers participated in 28 strikes causing the government to
establish minimum wages, paid days o f rest and other reforms.111 Puppet President Rene
Schick was known as one o f the least repressive, and corrupt o f the Somoza cronies, and
his technocratic approach lent itself to social, and economic reforms demanded by
peasants, and workers. Despite his reform efforts- especially in the area o f land reform -he
was thwarted by the commodities export elite who simply refused to cooperate. He did

110Everingham, 48.
11•Gould, 245.
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have some success in carrying out a modest land reform program that was supported by
Luis Somoza Debayle. The program, known as Article 19, involved the government
confiscation o f unproductive land holdings that were redistributed to landless peasants.
Owners were given small compensation by the government.
The program was largely ineffective, and it went by the wayside when Schick died
in 1965; Luis Somoza Debayle who supported the reforms died just two years later. The
opposition to land reform by Anastasio Somoza Debayle, then in command o f the GN,
was probably the primary factor that caused the failure o f the land reform program.
“Tacho was undoubtedly afraid o f losing some o f the estimated ten percent o f Nicaraguan
farm land which belonged to his family . . . would alienate important elite sectors . . . and
provoke even more campesino insurgency .” 112 By the end o f World War II, Anastasio
Somoza Garcia had added to the family fortune through confiscation o f German-owned
properties, but it is unlikely that the extent o f the family fortune will ever be known. His
family worth at the end o f the war is estimated at $60 million.113
During the 1960s, all Central American republics were struggling with economic
performance and social reform issues. The IADB, the Alliance for Progress and the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided substantial expertise and
assistance to improve economic performance and accelerate social reform. In 1981, after
the FSLN Triumph but before the pressures o f the Contra War, and natural disasters, the
net result o f the interventions in Nicaragua was that Nicaragua by far had the highest trade

112Gould, 250.
113Merrill, 26.
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imbalance at $12,576 billion in Central America. The next closest was El Salvador at
$3,058 billion.114
Beginning in the early 1960s, the United States’ “assistance” was more welcome
among politicians and bureaucrats o f those republics than economic elites because the
programs were focused on making concessions to the middle class and/or the military.115
In any case, the United States, that controlled all o f these instruments o f power, was
interested in avoiding social upheaval and providing an opening for Soviet/Cuban-inspired
revolution as seen in Cuba in the late 1950s.
In effect, the United States embarked on a policy that today is seen as preservation
o f military dictatorships in Latin America in furtherance o f the Truman D octrine’s
containment strategy. “Even before real insurgent threats surfaced, various U.S.
Government agencies were committed themselves to the preservation o f those regimes.” 116
Above all, the Somoza dynasty, and its policy o f obsequiousness to the United States
foreign policy goals fit the mold; therefore, its cooperation enabled the Somozas to retain,
and grow political and military power. The formation o f the INFONAC facilitated U.S.
policy. “In the span o f a few years, the peaceful evolution envisioned by the Alliance for
Progress was transformed into preventative counterrevolution, and early militarization o f
states. Democracy, once thought o f as an alternative to communism, came to be seen
instead as a potential for its intrusion.” 117

114Vilas, Between Earthquakes, 126.
I15Ib id , 100.
,,6Ib id , 98
I17Ibid
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Returning to the general subject o f import substitution as a tool o f dependency
theorists, despite the clear facts that Dependency Theory did not accomplish its goals o f
stimulating Latin American state economies and reducing economic disparity. It is true
that the period before the m id-1980s when most o f the states were not democratic and
tightly controlled by military leaders or civilian leaders with military backing, but the
power that those governments exercised could not formulate and implement such policies
successfully. It was after that period when Latin American states began the transition to
true democratic systems that import substitution was by and large abandoned; the result
was that most o f those economies faired well until the economic crisis o f the early 1990s

Religion and Nicaragua’s Development
Nicaragua’s post-colonial religious history can be split between Mosquitia that was
relatively isolated from the more highly populated western third o f Nicaragua that had
been settled by the Spanish. Little is known about the original indigenous populations’
religions in the western third. The Catholic church operated in concert with the Spanish
conquistadores’ brief to discover and hold territory for the Spanish crown. Today, the
predominant religion in Mosquitia among the three main indigenous groups (Miskito,
Suma, and Rama), and the Creoles is Moravian.118 The balance o f Nicaragua— the

118The Moravian Church originated in Moravia, and Bohemia (Eastern Europe) as
a Protestant denomination based on the teachings o f John Hull. Ministers from the
denomination were a part o f the early British colonies in the Caribbean. The church was
highly organized, and served the social needs o f the slaves imported by the British from
Africa to work the agricultural plantations in the Caribbean. The Moravians gained
acceptance by the British governors, and were later granted authority to carry out their
religious work along the M osquito Coast from the earliest days o f British colonization.
The church served as a de facto government, record keepers, and educators. It is still the
predominant church in Mosquitia; however, in the past fifty years the Catholic Church has

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

200

Spanish-speaking western third— has a mix o f Catholic, and Protestant religions.119 As
previously addressed, religion plays profound role in the lives o f Nicaraguans whether they
be Spanish-speaking creoles or Miskito. The participation o f the various predominant
organized religions in Nicaraguan politics-especially the Catholic Church-is unlike any
European or English, Dutch or French speaking state in the Western Hemisphere.

The Role O f The Moravian Church
As an organized religion, the Moravian Church had an enormous impact in
integrating the M osquito C oast’s various indigenous groups. It served as the de facto
secular government providing services to the Creoles and indigenous alike. While the
British consolidated its power by coopting the various “royal” families o f the indigenous
groups, naming a king, and supplying warships to them, it was the Moravian Church that
provided the vehicle o f integration o f the various groups and subgroups. 120

made inroads in the region following its parishioner as the Spanish-speaking agricultural
frontier has pushed east into the region. The Moravian Church is still the moral foundation
for most who live in the region-especially for the indigenous. While it initially resisted any
participation in the Sandinista Revolution, it, and its followers become politicized when
the victorious FSLN National Directorate began to impose mandatory Spanish language
education, and other measures to integrate the region into the larger state.
119As agricultural encroachment proceeds from the Spanish-speaking third o f
Nicaragua, along with it is that culture’s Catholic church. Thus, over time, the formerly
dominant Moravian Church has lost it large majority. In terms o f population, roughly one
tenth o f Nicaragua’s population is in he RAAN and RAAS that makes up about tw o thirds
o f the land mass, while nine tenths o f the Spanish-speaking Catholic population occupies
the western one third o f the land mass. Also, most estimates put 90 percent o f
Nicaragua’s natural wealth such as valuable timber and gold in the western two thirds o f
the territory.
120The British government crowned the Miskito king in formal ceremonies in 1687.
It was a quid pro quo arrangement. The Miskito strongly disliked the Spanish; in return
for formal recognition, and respect, the Miskito kingdom facilitated the activities o f the
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In 1847 tw o ministries o f the Moravian Church were initiated in Mosquitia. The
first Moravian Church officials were English-speaking missionaries from Jamaica The
Moravians first recruited lay ministers from the coastal, mostly Sambo Miskitos, and those
lay ministers traveled to the interior to evangelize. Although there had been an earlier
Anglican Church presence in the region, the Moravians had far greater success in
converting the indigenous population. While no public schools were provided, the
Moravian Church provided church-run schools. While record keeping was nil at the
official government level, the Church provided for that function through it church
registrars. The British had a very strong presence until the end o f the 19th Century, but it
had little interest in filling an administrative or local government role; rather, it was
focused on protecting the crow n’s trade interests. Therefore, the Moravian Church
operated with the tacit approval o f the British crown without supervision o f any sort.
Between 1861 and 1894, the Moravian Church was named by Miskito leaders as
the official financial administrator o f what had become a reserve (or territory). The British
had given up any formal claim to the region in the Treaty o f Managua o f 1860 but
provided for its former de facto colony by arranging the inclusion o f clauses that
guaranteed (1) a defined semi-autonomous region, (2) self government within the region,
and (3) that an annual stipend be paid to the Miskitos by the Managua government.
Implicit in the agreement was the continuation o f the Moravian Church’s role. The
Moravian Church schools were conducted in English, and as it did in its civil government

British buccaneers who based their operations in the region. See. Bernard N ietschm ana

Between Land and Water (New York: Seminar Press, 1973) for extensive details on that
relationship.
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role; it became the de facto civil authority under the loose control o f the new Miskito
council provided for in the Treaty.
The Moravian Church was completely supportive o f the Miskito society as a whole
incorporating the culture to the extent possible. In effect, it was the focal point for later
political issues that included its insistence on use o f the English as the lingua franca, its
own education system, and a general dislike o f anything Spanish including the Catholic
Church. “The new government decreed that the laws o f England, adopted in 1848, and the
English language would continue to be used on the reservation.” 121
In effect, the Moravian Church became politicized by the circumstances o f the day,
and the wishes o f the Mosquitia people. So long as the region remained relatively under
populated, represented no threat to the national government, and maintained its self
chosen insular habits, there were no important political issues. However, this was not to
be the case in the long term .122
On 20 November 1894, the Miskito chiefs (the king had little authority by that
time) voted to “re-incorporate” but received no encouragement from the British or
Americans. The Managua government had not paid the annual tribute stipulated in the
Treaty o f Managua, and the Miskitos wished to return to their condition o f self rule under
the British. Again, the Moravian Church supported the move. To complicate matters, in

121Naylor, 199.
122“Today, the Miskitos use the pejorative term, panas, to refer to nearly any
Spanish-heritage person living in or visiting the region. However, with the agricultural
encroachment from the west that is largely mestizo, that term is not as much used as
before their arrival.
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1901 the United States, and Great Britain entered into the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in
which the British ceded any further claim to the region.
President Zelaya, whose anti-U.S. nationalistic zeal would come more the fore
later, took steps to reassert M anagua’s authority. Aside from non-payment o f the Treaty
o f Managua stipend, he began to grant commercial concessions to a variety o f foreign
companies-all o f which violated the spirit o f the Treaty, and sanctity o f the Miskito
territories. He exploited Mosquitia at will, and the most onerous act to assure long-term
political control was the decree that the Moravian Church school system be dismantled,
and that all further instruction be conducted in the Spanish language. However, in positive
terms he recognized the Miskitos and their culture as a distinct entity but part o f the
Nicaraguan state.
Because the Moravian Church had been the keeper o f the Miskito culture
(including maintenance o f the Miskito language), and the center o f social life as well,
Zelaya’s decree had the effect o f dismantling the cohesion brought by the Church.123
Perhaps the most telling o f the relationship between the Moravian Church and the
Nicaraguan national government appears in a 1901 United States Department o f State
cable: “‘[The Nicaraguan authorities allege that the Moravians] have always been
unfriendly, and even openly hostile towards the Nicaraguan g overnm ent. . and taught in
its schools, and churches the natives a disregard, and disrespect for the laws, and customs

123The FSLN’s first efforts at integrating the Miskito territories, then known as
Zelaya Province North, and Zelaya Province South, were similar in tactics, and similarly
destructive. The FSLN’s National Directorate ordered a cadre o f party faithful school
teachers to the region for the dual purpose o f education, and politicization o f the people.
Tomas Borge, the FSLN Minister o f Interior, later admitted the error, and took steps to
correct it. However, his program was short lived with the election o f Violeta Chamorro in
1990.
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o f the country.’ This allegation, no matter how valid, constituted a good basis for
discriminatory actions.” 124
When Zelaya was removed from office in 1909, the Moravian Church was able to
resume its former role; however, much damage had been done. In any case, the de facto
benign neglect policies o f Anastasio Somoza Garcia beginning in 1936, and lasting until
Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s departure in 1979 saved the Moravian Church and its role.
Over time the shift in demographics o f the region diminished the importance o f the role o f
the Moravian Church. In 1988 the population o f the Atlantic coast o f Nicaragua was
roughly 240,000 o f which 120,000 were Mestizos; 80,000 Miskito; 30,000 Creole; 8,000
Sumu; 1,500 Garifunos, and 800 Ramas.125
The Moravian Church was seen by the FSLN as a key obstacle to the consolidation
o f the 1979 revolution. The FSLN’s earliest efforts to fully consolidate the region into the
state were ill-advised and poorly executed. Those efforts led to the active support o f many
Miskitos who joined the Contra forces in the south with Eden Pastora, and the CIA-led
force in the north.
In 1998, Palmerson Budier, the pastor o f the largest Moravian Church located in
Bluefields, related that not long after the FSLN victory, Sandinista troops, and FSLN
functionaries systematically harassed his church and its parishioners126. The harassment

124Craig L. Dozier, Nicaragua's Mosquito Coast, The Years o f British, and
American Presence (University o f Alabama: The University o f Alabama Press, 1985), 162.
12SJane Freeland, A Special Place in History - the Atlantic Coast in the
Nicaraguan Revolution (London: Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign, 1988), 16.
126Palmerson Budier (Moravian Bishop in Bluefields), in discussion with author
and others in Hays-Fulbright group in July 1999 in Bluefields, Nicaragua.
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included the kidnaping o f his own son. After a terrifying 24-hour ordeal, he was allowed
to go home but he was forever silent about what had happened. The son immediately quit
his former student leadership position in the Moravian high school from which he had
criticized the FSLN.127 In 1984, FSLN Minister o f Interior Tomas Borge reflected on the
early tactics:
The Somoza dictatorship never made the slightest effort to bring education or
health to the . . . population. Tuberculosis decimated lives, and illiteracy blotted
out minds. Neglect was the policy toward Miskitos. We wanted to resolve this
historic backwardness, having a great deal o f will, but with little knowledge. We
committed errors, many times no account was taken o f the cultural particularities
o f the Miskitos . . . Such errors were committed in good faith; they were taken
advantage o f by the bad faith o f the counter-revolutionaries [CIA-supported
Contras] 128
Clearly, the Miskito preferred benign neglect to the FSLN program; ironically the
real legal protections that included freedom o f religion came with Borge’s determination
to rectify the errors with the National Autonomy Commission o f the Sandinista
Government. That Commission, inaugurated in June 1985, invited the participation o f the
Miskito leaders to write a national law that would grant unique rights to the Miskitos,
preserve culture and religion, and incorporate the region into the whole o f Nicaragua.
Most important from the FSLN perspective was the goal o f regaining political
trust. On 30 October 1987, Law 28 - Statute o f Autonomy o f the Atlantic Coast Regions
o f Nicaragua was ratified by the National Assembly .129 In effect, the FSLN was successful

127Budier.
128Mary B. Vanderjaan, Revolution, and Foreign Policy in Nicaragua (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1986), 100
129Among other provisions was the renaming o f the Mosquitia political regions
from Zelaya Province North, and Zelaya Province South to National Autonomous Region
North (RAAN), and National Autonomous Region South (RAAS).
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in finally including Mosquitia into the larger Nicaragua, by allowing the region to return to
its traditions, and preferred religious practices While this could be seen as political
manipulation by the FSLN, the effect has been more altruistic in outcome. The Moravian
Church now competes with increasing Hispanic Roman Catholic population, and is
nominally apolitical. However, memories are long
The legal protections put in place by the FSLN are somewhat less meaningful
today because o f the diminishing Miskito population, and influence o f the Moravian
Church 130 It is important to remember that approximately half o f the sources o f capital in
the RAAN and RAAS come from remittances while much o f the balance comes from drug
transit business 131 According to IMF data, between 1970 and 1998, the mean percentage
o f remittances against the total GDP o f Nicaragua was 12 .5 percent .132 Much o f the loss
o f uniqueness and regional identity is due to the Spanish-speaking, Catholic agricultural
encroachment into the region from the highland regions, and improved transportation, and
public media infrastructure.133 President Violeta Chamorro who took office in February
1990, and the later Presidents Aleman and Bolanos returned to a laissez-faire relationship

130In 1999, Palmerson Budier estimated that in Bluefields forty percent o f the
population was Moravian, forty percent Catholic, and twenty percent other (mostly
Pentecostal).
131Aynn Setright (Academic Director, School for International Training, Nicaragua
Study Abroad Program), in discussion with author June 1998, December 2002 and
December 2003.
132Ralph Chami, Connel Fullenkamp and Samir Jahjah. Are Immigrant Remittance
Flows a Source o f Capital fo r Development? (IMF Working Paper). (Washington, D C .:
International Monetary Fund, 2003), 32.
133In 2000, there was only one Miskito member o f the 97-member Nicaraguan
national assembly, and only one Miskito high national government official who was the
head o f the Election Tribunal
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with the region not unlike that o f the Somoza dynasty-benign neglect. The relative
isolation o f the region and its minor role in the National Assembly account for much o f
this behavior, but more important the region has preferred relative isolation and unless the
region’s economy is affected such a laissez-faire relationship is the norm.

The Role o f Pentecostal and other Protestant Churches
Even though Nicaragua, as a state, was founded with Catholicism as the state
religion, there has been a significant increase in Protestant churches, and
membership-especially during the 20th Century. By the turn o f the 21st Century, rough
estimates put 70 percent o f the population counted as Catholic, and the balance
Protestants.134 While the Moravian Church has dominated religious, and social life in the
past in the eastern two-thirds o f Nicaragua, it is losing ground fast to the Catholic Church,
and Pentecostal Church
The Pacific side o f Nicaragua, has a significant Baptist Church presence. The
period between the mid-1960s, and 1990 was an era o f significant change for all churches
in Nicaragua. This was due to the social unrest, the increased repression o f Somoza
dynasty as it lost its grip, the FSLN-led revolution and general self examination. As the
changes occurred, all churches in Nicaragua shifted their alliances, and strategies in
response. This was particularly true o f the Catholic Church. The universal truth is that all
o f the churches in Nicaragua have been politically active since the 1960s although their
roles vary by social, and economic classes.

134Merrill, 86.
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Beginning from an almost one hundred percent Catholic Church presence in the
western third o f Nicaragua from the earliest colonial period, the influence o f the American
Baptist Church as risen substantially to what is today probably at about thirty percent. The
traditional Catholic Church in the region, until the mid-1960s, had supported the national
governments including those o f the Somoza dynasty while still providing the religious base
for the poorest Nicaraguans
The Nicaraguan Baptist Church, affiliated with the American Baptist Church, early
on had made its evangelistic appeal to the peasants and farmers in the region-not with the
ruling classes Therefore, its growth can be attributed to its identification with those
classes; however, today the Baptist Church is more identified with the middle class o f the
region.135 In any case, it is interesting to note that one o f the earliest class conflicts in the
rich western agricultural area, was led by a Nicaraguan Baptist preacher, Manuel Campos,
who sought to redress the disparity o f peasant workers, and challenge the large
landholding families in the Chinandega Province.
The earliest interconnections between religion, labor, and political parties can be
traced, in part, to the activities o f Campos who was instrumental in the joining o f
Chinandega peasant labor and Corinto dock workers in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
“More than a decade before Catholic activists began to speak o f (Liberation Theology),
this ex-moonshiner found that Christianity, and class struggle were inextricably
linked.” 136 He was harassed by local officials and once was arrested for littering in front o f
a Catholic Church.

135Merrill, 86
136Gould, 199.
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However, his powerful personality and conviction gained both peasant union
members and parishioners. His election to the presidency o f the predominantly Catholic
union (El Realejo Agricultural W orkers’ Union) was unusual in itself, but he successfully
mixed union leadership with his ideas about the connection between church and social
responsibility.
Campos managed to consolidate both agricultural and dock w orkers’ union
movements into a synergism that forced the Anastasio Somoza Garcia and Luis Somoza
Debayle governments to live up to commitments to labor interests, and still keep the GN
at bay when called on to protect crops and warehoused goods at the port from labor
demonstrations. (See discussion in following section on labor regarding horizontal
relationships between peasant, and worker interests.)
President Luis Somoza Debayle finally acquiesced to the demands o f the combined
labor movement on 1 March 1962, but not before having Campos symbolically arrested as
an agitator-he was released several days later. In effect, Campos managed to lever the
PLI’s promises to labor, his and his followers’ religious conviction in attaching religion to
social action, and responsibility o f the workers to great advantage-one that benefitted the
workers, and provided a model for the soon-to-follow Catholic-led Liberation Theology
movement
While Campos’ approach was more pragmatic than politically driven, the result o f
his and others’ work fit neatly with the successful recruitment o f workers and peasants in
the region by the FSLN during the revolution.
The Catholic Church’s role in Nicaragua changed over tim e-it political role is most
important to this discussion but it is necessary to lay out how that role evolved from a full
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partner with the Spanish crown in conquering, colonizing and “Christianizing” the
indigenous people, to acting in a supporting role to government after Nicaragua’s
independence in 1821 through the mid-1960s when some factions took on a more secular
role-even before it was mandated by Pope’s encyclical in 1968.
The Catholic Church’s influence in the daily lives o f Latin Americans is profound,
and Nicaragua is no exception even today While there have been some minor inroads by
evangelical Protestant churches in Nicaragua, the increasingly secular mission o f the
Church has influenced the Protestant churches to follow that lead.
As in the European model that is first seen in the late 1940s, many Catholic priests
see little or no conflict between the Church’s role and Marxism as a model to address
social disparity. Surprising to most in the English speaking world, after the July 1979
overthrow o f Somoza the FSLN National Directorate, and its subordinate bodies
were made up o f no fewer than three priests o f various orders-but the FSLN was not
supported by the more traditional Cardinal Obando y Bravo and his conservative church.
The early history o f the Church in Nicaragua is important when contrasted with its
more activist secular role today. In the conquest o f the indigenous peoples in Nicaragua
through its official role in “chritianization” o f the indigenous, the Church and the Spanish
Crown’s officials enforced requirements that the indigenous submit to the Church. “(The
Spanish Crown) justified the wars, and massacres (o f the indigenous) by the Crow n’s
sacred imperative to ‘extend the faith’ which had been requested by the Pope.” 137 During
the early days o f Spanish conquest, the indigenous resisted.

137Wheelock, 34
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In a transcribed meeting between Catholic priest Francisco de Bobadilla and
indigenous high priest Tocoteyda, Bobadilla asked Tocoteyda to clarify his position on
Christianity. His reply was “I am old, and I am not a cacique because I am Christian.” 138
The Spanish in Nicaragua were frustrated in their attempts to subjugate the indigenous but
“With the objective o f striking a blow to the political structure o f the Nicaraguan
aboriginal people . . abolished the Elder Councils . . in which communal sovereignty
resided . . . what was a collegiate system.” 139
In keeping with the established system, the Spanish Crown instituted autocratic
systems that were intended to undermine the indigenous system, and further the
colonization o f Nicaragua.140 The Catholic Church was complicit in obscuring the true
treatment o f the indigenous141 This was especially true during the period o f conquest
ruled by Pedrarias who saw the destruction o f the indigenous culture to the end. However,
some Catholics were appalled at the treatment o f the indigenous, the most well known
being Fray Bartolome de las Casas who chronicled in his History o f the Indies -

Foundation o f the Economic Culture . “Every four or five months . . . the cacique was
forced to provide fifty slaves under the threat o f his being burned alive or thrown to the
mad dogs. They first took the orphans . . ., and later asked (families) with legitimate

138Ibid., 35.
139Ibid.
140It is interesting to note that a great deal o f resistance occurred in the indigenous
village o f Subtiava, just south o f modern-day Managua. Subtiava was also the center o f
resistance to the Somoza dynasty, and source o f support to the FSLN during the
revolution.
141A notable exception being Fray Bartolome de las Casas, a Catholic priest who
chronicled the abuses during the conquest period.
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children for one (male), and for two females (if they had three females). This happened
many times between [15]23, and [15]33" 142
Finally, the Roman Catholic Church’s and Crow n’s actions overcame the
indigenous nations to sustain themselves; however, the indigenous often fought back
attacking indigenous slave mining operations, and similar Spanish-run abusive operations.
Despite the ultimate subjugation o f the indigenous their resistance continued. The
introduction o f African slaves in 1542, and the evangelization efforts o f the Catholic
Church were instrumental in the final fate.
While it seems obvious that the Catholic Church was complicit in the early
conquests, what is less obvious is that the Church was intimately involved with all
succeeding governments in Nicaragua until its role was officially removed from the
Nicaragua Constitution in 1939. Beyond that date until the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
Catholic Church was an integral part o f governing system in Nicaragua. Its failure to grow
can be attributed to its traditional, long-term association with the stategovem m ents-a rare
exception being during the term o f anti-clerical General Zelaya who ruled Nicaragua from
1889 to 1909.
After Zelaya through the end o f the Somoza dynasty in July 1979, according to
Carlos Vilas, the Roman Catholic Church was “Among the most backward o f the
continent, the hierarchy spread a Christianity o f submission to the temporal order. The
dictatorial power was in effect presented as the product o f a divine will, and any effort to
rebel against it as an unsubordination to God.” 143

142Ibid., 37.
143Vilas, The Sandmista Revolution, 87
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The abuses o f the oligarchy, and the governments until the early 1970s were
generally ignored by the Catholic Church that too often failed to take up the causes o f
ordinary peasants and workers. This provided an opening for the Protestant churches (see
discussion above), and accounts for the general weakening o f the Catholic Church’s
influence.
“Outsider” Catholic Church priests, brothers, and nuns took up the cause o f the
poor and abused in Central America. Often this meant alliances with Marxist rebel
organizations. Most notably, in Guatemala the Maryknoll Berrigan brothers assisted the
Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes - FAR) in the mid-1960s, Maryknoll
nuns assisting the poor in El Salvador were killed by government agents in the early
1980s, Catholic Priest Camilo Torres became famous in Colombia for joining the leftist
guerillas (his death at the hands o f the Colombian government made him a martyr), and El
Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero who was killed by government forces in 1980
while giving mass; he had been associated with the left taking up the causes o f the poor in
El Salvador.
Beginning in the 1960s, the Church began to change to undertake a secular
mission. Pope John X XIII’s encyclical Mater et Magistra, and Pope Paul V i’s Pacem in

Terris were the first steps. Finally the Second Vatican Council’s Gaudium et Spes took the
final step toward a new role that, effectively, politicized the Catholic Church’s activities in
Latin America. This represented a change in direction for the more traditional priesthood,
and required a re-orientation or rationalization.

Gaudium et Spes declared the independence o f political from theological
judgements: no Christian could legitimize a political choice through “truths o f the
faith,” a formulation that could not but severely undermine the authority o f
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conservative religious hierarchies. One significant element in the Church’s critique
o f capitalism was a partial return to Patristic doctrine, which stressed the collective
origin o f worldly goods, and revived the Church’s condemnation o f the profitbased economy. The demarcating o f the political, and social spheres from the
strictly religious effectively softened Church attacks on leftist groups, and
legitimized the involvement o f Church workers in social reforms against the most
naked expressions o f capitalism. Doctrinal renew al. . . opened the door to
cooperation between Christians, and Marxists in political, and social fields . . 144
The changes brought about by the Church were adopted by the 1968 Latin
American Bishops convention held in Medellin, Colombia, and reaffirmed actions that had
already been taken in Latin America to address political, social and economic disparity
The adoption gave the Church in Latin America the imprimatur to further expand its
efforts These included the establishment o f Christian-based communities (CBCs) that
were organized mostly in poor communities where the Catholic Church had long before
lost the allegiance o f the local parishioners to Protestant Churches. The CBCs were made
up o f approximately 200 members, and often led by un-ordained lay priests.
While this change was not seen as negative by the more traditional, conservative
Church, the Church leaders balked at the recruitment o f priests, and nuns into a politically
active role that included revolutionary activity, and organized protest often in alliance with
leftist or communist political organizations.145 It was this opening that provided the FSLN
with a framework from which to recruit members and carry out its agenda to overthrow
Somoza in 1979, and to recast the economy policies in Nicaragua toward a mixed
system.146 In any case, dissident147 priests, and nuns who were sensitive to the needs o f the

144Ibid , 112.
145Ibid., 115.
146The CBC system established by the Catholic Church fit well with the later
community-based Committees for the Defense o f the Revolution (CDR) set up by the
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people, and the economic disparity were willing participants. The FSLN ’s earliest leaders
were all at least nominal Roman Catholics, and they never denounced the Church per se;
rather, they embraced Liberation Theology as a tool to further its own agenda.
Cardinal Obando y Bravo was the head o f the Catholic Church in Nicaragua, and
as a conservative church leader had followed the tradition o f finding accommodation with
the established governments in return for, at least, nominal support. The Somozas were
always careful to protect this relationship, and benefitted from it with the presence o f
Catholic officials during official government events. However, by the mid-1960s the
increasing reality o f the growing disparity in Nicaragua, and the impending revolution
along with the changes in Catholic Church mandates (Liberation Theology) forced a
change in his direction o f the national Church.
In the earliest days o f the revolution, the presence o f “foreign” priests in
Nicaragua, and the splitting away o f Nicaraguan priests was troubling to Obando y Bravo.
During that period he was critical o f their unwillingness to tow the line o f his traditional
conservative approach. However, when the inevitable victory o f the FSLN was apparent,
Obando y Bravo kept a low profile until he could formulate a new path.

Somoza Debayle’s Postscript
Anastasio Somoza Debayle, after fleeing to Miami with his immediate family and
entourage, eventually settled in Asuncion, Paraguay. Although he was murdered in

FSLN governments which were modeled on the Cuban example. The CDRs were
designed to reveal anti-revolutionary activity, and serve as a quasi-official administrative
arm o f the FSLN government.
I47In Cardenal Obando y Bravo’s definition
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Asuncion in September 1980 by what was believed to be Argentine leftist

guerrillas,148 he

managed to complete a book with American co-author Jack Cox titled Nicaragua

Betrayed 149 (See review in Chapter II.)
That book serves to provide some understanding as to his distorted view o f the
condition o f Nicaragua, and his mis-guided actions to retain control despite all odds. It
was the Organization o f American States condemnation o f 23 June 1979 that convinced
him to give up his cause During the vote, only Nicaragua, and Paraguay voted against the
declaration. Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras abstained150. The “Resolution
Project” o f the Seventeenth Consultation Meeting o f [American] Foreign Ministers
proposed by Costa Rica, the United States, and Venezuela among others, included
“Immediate, and definite replacement o f the Somoza regime . . . [and] Carrying out free
elections as early as possible that lead to the establishment o f a true democratic
government that will guarantee peace, freedom, and justice.” 151
Somoza had lost control because o f his own actions as much as because o f the
efforts o f the FSLN and Broad Opposition Front; however, it is important to understand
that he still had his supporters both within Nicaragua who became silent, and outside o f
N icaragua-those largely among his loyal, former GN forces who had joined in the Contra

148Merrill, 38.
149Anastasio Somoza and Jack Cox, Nicaragua Betrayed {Boston: W estern Island
Press, 1980). (Western Island Press is the publishing arm o f the John Birch Society.)
150Ib id , 265.
,5IIbid.
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force to spoil the FSLN victory. This residual support extant even today, serves to explain
the complex political forces in Nicaragua
Very privately, many in Nicaragua will voice support for Anastasio Somoza
Debayle, and his government. This is particularly true o f both Moravian, and Catholic
Church functionaries who saw his benign and very careful treatment o f religion in
Nicaragua as positives.152
Those who live in the eastern regions o f Nicaragua (Mosquitia) are particularly proSomoza because the Somoza dynasty always adopted a sort o f hands off benign attitude
toward the region; the FSLN, on the other hand, was very aggressive in its failed attempts
at controlling the region, and attempts at political “re-education” o f the people because o f
their known support for the Contras.
It could be argued that the Somozas used the Church as an extension o f political
power through that process-no doubt there existed a symbiosis that will probably never be
revealed through more than anecdotal knowledge. However, it is clear his book that
Anastasio Somoza Debayle saw the Catholic Church as having too strong a sense o f
entitlement in the political process. In particular, he criticizes Cardinal Miguel Obando y
Bravo, who as Bishop o f Managua on the date o f the devastating earthquake on
December 1972 in Managua, assumed an independent, non-cooperative role in the relief
effort. Although Somoza states that he invited Obando y Bravo to serve as vice chairman
o f the relief committee, Obando did not attend. “Each group (NGOs, and other
organizations), but particularly the Red Cross, and the Catholic Church wanted to do its

152Such sentiment was related to this author during research visits to Nicaragua
between June 1998, and December 2003; however, respecting their requests for
anonymity, their names are not provided here.
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own thing This simply could not be. There had to be cooperation

. . Otherwise, there

would have been chaos.” 153
It is very probable that Obando y Bravo had by that time seen the handwriting on
the wall, but most probably he was carrying his duties as Bishop o f Managua under the
general guidance o f Rome.154 Above all, it has always been clear that while Archbishop
Obando y Bravo serves his church first, he is a pragmatist in approach to difficult
circumstances. Further, while it could be argued that he follows the long-term tradition o f
the Catholic Church allying itself with the de jure or de facto heads o f state, he n ev erth e
less is willing to take positions. Usually, his strategy has been one o f resistance and tacit
approval for those prefers. Not to be overlooked is the clear record o f trading favors o f
support for greater access to the Nicaraguan people. No doubt, Obando y Bravo believes
such a strategy is, in the longer term, the most effective. At present-day example o f such
an exchange is Obando y Bravo’s silence in supporting the Bolanos government while he
actively has representation at opposition rallies and ceremonies held by the PLC, the
FSLN and/or the pacto.

Observations on Nicaragua’s Conditioning
As with any nation, historical experiences condition political culture Nicaragua’s
experiences are conditioned by a long history o f political unrest punctuated by nature’s

153Ib id , 11.
154Lino Gutierrez. U.S. Government relief after Hurricane Mitch was purposely
funneled through Catholic Relief.
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handiwork The most recent historical experiences are most influential in conditioning the
behavior o f domestic independent variables. This is especially true because the
demographics o f Nicaragua, due in part to the Contra War, reveal that more than fifty
percent o f the population is under the age o f 15 years old. Therefore, their cognitive
memory goes only back to the later days o f the Chamorro administration, and that which
they may have heard from their older family members. Unquestionably, they are at least
aware o f the reasons from Somoza’s downfall, and while living in poverty are aware o f the
failures the Bolanos’ administration and his adoption o f the neoliberal solution.
The subtle, and least understood dynamic that is part o f the youthful Nicaragua
psyche today is a sense o f political empowerment that it is a legacy o f the FSLN period.
This extends to most o f the population, but the constant presence o f Daniel Ortega serves
to remind the youth o f the FSLN period when Nicaragua defied the United States, and
that the neoliberal agenda now being implemented by President Bolanos, and championed
by the United States is the true cause o f poverty, and social inequities. The one-sided
argument is a recipe for another round o f social revolution unless neoliberalism shows
results. The impatience o f the young is no doubt fueled by their ready access to the many
television programs received in Nicaragua from Costa Rica, and other relatively
prosperous states.
Nicaragua’s historical role as step-child o f the United States, and use as a political,
and economic pawn do little to settle the political stomach in the today’s neoliberal world.
It should be no surprise that there have been extreme reactions to outside forces, and that
the United States is held in a skeptical light. This alone conditions the domestic
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independent variables that will finally influence the outcome o f the neoliberal agenda
undertaken by the Bolanos administration
Since 1990, Nicaragua has had to acquiesce to the external demands, but the habit
developed long before. Even with a modest recovery, it is clear that the Nicaraguan
electorate may seek yet another path not unlike that first initiated by General Zelaya, and
later politicized and energized by the FSLN. The most recent flexing o f political muscle o f
the Constitutional Liberal Party, and Sandinista Front, either jointly or independently,
points in that direction.
What developed after the election o f Violeta Chamorro in 1990, and the condition
that most Nicaraguans find themselves today will be the most important determinants, and
influence on the internal domestic variables in treatment o f neoliberalism.
Leaving motivations aside, the post-Cold War dominant states led by the United
States seek to restore Nicaragua’s potential as a full participant in the neoliberal model
The current iteration o f the relationship is more abstract but just as important to those
states as it was during the Cold War. Skeptics o f neoliberalism would predict that
Nicaragua, in full bloom, would return it to the classic neocolonial dependency
relationship in the North-South theory context.
This manifests itself today in Nicaragua. It is a HIPC case that has the attention o f
state, and non-state actors alike. IGOs such as the World Bank, the IMF and IADB as
well as a panoply o f NGOs seek to guide it toward economic recovery, and reintroduction
into the w orld’s globalized neoliberal model.155

155While not a subject o f this work, it is clear that the international consensus is
that first world states have some mix o f moral obligation, and economic interest to fully
restore the potential o f states such as Nicaragua.
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As with any state, its behavior, actions, beliefs, and prejudices are formed, and
conditioned by historical experience While such conditioning is not so relevant during
periods o f economic health and social justice, when states are faced by hard times their
historical experiences become more relevant. Such is the case in Nicaragua. Having made
the choice to seek another path in 1990, Nicaraguans had an expectation that such a
choice would lead to improvement; however, this has not been the case
While there has been some small improvement, the measures necessary to make
the transition to a free-market system demanded by the neoliberal solution have been
painful. The memory o f the FSLN period that raised social consciousness, and the
potential for organized political action remains fresh. This legacy o f self worth, and
empowerment is in contradiction with the powerlessness o f the people or government o f
Nicaragua as the neoliberal agenda takes hold. Thus, with historical memory and a newly
learned sense o f self worth, the lack o f progress must be accompanied by extreme
frustration. These factors influence how the most important domestic independent
variables will proceed with the neoliberal agenda, but they also are ingredients for yet
another revolution.
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CHAPTER IV

NICARAGUA AND NEOLIBERALISM 1990-2006

Since Violeta Barrios de Chamorro’s election to the presidency o f the Republic o f
Nicaragua, the political influences o f the Cold War dissolved and reformed into economic
issues and, most recently, the war on terrorism. Russia has joined NATO as an associate
member but more important it has given up its old political/economic model in favor o f the
promises o f neoliberalism. It is now a full member o f the G8 and, while not an economic
powerhouse per se as are the other members o f the G8, its full participation signals the
permanency o f the neoliberal agenda even though there are holdouts 1
The few hold-outs from this agenda are inconsequential, but more important those
states that had subscribed to the Marxist or neo-Marxist models must now make the
adjustments necessary to survive. That represents both a transition dilemma and an
opportunity for states such as Nicaragua.

‘It is difficult to discern whether President Hugo Chavez’ populist rhetoric in
criticizing the United States is home grown or an extension o f his friendship with Fidel
Castro. His rhetoric is filled with vitriol that reminds one o f C astro’s caustic and animated
anti-U.S. speeches during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. However, by any observation,
Castro has moderated his tone and taken on a less militant posture. Picturing Castro in a
formal suit greeting the Pope at Havana’s San Martin Airport is a sight that could not have
been imagined; this brings one to wonder how the current Pope would be treated by
Chavez at Simon Bolivar Maiquetia International Airport that serves Caracas. In any
case, C astro’s Cuba remains as one o f the few holdouts for communism. In combination,
Chavez and Castro reminds us o f the Cold War period in which the Truman Doctrine was
operative. Having psychologically passed through the Cold War, U.S. policy makers must
be bewildered as to how to deal with Chavez even though Castro has been effectively
bottled up.
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The July 2005 plenary meeting o f the G8 heads o f state in Gleneagles, Scotland
had at the top o f the agenda the task o f how to integrate those states such as Nicaragua.
In fact, despite terrorist bombings in the London underground during the conference, the
G8 conference concluded as it had begun: a firm commitment to find a way to (1) rescue
HIPC states and (2) work toward their full participation in a neoliberal world economic
model There was remarkably little dissension as to the ultimate goals, and that dissension
had more to do with recognition that internal commitments and structural reform must
take place in those HIPC states before any further application o f funds or in-kind help be
provided. Put in simple terms, the dissenting voices were insisting on an internal
bootstraps approach be undertaken as a first priority.
Unquestionably, the Nicaraguan electorate voted against the failed mixed-model,
Marxist-inspired FSLN program in favor o f a not well understood neoliberal model. In
truth, the people o f Nicaragua, as with other HIPC states, had little choice. However,
Nicaraguans took that step.
The implementation o f the neoliberal agenda has been another matter entirely
because o f Nicaragua’s long-term conditioning and its domestic independent variables that
modulate the expected results o f neoliberalism. This important collective force-the
domestic independent variables-fits with the dissenting voices heard at Gleneagles.2 One
often-heard criticism o f the commitment to provide $60 billion to Africa relief was that
unless corruption in those HIPC African states be brought under control, the effort will

2Steve Schifferes, “Can G8 be considered a success?” BBC [web] News, 8 July
2005. Available [Online]:http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/4663659.stm [14 October
2005],
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have been wasted This and other dissenting comments speak to the dynamic o f the
internal variables that are at least half o f the equation.
Despite a poor understanding o f the neoliberal rubric by the general Nicaraguan
electorate and by Daniel O rtega’s opposition candidate, the die was cast after the election.
However, immediate and long-term internal adjustments that would be necessary were not
well understood.
This was the challenge o f President Chamorro and those who followed her. The
three presidents since O rtega’s defeat, Chamorro, Aleman and Bolanos, had to craft policy
such that they would not destroy Nicaragua as a viable state but still find a path toward
adopting the path chosen by the people.
Unquestionably, as prominent Nicaraguans, those three presidents well understood
and understand the obstacles presented by the domestic variables known to them, and
likewise understood the residual effect o f the FSLN revolutionary period. Perhaps the
biggest obstacle, at least in the eyes o f a neoliberal proponent was that the adjustment to
the new system would take a long period-something for which the general electorate had
little patience. The resistance to make a full commitment to neoliberalism by domestic
independent variables has been influenced by its apparent failure. Thus, the first president
after the fall o f the FSLN enjoyed a short honeymoon period but soon afterward was faced
with the reality o f extreme poverty. Chamorro, followed by the next tw o presidents, has
seen little improvement. Each president, during the thermidor period has made incremental
progress but at a rate that may not ultimately keep the Nicaraguan people from seeking yet
another path.
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The Thermidor Period: Dona Violeta Chamorro
From the outset o f her election in 1990, President Chamorro had few options
Overcome by the extreme financial crisis, impossible foreign debt and the reluctance o f
private foreign investment, she had to address the expectations o f the people who made
the decision to remove the FSLN from power. The FSLN government was the very
government that stood on its promise to reform Nicaragua’s political, social and economic
ills.
The conundrum resulted in surprising decisions. In hindsight President Cham orro’s
decisions seem quite politic. Her most contentious decision was the retention o f Humberto
Ortega, brother o f Daniel Ortega, as the head o f the Nicaragua military. While designed to
soften the blow to the FSLN and avoid a political crisis, that act o f conciliation slowed her
program o f reforms. However, accommodation with the FSLN was seen as necessary to
proceed with President Cham orro’s mandate to get on with the business o f change. The
“Transition Protocol” that laid out the accommodation was authored by Antonio Lacayo,
her newly named Minister o f the Presidency, was a pragmatic if not Solomon-like
approach.3 In retrospect, it is clear that her administration may not have lasted its entire
term if it were not for her willingness to compromise and seek reconciliation.
To re-engage the international community, President Chamorro had to make
commitments that while reasonable to the outside observer, would also prove nearly
impossible to meet given the internal conditions and forces that caused distorted public

3Antonio Lacayo (Minister o f the Presidency, Chamorro administration), in
discussion with author, December 2003, Managua.
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policy. Those forces and the internal policies that were taken by her administration4 and
the next two administrations (Aleman and Bolanos) have not met the expectations o f the
people o f Nicaragua or the international community; neither has the extreme slowness o f
the economy to recover been helpful nor signal much hope for the future.5
There was little choice since the 1990 election o f President Violeta Chamorro but
to appeal to outside international aid for help. According to her Minister o f the
Presidency, Antonio Lacayo, President Chamarro was faced with an external debt that had
risen from $1.6 billion in 1979 to $12 billion in 1990 with the largest per capita debt in the
world on the eve o f her assuming the presidency .6 In the face o f the considerable residual
political power o f the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de
Liberacion Nacional - FSLN), President Chamorro made concessions that were both
pragmatic and political.7
President Chamorro had to take great care not to institute free-market reforms too
quickly, be careful to retain her political mandate, dance to the tune o f would-be
international aid (especially that o f the Paris Club), and undertake structural reforms and
redefine institutions that had been radicalized since the July 1979 FSLN victory. No doubt,

N otw ithstanding her most altruistic motives, the challenge was not reform and
recovery, but more to provide for a transition toward that end In that sense, Cham orro’s
government can be seen as a success by any measure.
5In response to a question by this writer on 9 March 2004 in Norfolk, Virginia the
Executive Director o f the Inter-American Development Bank, Jose Forquet, admitted that
he could see little hope for the near term, but insisted that there is no reason to quit trying
programs that might ultimately pull Nicaragua from its quagmire. While his response
seemed pessimistic, his determination was as evident.
6Antonio Lacayo Oyanguren.
7Ibid.
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the nearly forty percent vote in the 1990 presidential elections for Daniel Ortega gave
impetus to her taking decisions to move cautiously and judicially lest she suffer an
unexpected removal from power-something that was a very real possibility.
President Cham orro’s decisions to take care with the FSLN, and to avoid any
sense that she would rush to overturn the well-ensconced FSLN membership in the
military,8 police and national bureaucracy, angered the U.S. Congress and caused critical
delays in promised financial support.
The 1990 election o f Violeta Chamorro was a surprise to many in Nicaragua, not
the least being to Daniel Ortega. To his credit, he was quick to express congratulations
and unconditional support for Chamorro although he later partially recanted. After all,
Violeta Chamorro had been a member o f the original FSLN National Directorate in 1979,
and her husband, Pedro Chamorro, former co-owner, and editor o f opposition newspaper

La Prensa who was murdered in January 1979, supported the ousting o f Anastasio
Somoza Debayle by whatever means.
Chamorro was faced with a failed economy, the need to re-integrate Nicaragua
into the greater world economy and politics, plus find a way to reconcile the deep
divisions in Nicaraguan society. She was faced with addressing the unmet promises o f the
former FSLN governments, and the newest mandate o f the people to find a way toward
economic recovery. In retrospect, her careful and measured approaches to these problems

8Among other decisions aimed at a reconciliation, Chamorro left Humberto
Ortega, brother o f former FSLN President Daniel Ortega, in charge o f the military. This
was a factor that caused the United States pause in resuming economic aid; however, it in
retrospect, had she not undertaken such steps (included in the Transition Protocol), she
may not have had the opportunity to later reduce FSLN domination and the eventual
removal o f Humberto Ortega).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

228

can be counted as successful because they led to a stabilization that Nicaragua had not
seen since before the 1972 earthquake in Managua
Her success was due, in part, to the astuteness o f Dr. Antonio Lacayo, her son-inlaw whom she appointed as Minister o f the Presidency. Lacayo authored a detente with
the FSLN known as the Transition Protocol that left the Nicaraguan Army and police
forces in the hands o f the FSLN This satisfied the FSLN because it left the EPS largely
unchanged with Daniel’s brother, Humberto Ortega Saavedra, still its chief. However, the
agreement also stipulated that its strength be cut in half to 42,000 members.9
Most important, Chamorro survived as the thermidor leader replacing a
revolutionary government She broke the predicted short-term crisis that is theorized by
Crane Brinton in his The Anatomy o f Revolution. Further, she managed to facilitate a
relatively smooth transition to a democratic system o f government and market economy.
Despite her measured steps and pragmatic approach, her unwillingness to directly
challenge the FSLN and its institutions was roundly criticized by the U.S. Congress. This
led to delays in expected foreign aid from the U.S. Government On the flip side, she was
criticized by the FSLN for not carrying out the most needed social and economic reforms
that had been instituted by the FSLN. This error was seen as the most grave, and that
which kept open the door for the FSLN in future elections.10
In 1995, Chamorro was able to remove Humberto Ortega as the Chief o f Military,
and by the end o f her term in 1996 she had managed to re-engage the major sources o f

P lu n k ett, 32.
10Carlos Benevente Gomez, Director, Institutional Advancement and Chief
Economist, Fundacion Augustino C. Sandino - FACS [Augustino C. Sandino Foundation]
in discussions with author, October 2002 and December 2003, Managua.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

229

monetary assistance including the United States as an independent donor and some other
states This was despite President George Bush’s rejection o f her 1992 request for an
infusion o f $70 billion; the rationale being that U.S. law forbade any such transaction with
a state that had confiscated U.S. private or commercial property.11
Chamorro bought into neoliberalism as a solution to Nicaragua’s needs by entering
into an World Bank’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) that was based on
the central tenets o f neoliberalism. (See Chapter II.) The ESAF agreement left Nicaragua
with a lower dollar foreign loan commitment ($7.7 billion), and with longer more
favorable repayment terms. In effect, the ESAF subordinated Nicaragua to the
wishes o f the G8. The first agreement was followed in 1997 by the succeeding President
Enrique Aleman with agreement to its second iteration.12
She took the necessary steps to reduce the public payroll and other public
expenditures. As a consequence, she was bitterly opposed by labor and trade unions.
While she had reduced the public external debt considerably, and restored some
confidence for foreign direct investment, it was at the cost o f reduced living conditions
and increased unemployment.
Chamorro left office with a foreign debt o f $6.6 billion, considerably lower than
the approximately $11 billion (about seven times its gross domestic product at the time)
she inherited from the FSLN.13 However, according to the Augustino Sandino

1Com m only referred to as the Helms-Burton Law.
12Antonio Lacayo Oyanguren.
13Nestor Avendaiio, Nicaragua: Debt Relief/HIPC vs. Poverty (Managua:
Ediciones Educativas, 2003), 3.
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Foundation’s Chief Economist, Carlos Benevente Gomez, she too willingly acquiesced to
pressure from the United States to accelerate economic reform. The result was that under
rapid privatization and rapid restoration o f private banking, Nicaragua could not compete
on its own feet, and the ultimate result was a series o f labor strikes, slowdowns and
company closures that ultimately led to a crises between Chamorro and the National
Assembly.14
Despite reforms, however, she was not able to attract sufficient foreign direct
investment during her tenure. Between 1990 and 1994, Nicaragua attracted only $20
million in FDI (net FDI inflows minus capital taken out by the same foreign investors), and
ultimately failed to get Nicaragua’s economy back on track. By comparison, during the
same year, Costa Rica attracted $222 million during the same period.15
In the beginning, Chamorro was unwilling to acquiesce to all o f the demands o f the
U.S. Government for reform, and not able to overcome the negative consequences o f
foreign investment losses o f the 1980s. Benevente’s comments, and calculation (above)
relate to her finally aligning her policies more fully with the neoliberal imperatives. From
the optic o f the FSLN, her acquiescence to the demands were the primary cause o f the
failure o f the economy to improve as much as it should have during her tenure.
This sentiment by FSLN proponents remains in the craw o f the diehard FSLN
membership, and today, during the Bolanos’ administration, represents domestic
reluctance to proceed further along the neoliberal path. Further, it is the source o f much
criticism o f the Bolanos’ policies while disregarding the terrible state o f the economy left

I4Ibid.
15Benevente, December 2003.
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to Chamorro when she assumed pow er.16 The is especially poignant for Bolanos
supporters who in 2003 attracted S241 million in FD I.17 In any case, the Chamorro
administration failed to quell domestic demands on the government that had been
conditioned by the FSLN during the 1980s.
Her larger and most positive contribution was setting the stage for further
improvement and progress. This included a reconciliation, general movement toward
economic recovery, re-institution o f the Roman Catholic Church’s influence, and a general
“We will be ok ” public sentiment. However, she earned the ire o f many female FSLN
loyals who saw her return to “traditional” values as destroying the gains made by women
during the FSLN period
While the UNO coalition that had formed to support her election began to
deteriorate after the 1990 victory, today, she is viewed with great reverence, and often
referred to with the endearing expression “the lady” (La Dona).

Amoldo Aleman and His Thermidor Role
With reference to Crane Brinton’s The Anatomy o f Revolution, Aleman’s election
in 1996 led to the further breaking o f the “fever” period in which a return to pre
revolution normalcy was the order o f the day. Aleman was an ardent Liberal Party
member who managed to survive the FSLN period. Aleman and his family had been
supporters o f the Somozas.

16An interesting parallel is the resurgence o f support for communism, and the
return o f the old command economy in Russia that emerged during the period o f
adjustment to its market economy system.
l7Ibid.
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In the October 1996 presidential race, Aleman ran on a platform o f (1) honesty in
government, (2) austerity, (3) setting conditions for “real foreign investment,” and (4)
strong subscription to the remedies o f the World Bank, IMF and IADB 18 Much o f his
tactics was based on his unvarnished admiration o f the American way o f life and the
promise o f market systems to save the destitute. He won with a fifty-two percent majority,
the runner-up was Daniel Ortega with thirty-seven percent o f the vote 19 With the election
o f Aleman, he represented a return to pre-FSLN populist politics. As mayor o f Managua,
in the American model o f a big city boss, he slogan was “The mayor who gets things
done.” In point o f fact, and as later revealed by Nicaragua’s press and his own political
enemies, Aleman represented a return to the corrupt crony politics o f the Somozas.
Even though he had been briefly arrested in 1979 by the incoming FSLN
government, Aleman had managed to expand his family’s coffee interests, and work as a
lawyer in Managua during that period. He was elected Mayor o f Managua in the 1990
elections, and built his political base from that office.
Much o f his reform was superficial, but his frequently seen billboards in Managua
advertised him as a populist: “The Mayor Gets Things Done.”20 His constituency,
however, was based in the money elite but also included considerable support from the
city’s slum dwellers due to his “boss” strategy o f distributing favors to the poor in return
for support.

18Benevente
19A very similar result in the October 2001 elections.
20Hazel Plunkett, In Focus Nicaragua (New York: Interlink Books, 2002), 33
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Following his election to the presidency, Aleman asked for a second ESAF round
from the IMF to further reduce economic pressures. He actively courted the international
community for continued assistance, and minimally met the conditions o f the various
programs.
How Aleman operated was not an anathema to the general electorate having been
conditioned to such behavior in the pre-FSLN period. Despite the negatives, on balance,
Aleman was seen as a reasonable step toward post-revolution recovery. In less than two
years in office, however, President Aleman was hard pressed to persuade an increasingly
skeptical popular political base to support him given evidence o f growing cronyism,
corruption in government, his failure to “depoliticize” the national government and relative
failure in encouraging foreign direct investment. In part, this was caused by a collapse in
the world price o f sugar and coffee, both primary export earners for Nicaragua. The
difficult situation was magnified by the major natural disaster o f Hurricane Mitch
With the devastating effect o f Hurricane Mitch that ravaged Nicaragua’s heartland
in late October 1998, the international community turned toward disaster relief, and
forgave any delinquencies in Aleman’s government’s failures to meet the previously
mandated reforms that conditioned relief In effect, Hurricane Mitch, a category five
hurricane and perhaps the worst ever to hit Central America, provided Aleman a respite
that he took advantage o f until the end o f his term in January 2002 when Enrique Geyer
Bolanos assumed the presidency.
In 1999, the Aleman government managed to convince the World Bank that its
situation was dire. The World Bank and IMF forgave eighty percent o f its foreign debt,
and Nicaragua remained on the HIPC list o f most distressed states in the world that it had
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been on since 1996. (See above.) The ESAF negotiated by the Chamorro government was
renamed “Poverty Reduction, and Growth Facility” (PRGF), and required the Aleman
government to come up with a detailed plan o f action to meet certain conditions that
included greater transparency in government, reduction in corruption, structural reforms,
austerity measures and redirection o f its focus to poverty reduction This last requirement
o f the World Bank and IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility was known as the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper o f the Republic
The HIPC plan was modified to accelerate three critical areas: (1) Deeper, and
broader relief, (2) faster relief allowing incremental payments before all conditions were
met, and (3) provide for a stronger link between debt relief, and poverty reduction, e.g. to
directly channel freed resources to support poverty relief.21
While the Aleman government had managed to arrange for international relief, his
own political habits were increasingly apparent including cronyism and outright
corruption. He had lost all but the most hard-core members o f the Liberal Party, and his
vice-president, Enrique Bolanos was distancing himself politically as quickly as possible
because he had ambitions o f his own. This was all despite a favorable World Bank and
IMF report that “The debt relief program . . . is the result o f steadfast pursuit o f sound
macroeconomic policies, and structural reforms.” [World Bank President James D.
Wolfenson], and “ . . . important is the government’s strong ownership o f its economic

21World Bank. “World Bank and IMF Support US$4.5 Billion in Debt Service
Relief for Nicaragua.”
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program, and its commitment to preserving stable macroeconomic conditions . . .” (IMF
Deputy Managing Director Agustin Carstens)22
Aleman’s corruption was the (not unexpected) “reward” for public office inside
Nicaragua. However, it was not acceptable behavior for would-be foreign investors
foreign governments, and IGO guarantors o f a stable and productive economy. This serves
to explain why there was such an uproar in m id-1998 when Aleman entered into a pact

(pacto) with Daniel Ortega, his former sworn enemy, to deny control o f the National
Assembly to anyone who might defeat Ortega in the upcoming November 2001 national
elections.
Through their combined support in the National Assembly under the “pacto,” the
two parties managed to make Aleman the President o f the National Assembly23 after his
stepping down as president, make Ortega his would-be successor as the President o f
Nicaragua, and provide protection from prosecution for any corruption charges for
Aleman brought by the next government-especially if Ortega were to lose.24

22Ibid.
23The Political Constitution o f Nicaragua provides immunity from prosecution for
members o f the National Assembly, and also stipulates that a seat will be reserved for the
immediate past president and runner-up in the most recent presidential election.
24It later developed that the “pacto" went far beyond what was initially apparent.
Because most o f the judges, and justices had been appointed by the previous FSLN
government, the “pacto" controlled all but the most blatant cases; it failed to intimidate or
dissuade Bolanos from successfully prosecuting Aleman for corruption. The “pacto" has
been durable, and manifested itself in the late 2004 maneuver to take appoint powers away
from the executive branch. Further, it has effectively handcuffed the Bolanos
administration for any legislation that it sees as either prejudicial to the pacto or
strengthening Bolanos. By February 2005, the “pacto" through its control o f the National
Assembly has de facto encouraged the teachers’ strike that is heavily dominated by FSLN
supporters
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By 1998, O rtega’s support was more as a personality than as the leader o f the
FSLN even though he still controlled i t 25 In addition to the pact with Ortega, Aleman was
busy empowering Cardinal Obando y Bravo, and reopening avenues o f influence that
included a “free ticket” to re-establish the Catholic radio network in Nicaragua Aleman’s
strategy was not unlike that o f the Somoza dynasty, a system o f mutually supporting deal
making
The legacy o f Aleman is dubious. He still controls the Constitutionalist Liberal
Party (PLC) from the confinement o f his country estate (El Chile), even though he was
convicted o f major embezzlement and corruption under his successor’s government
despite the firm FSLN control o f the judiciary Other actions o f his successor, Enrique
Bolanos, include the late 2002 closing o f the “illegal” Catholic radio network that Aleman
had arranged. This was much to the chagrin o f Obando y Bravo. Populist Aleman left
Bolanos a foreign debt o f $6.6 billion (despite substantial assistance from the international
community), very little progress in the war on poverty, an unmanageable National
Assembly, a questionable FSLN-sworn judiciary, many unkept promises to the
international community and a restless organized labor that still holds on to the promises
o f the FSLN. Perversely, Aleman’s poor performance was and is somehow forgotten
today, and the “pacto” with the FSLN, while weakened with time, further insulates him
from culpability.

25Envio, “Three Celebrations, and a Host o f Scenarios.” Volume 22, number 265.
Envio. (Managua: Universidad Centroamericana, August 2003), 2. Bayardo Arce (FSLN
Directorate) in discussion with author in June 1998; Arce at that time was running the
day-to-day operations o f the FSLN.
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Enrique Bolanos - Progress or Stagnation?
Enrique Bolanos ran under the PLC ticket but with the support o f the coalition
party known as the Liberal Unity Movement (Movimiento de Unidad Liberal - MUL). He
again defeated the perennial FSLN candidate, Daniel Ortega, by roughly the same margin,
fifty two percent to thirty nine percent with which Aleman had won with in the
previous national election. The MUL was made up o f six liberal parties; today the core
PLC, the largest o f the liberal parties, is still in the hands o f Aleman.
Bolanos has an intangible quality, not unlike that o f Violeta Barrios de Chamorro,
o f seeming grand-fatherly (or grand-motherly) that is ingratiating and inspires trust. This
enables him to implement policy that would otherwise be difficult to carry out. This
characteristic, while difficult to fathom in the Anglo world, fits neatly in the Nicaraguan
culture. Likewise, his septuagenarian status spells little long-term political threat to wouldbe adversaries except that his unbridled enthusiasm for reform has mobilized the “pacto "
Bolanos’ greatest appeal is his elderly and respected position in the business community o f
Nicaragua, and his advanced age that guaranteed that he would have little further political
ambition for himself.26 However, despite his platform consisting o f the same reforms
promised by Aleman plus a transition from a corrupt system o f government to a
technocracy, he has lost support. This is due, in part to the PLC’s condemnation o f him
shortly after his taking office, the “pacto” and the incessant criticism from his own
Minister o f the Treasury Eduardo Montealegre, M ontealegre’s attacks, while politically
motivated, are centered on Bolanos’ house cleaning and strict compliance with the

26The Nicaraguan Constitution does not, and has not allowed a president to
succeed himself or herself in office.
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conditions set by the World Bank, IMF and IADB in its bid to recover from its own
economic crisis
In the eyes o f the public, Bolanos is not an innocent bystander o f earlier
transgressions. He was Aleman’s vice-president, and could not have missed the most
blatant abuses o f that administration. Further, he was party to the deal making between
Ortega and Aleman and creation o f the “pacto" to retain and alternate political pow er in
Nicaragua between the FSLN and the Liberal Party.
In part, Bolanos has lost support from the general electorate because o f his closing
the Church’s radio station that had been put back on the air by Aleman. During the

19

July 2003 commemoration o f the 1979 FSLN victory in Managua, Cardinal Obando y
Bravo’s personal envoy to the event, Vicar o f the Managua Archdiocese Eddy
Montenegro, was on the platform with FSLN founder Tomas Borge and other FSLN
functionaries all wearing commemorative t-shirts with the picture o f Christ in profile.
Montenegro offered a prayer: “We ask you, O Lord, that we Nicaraguans, reconciled, and
embracing each other in peace, may build the future, forgetting the past, and looking
toward the present.”27 Such an act by a high Church official does not go unnoticed by the
general electorate, and provides further evidence that the Church will undertake political
projects as its sees fit.
In August 2003, Bolanos’ Vice President, Jose Rizo, tried to unseat Bolanos
during a visit o f Bolanos to the Dominican Republic by calling for a “national dialogue.”
Just after Bolanos’ departure, Rizo invited all Nicaraguan Catholic bishops, the FSLN as
well as the PLC leadership to participate in the only slightly veiled coup attempt.

21Envio, “Three Celebrations,” 4.
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However, Rizo’s plan was foiled because Daniel Ortega leaked the information to Bolanos
who immediately put a stop to it.28 The convention was to have been addressed by none
other than former President Aleman through a recorded message made from his exile in his
country estate.29
While none o f this political intrigue would be particularly surprising to most
Nicaraguans or Nicaragua observers, it does not speak well for political stability necessary
to carry out reforms that will lead to recovery. The trait can be included among the many
domestic independent variables that help shape Nicaragua’s situation today and predict its
recovery.
What is most important in the context o f neoliberalism and how Nicaragua’s
economic success or failure play out is that the three Nicaraguan presidents beginning in
1990 all danced to the tune o f the piper. No would-be national leader can reasonably
propose an alternative to the neoliberal solution over which Nicaragua has little or no
control.
In Cham orro’s case, it was a necessary evil, and part o f the reconciliation process
that she make changes in measuredsteps to retain sufficient power to effect meaningful
change. This included necessary external financial support. In her cautious strategy, she
was not ready to embrace the neoliberal rubric, but did so gradually; her greater role was
in providing a transition and reconciliation.

28It would seem that Ortega is loyal only to his own ambitions. M ost o f the FSLN
leadership has abandoned the party, and O rtega’s pact with the PLC and Aleman is only
good until the results o f the next national election in which he will probably run again.
Ortega likely reasoned that he would have to share the credit (or blame) for a successful
coup against Bolanos thereby making it far more difficult at a run for the presidency.
29Ibid.
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In Aleman’s case, it was a question o f pragmatic politics, and at least nominally
agreeing to the neoliberal agenda In fact, Aleman was the first o f the three presidents to
meet the requirements o f the World Bank and IMF for “promotion” to HIPC status. The
electorate knew what they were getting with Aleman, but also knew that he had the
reputation for delivering results.
In the case o f Bolanos, the expectation was that he would follow in Aleman’s
footsteps but with greater integrity. He represented the old oligarchy but was trusted
because o f his business acumen, his advanced age (no further political ambition) and the
expectation that he would be able to follow up on Aleman’s HIPC success. While this
developed to be accurate, it is also true that Bolanos has been victimized by his own HIPC
successes, his stubbornness or lack o f political acumen, and the exaggerated expectations
o f the people. This is the fodder for Daniel Ortega that keeps him in the running for the
next presidential election.30 Further, it has developed that while Bolanos is business savvy
he is not as skillful as a politician. His previous PLC support lost to the “pacto” between
the FSLN and the PLC has effectively guaranteed that his dedazo candidate will not win
the upcoming presidential election.
What is certain is that the same domestic independent variables are in play, and any
adjustments that might occur will be evolutionary in nature but not because o f the will o f
the people to suddenly find themselves in good condition or the demands o f the

30While Daniel Ortega is recognized as the senior Sandinista Front person, the dayto-day operations are left to his number two. Bayardo Arce Castano. Arce enjoys the
prestige o f the responsibility and serves as the Front’s spokesperson while Ortega carries
out the Front’s political agenda. The Sandinista Front still owns a number o f businesses
that include the powerful television Canal Dos through which the Front keeps up its
supporting constituency’s interest and information. Arce, in turn, benefits from income
from the various Front’s businesses.
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international community. Rather, any transition, however slow, will be conditioned always
by Nicaragua’s history.
As the neoliberal programs continue to be adopted and structural adjustments are
made internally, the pace continues to be too slow to meaningfully alleviate the extreme
social, political and economic disparity in Nicaragua. As earlier noted, at the current rate,
it will take at least fifteen more years to cut the poverty rate in half.
By any measure, that is unsatisfactory Such lack o f progress provides fodder for
O rtega’s continuing efforts to gain power once again. Presuming that his motives are at
least as altruistic as they are his personal ambition, if he succeeds in winning the next
presidential election in November 2006, he will take his place in another thermidor role,
not a revolutionary role.
The reasons are readily apparent. Ortega will not have the support o f the Soviet
Union nor its surrogate states such as Cuba. Rather, he will be faced with making peace
with the “new” world economic reality and use the FSLN revolutionary period judicially
lest he suddenly find himself in a self-made quagmire o f popular support with no means to
carry out his agenda. At the same time, his legitimacy as an FSLN leader is being
challenged by Dora Maria Tellez, President o f the Movimiento Renovador Sandinista
(Sandinista Renewal Movement), who is in alliance with Alternativa Cristiana (Christian
Alternative) and the Movimiento por el Rescate del Sandinismo (Movement for the
Rescue o f Sandinista), and supports Herty Lewites, Mayor o f Managua, as a presidential
candidate in the next presidential election.31

31Dora Maria Tellez, “La alianza en tom o a Herty Lewites es una oportunidad
unica, un capital que no podemos desperdiciar” (The alliance with Herty Lewite’s turn is a
unique opportunity, capital that we should not waste), Envio, No. 265, December 2005
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The important domestic domestic independent variables addressed in the next
chapter are those forces that must be addressed. The historic conditioning o f the people
is, in part, an impediment but those four most important variables driven by the realities o f
today must be dealt with by Nicaraguan leadership.

(Managua: Universidad Centroamericana, December 2005) Available
[Online]:http://www envio.org.ni/quienes_somos.es [9 December 2005],
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CHAPTER V

DOMESTIC VARIABLES AND NEOLIBERALISM

The selected domestic independent variables-the Roman Catholic Church,
organized labor, the business community and its instruments, and civil society with the
long-term effects o f the FSLN revolution-and their effect on the progress o f Nicaragua in
adopting neoliberalism are presented below. As with the external independent variables
(the constancy o f G8/Paris Club instruments o f power to revive Nicaragua’s economy and
institute reforms), domestic independent variables can be seen both in combination and
acting individually to impede or facilitate the transition. This chapter provides a detailed
look at the p o st-1990 situation, provides further explanation as to why external variables
are held constant, provides a pessimistic but objective view o f a prominent Nicaraguan
economist, presents a short history to summarize the conditioning o f the Nicaraguan
people, and treats each selected domestic independent variable in the context o f its current
effect on the adoption o f neoliberalism.
The ordering o f the selected variables is somewhat subjective but clearly the
Roman Catholic Church in Nicaragua is and has been the most enduring institution. The
Church was closely identified with its partner in the colonization o f most o f Latin America
serving as a tool o f the Spanish crown to subjugate indigenous people, later served a
similar role with post-independence rulers, after 1968 took on a more secular role to help
the poor and, finally, can be seen in its traditional role o f supporting those in power while
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simultaneously taking on a more secular role under Liberation Theology to empower the
poorest o f the society.
The next most important domestic independent variable is seen as organized labor
which first became a political entity during the early 20(h Century, and since become more
politically potent because o f its new-found sense o f empowerment learned during the
FSLN period. Because labor and labor organizations make up the vast majority o f the
population, their potential influence in the political process can be seen as potent and a
source o f a new social revolution. This is especially so because the neoliberal agenda
adopted since 1990 has required sacrifices from labor yet has not fulfilled its promises o f
raising the standard o f living and decreasing economic disparity.
The business community in Nicaragua is seen as an important force because it has
a great deal o f influence on the day-to-day conduct o f the domestic economy, has chosen
to or become involved in national politics and has chosen to adopt the neoliberal rubric as
a long-term solution. The business community, while currently aligned with President
Bolanos, should be seen as a force in its own right independent o f political parties. It has
the potential to become disenchanted with the neoliberal agenda o f President Bolanos, and
attach itself to another political force as it did with the FSLN just before the July 1979
Triumph. Recent events has demonstrated such disenchantment using its control o f the
media to attack Bolanos’ administration.
The most elusive to define but perhaps the most important domestic variable is the
collective civil society in Nicaragua. While Somoza dynasty strategy was to silence
dissenting voices by ignoring civil society as a whole, operate Nicaragua as a corporate
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state and refine crony capitalism to a high art form, the FSLN was able to take advantage
o f the vacuum left by Anastasio Somoza Debayle.
President Bolanos’ problems are due in part to the FSLN’s having unleashed civil
society as a whole. Civil society as an organized activity can be traced in the modern
historical context first to the mid-1970s support o f the Nicaraguan bourgeois that had
been ignored the Somozas, and to the early post-Revolutionary organization o f society.
Almost immediately after the Triumph, the FSLN organized what little o f what was left o f
civil society into a form o f Cuban-style neighborhood watch committees. The newly
formed Committees for the Defense o f the Revolution (CDSs) was really a hybrid form o f
the Cuban system. The CDS system served to extend the FSLN’s influence to every level
o f society by using the system to (1) distribute food and other goods, (2) provide a grass
roots compliance system for the revolution, (3) serve as an administrative arm o f the
government for low-level governance, (4) organize work projects, and (5) provide a sense
o f security for the people. In sum, while the central purpose was to retain control o f the
people, the positive aspect was that the CDS system gave a sense o f empowerment to the
people that the Somozas had never allowed. The CDS system, known as a “mass
organization” in Marxist terminology, also served to insure that the bourgeois would not
have opportunity to undermine the revolution. The bourgeoisie that had turned away from
Somoza in favor o f the FSLN revolution felt betrayed by such a system and later, using
the COSEP as its voice, protested to the government that the CDS system (1) had only
vague but too often abused powers, (2) impeded free enterprise under the mixed-model
system, (3) marginalized the private sector, (4) was a burdensome and inefficient extension
o f the official government bureaucracy, and (5) betrayed the original program o f the
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original revolution.1 Despite the these protestations and until the 1990 election, the CDS
system was a vital instrumental in creating a sense o f civil society and eventually led to the
creation o f the Coordinadora Civil2 in 1998, well after the FSLN had lost twice its bid for
control o f the presidency. Thus, President Bolanos is faced with growing discontent due
to he slow economic recover, the “pacto” majority in the National Assembly and the
political force o f Coordinadora Civil.
President Bolanos, in following the neoliberal path, has made a calculation that he
can maintain civil order while making meaningful changes in the social fabric o f Nicaragua.
His calculation depends on his ability to manage the domestic independent variables
sufficiently to allow real progress toward a long-term solution despite active resistance
and lack o f real economic progress.
Those variables, conditioned by Nicaragua’s history and Nicaraguan’s attitudes
vis-a-vis expectations developed during the FSLN period, are further conditioned by the
long-term acquiescence to the self-enriching Somoza dynasty, longer-term conditioning to
corruption, and a relatively brief period o f a radically different political and economic
system under the FSLN.

External Variables Held as Constant
It is clear that the external independent variables are important; however, for the
purposes o f this work, they are held as constant. The reasons are many. The mix o f

‘Vilas, The Sandinista Revolution, 148-149.
2Coordinadora Civil organization web site. Available [Online] :http://w w w .
ccer.org.ni [15 October 2005],
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external actors is complex and all actors have motives whether altruistic or pragmatic. In
any case, the international institutions most heavily influenced by the United States, and
even those more neutral IGOs such as the United Nations3 are committed to the full
recovery o f Nicaragua. The European Union as an independent actor, and its individual
member states are also committed to the recovery. Nicaragua has an inordinate number o f
NGOs in place to facilitate a recovery and attend to the general welfare o f the people.4
Some home-grown NGOs exist, but most are either foreign or foreign-funded
organizations A common variation is a locally organized NGO that has international ties
and outside funding support.5
It was at the 1999 meeting o f the Paris Club6 in Cologne, Germany where the high
foreign debt burdens o f the w orld’s poorest states were addressed. At that conference the

3United Nations. Meeting the Millennium Poverty Reduction Goals in Ixitin
America, and the Caribbean. (Santiago, Chile: United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America, and the Caribbean, December 2002).
4While not a subject o f this work, there is a body o f thought, and literature that
holds that NGO actors impede underdeveloped or developing states from the natural
processes o f adjustment to the post-Cold War environment. The high number o f NGOs
operating in Nicaragua (mentioned earlier) can be anecdotally observed on the streets o f
Nicaragua where a large number o f vehicles with NGO logos on their sides can be seen.
Most prominently seen are UNESCO, European Union, and many local NGO vehicles.
5One o f the best respected domestic NGOs is the Grupo Civica Transparencia
Etica (Civil Group o f Transparency and Ethics). This independent NGO monitors
elections, reports on government corruption, and generally monitors any political or
governmental irregularities in Nicaragua. In a recent report, the NGO revealed that the
public perception o f corruption in Nicaragua, Nicaragua placed 97th o f the 146 states
studies. (First position is best, 146 is w orst.) The GCET is a chapter o f Transparency
International. Available [Online]: http://www.transparency, org/tilac/indices/indices
_percepcion/2004/ipc2004_nicaragua.pdf. [22 July 2005],
6Club de Paris Cologne Terms. Available [Online]: http://www.clubdeparis.
org/en/presentation/ presentation. php?BATCH=B02WP07> [13 November 2004],
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decision was taken that Nicaragua’s foreign debt would be reduced by 90 percent;
however, the cut-off date was set at 31 October 1988-just fifteen months before the
Nicaraguan people rejected the FSLN and voted in President Violeta Chamorro who
would begin the shift toward a market economy. After the cut-off date, all foreign debt
would be restructured at very concessionary rates.7 That decision was the starting point
for the Chamorro government that negotiated a further cancellation o f more than $ 11
billion in foreign debt. But despite Cham orro’s success and the questionable acts o f
Aleman Nicaragua, as o f late 2003, still had an outstanding debt o f $2.4 billion—an almost
impossible obstacle for the Bolanos government.8
The creditor states have taken extraordinary steps, and made tangible
commitments to the recovery o f Nicaragua while tying such efforts to poverty reduction
and permanent infrastructure changes that had to be met before implementation. The
Bolanos government has been required to submit to a great deal o f scrutiny, and come up
with what are known as the National Development Plan and its own Poverty Reduction
Strategy Facility (PRSF). The mandate o f the Paris Club was that Nicaragua use the relief
from foreign debt to fund poverty reduction with the long-term aim that would allow it to
reach a stage o f internal self-regeneration and economic independence. In order to further
stimulate Nicaragua’s chances to meet the conditions, the Paris Club further pardoned
$215 million in due interest payments on foreign debtthat was not included in the Paris
Club Highly Indebted Poor Countries debt relief plan.9

7Avendano, “Where is the State’s Role in the National Development Plan,” 22.
8Ibid., 23.
9Ibid., The Paris Club plan forgave the principal, but not the interest on foreign
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In a press release on 4 March 2004 the Paris Club announced that Nicaragua had
meet the conditions o f the second iteration HIPC plan taking note that it welcomed
“Nicaragua’s determination to implement a broad-based, and sound economic program
which should provide the basis for sustainable economic growth, and comprehensive
poverty reduction.” 10 The press release included language that was as much instructional
as hopeful that Nicaragua would use the debt relief to carry out the debt relief program
package that it had submitted to the Paris Club as a condition o f approval.
The commitment and actions o f the international community to Nicaragua’s
recovery as a factor in the likelihood o f a full recovery for Nicaragua is beyond question,
and has been unwavering in both commitment and carrying out agreements.11 Again, the
external independent variables when held as constant leave only the domestic independent
variables to consider. Not to be overlooked, however, is the experience and history o f
Nicaragua that influence those critical independent internal variables.

Determinants Driven by History
It is impossible to ignore the cynicism o f one o f the most highly respected
Nicaraguan economists. Nestor Avendano, United States-educated at Notre Dame,

debt. Strong anti-neoliberal champions would see such actions as a tactic to keep the
South states subordinated to the North states; such a view further strengthens the
argument that neocolonialism is little different than old-fashioned colonialism.
10“The Paris Club Agrees to Reduce Nicaragua’s Debt by US$902 Million in Net
Present Value Under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative,” Available [Online]: www
clubdeparis.org [5 March 2004],
"W ithout consideration o f the events o f the past few years in which Venezuela an
Bolivia has adopted socialist government that are antithetical to the underlying tenets o f
neoliberalism, Nicaragua seems committed to the a democratic and capitalistic system.
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expressed doubt before the approval o f the PRSF that Nicaragua would or could keep its
commitments. He cited that Nicaragua did not have a published national budget, had only
minimal transparency in its budget process, and had, for 2004, only allocated $120 million
o f the $200 million previously forgiven to poverty reduction. Further, he boldly stated that
he expects business as usual under the administration o f President Bolanos who
campaigned on a commitment to reforms. Avendano predicted that the $80 million missing
balance that should have been committed to poverty reduction programs would be
earmarked for Nicaragua’s wealthiest and private bankers.12 He further criticized the
Bolanos administration for not actively participating in the drawing up o f the overall plans
noting that the National Development Plan was “formulated, and drafted without
consulting the country’s main economic agents, the national producers. . . Nor does any
important political force claim familiarity with the plan.” 13
Avendano posits that the internal variables are the most critical. His predictions o f
ultimate failure o f the Bolanos’ administration are really observations that can be made o f
previous administrations. They include (1) lack o f transparency in government operations,
(2) “business as usual” attitudes o f the government, (3) failure to consult civil society in
planning (including labor), (4) failure to garner popular support or recognition o f that
need, and (5) ignoring the internal business, and industry sectors. These observations are
from his optic as an economist but include socio-political habits that pervade
What he did not address were other factors that may be too close to his
understanding o f the problem such as the role o f the Roman Catholic Church in

12Ib id , 24.
13Ibid., 25.
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Nicaragua, the long-term political corruption or even the conditioning that took place
during the FSLN period. In any case, he makes it clear that the critical independent
variables are far more internal than external in nature.
While Avendano’s predictions and criticisms would be o f little surprise to most
Nicaraguans, it should also not be a surprise to the decision makers in the Paris Club who
must have taken a certain degree o f such behavior into account, even while dictating terms
for agreement. Despite that, in the overall scheme, the international creditor community
extend out to more than 50 years.
Even though the external independent variables are held as constant, given the
depth o f the commitments o f the various external actors, there is no assurance that such
commitments translate into success in Nicaragua unless the internal variables are aligned in
concert with those commitments even over the long term
Avendano notes that while the G8 states that have the greatest stake in
Nicaragua’s future use the term empowerment to signal the participation o f civil society in
the process, that does not guarantee that it will happen, or even avoid a full return to old
self-destructive habits.
The least tangible, and most vulnerable to misunderstanding by the G8 states are
those very same key internal domestic variables. They are most difficult to change because
they require fundamental changes in the culture o f the society that has been conditioned
over time by the very different attitude and actions o f the outside world before 1990 that
saw third-tier states including Nicaragua in a subordinate neocolonial role.14

14N estor Avendano.
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While the effect o f pervasive corruption throughout government and civil society
as a whole is difficult to calculate accurately in terms o f how it affects potential for
recovery in Nicaragua, it is a subject that must be treated as a common element in all o f
the domestic independent variables. Unquestionably, Nicaraguans have some sensitivity to
the issue, and this has shown up in an overt way since the 1979 FSLN Triumph.
The increasing sense o f the Nicaraguan people in the early 1970s was that the
Somoza dynasty was, in fact, a fascist system characterized by corporatism. “ Such regimes
could

. . promote themselves as long-term solutions to the problems o f political order,

and as the best possible modes o f governance for their societies. . . . [and] achievement o f
. . . economic development.” 15
The Somoza dynasty while engaging in systematic self enrichment with a certain
amount o f political obsequiousness directed at the United States, sought to remain in
power and maintain international legitimacy while promoting a facade as protector o f the
Nicaraguan people. Because Nicaragua enjoyed periods o f prosperity relative to other
Central American states during the Somoza period, the Somozas were able to retain
sufficient popular support. This was so until the FSLN began to consolidate support from
abused peasants, and (later) from the emerging disenchanted middle class, and business
community.
With its corrupt practices, the Somoza dynasty coopted labor and labor unions, the
Roman Catholic Church hierarchy, various sectors o f civil society including the monied
oligarchy, and emerging middle class. While such practices were carried out under the

15Guillermo O ’Donnell, and Phillipe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule - Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986), 15.
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nominal goals o f economic development and social welfare, corruption and greed were the
lubricants. This is not to say that there exists anywhere a purely altruistic and non-corrupt
system, but that the Nicaraguan experience is far more riddled with corruption is
important to this discussion
According to Transparency International - Coalition Against Corruption 2004
report, Nicaragua ranks with Algeria, Lebanon, Macedonia (Federal Yugoslav Republic),
and Serbia Montenegro, and below Russia, India, Gambia, and Tanzania in corruption.16
The evaluation is based on self perceptions o f N icaraguans- largely those o f public
officials and politicians. While such an evaluation would seem alarming to a naive citizen
o f a first-world state, the real meaning is in the pervasiveness o f such perceptions and the
actual practices.
The Somoza dynasty exercised many forms o f corruption-money, and/or political
favors to groups that entitled them to participation in corruption, and graft at the expense
o f the general population. It accumulated a veritable fortune between the mid-1930s and
1979 that consisted largely o f cattle, gold mines, sugar and coffee enterprises as well as
shipping; they managed public policy to favor those enterprises. It is generally believed
that the Somozas, by the end o f the dynasty, owned or controlled more than twenty-five
percent o f all land in Nicaragua, and estimated in value between $550 and $900 million at
the time o f the Sandinista Revolution.17

^Transparency International, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions

Index 2004, 5.
I7Vilas, The Sandinista Revolution, 87.
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The control o f the family fortune, shared by its various members, was managed
through its domination o f the Liberal Party and command o f the National Guard, not to
mention the acquiescence o f the United States that implicitly enforced their domination.
An example o f family sharing was the appointment o f Luis Manuel Debayle, Anastasio
Somoza Debayle’s uncle, as the Director o f the Nicaraguan National Energy Agency. In
that position, is was alleged that he stole more than $30 million.18
When threatened, the Somozas were typically adept at maneuvering the set pieces
to further enrich themselves while thwarting off any political or economic
competition. An early example o f such efforts was the considerable political threat
o f Conservative Party oligarch Emiliano Chamorro. In April 1950, Anastasio
Somoza Garcia ensured the survival o f the Somoza dynasty through an agreement
known as the “Generals’ Pact” that, in short, exchanged the very real threat for
Conservative presence in the National Legislature, and some key positions in the
national government. In effect, Somoza exchanged a share o f the state’s wealth to
eliminate the Conservative threat by giving the Conservative forces a place in the
system o f corruption.19
Luis Somoza Debayle managed later follow-on maneuvering to avoid outright
political confrontation that occurred after the murder o f his father, Anastasio Somoza
Garcia. While the younger son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, held the reigns o f the National
Guard, Luis put forth a puppet candidate for the presidency in his nomination by the
Liberal Party (PLC)in early 1963 o f Rene Schick who was a close family confidant. This
followed a five-year economic slump and political unrest in the PLC as well as an
increasing Conservative Party threat. Luis Somoza, who had imposed martial law after his
father’s murder, in the face o f the unrest just before the presidential elections in November
1963, reinstated rights including that o f free press. This strategy is well known to

18Thomas W. Walker, Nicaragua - Living in the Shadow o f the Eagle, 143.
19Vilas, The Sandinista Revolution, 86.
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Nicaraguans; Luis Somoza Debayle’s true motives are unknown but certainly followed the
pattern o f manipulation.
Luis Somoza, in the face o f potentially damaging dock worker strikes at the port
o f Corinto, sponsored a minimum wage reform demanded by organized labor. Luis
Somoza, and the PLC softened its political rhetoric in the face o f expected demands o f
newly elected John F. Kennedy. Luis Somoza promised and carried out other reforms.
Rene Schick was elected President o f the Republic, and began to carry out
surprisingly true reforms; had he not died o f a heart ailment during his administration more
reforms beyond those approved by the Somozas may have been carried out. In any case,
the entire period illustrates the manipulation o f the Somozas who stood behind the scenes
with both political favors that included graft manipulation rights plus military power.
The FSLN leadership itself was seen as corrupt by some, and this was especially
reinforced by accusations by anti-FSLN political forces in 1990 that on leaving power they
helped themselves to a pinata (golden parachute) through transfer o f public state holding
to their private hands. (See earlier discussion.) Even today, it is widely held that stillactive FSLN officials are still benefitting from their terms in office. Two o f the founding
members o f the FSLN, Borges and E. Cardenal abandoned the FSLN and only Bayardo
Arce remains in charge o f the residual organization from that period. In a 16 May 2005
La Prensa news article, the newspaper blasted Arce “Bayardo Arce Castano, . . . director
o f the Sandinista Popular Revolution, enemy o f the bourgeoises, is today a “bourgeois
[actor]” who managed a group o f companies with millions in assets. . . after the 1990
electoral defeat, Arce claimed ownership o f FSLN partrimony [assets] o f the FSLN. The
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“patrimoney” was to survive political forces.”20 The article cites a newspaper investigation
that revealed that the FSLN under the management o f Arce owns and operates 44
businesses, many o f which originated under the FSLN administration and some which are
derived from those original businesses. Further, two o f the remaining original FSLN
directorate, Sergio Ramirez Mercado (vice president during the FSLN period and Henry
Ruiz (member o f the FSLN National Directorate), have publically admitted to the post1990 ownership and management o f former state properties that the FSLN acquired
during its period in office.
There was little doubt in the minds o f the electorate that President Aleman who
followed her in office would resume such practices. Enrique Bolanos, who succeeded
Aleman, was seen as not corrupt, at least to the extreme o f Aleman’s practices, because he
presented himself as a reformer, and, in any case, was already a wealthy retired
businessman. However, he became painted with the same brush as Aleman while trying to
carry out his reform programs.
Enrique Bolanos’ 2000 campaign platform included cleaning up government
corruption. The plank was much a political move as a step in the clean-up process, and it
illustrates at least the recognition that corruption in government is a problem that stands in
the way o f the neoliberal project o f the Bolanos regime.
The boldest step that President Bolanos took was to carry out his threat to
prosecute former President Amoldo Aleman for corruption and graft. Aleman engaged in

20Jorge Loasiga Mayorga, “ Sombra de Bayardo Arce Tras Fastuosa Edificio
(Shadow o f Bayardo Arce over pompous building)” (Managua: La Prensa, 16 May 2005).
Available [Online]:http ://www. laprensa.com. nic/ archivo/2005/mayo/16/nacionales/
nacionales [5 November 2005],
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practices not unlike the Somozas had. When mayor o f Managua before his election to the
presidency, he was well known for his practices but he was also very popular among for
his well-publicized “The Mayor G et’s Things Done” slogan that focused on public works
projects in the city (See complete discussion in Chapter IV.)
The tipping point that committed the Bolanos administration to initiate Aleman’s
indictment occurred on 10 September 2002 when the criminal court judge, Juana Mendez,
installed by former President Daniel O rtega,21 allegedly mishandled the case against
businessman Byron Jerez, an Aleman confederate in graft, such that he could not be
prosecuted. Aleman enlisted the aid o f the Church to avoid any punishment o f Jerez;
Bishop Mata sent a letter to the judge asking for house arrest instead o f jail time because
Jerez’ adolescent son was confined to a wheelchair. She granted the request.22
There was considerable domestic political angst as President Bolanos carried out
his promise to prosecute Aleman. Aleman was, and is popular because he presided over
the period between 1999 and 2001 o f modest economic growth and a slight reduction in
poverty; those improvements were largely due to the foreign aid that appeared after the

21While not detailed in this work, it is o f record that the FSLN carried out its
commitment to women in including them in government. Nowhere is this seen more
vividly today than in the court system where female judges are serving still their long-term
judgeships created during the FSLN period. It is a reasonable argument that the FSLN still
holds residual power in the Nicaragua judiciary, and the relatively light sentence handed
down in the Aleman corruption case is reflected by this fact.
22“A Prolonged Duel Between Legitimacy, and Legality,” Envio (Managua:
University o f Central America, September 2002), 1-5. This event is as good an
illustration o f complicity between the Church, and corrupt politicians at least in the
political sensibilities o f most Western democracies.
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destruction o f Hurricane Mitch in 1998 Most o f the growth disappeared by early 2000,23
but Aleman remained quite popular with the general electorate.
Because o f the “pacto” between Sandinistas, and the PLC, it was difficult to
prosecute Aleman because the FSLN-dominated judiciary and the FSLN/PLC pacto that
controlled the National Assembly. The PLC, devoted to Aleman’s cause, tried to weaken
the 2000 electoral law reforms. Earlier, Aleman had been hiding behind the Constitution’s
provision that a legislator in the National Assembly could not be prosecuted during the
tenure o f office. Aleman, as leader o f the PLC, had been the President o f the National
Assembly after Bolanos’ election.
When President Bolanos made the elimination o f corruption in government a
central plank in his campaign, the altruistic pledge was met with general agreement but
without expectation that it would be carried out. The sagacious Bolanos surprised
Nicaraguans by symbolically carrying out the pledge that culminated in Aleman’s
conviction for corruption on 7 November 2003
The conviction was met with general approbation that included comments by
Miguel D ’Escoto, former FSLN Foreign Minister, who remarked, “The immense majority
o f people believe this is a good thing. How can you run a country if you only apply the law
to some people?”24 The applause was short lived as Bolanos instituted austerity measures
to meeting the conditions o f the international community. Given the most recent

23Ibid., 6.
24Mary Jordan, “Nicaraguan Leader Hails Conviction o f Predecessor,” The
Washington Post (Washington, D C.: The Washington Post Company, 9 November 2003).
Available [Online]:http://www.Washington post.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A47372-2003Dec8?>[25
December 2004],
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developments, Bolanos slipping power points tow ard a more pervasive attitude about that
acceptance o f corruption and graft. It would seem that while most subscribe to
higher standards, they are also just as eager to support a public figure who they know
does not but may otherwise bring them some modicum o f comfort.
While D ’Escoto could have been seen as betraying the FSLN/PLC “pacto" his
statement was probably more reflective o f an ulterior motive, and the fact that he had
begun to distance himself from the FSLN that was becoming more a private project o f
Daniel Ortega. President Bolanos was especially laudatory about the Nicaraguan high
court’s decision with a statement that revealed his determination to carry out the campaign
commitment
As the FSLN saw Aleman’s position weaken, it shifted slightly by entering into
dialogue with President Bolanos. However, the “pacto" remained intact but not so strong
as to fight off Bolanos determination to prosecute Aleman. As a concession, the
incarceration penalty was reduced to no more than house arrest at his luxurious country
estate, El Chile.
The long, and short o f the history o f corruption, graft, collusion and other forms in
Nicaragua appears today as “business as usual” despite the public admissions o f political
and church officials The permeation o f such practices, and the conditioning o f the people
is such that their level o f cynicism is so off the scale that it interferes with the neoliberal
agenda. Above all, the neoliberal agenda demands transparency in government, and
elimination o f corruption. D ’Escoto commented further, “Never has something like this
happened in Nicaragua,” . . . commenting on a judge’s verdict that Aleman was guilty o f
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money laundering, embezzlement, and other crimes. “The frying o f the Big Fish . . . helps
give the country high hopes ”25
Despite the most altruistic motives o f President Bolanos, and his efforts to change
the national government to make it more transparent, within a year his own core PLC
party26 turned its back on the reforms. Former President Aleman (from his home exile at
his country estate), in collusion with FSLN leader Daniel Ortega managed to emasculate
Bolanos’ political power through a legislative maneuver
In late November 2004, the “pacto” between the loyalists o f Aleman in the PLC,
and the FSLN flexed its combined majority in the National Assembly by beginning a twostep process to amend the Nicaraguan Constitution to shift appointment rights to the
legislature from the executive branch o f government. If the amendment is affirmed in the
next (2005) session o f the National Assembly, Nicaraguan presidents will no longer have
the unchallenged right to appoint major cabinet secretaries thereby reducing the ability o f
the chief executive to make appointments for the major government offices.27 While the
legislation is subject to review by the Nicaraguan Comptroller General, and the Supreme
Electoral Chamber, it doubtful that it will be overturned.28

25Ibid.
26Bolanos’ coalition party is made up largely o f PLC loyalists, and other antiAleman members. It is known as the APRE (Alliance for the Republic Party).
27Ministers, vice-ministers, chiefs o f missions or directors o f independent agencies.
28Maria Jose Uriarte R. “Captain Poder a Bolanos” (“Power taken from Bolanos” ),

LaPrensa (Managua: La Prensa, edition 23645, 26 November 2004). Available
[Online]:http ://www-ni.laprensa. com .ni /archivo/2004/noviembre/26/>[28 November
2004],
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In effect, the seventy-four to vote o f the National Assembly re-politicized the
selection process by putting it into the hands o f the National Assembly, and left the door
open to more corruption. Any presidential appointments to high office will be subject
to a sixty percent approval o f the National Assembly; likewise, the National Assembly will
be able to remove any such official by the same percentage vote.29
In an analysis offered by one United States Department o f State official, Bolanos
has spent too much political capital on confrontation tactics, and lost his ability to wage a
long-term program to make lasting reforms.30
While the implications illustrated by the examples above cannot predict the future
integrity o f Nicaragua’s national government, they point toward more o f the same. This is
especially important because the conditions o f most aid, and grant agreements that make
up the neoliberal packages require transparency, reduced corruption and legitimacy in
government. President Bolanos has taken some steps that will reduce the incidence o f
corruption including his ordering that the foreign accounts made available to the general
public on the World Wide Web.31

29While this is much like the United States system in which the U.S. Senate affirms
major appointments by majority vote, in Nicaragua the sixty percent requirement almost
guarantees that the majority in the National Assembly will be in control o f the executive
branch.
30Marcela Sanchez, “Crucifying Nicaragua’s Redeemer” The Washington Post
(Washington, D.C.: The Washington Post Company, 9 December 2004). Available
[Online] :<http://www. washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A52649-2004Dec9?language>.
[12 December 2004],
31Nicaragua government. National Bank web site. Available [Online]: http://w w w .
ben.gob.ni/. [20 June 2005],
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Aleman muddied the waters early on by implying that as his vice-president,
Bolanos had participated in a system o f exorbitant sinecure salaried positions to retain
support. No doubt, Aleman’s accusations against Bolano were designed to divert
attention from himself; however, as president, Bolanos escaped scrutiny and he was able
to carry out his threat to prosecute Aleman for corruption.
According to newspaper accounts in October 2002, the United States impounded
more than $5 million o f illegal Aleman accounts in the United States,32 and the Nicaraguan
government audit revealed that Aleman’s wife received free services from the state
telephone company (ENITEL).33
To date, President Bolanos’ efforts to clean up the government have resulted in
generous foreign aid, and debt relief, but a return to “politics as usual” may point toward a
slowdown in such assistance. While Nicaraguan politics are not unique for corruption and
under-the-table dealings, it is clear that the system ranks particularly low
In January 2005, Ortega mobilized the FSLN (Sandinista Front) minority in the
National Assembly to join with the residual o f the PLC still supporting Aleman to
challenge President Bolanos. The “pacto” was activated because Bolanos took his selfproclaimed mandate to clean up government a bit too seriously with his vigorous
prosecution o f former President Aleman, and efforts to reduce the influence o f serving
justices appointed during the FSLN period.

32“Son 5 Milliones los Congelados en E.U. (Five hundred million dollars are frozen
in the United States,” El Nuevo Diario (Managua: El Nuevo Diario, 12 October 2004), 1.
33“Estado Pago Por Obras de Dona Amelia (The state paid for works o f Dona
Amelia Aleman), ” I a Prensa (Managua: La Prensa, 14 October 2002), 1
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The joining o f the two political factions in the National Assembly sought to further
emasculate Bolanos as the chief executive o f government. It was only through the
intervention o f the United Nations that the “pacto" was nudged into backing o ff-if only
temporarily. The “pacto's” distinctly anti-democratic maneuvering does not bode well; it is
clear that Ortega and Aleman understood the reproaches o f the United Nations and the
international community well. The Organization o f American States’ response to the crisis
was both feckless and tepid.34 Likewise, it is obvious that the “pacto" will continue its
efforts to overtake Bolanos’ reforms.
Part o f the effort is the threatened reform o f Article 68 o f the Nicaraguan
Constitution that was promulgated in 1985. It recognizes the importance o f a free press,
and stipulates among its provisions that all supplies, machinery, distribution and any other
element necessary to support a free press be exempt from all taxation The “pacto"
threatened a constitutional change that would eliminate that provision, and the proposed
change was seen as a threat to the freedom o f press in Nicaragua.
On 21 January 2005 all Nicaraguan radio, and television stations simulcast a
conference o f owners and editors o f the press in Nicaragua in which they objected to the
proposed change. During the broadcast, it was made clear that the participants saw the
proposal based on hidden political agendas o f the “pacto" rather than a legitimate effort to
raise revenue. The inference o f the proposed amendment is that the press stop its positive

34Marcela Sanchez, “Narrowly Saving Nicaragua’s Democracy,” The Washington
Post (Washington, D C.: The Washington Post Company, 13 January 2005). Available
[Online]:http://www. washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A736l-2005Janl3>[ 14 January
2005], The behavior o f the OAS with regard to taking firm stands has weakened it as an
organization and released the United States to act on a unilateral basis.
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reporting on the Bolanos’ reforms and increase support for the coalition majority o f the

“pacto”’5
While a final assessment is still out on the honesty o f the Bolanos administration,
his supporters would argue that as an older and highly respected businessman who entered
the office already a wealthy person, he is in the best position to clean up such practices. It
should be noted that there is ample evidence that the former FSLN directorate provided
itself with pihatas in early 1990, some with the tacit approval o f the Chamorro
administration as the price o f reconciliation-all o f which present difficult problems for
Bolanos.
President Bolanos’ strengths as a wealthy politician above reproach with an agenda
to clean up corruption have also have developed into weaknesses as well. As a PLC
candidate for the presidency, he was the de facto substitute for former President Aleman
who became the President o f the National Assembly after the election in 2001. Aleman, in
his office as President o f the National Assembly, was constitutionally immune from
prosecution for corruption; fora while he managed to stymy Bolanos’ campaign promise
to go after corrupt officials including former President Aleman himself.
Thus, Bolanos’ hands were further tied by the “pacto” between the FSLN and PLC
to control politics in Nicaragua. In effect, Bolanos defied Aleman as de facto political boss
o f the PLC, but this caused Bolanos estrangement from the PLC. Bolanos, while finally
successfully prosecuting Aleman for corruption and sentencing him to in-country exile to

35Ludwin Loaisga Lopez, “Medios retan a diputados” (M easures retained by
deputies), La Prensa (Managua: La Prensa, 22 January 2005), Available [Online]:
http://www. laprensa.com.ni/egi-bin/print. pl?id=nacionales-20050122-12>[24 January
2005],
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his country-side estate, began to pay the price o f his altruistic motives in late 2004. The

pacto between the PLC and FSLN effectively excluded President Bolanos.
The 26 November 2004 National Assembly vote to reduce President Bolanos’
constitutional powers serves as a strong disincentive to would-be international supporters.
In his anti-corruption campaign, President Bolanos either threatened to fire or fired a
number o f high officials; his vigor in carrying out his reform program probably served to
reinvigorate the PLC/FSLN pact that is seen by Bolanos, and his supporters as a “deal
with the devil” because it effectively empowers the FSLN to manipulate the PLC agenda
with the promise to support Aleman and undermine President Bolanos.
The implications o f the National Assembly’s maneuver to remove the President’s
powers go far beyond mere “politics as usual” in Nicaragua because the current
international programs o f support through the HIPC and others are conditioned on a
cleanup o f government and transparency The electorate in Nicaragua, it seems, would
rather return to the traditional manner o f doing business rather than reform the system. In
any case, these developments are very alarming to international observers. “European
Ambassador Kees Rede said aid cannot be given “to a country where there is institutional
deadlock.” (and) U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary o f State Dan Fisk visited to express
concern about the conflict.” Further, the heads o f state o f Guatemala, El Salvador and
Honduras warned that the efforts to remove Bolanos or emasculate his office could lead to
crisis.36

36Filadelfo Aleman, “Nicaragua Congress Grants Itself Powers,” Washington Post
(Washington, D C.: Washington Post, Nov 26, 04) Available [Online]: http://www
washingtonpost.com/ ac2/wp-dyn/A15270-2004Nov26?>[Nov 28, 2004]
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Pervasive corruption is the norm that was established long ago, and it would
appear that it has become so institutionalized that the efforts o f the PLC, and FSLN to
weaken Bolanos seem appropriate. This is especially germane given the austerity measures
that President Bolanos has imposed in taking a strategic structural approach to economic
recovery to assure outside support. Another view would be that the Nicaraguan electorate
has become so enured to corruption that it is seen as a remedy to hard times rather than a
negative.
This brief recounting o f the history o f corruption in Nicaragua, and snapshot o f a
seeming return to the worst o f those practices is just that-a glimpse o f a damaging
endemic crisis that cannot be resolved in one presidential administration. While no state
can claim a corruption-free system, the portent o f long-term normative conditioning o f the
body politic vis-a-vis corruption as an expected feature o f daily life does not bode well and
undoubtedly will affect the critical domestic independent variables that influence
Nicaragua’s position in a world-wide neoliberal system. The discussion above focuses on
political corruption per se, but long-term habits extend to all o f the domestic variables.
Likewise, this is not to presume that corruption is the norm within all segments o f
Nicaraguan society; rather, it is to observe that corruption, especially among government
officials, corporations, public utilities, politicians, the court system and other similar
entitities is never a surprise. Thus, cynicism prevails among the general population and the
people are sometimes forced to participate if they wish to survive. Unlike corruption in
north states that usually driven by greed, corruption in Nicaragua can be driven both by
greed and the need to survive. Given those hard facts, it is no surprise that Bolanos’ plan
to clean up graft and corruption at all levels is not especially welcome either by the poor
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who depend on patron relationships and the wealthy who want to perpetuate the system.
Graft and corruption, then, can be seen as a constant that cannot be simply ordered or
wished away by would-be neoliberal saviors. In any case, such attempts surely are met
with secret derision; therefore, it is fair to assume that graft and corruption are constants
to a greater or lesser degree in the four most important variables discussed below.

Critical Domestic Independent Variables

The Roman Catholic Church
The most central and enduring institution in Nicaragua is the Roman Catholic
Church. While the Roman Catholic Church in the largest context can be seen as having
NGO functions, the specific behavior and influence o f the Church in Nicaragua is unique
to that state and no others albeit that are commonalities with other Latin American states,
and the role o f the Church. It is impossible to measure the degree o f influence the Church
has on the people as a whole over time, but it is an absolute that the Church is as much an
element o f the Nicaraguan people’s psyche and experience as any other. Therefore, the
Church, above all, must be considered first as the primary domestic independent variable
that influences behavior, the political process and the likely role o f civil society in
Nicaragua’s fate.
In a remarkable public confession by the Church that made headlines after
Bolanos’ election, the Vicar o f the Archdiocese o f Managua said, “ . . . it would be a sin to
try to justify the benefits, and economic and material aid that the religious institution
received during the government o f ex-President Amoldo Aleman”37 This statement both

37“Vicario Asegura que Ayuda a la Iglesia Es Ahora Pecado” (Vicar assures that
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validates that the Church participated in corruption, and recognizes the impropriety o f the
Church. That the Bolanos government chose to close the Church’s radio station that
former President Aleman had permitted puts into question the Church’s motives for such a
confession given just two days before the closing o f “La Poderosa ”
With regard to the conditioning o f civil society as a whole, Nicaragua is
particularly unique. The Church in Nicaragua can be seen as adapting to the needs o f its
charges, and the splits that occur within the Church are reflections o f Conservative versus
Liberal activist forces.

The Liberal activists in Latin America followed the lead o f the

1968 encyclical that the Church become more proactive and secular in mission, while the
Conservatives remained in the more traditional role. All o f this played out in Nicaragua,
but in no sense can the Church be seen as either a corrupting force or a bystander. At the
same time, it is clear that the Church is caught up in the political process. The Somoza
political strategy extended to the coopting o f the Roman Catholic Church that had until
the 1970s a synergistic mutual support system that emphasized the “blessing” o f the
Church for the Somozas as beneficent rulers. In turn, the Church was allowed to operate
with little restriction making its own decisions with regard to how it spent its funds, run its
schools and to what extent it cooperated with the Somozas. The most senior Church
officials were always present at public events during the Somoza period, and the Somozas
were ready to use the Church as a willing partner especially with regard to maintaining the
loyalty o f the poor. According to Carlos Vilas, “ . . . the hierarchy, and the clergy spread

help to the church is sinful), La Prensa (Managua: La Prensa, 12 October 2002), 1. Such
an admission is a remarkable departure from the Nicaraguan Catholic Church given the
impunity with which it has operated, but always with acquiescence o f the forces in power.
Chances are that reasons that it made such an admission will never be know, especially in
view o f the fact that President Bolanos is not seen as a strong supporter o f the Church.
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Christianity o f submission to the temporal order The dictatorial power was in effect
presented as a product o f divine will.”18
It was under the direction o f the Pope Paul VI39 in 1968 in the form o f “Liberation
Theology” at the Medellin Bishops’ Conference (officially CELAM II - Second General
Conference o f Latin American Bishops), and the growing unrest o f some more radical
priests who later appear in the FSLN leadership. The grudging approval o f the then
Obando y Bravo,40 interrupted but did not break the tradition o f Church cooperation with
the state
In keeping with the direction o f the Vatican II Council expressed in its Decree on
the Apostolate o f the Laity “The laity must take on renewal o f the temporal order as their
own special obligation. Led by the light o f the Gospel,

. . . let them act directly an

definitively in the temporal zone.”41 Pope Paul VI energized CELAM II in Medellin with a
proactive instruction that the church in Latin America involve itself in the political realm.
In his opening homily, Pope Paul VI exhorted the Church in Latin America to
“[T]ake a position . . . united in plan, and intention for the defense, and elucidation o f the
truths o f the faith . . . Do not be afraid. . . . open wide the doors . . . the boundaries o f

38Vilas, The Sandinista Revolution, 87.
39Elevated in Pope in October 1978.
‘“ Obando y Bravo was named Archbishop in 1970, and named to the College o f
Cardinals by Pope John Paul II in April 1985.
41Quentin L. Q u ad e,, ed., The Pope, and Revolution - John Paul II Confronts
Liberation Theology. (Washington, D C.: Ethics, and Public Policy Center, 1982), 130.
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State, economic, and political system.”42 It was this event that is usually cited as the real
start o f the proactive nature o f the Church in Latin America, and the implicit conjoining
o f Latin American Marxists in the central mission o f reforming the extant systems to
promote opportunities for social and economic equity
The dialogue that began with that common ground manifested itself very quickly
through the appearance o f activist priests who subscribed to the Marxist solutions, and
implemented the exhortation o f Pope Paul VI. Their activism became a major force that
both enlisted support for the FSLN in Nicaragua and enlarged the Church’s membership.
The joining o f activist priests under the rubric o f Liberation Theology with Marxistinspired revolutionaries became an important force in Nicaragua for the FSLN, and can be
seen in the early FSLN junta membership.43
During the FSLN period, the Church’s formal leadership in Nicaragua was
reluctant but acquiescent; Liberation Theology tenets began to take hold. While Obando y
Bravo held a welcoming mass for the newly installed FSLN government in July 1979, he
quickly retreated from his initial support taking a role in criticizing the government when it
did not live up to its promises to liberate the oppressed. During Obando y Bravo’s retreat,
the activist priests such as Miguel d ’Escoto, and Ernesto Cardenal began to influence
mainstream Christianity in Nicaragua under the banner o f Liberation Theology while

42Quade, 55.
430utside o f Nicaragua, well-known activist priests such as Camilo Torres in
Colombia, and Gustavo Gutierrez in Peru became martyrs (Torres), and spokespersons
(Gutierrez) for the movement. Also, many others joined the movement who were focused
on the other liberation movements including racial, and gender issues.
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Obando y Bravo using Biblical passages in his homilies sent subtle messages o f criticism o f
the FSLN for its own class prejudices
Christian-based communities (CBCs) became the central method o f organization,
and also served as a political tool for the FSLN to gain support. For all apparent
purposes, the more traditional role o f the Church in Nicaragua had vanished until the 1983
visit o f Pope John Paul II44 to Managua where he publically admonished Ernesto Cardenal
Ernesto Cardenal describes the moment as staged public humiliation45 According
to him, the Pope’s words on refusing the kissing o f his papal ring by Cardenal was, “You
should regularize your situation.” He repeated it again to make sure that Cardenal heard
the admonishment clearly. Cardenal w rote that he had the blessing o f Obando y Bravo,
that the admonishment was unfair, and it was only later that the Church prohibited priests
from such political activity.46
It soon became clear that the message was more than an admonishment o f one
priest’s actions, rather, it was an admonishment o f the People’s Church47-th e commonly
used name for the branch o f Roman Catholic priests who both subscribed to liberation
theology, and supported the FSLN.
Pope John Paul II’s March 1983 defrocking o f the priests who were members o f
the FSLN government including Ernesto Cardenal, Fernando Cardenal and Miguel
44Interestingly, during Aleman’s administration, critical accusations were made by
his own internal PLC opposition that the Church’s historical relationship o f supporting
autocratic dictators had returned. Obviously, the activist Liberation Theology priests had
made an impact outside o f just the FSLN bounds.
“ Cardenal, 421.
“ Ibid., 423-424.
47Sometimes referred to as the PCLT (Popular Church o f Liberation Theology).
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D ’Escoto sent a clear signal. Further, the later the naming o f Obando y Bravo in 1984 to
the College o f Cardinals left no question as to Pope John Paul II ’s position on liberation
theology, and cast a very critical eye on the FSLN leadership.48
In his book, Ixi Revolution Perdida, Ernesto Cardenal complains bitterly that
during the Pope’s 1983 visit the Pope compared Nicaragua to Cold War Poland, and that
the Pope should have known the difference. Cardenal claimed that it was the Pope himself
who created the rift in the Nicaraguan Church, and was complicit in the eventual downfall
o f the FSLN in the elections o f 1990.49
The Church’s role in modern Nicaragua should be seen as politically engaged, and
taking sides In a sense, the symbiosis between the pre and post-FSLN periods can be seen
as a sort o f corruption or at least, in the United States context, a mixing o f Church and
state roles. During the FSLN period, the radical branch o f the Roman Catholic Church in
Nicaragua was prominent both in its membership o f the national-level ruling group and its
engaging community-based Liberation Theology that favored the FSLN central ideology.

48Pope John Paul II elaborated on his view that the Church should stick to its
primary mission, and stay out o f politics. That is not to say that he did not criticize
capitalism for its excesses. Likewise, he did not embrace Marxism either. Rather, he held
both political systems responsible for each system’s excesses that impoverished, and
dehumanized people. In an address to CELAM III held in Puebla, Mexico in January
1979, Pope John Paul II condemned the Marxist connection o f the Church remarking that
Christianity is not reducible to Marxist categories (Quade, 74), and that “[T]he Church
wishes to stay free with regard to competing system, in order to opt only for man.”
(Quade, 76.) In his visit to the United States in January 1995 he somewhat more
obliquely criticized capitalism’s excesses, and spoke to the issue o f poverty in the United
States that is hidden by wealth. In his visit to Cuba later that month, he, and Fidel Castro,
who identified Cuba as a secular state (not Marxist or atheist) sought to reconcile
differences; no doubt the Pope’s central mission was to re-energize the Catholic Church in
Cuba.
49Cardenal, 427-448.
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Under the Bolanos administration, the role o f the Church is far less prominent. However,
senior Church officials are seen at events supporting Aleman, and what remains o f his PLC
support.
In February 2005, the Church once again agreed to arbitrate conflict between the
dominant political forces that control the National Assembly (the pacto), and the executive
(President Bolanos) thus thrusting the Church back into political limelight as if by fiat o f
the people. While it is not clear whether Church officials interjected themselves into the
role as arbiter, what is clear is that the Nicaraguan people see the Church as a valid player
in such political roles. In the United States context, this seems an extreme violation o f the
“wall o f separation” but in Nicaragua this is little more than business as usual.

Organized Labor
On the surface, it would appear that organized labor has evolved normally if not
erratically since the late 19th Century. (See Chapter II) Labor has organized by function
around issues o f pay and conditions.50 However, what is not as obvious is the success that
the ruling oligarchies have had in manipulating organized labor through duplicitous tactics
and manipulation.
Organized labor was a critical piece in the Somoza grand plan to gain and retain
power in Nicaragua. In its program to control the economy o f Nicaragua beginning in the
1930s, the Somoza dynasty, variously suppressed, manipulated, facilitated and finally
locked down labor, labor movements and labor unions in Nicaragua until July 1979.

50Arguably, the FSLN also coopted organized labor while most o f its earliest
support was unorganized labor in the countryside; the boost that brought them to power
was from the middle class that turned its back on Somoza.
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Perhaps one o f the interesting aspects o f the Somoza dynasty was that a variety o f unions
developed during that period were overtly socialist and communist inspired movements;
however, it should well understood that such developments were always part o f the
Somoza calculus. Also, because Nicaragua is and was an agrarian economy, its most
powerful unions were either agrarian worker unions or quasi-professional cattlemen’s
associations which the Somozas controlled.
During the brief presidency o f Luis Somoza Debayle who succeeded his father
after his father’s assassination in 1954, the government turned away from its earlier tactics
o f manipulation and suppression o f those labor elements that would oppose the dynasty It
was Luis Somoza who loosened the reigns, and allowed the emergence o f a labor element
that ultimately identified with and supported the FSLN.

From the optic o f labor, the

victory o f the FSLN in July 1979 forecast increased influence for the labor class in
Nicaragua whether organized or not. Labor strikes and general support for the FSLN had
contributed to the downfall o f the last Somoza and the ascension o f the FSLN, and labor
was very motivated by the positive aura o f the FSLN and its program o f labor reform.
In fact, the FSLN carried out promised labor reform but in its mixed economy
model and adherence to Marxist tenets o f state ownership labor found itself in unfamiliar
territory. Probably the most significant early act o f the FSLN Directorate was the
confiscation o f the substantial Somoza family holdings including the best agricultural land
in Nicaragua. This land was redistributed to there-to-fore landless peasants to great effect.
However, not unlike the similar actions o f the early Castro government, the redistribution
often resulted in poor agrarian production due to economy o f scale and equipment issues,
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and evidence abounds today o f poorly maintained confiscated private property (means o f
production) that have never fully recovered 51
The FSLN made early reforms in labor law including equal pay for equal work and
other reforms that are generally accepted in the modern developed economies. In effect,
the FSLN labor reforms moved the relationship between owner and worker from an oldfashioned patron system to one o f state-guaranteed protections. While this shift in
relationship was eagerly if not somewhat clumsily adopted, the more conservative, wealthy
business, agrarian and industry oligarchy saw it as threatening, but were reduced to the
whims o f the FSLN Directorate and the implementation o f a mixed model economy.
Organized labor in Nicaragua understood that the FSLN brand o f Marxism was as
much a political as economic doctrine. According to some current Nicaraguan labor union
officials, labor saw itself as voluntarily coopted into the new FSLN government and a part
o f the movement to facilitate reforms under a Marxist-dominated mixed model economy.
Today, much o f the residual allegiance to those attitudes remain central to organized labor
in Nicaragua-especially for those who were loyal to the FSLN doctrinaire approach to
centrally managed economic systems.
The legacy o f the FSLN period with regard to labor can be seen as both positive
and negative. On the positive side, most would agree that labor reform was a must for the
new FSLN government, and in the long term necessary for its economic. Reforms put in

51As with the early Cuba experience following C astro’s victory, land reform and
redistribution led to a great deal o f inefficiency largely due to economy o f scale issues. The
result was considerably reduced production. In Nicaragua, inefficiencies in the cattle
industry were due, in part, to a black market in beef, e.g. slaughtered cattle that otherwise
would have been part o f a managed herd.
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place by the FSLN governments remain on the books today, and provide for the basis o f
both expectation and further reform
The FSLN-written political constitution, with amendments, is still in force, and
contains language from that period. Chapter V, Labor Rights, o f the Political Constitution
o f the Republic o f Nicaragua (formal name), articles eight to eighty-eight outline basic
labor law that includes (1) right to work, (2) equal pay for equal work, (3) remuneration in
national currency, not barter or trade, etc., (4) guarantees o f workplace safety, health and
hygiene, (5) eight-hour work day with both national holidays off and payment for “ 13th
month,” (6) equal opportunity for promotion, and (7) inclusion in the national social
security system and remediation for on-the-job injuries plus maternity leave. Other
provisions include child labor law, rights to organize, rights not to join a union as a
condition o f employment, and requirements that employers provide written contracts.52
It was until the advent o f the FSLN revolution supported to a large degree by
labor, that labor was given recognition and power under the new FSLN-written
Nicaraguan Political Constitution and labor law that was developed from that core
document.
Organized labor had a major role in the expulsion o f Anastasio Somoza Debayle,
and it re-organized around the FSLN model in the exercise o f its rights o f legitimacy in
civil society as a whole. In particular, organized labor became more effective in its
demands because the introduction o f Marxist-inspired forms o f strategy.

52The tradition o f the thirteenth month pay, known as the aguimldo, compels
employers to pay employees an additional separate payment, usually in mid-December just
before international mothers’ day, o f one twelfth o f previous pay earned during the year.
Before the guarantee, many employers simply avoided payment.
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Before the FSLN revolution, organized labor was weakened by the Somoza
strategy. Anastasio Somoza G arcia’s intervention in the Ingenio San Antonio (San
Antonio Sugar Mill - ISA) labor strike (See Chapter II.) is the first example o f the strategy
that the family dynasty would employ to coopt labor. Somoza Garcia managed to
simultaneously satisfy labor demands, and coopt the Obrerista movement,53 and save the
economic interests o f the oligarchy in keeping Nicaragua’s largest export industry (sugar)
in operation.
Somoza’s labor arm newspaper. La Tribuna, published his prediction “in late 1943
that the USSR ‘was going to lead humanity’s way.’”54 At that moment in history, the
Soviet Union was an ally o f the United States against Germany, hence Somoza felt
comfortable coopting the left-leaning labor movement to overcome the increasing
opposition from the conservative opposition led by students, business, the conservative
oligarchy and professionals. In short, Somoza gave his tacit approval for the emergence o f
the PSN from its semi-clandestine status to champion labor demands that he was ready to
meet for labor’s political backing.
During the Somoza dynasty, government agents and a system o f political favors
kept the labor unions under control, and used labor to balance the growing conservative
opposition. In the April 1944 PSN w orkers’ and peasants’ congress, Somoza launched the
event with a speech that included what seemed at the time as genuine but today is known
to be hypocritical and self serving. Somoza Garcia, in his speech, said “I have desired to

53The obrerista movement had form beginning in the early 1920s that was focused
on the establishment o f w orkers’ rights, paid vacations, w orkers’ compensation, and the
right to organize.
54Gould, 47.
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inspire hope, and faith in the weather-tanned fanners who work from sun-up to sun-down
in the fecund task o f sowing the earth, and in the workers in the shops, and factories, as in
the mines, who with their sweat, and blood add to the national wealth in nights without
stars.”55
In the context o f the time, such actions, and rhetoric can be seen as a healthy and
pragmatic political response; however, the long and short o f the strategy was that
manipulation and exploitation o f labor continued, but the strategy o f Somoza Garcia was
understood by the PSN and its supporters. The battle for the loyalty o f workers, most
particularly at the all-important San Antonio Sugar Mill, continued. Somoza, in his usual
duplicitous style would simultaneously arrest Somoza loyalists labor leaders for misdeeds,
and keep the mill operating for the benefit o f its conservative oligarchy ownership all the
while espousing general support for the obrerista movement.
Somoza was rewarded with conditional support from the PSN and the ISA
workers in part because their labor demands were codified into labor code by the 1944
Nicaragua Congress. However, just before the labor code was to take effect at the end o f
March 1945, the ISA owners fired 300 union members and the entire Somoza union
leadership cadre.56
ISA workers, and former workers and the residual o f the PSN that was later
outlawed provided grist for the FSLN revolution. It was labor, and peasants who joined
with the cognoscenti and disgruntled middle class that turned the tide o f the revolution
against the Somozas by joining the Sandinista cause. It was the FSLN’s early commitment

55Ibid., 48.
56Ibid , 51.
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to improving the lot o f the everyday Nicaraguan including promulgation o f labor laws, and
a new constitution that validated the FSLN’s motives, and even today maintains the
allegiance to the FSLN model o f labor, and labor unions-particularly the National
Federation o f W orkers (FTN ),57 Nicaragua’s largest, and most active labor union. The
FTN continues to support the FSLN agenda and demand strengthening o f established
workers’ rights, and labor law that were first promulgated under the FSLN.58
Because Nicaragua is not a highly industrialized state, its labor force did not have a
sufficiently strong organization to make a difference on its own Most o f the industry is,
and was artisan in type, not centralized nor highly vertical in organization It was this
weakness that, in part, allowed exploitation by the Somoza dynasty. With the FSLN
revolution came a more structured, and methodological organization and strategy with a
clear political basis-Marxism. As the FSLN championed the labor cause, it gained a strong

57For all intents and purposes, the PSN and FTN represent the same labor force,
and politics. That the PSN evolved into the FTN was due to the efforts o f the FSLN
during the 1975 to 1978 marshal-law period to consolidate the Frente Obrero (w orkers’
front - a Maoist group), and the FSLN (the Maoist tendency, and the proletariat faction).
The murder o f the La Prensa owner/editor Pedro Chamorro in January 1978 was the
impetus for final cooperation o f the two groups taking an overt stand against the regime o f
Anastasio Somoza Debayle with closing o f the ISA, still the most important single agro
industrial activity in Nicaragua.
58Leonardo Lezama Castillo, Derecho Laboral Basico -FNT (Basic labor rights FNT) (Managua: Comision de Education del FNT, January 2003). Basic labor law, as
written during the FSLN period, is contained in Chapter V o f the Nicaraguan Political
Constitution. Nicaragua Political Constitution, 8th Edition, 2002 (Managua. Editorial
Juridica, S .A ), 28. Labor rights include all o f those demanded by the PSN, and later
delivered de jure by the FSLN. Other labor rights can be found in Chapter III (“Social
Rights” ) o f the Constitution that includes references to rights to education, health, work,
security, equal treatment, and related civil liberties, and rights. In January 2003, the FNT,
with the funding o f a Danish NGO, published an elaboration o f labor and social rights that
are codified in Law 185 (Nicaragua Labor Code) that puts in plain language what is
contained in the Constitution and labor code.
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support arm. As mentioned above, this lead to quid pro quo when the FSLN rew rote the
Nicaragua Constitution in 1985 adding considerable rights to workers59 plus instituting
labor rights laws. By the end o f the decade, labor strongly identified with, and supported
the FSLN.
When Violeta Chamorro won the 1990 presidential election, organized labor
suffered an crisis o f identity because the fundamental underpinnings o f its organization has
been removed with the departure o f the Marxist FSLN government. Likewise there was a
backlash in some labor sectors against the Marxist inspired labor organizations. The
strategy o f the major o f labor organizations was to seek out an independent identity, and
autonomy from the new government.
The neoliberal agenda that ensured hurt organized labor because the organized
labor in the public sector was reduced considerably and unemployment rose. In any case,
however, the majority o f organized labor holds firm to the gains made during the FSLN
period, and identifies with the FSLN, and Daniel Ortega.60
While the FTN is the largest, and most all-encompassing labor union in Nicaragua,
there are many other w orkers’ unions that generally are opposed to neoliberalism as a
national policy, and hold on to the promises made during the FSLN period. These include
the AMPRONAC (Association o f Women before the National Problem) now known as
the AMNLAE (Nicaraguan W omen’s Association, Luisa Amada Espinosa), the ATC

59Nicaragua Political Constitution. The first edition was promulgated in 1985. The
basic labor law is fully elaborated in Chapter V.
“ Guillermo Leiva (retired Nicaragua Sandinista Popular Army political officer,
political observer and writer active in the FSLN), in discussions with author, October
2002 and December 2003, and email exchanges in November 2004 and December 2005.
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(Association o f Agriculture Workers), the National Coalition o f Women (CNM), various
professional unions operating under the umbrella o f the FTN and a number o f associations
designed to protect the Constitutional indigenous rights o f the Miskitos. With the
exception o f the last group, these unions and organizations are focused on pay equity,
working conditions, political access, and similar issues that were championed by the
FSLN.
Generally speaking, organized labor has not been a problem for the Bolanos
administration. However, recent strikes for higher pay by public school teachers seem to
point toward a change in what has been passive behavior. The neoliberal adjustments
reduced the public payroll and the willingness o f the national government to dispense
raises for support. This process began with the Chamorro administration, but has now
come to be growing problem for the Bolanos’ government, and represents a strengthening
o f support for Daniel Ortega in his perennial quest for a second term 61 Further, the
residual o f the FSLN with its organic television station (Channel Two) is always ready to
exploit opportunities presented by labor issues.

Business Community
The Confederation Superior de Empresas Privadas (COSEP - National Chamber
o f Commerce equivilant) was a powerful instrument o f the last Somoza, Anastasio
Somoza Debayle, until many o f its members turned away from that affiliation in the mid to

61Although the FSLN was in power from July 1979 until the 1990 election o f
Chamorro, the constitutional government established by the FSLN in 1985 was the only
period in which Ortega was officially the president o f the republic.
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late 1970s due to the excesses o f his failing regime 62 Despite the turn in allegiance, the
COSEP was no friend o f the Sandinista regime either as the FSLN government sought to
turn to a mixed economic model as it nationalized many industries and confiscated
property in the name o f the revolution
While COSEP survived as an organization o f the most powerful business and
industry leaders in Nicaragua, it was tainted by frequent accusations that it was funded by
and acted as an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency during the Sandinista period
from 1979 to 1990.
Today, the CO SEP’s closest ally is President Enrique Bolanos who, even as
Aleman’s vice president and president o f the National Assembly before his election as
president in 2002, served as a vehicle to further dismantle the vestiges o f the Sandinista
economic model and restore a full-market economy.
The Somoza dynasty took great care to develop the business community in
Nicaragua all the while giving the greatest perks to the old, wealthy oligarch families that
owned the major means o f production and the major commodities export businesses such
as the Ingenio San Antonio (ISA) in Chinandega. The Somoza fortune, outside o f its graft

62The seminal event that turned the business community from supporting the
Somoza regime was the 1978 murder o f Pedro Joaquin Chamorro who was the majority
owner and editor o f La Prensa newspaper. Chamorro was killed in downtown Managua
on his way to work, and his murder was immediately attributed to Somoza’s henchmen led
by his West Point-trained son. By that point in time, the Somoza government’s censorship
o f La Prensa had reached such a stage that Chamorro had to submit all copy to the
government before publication. For the deleted material, Chamorro would often leave
blank spaces or substitute ridiculous Hollywood publicity photographs to make the point
about the lack o f freedom o f the press in Nicaragua. Likewise, the murder o f the vicepresident o f the COSEP during this same era was attributed to Somoza. Those events, in
combination, guaranteed that the conservative COSEP faced hard choices with the rise o f
the FSLN.
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from control o f the state treasury, was mostly in cattle and shipping. The general
economic health o f Nicaragua was important to the Somozas and they acted to facilitate
the big business interests. The Somozas, especially Anastasio Somoza Debayle,
recognized the importance o f agricultural technology and general modernization, and
often sought outside expertise.
At the same time, the Somozas recognized the importance o f a strong business
class that was key to the overall economic well-being o f Nicaragua. Anastasio Somoza
Debayle supported the Central American Common M arket (CACM)63 that had been
established in Managua in 1960 during the presidency o f his brother Luis. The signatories
to the treaty were Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua.
The CACM was an early form o f neoliberal trade policy. The CACM eliminated
most tariffs on goods between the member states, and otherwise standardized weights,
measures and other factors to “harmonize” trade. The treaty stipulated that goods that
could be produced in the four-state zone would enjoy duty free status while outside
sources o f the same products would not; a variation on import substitution. M ost
important, perhaps, was the recognition in the opening lines o f the treaty was that its goal
was the improvement o f living conditions for the poor.
As with President Bolanos, Luis and Anastasio Somoza Debayle were strongly in
favor o f good business management practices. They supported the COSEP, and its
projects that included the INCAE (Instituto Centroamericano de Administration de
Empresas - Central America Institute o f Business Administration) that was affiliated with,

^Organization o f American States web site. Available [Online]: http ://www.
sice.oas.org/trade/camertoc.asp [20 July 2005],
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and under the technical supervision o f the Harvard Business School. It was established in
Managua in 1964 as a joint project between the Central American republics, and their
respective national chambers o f commerce but it was largely a project o f the COSEP that
donated the land for the Managua campus.64
The apparent non sequitur that the Somozas would support and encourage both
the COSEP and INCAE was a part o f the complex strategy o f the Somozas and their
fundamental motivations o f self-enrichment. As the business climate deteriorated in the
last years o f the Anastasio Somoza Debayle regime and Somoza abandoned the business
community, the business community drifted toward supporting the early Group o f
Twelve/FSLN option.
With the return o f political democracy in Nicaragua in 1990 came an improved
business climate. The INCAE returned to Managua and the COSEP regained its strength

^Forrest D. Colburn, My Car in Managua (Austin: University o f Texas Press,
1991), 50-54. The main campus o f INCAE in Managua reduced operations during the
FSLN period because it was antithetical to Marxist ideology, and many identified it with
the CIA. M ost o f the operations that confer graduate business degrees have now returned
to the Managua campus. During the FSLN period, the MBA operation was moved to and
operated in San Jose, Costa Rica while the Managua operation was reduced to a one-year
program in “functional administration.” President Kennedy, during a heads o f state visit to
Central America in 1962 held in San Jose, recognized the need for a high-quality business
management institution in Central America. Kennedy tasked Henry Cabot Lodge (Jr.)to
bring the idea to fruition. Lodge gained the commitment o f the Harvard Business School
and a generous donation o f property from several prominent Managua businessmen plus a
$4 million contribution from the U.S. Agency for International Development.The Somozas
saw INCAE as a prestigious institution that (rightfully) located in Managua. The family,
despite it self-serving motives had always sought the latest management technology; no
doubt much o f this was influenced by the fact that Anastasio Somoza Garcia had
graduated from a prestigious business school in Philadelphia. During the FSLN period, the
government used INCAE as a tool to educate FSLN managers, especially those in the
Ministry o f Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. Jaime Wheelock, the Minister, recognized
its value to the Revolution yet still insisted on a “historical context” in the vein o f
Marxism.
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as an organization. President Bolanos is an enthusiastic supporter o f COSEP, and COSEP
members are equally enthusiastic about the neoliberal agenda.65 O f the critical domestic
independent variables, it is only the business community that has signed up for complete
cooperation.

Civil Society
Civil society in Nicaragua has been conditioned and shaped over the history o f
Nicaragua since the earliest conquistadores beginning with Pedro Davila. It is useful to
separate the components o f civil society in a general way to further elaborate on how civil
society as a whole influences domestic policy o f today’s world in Nicaragua.
In 1980, the last year that accurate statistics could be calculated before the turmoil
o f the revolution. The Nicaraguan work force was typical for a Latin American state with
a similar history; the 1980 data reflect the condition o f Nicaragua under Anastasio Somoza
Debayle in the last few years o f his government. Just before, and after the revolution, there
was a great exit o f the monied elite oligarchy (minus their land holdings) and a growth o f
the informal sector that, in today’s context, means street vendors and casual labor.66
The data reflect the disproportionate numbers in the lower classes. The data shows
that about 53 .5 percent o f the work force in 1980 was non-propertied, and if the
propertied petit-bourgeoisie were included, about 71 percent o f the entire work force
could be classified at subsistence-or-below levels.

65Gabriel Pasos Lacayo.
“ Richard Harris and Carlos M. Vilas, A Revolution Under Siege (London: Zed
Books, Ltd., 1985), 47. The table in Appendix VII is defined in Marxist terminology by
the authors o f the source cited.
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The data provide a brief summary o f the political, and economic class distribution
o f the Nicaraguan people. What is important to this work is the trend back toward FSLN
popular support and the decline in support for President Bolanos’ coalition party. While
Daniel Ortega has only won approximately thirty-seven percent o f the votes in his races
for the presidency in 1990, 1996, and 2002 (see earlier discussion), his party is gaining
strength. It seems counter-intuitive because the per capita GNP is on the rise (albeit it
slight). This reflects a growing discontent at the slowness o f the recovery and cynicism
toward the Bolanos’ government.
In terms o f per capita GNP measurement, in 1980 Nicaragua it stood at $750, fell
to $453 at the end o f the FSLN period in 1990, and continued falling; in 1992-two years
into the Chamorro administration-the figure stood at $423 .67 By 2003, according to
World Bank figures, the per capita GNP stood at $730, and had been on an upward trend
since 1999 when it stood at $400 68 To provide a meaningful reference point, it is useful to
compare the data to a well developed neighboring state that did not experience the turmoil
o f the revolution nor the damage from earthquakes and hurricanes. In 1999, the per capita
GNP o f neighboring Costa Rica stood at $3,580, and in 2003 it was at $4,280.69

67MerriIl, 232.
68World Bank, “Nicaragua at a Glance,” 15 September 2004. (Washington, D C.:
The World Bank Group). Available [Online]:<http:// devdata.worldbank.org/
extemal/CPProfile.asp? SelectedCountry=NIC&CCODE=N...> [l 1 November 2004],
69World Bank, “Costa Rica Data Profile,” (Washington, D C.: The World Bank
Group). Available [Online]:http://devdata.worldbank.org /extemal/CPProfile.
asp?SelectedCountry=CRI&CCODE= CRI&CN AME=Costa+Rica&PT YPE=CP>[ 19
November 2004],
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In terms o f conditioning, the lower economic classes have experienced a long-term
existence at or below the poverty line. That is not to say that Nicaraguan peasants, and
urban workers do not recognize their substandard conditions, but to observe that since
1980, nearly a quarter o f a century, the poor have made no progress and probably do not
expect or demand but little progress.
It is interesting to note that the last year o f data taken before the FSLN revolution
took over completely in 1980, was the highest recorded per capita GNP. This fits quite
neatly with Crane Brinton’s observations that revolutions tend to occur when there is a
rise in per capita GNP, and a loss in confidence and legitimacy in government. (See
Chapter II for a detailed discussion.)
Whether the decline during the FSLN period from mid-1979 to early 1990 may or
may not be attributable to the shift from a market economy to a command (or mixed)
economy system is not relevant to the revolution theory; rather, in the context o f Crane
Brinton’s Theory o f Revolution, the modest rise in recent years could signal an impending
revolution if the current government does not maintain its legitimacy.
Certainly, the signs are not good for President Bolanos, this is reflected in the
November 2004 municipal elections held throughout Nicaragua in which the FSLN, and
FSLN/PLC pacto candidates won fourteen mayorships while the PLC candidates won
only two. In 2000, the FSLN and FSLN/PLC candidates won 11, and lost five to the PLC.
In numbers o f votes at the national level, the FSLN candidates won 641,401 while the
PLC candidates won 540,103 .70

70“Las Municipales en Cifras y Datos,” (The municipalities in numbers and results),

La Prensa (Managua: La Prensa, 9 November 2004), 1.
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In a 2004 retrospective, the campaign manager for the PLC (that not affiliated with
the PLC/FSLN pacto) attributed the loss to several factors. He outlined the factors that
including the ongoing influence o f former President Aleman who opposes Bolanos, the
“splitting” o f the PLC into competing factions, the austerity measures imposed by the
Bolanos government to comply with the HIPC, and the “crazy rat” which he defined as
ongoing subterfuge o f the FSLN with Daniel O rtega’s guidance. Sacasa compared the
failure to the effects o f a lion (FSLN) in a cage with a burro (PLC).71 In any case, the
November 2004 results should serve as a wake- up call to the PLC. The mayorship o f
Managua (won by the FSLN candidate) is often the path to the presidency. Such was
Amoldo Aleman’s path.
The state o f civil society in Nicaragua is not altogether negative. In a very
proactive move outside o f the influence o f the United States or the Nicaraguan
government, a group o f organizations formed into a coalition known as the Coordinadora
Civil. This occurred in 1998 just after Hurricane Mitch that cut a path o f destruction
through northern Nicaragua to the Pacific coast. The immediate goal o f the coalition was
to provide organized relief to the devastated regions but it has survived into an
organization with a larger vision o f sustainable development.72 This organization’s stated
goal is to create a condition o f “sustainable human development.” The organization is
comprised o f just less than fifty member organizations that include the NGO network in
Nicaragua, regional offices from each state or territory plus some project specific

7lLuis Felipe Palacios, “PLC Analiza Su Derrota” (“PLC analyzes its downfall”)

La Prensa (Managua: La Prensa, 9 November 2004), 1.
72Coordinadora Civil official web site. Available [Online]: http://www.ccer.org.ni/
[23 August 2005],
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organizations that were originally formed during the FSLN period such as the Asociacion
de Mujeres "Luisa Amanda Espinoza" - AMNLAE, a women’s rights organization that
existed in another iteration as a part o f the FSLN before the Triumph. If all o f the
membership including suborganizations are counted, approximately the CC is comprised
o f about 350 members.
The CC has its own web-based news network and has frequent press releases
meant for local consumption.73 As a proactive organization it takes part in international
organizations, and participated in World Bank and IMF talks in early 2005. During the
those meetings the CC objected to the siphoning o f HIPC funds meant to address the
extreme poverty in Nicaragua to help pay off foreign debt, and accused the World Bank
and IMF o f being complicit in the decision to use those funds for other than that originally
intended
The CC can be seen as a newly developing voice that presents both a challenge to
the Bolanos’ government and to the would-be power, the FSLN. This is because it
represents the will o f civil society while not participating in the policy-making process o f
the government. While its activities can be seen as proactive in a “loyal opposition” spirit,
its unofficial status impedes any meaningful positive support to the neoliberal agenda, and
the CC is an irritant that neither Bolanos nor the pacto can control. Likewise, the FSLN,
except for its limited influence through the CC membership organizations that were
inspired by the FSLN revolution, has little control either.

73Ibid., Available [Online]: http://www.ccer.org.ni/noticias_cc.htm [15 October
2005],
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In the largest sense, the CC is a healthy component o f the post-revolutionary,
newly evolving domestic reality that includes the adoption o f neoliberalism. The C C ’s
acceptance or rejection o f measures toward the neoliberal agenda’s full implementation
will affect if, whether, or how slowly or quickly the agenda will be adopted.

Summary
Except for the business community, the most critical domestic independent
variables are still in a state o f flux, and do not seem to be focusing on the larger goal o f
Nicaragua’s recovery. The other domestic independent variables, short o f outright
rejection, are weighing in against full acceptance o f the neoliberal program.
The Church remains divided despite the return to its original role under the
thermidor phase, but the eventual normalcy with reference to the Church’s political role
under Crane’s prediction that it will resume its pre-revolutionary role seems to be
occurring. The evidence is that the Church, as the leading domestic independent variable
and underlying engine o f political behavior, has undertaken a renewed secular role not in
the Liberation Theology sense, but in the partisan political sense. Certainly, Bolanos’
closing o f the El Impacto Church radio station as a part o f the Aleman corruption cleanup
was not politic, and probably accelerated the willingness o f the church to engage in
partisan politics. Also, the former priest members o f the original FSLN government are
still highly respected and have a voice today. While many o f those priests have made
negative comments about the final strategy and outcome o f the FSLN revolution, all o f
them can and do participate in influencing the general electorate. In effect, the Church still
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has not found it new role in the current circumstance, but any direction it takes still
influences the neoliberal agenda.
Organized labor and, indirectly non-organized labor, benefits from the programs
put in the place during the FSLN period As labor sees those rights either abused or
eroding in the name o f neoliberalism, it becomes more proactive in the political arena.
Recent teahers’ and health w orkers’ strikes are an example o f that-strikes that would have
never been considered or even possible during the Somoza dynasty. More important, labor
as a component o f civil society in the larger sense, both perceives and has a sense o f
political empowerment. Organized labor and labor in general final acceptance or rejection
o f the neoliberal agenda (including a reversal o f some rights and privileges seen as
immutable) will certainly affect neoliberal implementation.
The business community, especially that represented by the COSEP, while
generally in favor o f free enterprise in the larger sense, is a (re)growing influence on the
political process. Arguably, its pro-capitalistic tenets reflected in the COSEP name are
obvious, and it never changed from that position. However, its participation in the socalled Third Front in support o f the FSLN, gives the business community a curious
dilemma. On the one hand, it must support Bolanos and his neoliberal agenda, but on the
other hand, as the economy suffers (even discounting the human suffering that
accompanies it), the business community suffers likewise. Thus having been betrayed by
the FSLN in the post-revolution period and suffering under the slowness o f the economic
recovery in the thermidor period, it presents a potent force that must be recognized as a
key to the eventual adoption o f neoliberalism in its largest sense.
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Civil society, as a whole, represents the best and worst for neoliberal proponents.
The worst is that the FSLN-influenced “new awareness” o f the C C ’s membership will be
resistant to the neoliberal agenda as it challenges the downside o f structural reforms that,
at least in the short term, seem to prejudice the very people who already have suffered the
most. On the positive side, the CC is comprised o f domestic NGOs such as the Committee
for Ethics and Transparency in Politics (one o f the NGO sub-members) that speak to the
highest principles o f representative democracy. In combination, then, the CC and its
general membership, after the dominant influence o f the Catholic Church can be seen
potentially as the strongest voice that will finally influence the neoliberal agenda in
Nicaragua.
The combination o f these four internal independent variables is by means all
inclusive as to what affects the internal dynamic; however, they represent the major forces
that influence how, when and if the Nicaraguan people are ready to embrace neoliberalism.
Unquestionably, one could argue that there is some psychological fatigue in having already
made such radical shifts since the election o f President Chamorro in 1990. During the
Sandinista period, these four variables were polarized with the most obvious being
between the business community and organized labor.
The more amorphous civil society can be seen as taking pragmatic steps to reduce
the disparity in all areas including poverty and education. In the p o st-1990 period, these
four variables have softened the polarization. While not measurable, the most obvious
aspect o f the attitude o f the people is that they simply want to get on with life without the
disruption o f civil war, embargos and United States efforts to bring about change in the
post-Cold W ar environment that include political manipulation. The current debate about
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the FTAA is about the United States as acting in its own interests, and can therefore be
seen as suspect. However, Nicaragua bought into the DR-CAFTA regime with some
concessions to agriculture.
Given that these four component variables as a group recognize the inevitability o f
neoliberalism, then the task at hand should be how to facilitate Nicaragua’s entry into the
regime without damaging itself but still making progress domestically. As obvious as that
may seem, the residual effects o f the FSLN period (especially in the area o f w orkers’
rights) still represent a polarizing force. It is difficult for a Nicaraguan politician to tell a
worker in the “Free Zone” working for a Taiwanese business making garments that such
an approach is an improvement. The task at hand for any politician in Nicaragua is to
somehow convey the larger goal o f neoliberalism while, at the same time, asking the
people to be patient.
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CHAPTER VI

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The failure in Nicaragua, while not unique in Latin America or with other south
states, is case specific. Although easy to generalize common characteristics, it is far more
difficult to parse the differences for the implementation o f focused solutions. Recognizing
that each south state is unique is not enough Likewise, recognizing that south states have
similar negative characteristics such as pervasive corruption is not enough because it leads
to blanket solutions
The World Bank and IMF programs set out tailored benchmarks in the Nicaragua
HIPC strategy, but they are still conceived in the insulated atmosphere o f altruistic
international bureaucrats even if they have easy access to Nicaragua and its government
Further, the Nicaraguan administrations that are required to formulate planning based on
HIPC instructions and guidance are constrained by their own technical skill, motivations
and access to all aspects o f the society; something that is not so easily accomplished in an
atmosphere o f political instability.
This is not to impugn the motives o f the various IGOs, and NGOs, nor the
integrity o f the Bolanos’ administration but only to question the failed result. The
difference is that a deductive approach to observe failed results may be more useful than
an inductive approach that predicts: “X” must equal “Y” ; therefore, Nicaragua should fully
recover in “Z” fiscal quarters.
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It is the failure o f the international community dominated by the G8 states that
leads to a larger question in the minds o f Nicaraguans who see neoliberalism as a tool o f
the capitalist states that has lead to even greater disparity in the long term. This, in turn,
leads to the question o f whether some other approach is more viable. Such is the appeal o f
Daniel Ortega who, while he failed with his mixed-model programs, still appeals to the
greater Nicaraguan sense o f self worth and industry. This is not to endorse either Marxism
or capitalism; rather, it is to posit the question that lingers in the minds o f Nicaraguans
who are pondering the question whether their election o f Violeta Chamorro in 1990 was a
mistake.

Nicaragua’s National Political Psyche
The United States is potent and great
When you shake there is a deep temblor [earthquake]
that passes through the enormous vertebrae o f the, Andes
If you clamor, it is heard like the roaring o f a lion
Hugo already said it to Grant: The Stars are yours . . .
You join the cult o f Hercules to the cult o f Mammon . . .
Be careful. Viva Spanish America!
There are a thousand cubs loosed from the Spanish lion
Roosevelt, one would have to be, through God himself,
the fearful Rifleman, and strong Hunter,
to manage to grab us in your iron claws.
And, although you count on everything, you lack one thing:
G od!1
Nicaraguans hold their most famous poet, Ruben Dario, in great reverence as a
national hero who expressed the national psyche like no other. As an early modernist, he

‘Ruben Dario, “A Roosevelt,” 1904, Translated by Bonnie Frederick. Casa Poema
Famous Poetry Collection. Available [Online]: http://judithpordon.tripod .com/poetry.
/id 184.html [28 February 2006], See Appendix VIII for complete version o f poem in
English and Spanish.
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expressed the realities and dilemma o f the Nicaraguan people, and their relationship with
the United States in abstractions that, while typical o f the modernist, must have been
difficult to grasp in 1904. However, the pow er and emotion in D ario’s “To Roosevelt” is
easily understood today.
Dario’s treatment o f Theodore Roosevelt in the poem is a lament, admiration and
criticism. The lament and criticism are that the United States is heartless in the exercise o f
its strength and influence, and fails to consider the human plight. Inferentially, like Pablo
Neruda in “The United Fruit Company,” Dario makes reference to classical literature in
part to refer to misused power o f the past. He sees the United States as powerful, and
capable but subscribing to greed and ill-gotten riches (“cult o f Mammon” ) as the ultimate
motor for action, and “Godless” in character. His analysis is complex but clear. D ario’s
view o f the United States, while now one hundred years old, is not unlike that seen today
in Latin America. Thus, the cynicism conditioned by events o f the past, and the failure o f
neoliberalism to bring a recovery or give hope for one is easily understood but difficult to
measure. It is that cynicism, not addressed in this work, that may be the most influential
overriding factor o f all other domestic independent variables.
The frustration that the United States is on the one hand is responsible for the
plight o f Nicaragua, and on the other the only entity powerful enough rectify the dilemma
In the context o f neoliberalism, the United States as its primary proponent has failed That
Nicaragua and other HIPC states have no other choice but to join the neoliberal solution
adds to the frustration.
While impossible to quantify or otherwise characterize except through such poetry
the failure o f Nicaragua to move forward can be laid at the feet o f the long-term
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relationship between Nicaragua and the United States. This is not criticize the motives o f
the United States, and its Paris Club/G8 allies, rather, it is to reflect on how cynicism in
Latin America can affect the domestic variables as neoliberalism is invoked as the only
solution for recovery.

Constancy o f the Neoliberal Agenda
The rejection o f French and Dutch voters to ratify the European Union
Constitution in spring 2005 signals a movement away from globalization and neoliberal
solutions.2 However, other signals such as the G8 finance ministers’ recommendation on
11 June 2005 point strongly toward a continuation o f the neoliberal solution.3
Simultaneous to the failure o f those EU Constitution referenda were the strong efforts o f
the Bush administration to move forward with the DR-CAFTA ratification by the U.S.
Senate. It was ratified by the U.S. Senate in June 2005 and passed by the U.S. House on
28 July 2005 after acrimonious debate and a close vote.
In October 2004, Great Britain’s Chancellor o f the Exchequer Gordon Dawson
announced the International M onetary Fund’s intention to make substantial debt

2While not a subject o f this study, it is worth observing that the current economic
system in the European Union includes substantial subsidies for farmers as a form o f
protective tariffs. Such received knowledge, at least in the eyes o f south states upon whom
neoliberalism is being forced, leads to cynicism. The south states’ view, no doubt, is that
the G8 is hypocritical in outlook, and, “What is good for the goose, is good for the
gander.”
3The top two agenda items selected by Prime Minister Blair as the host for the
summit conference were debt forgiveness, and revisiting the failed Kyoto Protocol
regarding incremental carbon emissions that was opposed by the United States. As
expected, the result o f the conference was consensus on the first point, and a vague
agreement on the second point to further study alternate solutions.
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forgiveness for the third tier states such as Nicaragua. He repeated the commitment for
Great Britain in May 2005 that would devote .7 percent o f Great Britain’s national budget
toward alleviation o f world-wide poverty.4 The commitment o f states such as Great
Britain in alignment with the commitment o f the IMF and earlier statements by Kofi
Annan, UN Secretary General, point toward an unconditional and long-term effort to raise
third tier states from economic destitution and extreme poverty 5
On 10 and 11 June 2005, finance ministers from the w orld’s first tier G8 donor
states met in London in preparation for the upcoming July 2005 G8 summit in Gleneagles,
Scotland. Their recommendation was to forgive one hundred percent o f foreign debt
representing a total debt forgiveness o f $40 billion o f 18 selected HIPC states that include
Nicaragua.
While Japan, Germany and France initially balked at the “no strings attached”
forgiveness, they finally agreed under pressure from the United States, Canada and Great
Britain. The agreement to cooperate between the United States and Great Britain was

4“Gordon Brown, U.K. Chancellor o f the Exchequer, and Chairman o f the
International Monetary Fund’s International Monetary, and Financial Committee.” (Press
Conference Webcast), (Washington, D C., 2 October 2004) Available [Online],
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/tr/2004/tr041002.htm [6 June 2005],
Gordon Brown, “Extracts from Speech by the Rt. Hon Gordon Brown, MP, Chancellor o f
the Exchequer, to the Amicus Conference, Brighton.” London: HM Treasury, 18 May
2005. Available [Online]: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches
/press/2005/press_49_05.cfm [6 June 2005],
5Most HIPC states are in Africa, and that region is the focus o f the G8 for its
plenary meeting in July 2005. The four HIPC states in Latin America (Honduras,
Nicaragua, Guyana, and Bolivia) are seen as recovering, and manageable while the African
HIPC states are not.
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brokered during a meeting o f Prime Minister Blair and President Bush II; Bush had earlier
made overtures to the French for their cooperation.
Debt forgiveness and relief does not represent all foreign debt for beleaguered
south states, but there was some understanding that those residual issues would be
addressed at a later date. Whether the external actors’ motives are altruistic or driven by
economic interests, or some combination is less important than the unwavering
commitment.6 The reforms suggested by the Washington Consensus, and its later
iterations provide the framework for neoliberalism, and neoliberalism is a constancy that
must be dealt with by third-tier states that find themselves with no other choice except to
continue down a path o f economic ruin and political turmoil.
This is not to confuse the theory o f neoliberalism as originally laid out by
Williamson, but to make clear that the Paris Club and G8 use economic instruments o f
power as a means to implement their version o f neoliberalism-the theory that a ffeemarket system with minimal state intervention but strong internal institutions will follow
the David Ricardo model o f mutually supporting and enriching exchange systems. The
comparative advantage model operating without state interference would maximize the
incomes o f all states, and their citizens. Neoliberalism in the current-day application can be
seen as little more than an implementation o f that theory with some temporary
modifications to give a boost to poverty reduction and a reduction o f other social

6Particularly important is the effect on foreign direct investment which should be
stimulated by the knowledge that such steps are being taken. FDI is a critical piece o f the
neoliberal agenda that carries out the theory that all states will benefit from trade
exchanges.
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inequities. The question, then, returns to whether or how such a constant variable will
affect a meaningful result. Such is the question in Nicaragua.
On 6 June 2005, in a speech before the Organization for American States in
Washington, D C., Bush made his argument for the approval o f DR-CAFTA, and its
benefits to Latin American states, and the United States. President Bush advised that the
treaty would eliminate about eight percent o f tariffs on Dominican Republic and Central
American products, and open the region up to duty-free American products. He tied the
treaty to further democratization in Latin America as well. “CAFTA is more than just a
trade agreement ” he said. “ It is a signal o f the U S . commitment to democracy, and
prosperity for our neighbors, and I urge the United States Congress to pass it.”7
NAFTA, FTAA (Free Trade o f the Americas Agreement)8 and DR-CAFTA are
extensions o f neoliberal economic policy, and seen by its proponents as a foundation for
the development o f strong economies and democratic political systems. Neither has been
proven in the case o f NAFTA and, in the case o f DR-CAFTA the argument seems
unconvincing in the face o f the general failure o f the neoliberal agenda to improve

7Deb Riechmann, “Bush Calls for Democracy in Western World,” The Washington
Post. (Washington, D C.: The Washington Post Company, 6 June 2005), Available
[Online] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/06/
AR2005060601150.html [6 June 2005],
8Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan president has taken very proactive steps to disrupt
the U.S. advancement o f the FTAA by publically condemning it and claiming that it is
really a ruse o f the U.S. Government to help corporate America to exploit Latin America.
Further, he has announced plans to operate a powerful radio station aimed at Latin
America that will serve an anti-US propaganda tool. During the early November 2005
FTAA heads o f Western Hemisphere states held in Argentina, Chavez actively encouraged
workers to protest the U.S. efforts to further the FTAA project.
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conditions in Latin America 9 Nicaragua is a case in point because, among those states in
Latin America, it should have the greatest chance to succeed
Regardless o f the failure o f the promises o f neoliberalism and globalization, there
are no convincing arguments that globalization and the neoliberal agenda are not
inevitable The only effective arguments are expressed in the negative, i.e. that the result
to date has been a general lowering o f standards o f living in third tier states and dramatic
increases in poverty.
The evidence is overwhelming Various ad hoc groups, and organizations10
routinely demonstrate at the various WTO, IMF and G8 conferences, but the evidence for
their anti-globalization and anti-neoliberal agenda is largely anecdotal None-the-less, they
provide the counterweight to what otherwise would be an unchallenged assumption that

9Guillermo Leiva (retired Nicaragua Sandinista Popular Army political officer,
political observer and writer active in the FSLN), in discussions in October 2002 and
December 2003, and email exchanges in November 2004. Opponents in Nicaragua,
especially FSLN supporters, liken DR-CAFTA as an extension o f neocolonialism, and
enslavement o f the low-paid, semi-skilled workers who are victims o f tax-free enterprise
zones whose operations are really maquila sweat shops. Because o f the fact that the
previously strong labor unions in the FSLN period have lost power, and influence the
neoliberal government has regained control o f labor. However, as conditions worsen,
it is likely that a new collective mentality will emerge, and when a strong labor comes
along, the calculus will change dramatically.
“'Organizations include Kevin Danaher’s Global Exchange, and Ralph N ader's
Public Citizen. Influential public citizens include MIT professor Naom Chomsky These
prominent individuals, and NGOs are highly critical o f globalization, and the neoliberal
agenda, and are often the catalyst for large-scale demonstrations against the WTO, IMF,
World Bank, and IMF. Interestingly, an unlikely personage, rock star Bono, has been one
o f the few who takes a head-on proactive, and effective interest in alleviating extreme
poverty, and hunger. He is famous for having accompanied United States Secretary o f the
Treasury Paul O ’Neil to Africa in May 2002 to study the dilemma. In June 2005, he met
with President Bush at the encouragement o f Secretary o f State Rice to appeal for his
support to forgive foreign debt o f the most extreme cases. Bono is seen by the United
States as an altruistic champion for change who put aside politics in favor o f action
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globalization is evitable, and the neoliberal agenda is the only long-term solution for thirdtier south states The Nicaragua example in Latin America is sufficient to provide the
argument pro or con.
The relative failure o f the neoliberal agenda thus far even with the very determined
efforts o f an inordinate number o f NGOs operating in Nicaragua today, begs for
explanation. This is especially so because Nicaragua has enormous natural resources, and
willing workforce, the failure is a paradox in the eyes o f neoliberal proponents, and
external benefactors. If neoliberalism were measured by the progress or lack o f it in
Nicaragua since 1990, it would be seen as a severely flawed solution
While the consensus o f G8 states seems to be that generous programs including
comprehensive loan forgiveness are the short and long-term solutions, the counter
argument is that such programs create dependency relationships that worsen the disparity
in the long term
Opponents o f such solutions argue that states, as with people, develop dependency
relationships despite the best o f intentions on the part o f donor states or organizations. In
political economy terms this can be related to the fundamental dictum o f the egalitarian
system put forth by Marx: “From each according to ability; to each according to need.”
The mixed-model systems approach o f the FSLN is weakened, however, by the
fact that when it was in full bloom after the United States gave up the Contra war and the
FSLN lost its principal patron, the Soviet Union, it was in severe crisis. Further, the very
large government bureaucracy o f the FSLN in its last years proved to be a detriment to
government reform, and in a more subtle but no less important way, permanently affected
the way the general population views the role o f government.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

303

Nestor Avendano argues that the large number o f NGOs operating in Nicaragua
are likewise contributing to a dependency relationships, and ultimately causing the
government to ignore critical issues that are state responsibilities. In the neoliberal vein,
NGOs are seen as a part o f the mix in the neoliberal solution. However, the altruism o f the
NGOs such as Medicines Sans Frontieres is unchallengeable but their presence exists
because o f need for services not provided by the state. Thus, the argument becomes
circular, and any challenges to the benefit o f NGO presence in Nicaragua and other south
states are met with a great deal o f derision.
Those entities that provide unconditional assistance can be seen as both selfless in
motive, and culpable as enablers o f dependency relationships. Such generalizations are
dangerous, especially in view o f the fact that many NGOs are focused on empowerment
for women, nutrition for children, reduction o f domestic violence, transparency in
government, crime reduction and the like-all noble in purpose.
Those who criticize unconditional programs to alleviate poverty ignore the fact
that the IMF/World Bank ESAF project in Nicaragua established certain benchmarks that
would incrementally release funds as benchmarks were reached. It is also true that some
questions can be asked about the strictness o f the benchmark standards. That President
Aleman was able to meet the conditions for ESAF is evidence alone that puts into
question the standards to which he was held. Even at that point in time, Aleman was well
known for his own brand o f crony capitalism, and “big city boss” tactics.11

"D uring his administration Aleman was no friend o f the many NGOs. While his
official position was that such organizations interfere with government operations, the
closer truth was that they interfered with his corruption and kick-back schemes.
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In a Heritage Foundation web release addressing the July 2005 G8 summit in
Gleneagles, the opposition to such unconditional treatment was clearly outlined:
President Bush Should Not Sign On to the ‘Marshal Plan’ for Africa: . . . Gordon
Brown [Britain’s Chancellor o f the Exchequer] plan for Africa has hardly received
a ringing endorsement from the British public he expects to pay the bil l. . . A large
majority o f Britons believe that foreign aid is likely to be wasted by African
governments . . . [and] have no confidence that “money will be spent wisely rather
than being wasted or finding its way into the pockets o f criminals, and corrupt
government.12
The reference to the Marshal Plan makes clear that some rescue is in order, but the
Marshal Plan was distinctive in that while it did provide unconditional support, most effort
was focused on rebuilding the infrastructure o f Western Europe. In any case, there is
consensus that the dilemma o f south states must be addressed; the dispute is over how.
The U.S. and the UK should form a powerful alliance at Gleneagles calling for the
abolition o f artificial trade barriers by Western nations. President Bush and Prime
Minister Blair should jointly call for the scrapping o f Europe’s £33 billion ($60
billion) per year Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the biggest barrier to Free
Trade in the world and a vast welfare system for uncompetitive European farmers
French farmers alone receive a staggering £7 billion a year in CAP payments, 21
percent o f the total.[3] At the same time, the U.S. must pledge to end its own
(albeit far smaller) system o f agricultural subsidies. The United States and Great
Britain should advance a vision for Africa that emphasizes political and economic
reform on the continent, as well as open access to European and American
markets, and which condemns those African governments that tyrannize their own
populations. The Anglo-American communique must deliver a clear message: only
Africa’s leaders themselves can deliver their own people from poverty.13
The thrust o f the G8 summit was focused on the Africa states’ emergency, and the
United States was participating in its role as a leading member o f the G8, but its larger

12Niie Gardiner, “The G-8 Summit: Advancing U.S. Leadership on Africa,”
(Heritage Foundation Web Release WebMemo #784, July 6, 2005). Available
[Online]:http://www.heritage.org/Research/IntemationalOrganizations/wm784.cfm [8 July
2005],
,3Ibid.
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interests lay in Latin America in the long term. European interests are focused on former
European colonies in Africa that are now in dire straights; the opponents o f neoliberalism
would quickly identify the neoliberal/neocolonial relationship between European states and
African states as the direct cause, and lay the responsibility for the solution at the feet o f
the Europeans. The United States is seen similarly culpable in its relationships with Latin
American states.
It is clear that the solutions taken at the G8 summit are also the same as would be
considered for HIPC states in Latin America. Likewise, the same anti-neoliberal/antiglobalization arguments are used by opponents to the development o f the FTAA. Further,
the United States is vulnerable in the area o f farm agricultural subsidies and subject to
criticism. Opponents to the neoliberal agenda see the European Union’s Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) as not unlike what the United States does to protect its own
agricultural commodities producers in Latin America, thereby strenghening Hugo Chavez’
argument against United States’ championed FTAA. (See later discussion.)

The Washington Consensus Revisited
While it is not necessary to review the Consensus point by point, it is sufficient to
say that since 1990 Nicaragua has taken at least nominal steps to enter the neoliberal
strategy. The implementation o f World Bank14 and IMF programs are developed based on
fundamental goals o f poverty reduction outlined in the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility programs. While Nicaragua continues to make progress, it is still well below the

14The major World Bank division that is responsible for HIPC, and ESAF
programs is the International Development Association (Bank).
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Central American, and Latin American states’ averages in critical areas o f poverty
reduction.15
The August 1999 IDA/IMF Preliminary Document on the Initiative fo r Heavily

Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)'6 was critical to the decision to reach the “decision
point,” and approve President Aleman’s plan outlines the structural readjustment and
reform. These include reforms in the tax system, labor market, social security institutions,
financial sector, trade, pricing policy, rule o f law, governance, accountability, transparency
in management o f public finances, poverty reduction, education and rural development .17
One example o f transparency in government is Nicaragua’s executive branch’s
very well developed use o f the internet to provide data and other information. Likewise,
the National Assembly has its own web site that tracks debate and legislation as well as
provides email addresses for each o f the Assembly’s nearly one hundred delegates.18 These
government and National Assembly sites are interesting because they both reveal the

15World Bank, Nicaragua Development Policy Review 3, Sustaining Broad-based
Growth 3 December 2004 (Washington, D C.: IDA/IMF) Available [Online]:
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/ servlet/WDS ContentServer/W DSP/IB/2005
/02/11/000012009 20050211102015/Rendered/PDF/291150NI.pdf [6 July 2005], This
report in early 2005 provides substantial detail on the status o f Nicaragua’s ESAF
progress

16Preliminary Document on the Initiative fo r Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC). (Washington, D C : IDA/IMF, 23 August 1999).
17The government o f President Violeta Chamorro failed to meet the conditions o f
the first ESAF which ran from 1994 to 1997. The first ESAF debt relief was granted in
March 1998. In September 1998 President Aleman’s poverty reduction, and other
structural reforms satisfied the World Bank, and IMF such that Nicaragua was declared an
HIPC, and a beneficiary o f the programs debt relief regime.
18Nicaragua National Assembly, home web site. Available [Online]: http://www
asamblea.gob.ni/ [15 June 2005],
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domestic variables at play in debate and unanalyzed information that allows some ability to
measure political stability

A Comparison with Neighboring States
Nicaragua’s experience in the past thirty-five years could have been that o f any
similar Latin American state; however, the highlights o f its experience seem more
exaggerated. To the casual observer, the historical experiences and conditioning o f the
peoples o f all Central American states are very similar; however, the outcomes are far
different. For example, social unrest and economic disparity in El Salvador (similar to that
in Nicaragua) in the early 1930s gave impetus to a socialist-inspired people’s revolution o f
1932, but few immediate reforms and changes were undertaken as a result.19
The revolution in El Salvador did not bring about a upheaval such as seen in
Nicaragua, nor did the United States intervene directly as in Nicaragua. While other
Central American states share many characteristics with Nicaragua, they are not the same
nor has the result from external support been the same. The table below is very revealing.
It provides decade-specific results for the economy’s performance that align very closely
to the radical changes occurred in modern history o f Nicaragua. While the results are not
necessarily surprising, what is interesting is how very specifically the expected data aligns
with the decades.

19The Communist Party o f El Salvador, and Red Aid led by Faribundo Marti led
the rebellion o f laborers who were suffering under a repressive system o f near-slave wages
in coffee plantations. In the 1970s, and 1980s, the leftist group that opposed the El
Salvador military dominated governments was named in his honor: the FMLN, Faribundo
Marti Liberation Nacional.
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Table 2: Output Growth Variations 1960-2000 (Percentage Change)

1960-1970

1970-1980

1980-1990

1990-2000

Nicaragua

6.77

.35

-1.14

3.28

Latin America and
Caribbean change (average)

5.08

4.69

1.21

3 .54

Source:

International Development Association/International Monetary Fund,

Preliminary Document on the Initiative fo r Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
(Washington, D C.: IDA/IMF, 23 August 1999), 30.

Measuring Nicaragua’s performance in output growth in ten-year increments is
revealing because it demonstrates that relative to the rest o f Latin America, Somoza
Debayle’s “crony capitalism” was effective in result. That is not say that it included social
or economic equity, only that overall economy prospered.
The period 1970-1990 shows a dramatic drop in output. That includes the period
that began in December 1972 with the Christmas earthquake that wiped out M anagua’s
infrastructure when the FSLN began to gain strength, and finally achieve victory.

W orse

still is the FSLN period from 1980 to 1990. When compared to the averages for all Latin
American and Caribbean states for the same periods, the evidence is very compelling.
The FSLN period, reflects very poor, negative performance that was affected by
the Contra War and the various strategies o f the United States to bring down the
government. However, notwithstanding those pressures, the datum from 1980 to 1990 for
Nicaragua seems worse than would be expected given the substantial Soviet Union and
Cuba s u p p o rt; however, the overall average for Latin America was also poor during the
period. Remarkable, and an indicator o f the potential for recovery plus the effects o f the
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early neoliberal agenda, Nicaragua was nearly even with the overall average. What is the
most evident data set, however, is the relatively large difference in the period 1960 to
1970 for Nicaragua against the Latin America and Caribbean average.
The period from 1991 to 2000 is the most interesting for this work because it
reflects competitive growth that began with a severe deficit, a series o f devastating natural
disasters, and a fundamental change in the direction o f government policies to fit the
neoliberal agenda. While it is easy to explain the difficulties during the FSLN period, it is
more difficult to explain the successes from 1991 to 2000 unless neoliberalism, and its
facilitating actions by the World Bank, IMF and IADB are seen as positive forces
The Nicaraguan governments in power cannot resolve the dilemma by returning to
old habits nor can the most powerful domestic forces continue along self-destructive
paths. The neoliberal pieces are in place, but can they be arranged in such a manner to
remake Nicaragua into a modern, post Cold War state operating in the global market
place? A comparison with the experiences o f Costa Rica and Honduras are very revealing
Moreover, Mexico provides an early, and long-term example o f the neoliberal solution in
the form o f NAFTA.
Costa Rica and Honduras, as Nicaragua’s immediate neighboring states represent
both the best and worst result over the long term. Thus, they are used here for comparison
in performance but are not subjects for individual examination. Not unexpected, they have
remarkably parallel experiences, but the differences are significant. Many parallels can be
drawn between Nicaragua and other Central American states over time, but the unique
series o f events and pressures that influenced domestic independent variables in Nicaragua
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are such that Nicaragua finds itself at a crossroads that can only be addressed and resolved
through a national consensus and internal cooperative effort.
Since 1948, Costa Rica has managed to become the Central American model o f
success.20 The state adopted a mixed-economy model that is heaviest on the free-market
side, addressed the socio-economic disparity issues, and produced a stable political
environment that allows flexibility and operates with more than just a nominal political
democracy system. It produced a Nobel Peace Prize winner in former president, Oscar
Arias, who played a key role in the termination o f Nicaragua’s civil war. Only Costa Rica
remained relatively prosperous despite the pressures o f the Contra war and the flow o f
economic refugees that clearly affected its ability to provide services and jobs.21 Since
Costa Rica’s new constitution, and democratic systems that came about in 1948, and the
abolition o f its army in 1949, and despite the migration pressures o f the Nicaraguan
revolution, Costa Rica managed to stay on track. It has maintained a rich legacy o f social
responsibility as the centerpiece o f government domestic policy, and managed to maintain
a stable economy. It can be held up as a successful example o f policy and management in
the West European “social democracy” style.
Costa Rica suffered along with other Latin American states during the late 1980s
and mid 1990s, but its overall record o f poverty reduction improved slightly during that

20Self proclaimed as the “Switzerland o f the Americas.”
21It was Costa Rica’s President Oscar Arias recognizing the debilitating effect o f
the ongoing war, who organized the Esquipulas conference that, despite United States
government efforts to undermine it, brought a recognition that only a cessation o f conflict
in the region would allow a return to economic normalcy, and possible recovery. It was his
effort as much as the U.S. Congress’ refusal to further fund the Contra Forces that
brought about a transition to peace in the region
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period from 1986 when it was at 29 4 percent to 1995 when it was reduced to 25.6
percent. Most o f Costa Rica’s improvement is attributed to economic grow th.22
What is remarkable about the Costa Rica success is that while its history is a near
mirror copy o f Nicaragua’s until the early 1930s, it has far fewer natural resources, less
fertile arable land, and no strong attraction for foreign investment except its long-term
social and political stability. Since the 1948 Constitution ending a protracted civil war,
Costa Rica has been a stable democracy While not without its problems, it spawned very
competent presidents including Oscar Arias who was the architect o f the so-called
Contadora Agreement that finally put an end to the Central American civil war that had
been ongoing since 1967.23
While during the same period both Nicaragua and Costa Rica had substantial
government policy focused on social welfare and poverty reduction, Nicaragua remains
one o f the poorest states in Latin America with the a substantial poverty problem 24 In
2000, Nicaragua had the highest short-term external debt ($201 million) o f any small Latin
American or Caribbean state by a significant margin; the Dominican Republic was the next
at $187 million.25
Honduras, Nicaragua’s immediate neighbor to the north, is, along with Nicaragua,
one o f the four HIPC cases in Latin America. As reflected in the economic data, and social

22Kuczynski and Williamson, eds., 42.
23Costa Rica President Oscar Arias won the Noble Peace Prize for his efforts.
24Ibid„ 317.
25Detailed earlier, the illegal flow o f Nicaraguan workers to Costa Rica has caused
a crackdown, and tightening o f borders by the Costa Rica government. Further, Costa
Rican politicians publically complain that the flow o f illegal immigrants from Nicaragua is
causing a crisis in the state’s well developed social security, and public health systems.
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data. (See Table 1.) Honduras is in about the same situation as Nicaragua except it has far
fewer natural resources, a history o f despotic regimes and a very weak infrastructure. Its
history is at least as politically checkered as that o f Nicaragua except there have been no
significant social revolutions, nor has the United States intervened militarily except in
using Honduras as a “war platform” for the Contra war. Not to be overlooked, however,
was the advantage o f strategic position during the counter-revolutionary period o f
Nicaragua from roughly 1984 to 1988 that made Honduras extremely valuable to the
United States’ Central Intelligence Agency-sponsored Contra operations basing, and
operations. A cynic might observe that Honduras has nothing to offer, therefore, nothing
has been wasted on it.
H onduras’ recent, and past history reflects little more than obsequious behavior
toward the United States with a long series o f military dictatorships or puppet
governments There is little to recommend it from the perspective o f strategic advantage,
and its economy offers very little to the outside investor except its potential as a “maquila
state.” It is clearly in need o f outside assistance to relieve poverty through greater
participation in the world markets. Its FDI standing is remarkably high,26 no doubt because
o f its having subordinated itself to the wishes o f outside investors, and it remains a primary
HIPC program target for the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB). (See Appendix IV.)

26While stability is a necessary ingredient for would-be foreign investors, the
United States dominance in the region, and its history in Honduras provides a substitute
for stability. This is self-evident, however, must be recalled to explain the current FDI
situation, and reflect on the past behavior o f the United States in the region in the first
third o f the 20th Century.
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In terms o f foreign investment, Honduras stands between Nicaragua and Costa
Rica largely because if offers an environment o f low wages and minimal costs to outside
investment. While not a Central American state, M exico’s experiences and circumstance
can be used to measure successes and failures in Central America. Mexico can been seen
as a test-bed for neoliberalism in Latin America and held up as the example o f a state in
the region that early on fully subscribed to the neoliberal agenda by joining NAFTA as an
original founder. (CAFTA is largely modeled on NAFTA, and intended to emcompass the
balance o f the Western Hemisphere.) Its experience is illustrative o f the effects o f
NAFTA’s neoliberal core tenets 27 Its successes and failures since early 1994, therefore,
are o f interest because it serves as a benchmark and point o f departure for discussion o f
the relative merits o f neoliberalism and the potential for DR-CAFTA.
In Latin America, Mexico is a proto-typical second tier state and the liabilities that
go with that status. Mexican President Vicente Fox faces the political and economic
consequences o f the NAFTA decision. He was elected as the first non-PRI president since
1917,28 and expectations were that he, as an experienced and successful corporate
executive with close United States business ties, would lead Mexico to regained
prosperity. M exico’s having signed on for NAFTA, and its neoliberal program, however,
came with no guarantees.

27Nearly all non-tariff barriers were removed for trade between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico, and NAFTA called for phase-out o f all tariffs (with some
exceptions) between five, and 15 years after it became effective.
28Vicente Fox ran as the PAN (National Action Party) candidate, and took office in
January 2001. He was the first non-PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party) candidate who
won the presidency since 1917. His support, at least in part, was due to M exico’s failing
economy, and the failure to the PRI to convince Mexican voters that it the PRI would be
able to move Mexico toward recovery while reducing corruption in government.
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Mexico is further down the road than most states; however, while Mexican wages
are low compared with what they once were, they are still higher than those o f much o f
Asia and Central America. Investors who flocked to Mexico in recent decades to take
advantage o f cheap labor are now leaving for China, Malaysia and Guatemala. That has
cost Mexico thousands o f jobs exacerbating the oversupply that keeps wages down, said
Basilio Gonzalez, o f the federal government commission that sets the minimum wage
“Mexico faces a difficult dilemma.” . . . On the one side there is social justice, and
the need to provide human beings with what they need. On the other side is the
logic o f the market. If companies are not competitive, they close. The problem is
how to balance these factors. Many analysts interviewed said that Mexico needs to
position itself as a source o f higher-paid, higher-skilled labor . . . The United
Nations recently issued a report on M exico’s development, saying its northern
states have a level o f development akin to the Czech Republic, Brunei and
Hungary, and would rank among the top 35 countries in the world. But it said the
worse-off, such as Chiapas and Oaxaca in Mexico, would not crack the top 100,
and have even less development than Samoa and the Dominican Republic.29
Gonzales observes that Mexico is really tw o economies: one that reflect the old
dynamics and, in the north, reflect the neoliberal result. Both results are not good, and
Gonzales clearly see that some effort must be made to break the mold o f both. That
Mexico has not fared as well as expected is reflected in the flow o f illegal immigration to
the United States even while the United States government paints a rosy picture o f success
as President Bush champions NAFTA’s clone in the form o f the DR-CAFTA. The point is
that even the “best case” scenario has not met expectations, and the result is still driven by
the internal dynamics.

29Mary Jordan, “W orkers Falling Behind in Mexico: For Many, Wages Still Lower
Than Before ‘90s Crisis,” The Washington Post, (Washington, DC: The Washington Post
Company, 15 July 2003) Available [Online] :<http:// www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/
w p-dyn/A56121-2003Jul4?language =printer>. [15 July 2003],
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Credit must be given to the FSLN for several fundamental changes in the internal
dynamics o f Nicaragua that will, in the long run, enable the state to make necessary
adjustments.30 The first, and most obvious contribution is that change was and is possible
in the core values o f society. The second contribution, a corollary o f the first, is that the
general population now has a sense o f empowerment that goes beyond just the FSLN
period, and which is still in play today in domestic politics
Another more subtle but no less important change is the empowerment o f women
in society and politics. This can still be seen in the high number o f female judges who were
appointed during the FSLN period 31 The empowerment o f women, and their sense o f
empowerment brings another dynamic not seen before in Nicaragua. If they see
neoliberalism as failing in the long term, they may be a force to deal with that is not well
understood.
Finally, despite the pro-United States tradition o f the RAAN and RAAS, and the
early bumbling o f the FSLN to bring the region into the revolution, the FSLN 1985written Constitution provides specific and enforceable rights to the Miskito culture
including their rights to communal lands, and local authority placed in the hands o f the
Miskito community leaders. However, at present, there is only one Miskito in the National
Assembly, and in the recent past only one Miskito creole has held high office in the
national government.

30This is in reference to the “old” FSLN that governed from 1979 to 1990, not the
modem fractured FSLN from which many o f its early leaders have departed.
31T o the chagrin o f Bolahos, FSLN appointed judges were involved in the

prosecution o f cases that he brought in the name o f reform. Arguably, former President
Aleman, and some o f his cronies received light sentences for their not-so-subtle
transgressions.
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Much o f the current turmoil is centered on powers o f the executive. One o f the
FSLN inspired legislative maneuvers is to establish judicial police function in the Russian
style. This is anathema to a political democracy, and, if instituted, will roll back political
gains and violate the principle o f separation o f branches o f government.
However, to borrow from the adage that “the more things change, the more they
stay the same,” it is also clear that little has changed since 1979 with the influence o f the
Church, the business community and its instruments o f influence (COSEP, et. al), and the
politics o f the oligarchy. The Church still involves itself in politics o f the day as it did
during and before the FSLN period. While Bolanos and Cardinal Obando y Bravo retain
the old assumptions about the role o f state and church as mutually supportive, the new
form aligns itself with the political consciousness o f the people that was engendered by
activist priests, Liberation Theology and the FSLN readiness to include the Church in
politics.32
As for organized labor, the labor rights introduced into the current Nicaraguan
Constitution in 1985 by the FSLN remain intact as does the attitude o f self-empowerment
and political action. Before the FSLN, the labor sector was a cleverly manipulated pawn o f
the Somoza dynasty, however, in its new form it is a force that President Bolanos must
consider. Most o f organized labor in Nicaragua does not favor the neoliberal solution,
especially in view o f the poor performance o f the past fifteen years

32It seems a reasonable assumption that the Roman Catholic Church in Latin
America finds it necessary to engage in secular politics in order to carry out its work.
Without such involvement, the leverage o f the Church would be far less. In any case, its
involvement is an historical fact; given the intent o f Liberation Theology, it would seem
that part o f its mandate to serve the poor much necessarily include political engagement.
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With regard to civil society as a whole, the FSLN experience was life altering, and,
more important, raised social consciousness to a new high for Nicaragua. This is clearly
reflected in the majority control o f the National Assembly today. With the majority firmly
controlled by the combination PLC/FSLN pacto and its quite vociferous and contentious
relationship with the executive branch o f government, it has legitimacy like no previous
legislative body.33
Because there is little political energy left for a return to the “old” FSLN, it seems
likely that yet another party will form to oppose the pacto between Ortega and Aleman.
Bolanos’ influence, both due to his age and his participation in the neoliberal agenda will
wane. The safe bet prediction is that a pacto-selected candidate will be the next president
o f Nicaragua, and that his or her government will undertake some hybrid strategy to retain
what is good about neoliberalism (including the generous grants and loans), and undertake
some social welfare agenda along the lines o f Costa Rica’s European-style social
democracy. The activism and social consciousness that the FSLN engendered will mean
that any new government will be under close scrutiny and held to account. This is a
positive legacy.

Conclusions
In the meantime, the old oligarchy will struggle to find a role in the new system,
and business will take the pragmatic solution as the best route as it did during the FSLN
period for survival. The Church will continue to play an activist role, and labor will

33While in the U.S. context that may be viewed as politically healthy, the National
Assembly’s constant maneuvering to usurp Bolanos’ executive powers is probably
unhealthy for stability, and internal confidence in government.
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continue to press for equity. Predictions above are just that, and only useful to summarize
the dynamics o f the internal variables. No matter the final outcome, and direction that
Nicaragua takes, while the outside independent variable o f near-constant attention will not
abate,34 the internal variables will have to make the necessary adjustments on Nicaraguan
terms to take full advantage o f the only game in town.
Returning to Jagdish Bhagwati’s In Defense o f Globalism, the critics o f the
neoliberal agenda must turn to logic and pragmatism, and the proponents must allow the
space for the domestic internal variables to find long-term, culturally acceptable solutions.
No matter the altruism or morally driven motives o f the north states, the solution must be
within Nicaragua, not an imposed remedy that has no ownership. It is in this context that
the Nicaraguan people must make difficult and sometimes bitter choices. In the meantime,
there being no other apparent solution, they are forced to find their bootstraps and move
on.
What is most clear is that the general population o f the Republic o f Nicaragua
must decide for itself how to deal with neoliberalism in the face o f its inevitable rise as the
predominant post-Cold War global system. Whether it is seen as another form o f
imperialism-economic imperialism-is irrelevant. What is relevant is that south states such
as Nicaragua now have a chance to condition their existence in the new order, and
decisions taken internally will certainly be more viable than those imposed by outside
forces. To some degree this explains the long-term popularity o f Daniel Ortega and

34It seems very unlikely that there would be a repeat o f the FSLN revolution in any
form because o f the received knowledge o f the electorate at large, and because there are
no longer benefactors such as the Soviet Union or Cuba that have motive to control the
state through economic means.
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FSLN’s control o f the National Assembly. It also explains why General Zelaya is still held
in reverence despite his anti-Church policies o f the time It was he gave Nicaragua the
knowledge and pride that it could, when the will exists, to defy the United States no
matter the cost. This is not to ignore the obvious economic pressures o f unfettered
capitalism, but to remark on the fact that south states have the ability to take certain
decisions that had been imposed on them through economic pressures.
During the FTAA heads o f state summit held in Argentina in early November 2005
to confer on the future o f the agreement, tw o heads o f state for two o f the biggest in
South America publically opposed the FTAA as it stands. While Hugo Chavez opposed
the FTAA outright, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva o f Brazil is holding out for
agricultural subsidies as an exception to the agreement. M exico’s President Fox later
admonished Chavez asking that he moderate his rhetoric. In return, Chavez threatened
Fox and called him a “puppy” o f the United States. At the end o f the skirmish both
presidents withdrew their ambassadors from the other’s states. While such antics on the
part o f Chavez are amusing on the surface, the split between Chavez and large, developed
states such as Mexico does not bode well for a hemispheric-wide, focused effort to
overcome increasing disparity in the face o f inevitable neoliberalism.35
Recent history points toward Brazil as a responsible state that undertook austerity
measures in the mid-1990s to overcome an economic crisis begun in Asia; its tradition is
furthered by the former Brazilian President Henrique Cardoso. On the other hand,
Chavez’ behavior points toward little more populist rhetoric and seemingly irresponsible

35BBC World News, “Chavez and Fox Dispute Escalates,” BBC World News,
Available [Online]:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4438876.stm [16 November 2005],
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alliances with Castro and Cuba as the model for economic success. Chavez is able to carry
off such a campaign because the neoliberal rubric has not worked, and many Latin
Americans perceive far greater economic disparity than the 1980s when the most
governments turned toward truly democratic systems, and undertook to compete (even
with import substitution) in a purely capitalistic world economy.
The above is to provide food for thought that anti-neoliberalism has traction even
in the face o f its inevitability and at least Chavez’ political survival depends on it, but the
larger issue is whether or how states such as Brazil will be able to make responsible
adjustments in the face o f its own extant anti-globalization forces. Most states in Latin
America have the ability to deal with the tough issue, but whether the political will and
determination exists among general populations is another question entirely. Most
certainly, the perception that the United States is forcing the neoliberal rubric on Latin
America through DR-CAFTA and FTAA provides fuel to the its opposition, and makes it
far more difficult for Latin American states to take pro-neoliberal steps in an effort to
correct the economic and political disparity that exists. Certainly, the fourth FTAA heads
o f state summit held in Argentina in early November 2005 and the events that surrounded
it points toward a long and difficult process. The success o f neoliberalism depends in part
on political stability, and without it there is little chance for success. Likewise, there is
very little likelihood that Latin American states will embark on some hybrid mixed-model
such as that tried by the FSLN.
The first meeting o f the FTAA was held in Miami in December 1994. Through
later iterations including later meetings in Santiago, Chile in 1998; Quebec, Canada in
2001; and Monterrey, Mexico in 2004, Latin American states have come closer to
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enacting some agreement to that follows the tenets o f neoliberalism. The third draft o f
that agreement is on the table for consideration 36 The fourth summit, held in Mar de
Plata, Argentina 4 to 5 November 2005, theme was “Creating Jobs to Fight Poverty and
Strengthen Democratic Governance.”37 It is that signal along with the open opposition to
the United States advancement o f the FTAA, that forecasts that Latin American states
intend to stand firm on their own needs rather than routinely acquiesce to the United
States in the pre-1990 (end o f Cold War) model. That signal can be seen as a positive in
that it points toward more independent and responsible behavior on the part o f Latin
American states; however, as above, the obstacles to overcome seem insurmountable.
It would seem that President Bush, if presumed to be well intended and altruistic in
his support for the FTAA), may fall into the hands o f the anti-neoliberal proponents by
tough talk that does not go down well for people on the wrong end o f the economic
equation. On 6 November 2005 during a state visit to Brazil, Bush, taking direct aim at
Chavez stated that Latin American states have a choice between the neoliberal rubric o f
the FTAA or a far worse alternative. He outlined two choices, neither o f which would
palatable to most Latin Americans, “an American-supported ‘vision o f hope’ and another
that ‘seeks to roll back the democratic progress o f the past two decades.’ Such a
democratic retrenchment, the president said, would be ‘playing to fear, pitting neighbor

36Free Trade o f the Americas (web site), “Free Trade o f the Americas Agreement .”
Available [Online],http://www .ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index_e.asp [6 November
2005],
37Ibid.
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against neighbor, and blaming others for their own failures to provide for their people.’”38
Bush plays into the fear that the United States will continue to dominate The very title o f
Walker’s work, Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow o f the Eagle reflects that fear.
Thus, Nicaragua with other Latin American states, have bitter choices to make in
the face o f the inevitability o f neoliberalism. Those choices have never been so difficult,
yet to retain the dignity o f its people, Latin America as a whole must seek its own
solutions and make accommodations to find a best fit in the future. The results o f the
FTAA summit held in Mar de Plata, Argentina reflect the divisiveness o f the Latin
American states regarding neoliberalism with Venezuela’s Chavez being the most vocal
opponent Venezuela, as an oil rich OPEC member can shrug o ff and even threaten the
United States, at least for the short term, but all other Latin American states especially
those in Central America and the Caribbean are agrarian states that depend on
accessability to the export market to survive.
While DR-CAFTA concentrates on those states most dependent on the export
market, the FTAA is another matter entirely with major states such as Brazil and
Argentina that have solid heavy industrial development are reluctant to embark on a
neoliberal path that would require them to give up protections that they now can adjust at
will. O f the 34 members o f the FTAA, there is a clear split between those that want
neoliberalism for access to markets and those that either do not want it (Venezuela, Brazil,

38Elizabeth Bumiller and Larry Router, “Bush, Replying to Chavez, Urges Latin
Americans to Follow U.S.,” New York Times. (New York: New York Times, 7 November
2005). Available [Online]:http://www.nytimes.com/2005/1 l/07/intemational/07prexy
ready.html [7 November 2005],

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

323

Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay39) or other states (Colombia and Chile) that have a
combination o f heavy industry and heavy agriculture exports which makes for an even
more difficult decision.40 In fact, Colombia and Chile heads o f states tried in vain to act as
mediators between the pro-FTAA (neoliberalism) and the anti-FTAA. The final outcome
was that the parties recognized that there was a split and, in effect, tw o statements were
released. Nicaragua, as a member o f DR-CAFTA and an agriculture commodities
exporter sided with President Bush along with 27 other regional leaders.
The results o f the FTAA summit bring into sharp focus the issues o f neoliberalism
and the reactions among the various Western Hemisphere states. Further, the conference
reflects that at least for Nicaragua and other states that are dependent on agriculture

39With the exception o f Venezuela, these states make up the core membership o f
the MERCOSUR (Southern Cone M arket) which initiated its own version o f neoliberalism
on 31 March 1994 to reduce trade barriers and “normalize” trade procedures and
methods. Chile later became an associate member o f MERCOSUR. The MERCOSUR,
while initially viable has fallen by the wayside because o f the severe economic downturn
that Brazil and Argentina (its two most important members) in the mid-1990s. In South
America, another trade regime that has similar goals is the Andean Community that came
into being in 1969 (formerly known as the Andean Pact). The irony is that the Andean
Community and MERCOSUR embraced the same tenets as those o f neoliberalism and
codified them in early FTAA declarations. Probably some o f the fear o f the dissenting
states is that the FTAA would subsume the more region specific trade regimes and leave
their member states at the mercy o f the United States. Certainly not forgotten by
Nicaragua is the CACM (Central American Common Market) that was formed in 1960 for
the same purposes; however, the CACM self destructed because its members were either
at war or in revolution. CACM members were Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and
Nicaragua: El Salvador and Honduras “soccer war” (1969) over issues o f El Salvadoran
undocumented workers in Honduras, and Nicaragua (mid 1970s to 1979 to remove
Anastasio Somoza Debayle and civil war from 1979 to 1990). The losses that Nicaragua
suffered that resulted from the revolution and civil war that followed are very difficult to
measure, but if the failure o f the CACM is also included then the losses are incalculable.
40Andres Oppenheimer, “The Final Outcome o f Summit: Two Americas,” Miami
Herald, 6 November 2005. Available [Online]:http/www.miami.coom/mld/miamiherald/
news/13095474.htm [9 November 2005],
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commodities exports that they both recognize that their inevitable choice must be
neoliberalism but that other more powerful states in the region can resist to retain control
o f their own trade policies. It is interesting to note that President Fox o f Mexico lectured
the dissidents to the inevitability o f the rubric and that any resistance would result in even
more economic disparity and poverty. "There are 29 countries willing to advance on the
FTAA, we can do it without the other five."41
On the whole, the FTAA M ar de Plata summit reflects the split between Latin
American states, but probably more important illustrates that Latin American states each
has its own needs and goals. The United States, likewise, is beginning to recognize this
fact, but despite that Latin Americans retain in the recent historical memory that the
United States has treated most o f Latin America as a unit, something that has existed since
President M onroe’s state o f the union address parts o f which later became to be known as
the M onroe Doctrine. In effect, Latin Americans (including the dissenters in Nicaragua)
see the FTAA and DR-CAFTA as a step toward, not away from, complete United States
hegemony in the Americas. In any case, each state must formulate its own trade policy.
Nicaragua may have little choice; it is no stretch to liken its situation to that o f a drug
addict in a dependency cycle that cannot be broken.
Unquestionably, the United States must see DR-CAFTA and FTAA in a larger
context that reveals its effort to dominate the world economic system in a struggle with
both the European Union and China while at the same time finding itself closer to
Huntington’s Clash o f Civilizations in the War on Terror. In effect, the United States is

41“Two Americas Reject Free Trade Agreement” Pravda, 7 November 2005.
Available [Online]:http ://english. pravda. ru/w orld/20/91/368/16420_summit.html [9
November 2005],
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struggling to retain its Cold War dominance but with economic hegemony as the tool;
Latin American states must first deal with the realities at hand and therefore have a more
narrow scope In some sense, the successful “incursions” o f the European Union and the
powerful Asian states into Latin America challenge the underlying tenets o f the Monroe
Doctrine.
The various economic instruments o f power o f the United States and its most
powerful allies demand (and receive) reforms from those dependent states in return for
loan forgiveness, grants, in-kind aid and other benefits. The reforms are reviewed and
“approved” by officials o f those instruments who may or may not have a solid
understanding o f the consequences o f each reform. On the one hand, the neoliberal
foundation o f those instruments can demand poverty reduction documents such as the
PRGF submitted first by President Aleman, but the implementation itself is entirely
another and governed by the critical internal independent variables. Nicaragua’s lack o f
progress since Aleman’s election is proof enough that such an approach has been
ineffective. That relationship can easily be seen by opponents o f neoliberalism and the
FTAA as its extension as higher form o f neo-colonialism in M arx’ theoretical structure.
In a February 2003 World Bank Group publication, “The Distributional Impact o f
Loans in Nicaragua: Are the Poor Worse Off?” Nicaragua Poverty Assessment, the net
effect o f international loans to Nicaragua was that the poor got poorer between 1993 and
2001 late in the Chamorro administration and squarely during the Aleman period. Aleman
had convinced the World Bank in 1999 that Nicaragua was in dire straights. The
agreement that he negotiated, the PRGF, replaced the earlier ESAF negotiated by the
Chamorro administration. Despite the World Banks agreement based on Aleman’s PRGF,
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the situation worsened. The 2003 report reveals: “But decomposition o f average
treatment by decile reveals a disconcerting reality. The negative impact o f loans [based on
the negotiated PRGF] on the consumption and income o f the poor indicates that cash
loans may work against attempts at reducing poverty.
W orse still, and despite some indications on the positive side such as a slowly
decreasing level o f extreme poverty, foreign direct investment between the period 2000
and 2004 declined by six million dollars while the change during the same period for Costa
Rica was an increase o f $181 million, poverty.42

Table 3: Net Direct Foreign Investment 2000-2004 (US$ Millions)

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Nicaragua

267

150

204

201

261

Costa Rica

404

445

628

550

585

Honduras

282

193

176

198

195

Source: United Nations, “Latin America and the Caribbean: Net Foreign Investment,”
ECLAC Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile:
ECLAC, April 2004). Available [Online]:http://www.eclas.cl/cgi-bin/getProd.asp
?xml=/publications/xml 1/21231/P21231 xml&xsl=/deype/tpl-i/p9f.xsl&base=/tpl
/imprimir.xsl [6 July 2005],

The obvious conclusion, based on these recent data, is that Nicaragua has not
gained in the FDI arena at all during the period, and Costa Rica (already a relatively

42Arianna Legovini, “The Distributional Impact o f Loans in Nicaragua: Are the
Poor Worse Off? Annex 8” Nicaragua Poverty Assessment (World Bank), February
2003, 14. Available[Online]: http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/lac/lacinfoclient.nsf70/31a
\78860d493b7d685256e 3900647139/$FILE/Nicaragua%20Poverty%20Asessm%20
Annex-8.pdf [24 January 2006],
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well-off state) gained by nearly twenty-five percent. The table further illustrates that
neighboring Honduras, also an HIPC state, suffered a greater blow in the FDI arena. (See
Appendix IV for a comparative look at 1990 to 2001 FDI in terms o f rank and score.)
The Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) has itself come under recent
scrutiny as ineffective and burdensome. In an April 2005 World Bank internal learning
course43 for World Bank and International Monetary Fund employees, there is self
criticism that much improvement is needed
The Bottom Line => Mixed Success; Clear Room for Improvement; PRSP
approach has significant potential but achievements have fallen short, especially in
IMF-relevant areas; Policy discussions on macroeconomic and related issues
remain largely unaffected, Little progress in understanding obstacles to growth;
and Links between public policies, growth and poverty PRGF program design has
moved in the right direction, but progress in some areas is only marginal.44
While the international community seeks a better understanding o f the failures o f
neoliberalism, and external programs to facilitate economic recovery, the most immediate
solutions are internal and can only be acted on internally. For Nicaragua, the critical
internal independent variables-the Church, labor, business and civil society as a
whole-must examine the past, and move toward a more viable solution; bitter choices
must be taken.

43World Bank. Evaluation o f Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and the
Proverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) 25 April 2005 (Independent Evaluation
Office). Available [Online]: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRSl/Resources
/Attacking-Poverty-Course/399075-1115239057864/slchelsky.pdf. [9 April 2006],
44Ibid , 14.
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APPENDIX I
United Fruit Company1
(Spanish original)

Cuando sono la trompeta, estuvo
todo preparado en la tierra
y Jehova repartio el mundo
a Coca-Cola, Inc., Anaconda,
Ford Motors, y otras entidades:
la Compania Frutera, Inc.
se reservo lo mas jugosao,
la costa central de mi tierra
la dulce cintura de America.
Bautizo de nuevo sus tierras
como “Republicas Bananas,”
y sobre los muertos dormidos,
sobre los heroes inquitos
que conquistaron la grandeza,
la libertad y las banderas
establecio la opera bufa:
enajeno los albedrios
regalo coronas de Cesar
desenvainola envidia, atrajo
la dictadura de las moscas
moscas Trujillos, moscas Tachos
moscas Carias, moscas Martinez
moscas Ubico, moscas humedas
de sangre humilde y mermelada,
moscas borrachas que zumban
sobre las tumbas populares
moscas de circo, sabias moscas
entendidas en tirania
Entre las moscas sanquinarias
la Frutera desembarca,
atrasando el cafe y las frutas
en sus barcos que deslizaron
como bandejas el tesero
de nuestras tierras sumergidas

'Pablo Neruda, “The United Fruit Company.” Selected Poems o f Pablo Neruda.
(New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1963), 149. See Appendix VIII for English version.
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Mientras tantos por los abismos
azucarados de los puertos,
caian indios sepultados
el el vapor de las manana:
un cuerpo rueda, una cosa
sin nombre, un numero caido
un racino de fruta muerta
derramada en el pudridero.
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APPENDIX II
Nicaragua Major Events Chronology

1523-24

Pedrarias forces from Panama complete conquest o f Nicaragua
Indigenous, and begin colonial occupation o f Nicaragua mostly in
the western third. The Roman Catholic Church begins its project to
convert the indigenous, and the various governors establish Spanish
authority, and the use o f the Spanish language. Nicaragua remains a
colony o f Spain until 1821.

1650s

British settlement forced from Providence to 1898 to M osquito
Coast; British buccaneers establish bases along Caribbean coast;
Great Britain makes Caribbean coast a de facto protectorate.

1821

Nicaragua declares independence from Spain

1823

Nicaragua joins United Provinces o f Central America confederation

1838

Nicaragua leaves confedeation

1860

British give up control o f Caribbean coast (Mosquitia) through
Clayton-Bulwar Treaty

1893

General Zelaya seizes power, moves to free Nicaragua as a United
States economic dependency

1909

U.S. Marines force Zelaya’s departure, and begin pattern o f
occupation

1912-25

U.S. Marines establish military bases in Nicaragua including
Caribbean coastal areas.

1927-33

General Anastasio Cesar Sandinio wages independent war against
U.S. forces, and Conservative party to establish rights o f peasants.

1934

General Sandino tricked into ambush after meeting with U.S.
Ambassador; assassinated by Somoza G arcia’s National Guard.
U.S. complicity?

1937

General Anastasio Somoza gains presidency in rigged election;
beginning o f forty-two year dynasty

1956

Somoza killed by leftist anarchist; presidency passes to his first son
Luis.
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1961

Sandinista Front established, modeled on Cuba revolution, and
named for Augustino Sandino

1967

Luis Somoza dies but not before making legitimate political reforms
including low-cost housing, and constitutional amendments to
present a Somoza family successor; Rene Schick Gutierrez assumes
presidency but dies soon afterward opening door for Anastasio
Somoza Debayle to assume presidency.

1972

Devastating earthquake destroys most o f Managua central area,
Somoza fails to effectively overcome problems, and opposition
mounts led by Sandinista elements.

1978

Pedro Chamorro, editor, and owner o f opposition newspaper, Ixi

Prensa, supported by business community, killed in ambush in
M anagua by unknown assailants believed to be led by Somoza
Debayle’s son.
1979

Organization o f American States condemns Somoza’s repressive
policies; Somoza flees country; FSLN consolidates power, and takes
control on July 19th after bloodless coup.

1980

Somoza killed in Paraguay in street ambush by unknown assailants
believed to be financed by the Sandinistas. United States begins
imposition o f economic sanctions.

1982

United States Central Intelligence Agency organizes “Contra”
military force to wage counter-revolution using Honduras as base o f
operations. Sandinistas declare state o f emergency.

1984

Daniel Ortega elected president in first election since the July 19th
victory. Sandinista government brings charges against United States
for violating international law in attacking sovereign state,
World Court finds in favor o f Nicaragua. United States ignores
World Court, and world opinion.

1987-88

Led by efforts o f Costa Rica president Oscar Arias, Nicaragua signs
armistice, holds talks with Contra forces, and deals with devastating
hurricane.

1990

Violeta Chamorro, wife o f Pedro Chamorro, wins national election
for presidency with a U.S. backed coalition o f parties. Begins
program o f reconciliation, and move toward market economy.
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1996

Former mayor o f Managua, Amoldo Aleman elected president in
October. He reverses much o f Cham orro’s legitimate policy
reforms for political favor in the old-time style o f populist. He takes
office in January 1997.

1998

Hurricane Mitch stalled over central, and western Nicaragua doing
major damage. International aids poured in including much from the
United States. Not unexpected, Aleman’s government siphoned o ff
much o f the aid for personal enrichment. Aleman, and his
Constitutionalist Liberal Party, and O rtega’s Sandinista Front
(FSLN) entered into a mutually supporting agreement known as the
“pacto .”

2000

The FSLN, despite its failure to win the presidency in 1996 wons a
significant majority in municipal elections.

2001

Aleman’s former vice president, Enrique Bolanos, elected
president, promised deep reforms to satisfy would-be international
benefactors. Aleman was charged with corruption, and stealing
approximately $100 million from government coffers.

2003

In December, Aleman was convicted o f corruption despite the
Sandinista influenced court system. After short period in jail he was
allowed to serve his his sentence in his luxurious country estate.

2004

In January, Nicaragua was rewarded for its reforms that were part
o f a Paris Club commitment to forgive substantial foreign debt, and
arrange for loans to rescue Nicaragua from its economic distress.
President Bolanos was credited with success o f his reforms;
however, political opposition from Aleman supporters, and the
Sandinista Front built quickly. Details o f goals, conditions and
provisions o f Paris Club commitment. Available
[Online]:http://www.clubdeparis. org/en/ presentation
/presentation.php? BATCH= B04WP04 [15 October 2005],
On 26 July, the anniversary date o f the Cuban Revolution, Russia
forgave Nicaragua’s foreign debt incurred to the former USSR.

2005

In mid-January, the Liberal Party influenced by Aleman and
O rtega’s Sandinista Front pacto attempt to unseat President
Bolanos through its domination o f the National Assembly. The
United Nations intervened; however, the efforts continued with
alternate strategies. The Organization o f American States
admonishment was weak and obscure in language to no effect.
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In mid-February the Sandinista Front, allied with the PLC
appointed judges and other officials, an enumerated reserved power
o f the executive branch (the president)under the Nicaraguan
Constitution
In mid-March, a rift developed between Aleman’s PLC supporters
and Daniel Ortega who apparently decided that the affiliation with
Aleman, a convicted embezzler, would not serve his presidential
aspirations for 2006. Likewise, Ortega distanced himself from
Managua Mayor Henry LeWites who he apparently viewed as a
potential competitor; Lewites was a former FSLN would-be
presidential candidate who began to make moves on his own to run
for the presidency. Lewites was expelled from the FSLN at the
instigation o f Daniel Ortega
In mid-March, apparently at the instigation o f the FSLN-controlled
FTN, public school teachers remained on strike for higher pay and
benefits. This served to further undermine Bolanos’ legitimacy.
In mid-April, FSLN Secretary General Daniel Ortega blocks
Managua Mayor Lewites from using the FSLN to initiate a run for
the presidency in 2008.
In May and June, Daniel Ortega with support from his majority in
the National Assembly attempt to change the Constitution to
remove some o f President Bolanos’ powers
In July, Danial Ortega, the FSLN and PLC residual from the preBolanos presidency in the National Assembly make a move to
establish a judiciary police (Office o f Procurator General in the
Soviet/Russian model) so that the legislature is able to enforce
changes in Bolanos’ executive powers.
2006

In January, Nicaragua, along with the other three Latin American
HIPC states fail to meet deadlines o f the World Bank and
International Fund to complete internal reforms required to receive
the next round o f assistane.
In January, the Nicaraguan judiciary engages in internal argument
as to whether Jorge Aleman should be released from confinement to
his country estate. The final decision will probably result in a
political showdown between Aleman’s former supporters and those
in the FSLN who support him, and President Enrique Bolanos
thereby further weakening Bolanos’ political strength.
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On 13 January, Eduardo Montealegre, a political novice, announces
his candidacy for the upcoming November presidential election for
the PLC As the former Nicaraguan comptroller general and a
voice against the pacto between the Aleman PLC supporters and
the FSLN, he believes that his moderate positions will prevail. In
effect, he becomes a challenger to the more left-leaning, would-be
presidential candidate Herty Lewites who formerly supported the
pacto but now disavows any affiliation to garner the more centrist
vote. In both cases, the candidates hope to capitalize on the residual
PLC vote that does not support the pacto, nor desires a return to a
Sandinista dominated government. Underlying all other political
posturing and activity is the enduring popularity o f Daniel Ortega
who may declare himself a presidential candidate for the November
2006 election
In February Daniel Ortega begins to calculate his chances o f
winning the presidency by making more frequent public
appearances.
In March, Daniel Ortega declares that were he to run, his platform
would account for the current situation (meaning Nicaragua’s
neoliberal circumstance) while focusing on the alleviation o f
poverty.
In mid-April, President Bolanos PLC party accuses Hugo Chavez’
government o f Venezuela o f interfering in the upcoming national
election in November by offering discounted petroleum to 87 o f the
153 Nicaraguan cities and towns headed by FSLN elected officials.
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APPENDIX III
Letter from Jamaica 18151
(Selections)

Reply o f a South American to a Gentleman o f this Island [Jamaica]
Kingston, Jamaica, September 6, 1815
My dear Sir:
I hasten to reply to the letter o f the 29th la s t. . . only conjectures that are more or
less approximate can be made, especially with regard to her future and the true plans o f
the Americans, because our continent has within it potential every facet o f development
revealed in the history o f nations,. . .
[Y]ou will certainly not find the brilliant thoughts you seek but rather a candid
statement o f my ideas.
Three centuries ago, you say, “began the atrocities committed by the Spaniards on
this great hemisphere o f Columbus.” Our age has rejected these atrocities as mythical,
because they appear to be beyond the human capacity for evil. M odem critics would never
credit them were it not for the many and frequent documents testifying to these horrible
truths. The humane Bishop o f Chiapas, that apostle o f America, Las Casas, has left to
posterity a brief description o f these horrors, extracted from the trial records in Sevilla
relating to the cases brought against the conquistadores and containing the testimony o f
every respectable person then in the New World. . . . Every impartial person has admitted
the zeal, sincerity and high character o f that friend o f humanity, who so fervently and so
steadfastly denounced to his government and to his contemporaries the most horrible acts
o f sanguinary frenzy.
With what a feeling o f gratitude I read that passage in your letter in which you say
to me: “I hope that the success which then followed Spanish arms may now turn in favor
o f their adversaries, the badly oppressed people o f South America.” . . . New Granada,
which is, so to speak, the heart o f America, obeys a general government, save for the
territory o f Quito which is held only with the greatest difficulty by its enemies, . . .
Most o f the men have perished rather than be slaves; those who survive continue
to fight furiously on the fields and in the inland towns, until they expire or hurl into the sea

‘Simon Bolivar, “Letter from Jamaica, 1815,” Translated by Lewis Bertrand in

Selected Writings o f Bolivar, (New York: The colonial Press Inc., 1951). Available
[Online]: http://www.college.emory.edu/culpeper/BAKEW ELL/thinksheets/thsh-bolivar
.html [14 March 2006],
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those who, insatiable in their thirst for blood and crimes, rival those first monsters who
wiped out America's primitive race.
Is Europe deaf to her own interests? Has she no eyes to see justice? Has she
grown so hardened as to become insensible9 The more I ponder these questions, the more
I am confused. I am led to think that America's disappearance is desired; but this is
impossible because all Europe is not Spain. What madness for our enemy to hope to
reconquer America when she has no navy, no funds and almost no soldiers! . . Assume
that this mad venture were successful and further assume that peace followed, would not
the sons o f the Americans o f today, together with the sons o f the European
reconquistadores twenty years hence, conceive the same patriotic designs that are now
being fought for?
. .
Europe herself, as a matter o f common sense policy, should have prepared and
executed the project o f American independence, not alone because the world balance o f
power so necessitated, but also because this is the legitimate and certain means through
which Europe can acquire overseas commercial establishments. . .
Generous souls always interest themselves in the fate o f a people who strive to
recover the rights to which the C reator and Nature have entitled them and one must
indeed be wedded to error and passion not to harbor this noble sentiment. You have given
thought to my country and are concerned in its behalf and for your kindness I am warmly
grateful. . . .
Moreover, the tribute paid by the Indians, the punishments o f the slaves, the first
fruits o f the harvest, tithes and taxes levied on farmers and other impositions have driven
the poor Americans from their homes. This is not to mention the war o f extermination that
has already taken a toll o f nearly an eighth part o f the population and frightened another
large part away. All in all, the difficulties are insuperable and the tally is likely to show
only half the true count. . . .
I look upon the present state o f America as similar to that o f Rome after its fall.
Each part o f Rome adopted a political system conforming to its interest and situation or
was led by the individual ambitions o f certain chiefs, dynasties, or associations. . . . But we
scarcely retain a vestige o f what once was, we are, moreover, neither Indian nor
European, but a species midway between the legitimate proprietors o f this country and the
Spanish usurpers. In short, though Americans by birth we derive our rights from Europe
and we have to assert these rights against the rights o f the natives and at the same time we
must defend ourselves against the invaders. . . .
How different is our situation! We have been harassed by a conduct which has not
only deprived us o f our rights but has kept us in a sort o f permanent infancy with regard to
public affairs. If we could at least have managed our domestic affairs and our internal
administration, we could have acquainted ourselves with the processes and mechanics o f
public affairs. . . . Americans . . . who live within the Spanish system occupy a position in
society no better than that o f serfs destined for labor, . . . this status is surrounded with
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galling restrictions, such as being forbidden to grow European crops, or to store products
which are royal monopolies, or to establish factories o f a type the Peninsula itself does not
possess. To this add the exclusive trading privileges, even in articles o f prime necessity
and the barriers between American provinces, designed to prevent all exchange o f trade,
traffic and understanding. In short, do you wish to know what our future held?—simply the
cultivation o f the fields o f indigo, grain, coffee, sugar cane, cacao and cotton; cattle raising
on the broad plains; hunting wild game in the jungles; digging in the earth to mine its
gold,but even these limitations could never satisfy the greed o f Spain.
So negative was our existence that I can find nothing comparable in any other
civilized society, examine as I may the entire history o f time and the politics o f all nations

Events in Costa Firme have proved that institutions which are wholly
representative are not suited to our character, customs and present knowledge. . . . [We]
are dominated by the vices that one learns under the rule o f a nation like Spain, which has
only distinguished itself in ferocity, ambition, vindictiveness and greed
It is harder, Montesquieu has written, to release a nation from servitude than to
enslave a free nation. This truth is proven by the annals o f all times, which reveal that most
free nations have been put under the yoke, but very few enslaved nations have recovered
their liberty. . . . But are we capable o f maintaining in proper balance the difficult charge
o f a republic? Is it conceivable that a newly emancipated people can soar to the heights o f
liberty and, unlike Icarus, neither have its wings melt nor fall into an abyss? Such a marvel
is inconceivable and without precedent. There is no reasonable probability to bolster our
hopes.
More than anyone, I desire to see America fashioned into the greatest nation in the
world, greatest not so much by virtue o f her area and wealth as by her freedom and glory.
. .1 think that the Americans, being anxious for peace, science, art, commerce and
agriculture, would prefer republics to kingdoms. . . .
It is a grandiose idea to think o f consolidating the New World into a single nation,
united by pacts into a single bond. It is reasoned that, as these parts have a common
origin, language, customs and religion, they ought to have a single government to permit
the newly formed states to unite in a confederation. But this is not possible. . . .
The states o f the Isthmus o f Panama as far as Guatemala, will perhaps form a
confederation. Because o f their magnificent position between two mighty oceans, they
may in time become the emporium o f the world. Their canals will shorten distances
throughout the world, strengthen commercial ties between Europe, America and Asia and
bring to that happy area tribute from the four quarters o f the globe. There some day,
perhaps, the capital o f the world may be located-reminiscent o f the Emperor Constantine's
claim that Byzantium was the capital o f the ancient world. . . .
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When success is not assured, when the state is weak and when results are distantly
seen, all men hesitate; opinion is divided, passions rage and the enemy fans these passions
in order to win an easy victory because o f them.........
Such, Sir, are the thoughts and observations that I have the honor to submit to
you, so that you may accept or reject them according to their merit. I beg you to
understand that I have expounded them because I do not wish to appear discourteous and
not because I consider myself competent to enlighten you concerning these matters.
I am, Sir, etc., etc.
SIMON BOLIVAR
[Spelling and translation errors in original]
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APPENDIX IV
Indices o f Inward Foreign Direct Investment

Nicaragua, Honduras and Costa Rica (Rank/score) 1990 to 2001
Rank/Score1

Nicaragua

Honduras

Costa Rica

1999-2001

14/2.9

55/1.1

72/0.9

1996-1998

10/4.5

70/1.3

40/2.1

1994-1996

26/3.4

62/1.6

33/2.7

1992-1994

33/2.7

60/1.6

30/3.1

1990-1992

36/2.6

47/2.0

23/3.5

Source: United Nations, InwardFDI Performance Index. (New York: United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development - UNCTAD, June 2005) Available [Online]:
http://www.unctad.org/TemplatesAVebFlyer. asp?intItemID=[5 June 2005], Latest data
available as o f June 2005. All data are based on 140 states.

‘The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development definition o f inward
FDI rank is the position o f a state relative to the FDI received compared to its economic
size; the score is the state’s FDI received relative to its share in the global GDP. Lower
rank number indicates higher position relative to other states; higher score indicates
greater FDI as a percentage o f GDP.
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APPENDIX V
Selected Comparative Indicators

Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica and
All HIPC Average (where available)
1999 Through 2003

Aid per capita
US$:
Nicaragua
Honduras
Costa Rica

GNI per capita
US$:
Nicaragua
Honduras
Costa Rica
HIPC

1999

2000

136
130
-2

111
70

710
770
3580
290

740
850
3820
280

2001

2002

2003

179
103

97
64
2

152
56
2

730
900
3980
280

730
910
4070
280

740
970
4300
300

FD1 inflow
US$/n:
Nicaragua
Honduras
Costa Rica

337.3
237.3
619 6

266.9
282.0
408.6

150.2
189.5
453.6

203.9
175.5
661.9

201.3
198.0
576.7

GDP current
US $/>:
Nicaragua
Honduras
Costa Rica
HIPC

3.7
5.4
15.7
144.0

3.9
5.9
15 9
139.7

4.0
6.3
16.3
144.3

4.0
6.5
16.8
154.2

4.0
6.9
17.4
176 9

Source: World Bank, "World Bank Development Data Base" (Washington, D C.: World
Bank, 2005), Available (Online) http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/SM Result.asp.
(19 June 2005). Missing data are not available from source.
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APPENDIX VI
Class Distribution In Nicaragua

1980

Thousands

Percent

19

0.4

Middle Bourgeoisie (Property
Owners)

384

9 1

Middle Peasants (Property
Owners)

54.5

13 0

Petit Bourgeoisie (property
owners)

71.4

170

4.0

1.0

Proletariat and semi-proletariat
(non-property owners)

177.3

42.2

Sub-proletariat (non-property
owners)

72.5

17.3

Large Bourgeoisie (Property
Owners)

Petit Bourgeoisie (non-property
owners)

Source: Jorge Handal Shafik and Carlos M Vilas, The Socialist Option in Central
America: Two Reassessments. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993), 47
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APPENDIX VII
To Roosevelt1
Ruben Dario, 1904

It is with the voice o f the Bible, or the verse o f Walt Whitman,
that I should come to you, Hunter,
primitive, and modern, simple, and complicated,
with something o f Washington, and more o f Nimrod.
You are the United States,
you are the future invader
o f the naive America that has Indian blood,
that still prays to Jesus Christ, and still speaks Spanish
You are the proud, and strong exemplar o f your race;
you are cultured, you are skillful; you oppose Tolstoy
And breaking horses, or murdering tigers,
you are an Alexander-Nebuchadnezzar
(You are a professor o f Energy
as today's madmen say.)
You think that life is fire,
that progress is eruption,
that wherever you shoot
you hit the future.
No!
The United States is potent, and great.
When you shake there is a deep temblor [earthquake]
that passes through the enormous vertebrae o f the, Andes.
If you clamor, it is heard like the roaring o f a lion
Hugo already said it to Grant; The stars are yours.
(The Argentine sun, ascending, barely shines,
and the Chilean star rises...) You are rich
You join the cult o f Hercules to the cult o f Mammon,
and illuminating the road o f easy conquest,
Liberty raises its torch in New York.

'Ruben Dario (pseud ), “A Roosevelt,” Translated by Bonnie Frederick. Casa
Poema Famous Poetry Collection. Available [Online]: http://judithpordon.tripod
com/poetry /id 184.html [27 July 2005],
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But our America, that has had poets
since the ancient times o f Netzahualcoyotl,
that has walked in the footprints o f great Bacchus
who learned Pan's alphabet at once;
that consulted the stars, that knew Atlantis
whose resounding name comes to us from Plato,
that since the remote times o f its life
has lived on light, on fire, on perfume, on love,
America o f the great Montezuma, o f the Inca,
the fragrant America o f Christopher Columbus,
Catholic America, Spanish America,
the America in which noble Cuahtemoc said:
“I'm not in a bed o f roses”; that America
that trembles in hurricanes, and lives on love,
it lives, you men o f Saxon eyes, and barbarous soul.
And it dreams., and it loves, and it vibrates, and it is the daughter o f the Sun.
Be careful. Viva Spanish America!
There are a thousand cubs loosed from the Spanish lion
Roosevelt, one would have to be, through God himself,
the-fearless [correction in translation] Rifleman, and strong Hunter,
to manage to grab us in your iron claws.
And, although you count on everything, you lack one thing:
God!
A Roosevelt2
(Original Spanish)
Es con voz de la Biblia, o verso de Walt Whitman,
Y domando caballos, o asesinando tigres,
eres un Alejandro-Nabucodonosor.
(Eres un profesor de energia,
como dicen los locos de hoy.)
Crees que la vida es incendio,
que el progreso es eruption;
en donde pones la bala
el porvenir pones.
jNo!

2Ruben Dario, “Casa Poema Famous Poetry Collection,” Available [Online]:
http://judithpordon.tripod.com/poetry/ idl84.htm l [26 July 2005],
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Los Estados Unidos son potentes y grandes
Cuando ellos se estremecen hay un hondo temblor
que pasa por las vertebras enormes de los, Andes.
Si clamais, se oye como el rugir del leon.
Ya Hugo a Grant le dijo: «Las estrellas son vuestras».
(Apenas brilla, alzandose, el argentino sol
y la estrella chilena se levanta...) Sois ricos.
Juntais al culto de Hercules el culto de Mammon,
y alumbrando el camino de la facia conquista,
la Libertad levanta su antorcha en Nueva York.
Mas la America nuestra, que tenia poetas
desde los viejos tiempos de Netzahualcoyotl,
que ha guardado las huellas de los pies del gran Baco,
que el alfabeto panico en un tiempo aprendio;
que consulto los astros, que conocio la Atlantida,
cuyo nombre nos llega resonando en Platon,
que desde los remotos momentos de su vida
vive de luz, de fiiego, de perfume, de amor,
la America del gran Moctezuma, del Inca,
la America fragante de Cristobal Colon,
la America catolica, la America espanola,
la America en que dijo el noble Guatemoc:
«Yo no estoy en un lecho de rosas»; esa America
que tiembla de huracanes y que vive de Amor,
hombres de ojos sajones y alma barbara, vive.
Y suena. Y ama, y vibra; y es la hija del Sol.
Tened cuidado. jVive la America espanola!
Hay mil cachorros sueltos del Leon Espanol.
Se necesitaria, Roosevelt, ser Dios mismo,
el Riflero terrible y el fiierte Cazador,
para poder tenemos en vuestras ferreas garras
Y, pues contais con todo, falta una cosa:
jDios!
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APPENDIX VIII
The United Fruit Company1
Pablo Neruda, 1954

When the trumpet sounded all
was prepared on the earth
and Jehova divided his universe
Coca-Cola, Inc., Anaconda,
Ford Motors, and other entities:
the United Fruit Company, Inc.
reserved for itself the heartland
and coast o f my country, the delectable waist o f America.
They rechristened their property the “Banana Republics”
and over the languished dead,
the uneasy repose o f the heroes
who harried that greatness,
their flags and their freedom,
they established an Opera Bufa:
they relished all enterprises,
Trujillo the fly,2
Tacho the fly,
the flies called Carias, Martinez, Ubico
all o f them flies, flies dank with the blood o f their marmalade vassalage, flies
buzzing drunkenly on the populous middens:
the fly-circus fly
and the scholarly kind,
case-hardened in tyranny.
Then in the bloody domain o f the flies
The United Fruit Company, Incorporated unloaded with
a booty o f coffee and fruits brimming its cargo boats,
gliding like trays with
the spoils o f our drowning dominions
And all the while,

’Pablo Neruda. “The United Fruit Company.” Selected Poems o f Pablo Neruda.
(New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1963), 149.Complete content, slight reformatting for fit.
Free verse; stanzas are intact. See Appendix I for original Spanish-language version.
2Referring to Anastasio Somoza Garcia (Tacho I) and other Latin American
dictators o f the time.
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somewhere, in the
sugary hells o f our seaports,
smothered by gases,
an Indian fell in the morning; a body spun off,
an anonymous chattel,
some numeral tumbling,
a branch with its death
running out o f it
in the vat o f the carrion,
fruit laden and foul.
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MAP PLATE 1

Nicaragua
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Source: United Nations Cartographic Section. Political map o f Nicaragua. Available
[Online]: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map /profile/nicaragu.pdf [15 October
2005],
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M AP PLATE 2

Central America and the Caribbean Basin
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Source: World Fact Book 2005. Available [Online]: http://ww w .cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/referencem aps/centralam erica.htm l [15 October 2005]
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